أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور

أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا



تدعو رابطة دارفور بكندا جميع التنظيمات والأحزاب السياسية السودانية والمهتمين بالشأن السودانى وحقوق الإنسان المشاركة فى المسيرة الضخمة التى تنطلق يوم الأحد الموافق 17 /9/2006 فى تمام الساعة الثانية ظهراً بمدينة تورنتو بالتزامن مع مسيرات مماثلة فى أكثر من 15 بلداً حول العالم بعنوان( اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور ). يشارك فى المسيرة لفيف من قادة العمل المدنى والسياسى الكندى ومنظمات حقوق الإنسان والمنظمات الطلابية لمقاطعة أونتاريو.
يخاطب المسيرة السيناتور روميو دالارى والسيد جستن ترودو نجل رئيس الوزراء الكندى السابق بالأضافة لممثلى التنظيمات الاخري المشاركة.



المكان: Ramsden Park Young Street North of Bloor across from Rosedale subway


للأستفسار يرجى الاتصا ل ب:
هاملتون: تلفون 9055295213
تورنتو:416724099



عن رابطة دارفوربكندا: محمد حسن هارون

*****

*

Global Day for Darfur Canadian Unity Statement

Protect Darfur NOW: Time is Running Out

September 17, 2006

I. Security

á Strengthen the African Union peacekeeping force in the near term

The African Union (AU) forces in Darfur are under-funded, undermanned and need significant help now. The AU simply does not have the capacity to end the violence and protect the people of Darfur, but until a stronger UN force can be deployed, they are the only game in town. Canada must lead the international community to offer the AU immediate financial support or more civilians will die as a result.



á Transition to a stronger UN peacekeeping force as soon as possible

The United Nations has been slowly progressing towards a peacekeeping force for Darfur for many months now. The people of Darfur ö especially women and girls who are victim of intense sexual and gender-based violence - cannot be made to wait any longer. The UN Security Council has passed a resolution authorizing a UN peacekeeping force for Darfur with a strong mandate to protect civilians. Canada must use all its diplomatic clout to insure this force is deployed as soon as possible.



II. Humanitarian Aid

á Increased aid levels

Earlier this year, food rations in Darfur were cut in half due to lack of funding. They have since been raised to 2/3 of the UNâs minimum daily level, but shortfalls continue to mean that men, women, and children are going hungry. Canada and the international community need to make sure that the humanitarian aid life support system that has kept millions of civilians alive in Darfur does not break down due to lack of resources.

á Humanitarian access

Food and medicine alone cannot save lives if they donât get to the people who need them. Canada must work with the international community to maintain diplomatic pressure to ensure that humanitarian organizations retain unfettered access to all who need their help.



III. Peace Process

á Implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement

The signing on May 5 of the Darfur Peace Agreement was a step towards peace, but by no means a final one. For the agreement to become more than just another failed ceasefire, it is imperative that strong and sustained international pressure be brought to bear in order to ensure that;

O all parties to the agreement, and in particular the Khartoum government, live up to their responsibilities, including the verified disarming of the Janjaweed militias; and that

O all who hinder the peace process through violent action are held accountable for their actions; and that

O the Darfurian people are brought fully into an inclusive Darfur-Darfur dialogue to continue the ongoing peace process.

In order to ensure that the required pressure is maintained, Secretary General Annan should immediately appoint a UN Special Envoy for Darfur to compel implementation, and if necessary strengthening, of the agreement.



Canada must lead the international community with a sense of urgency, committing resources and making Darfur a top diplomatic priority, to ensure a strong UN force is deployed to protect civilians in Darfur. Canada must uphold the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect, a Canadian initiative adopted by the UN, which mandates the international community to protect innocent civilians from extreme harm when a sovereign nation is unable or unwilling to do so.

Why Darfur was left to its pitiful fate

By David Blair

(Filed: 05/09/2006)(i.e., Sep 5, 06 in American dating system)

As helicopter gunships and Antonov bombers sweep across the rugged plains of Darfur, striking villages at will, Sudan's emboldened regime must scent victory. When it comes to spurning international pressure and exposing the vacuity of Western rhetoric, President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan has proved himself a master.

More than two years after Colin Powell, then America's secretary of state, declared the civil war in western Sudan a "genocide" - and after the passage of no fewer than 11 UN resolutions on Darfur - Mr Bashir feels confident enough to launch yet another offensive. At this moment, his forces are laying waste to villages and forcing more families into squalid refugee camps.

Mr Bashir has made a fool of the West. The fighting now raging in North Darfur province, near the local capital of El Fasher, compares with the heaviest since the war began in 2003. UN officials expect it to escalate, for Khartoum is pouring more troops into the area. Mr Bashir, a dour, harsh and unscrupulous general who seized power in a coup 17 years ago, must scarcely believe his good fortune. How has he managed it?
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First, a brief look at how we reached this juncture. When Darfur's war broke out, Mr Bashir's Arab-dominated regime faced a grave threat from black African rebels. He could not trust his regular army to suppress this challenge, because most of its rank-and-file were recruited in Darfur and hailed from the same tribes as the insurgents.

So he relied on the notorious Janjaweed militias. These mounted gunmen, drawn from Khartoum's traditional allies among Darfur's Arab tribes, were given carte blanche to pillage the regime's enemies. This dealt the rebels a heavy blow - but also forced two million into refugee camps. The result was an avalanche of international condemnation.

In the summer of 2004, one Western foreign minister after another visited Darfur and spoke words of grave concern. Mr Powell went so far as to accuse Khartoum of carrying out a genocidal campaign, targeted largely on the Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit tribes. He was probably wrong: a UN investigation later ruled that genocide had not taken place. There is no evidence that Mr Bashir intended to eradicate these tribes - and proving genocide turns on whether one party intended to destroy a specific ethnic group.

Yet for a few months in 2004, Sudan felt the full glare of international scrutiny and a succession of UN resolutions followed. Resolution 1556 demanded that Sudan disarm the Janjaweed by August 30, 2004. Mr Bashir solemnly pledged to do so. Four months earlier, Sudan had signed a ceasefire agreement. In December 2004, it promised to ground its warplanes.

It scarcely needs to be said that Khartoum ignored each of these deals. But Mr Bashir never felt strong enough to reject them out of hand. In public, he bowed to every UN resolution and promised obedience, even if his behaviour exposed the mendacity of his words. Contrast this with his response to the Security Council's latest missive on Darfur. Resolution 1706, passed last Thursday, called for the deployment of a fully fledged peacekeeping force in Darfur, consisting of 17,300 troops and 3,300 civilian police.

But the newly emboldened Mr Bashir reacted with scorn. After spending months accusing the UN of "plotting" to "re-colonise" Sudan, he gathered his cabinet on Sunday and announced a "decisive rejection" of the resolution, urging his country to prepare "for the confrontation" with the UN. The unpalatable fact is that Mr Bashir has been watching the West since the onset of Darfur's agony and believes he can get away with almost anything.

In fact, the miscalculations of Western governments have actually strengthened him. Instead of placing pressure on Khartoum, they chose to sponsor a wholly ineffective African Union force of 5,000 troops and 2,000 civilians to Darfur - which made no impact.

The West also backed an endless round of peace talks between Khartoum and Darfur's rebels in Nigeria's capital, Abuja. In retrospect, this was probably the most disastrous move of all. The outcome of the talks was a half-baked peace agreement concluded in May. Mr Bashir's regime signed the deal - but the rebel movement split over whether to follow suit. One faction of the rebel Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), dominated by the minority Zaghawa tribe, signed up. But another SLA group, drawn from the much larger Fur tribe, refused to follow. So Mr Bashir's enemies tore themselves to bits, thanks largely to a peace deal mediated by Hilary Benn, the International Development Secretary, and Robert Zoellick, then America's deputy secretary of state.

This deeply flawed agreement also gave the regime an opening to buy off Minni Minawi, the Zaghawa leader, making him "special adviser" on Darfur affairs. Mr Minawi's rebels, now allied with the Khartoum regime, will fight alongside Mr Bashir's army in the offensive against their former comrades. This has given Khartoum the confidence to launch the new offensive. Having withstood the pressure of 2004 and seen his rebel enemies obligingly fall apart, Mr Bashir feels under no pressure from the West.

What should have been done? Instead of waiting until last Thursday, a resolution calling for peacekeepers should have been passed in 2004. That was the moment to call for an international force, backed by a robust mandate allowing the protection of civilians. Instead of using Sudan's moment of maximum weakness, the West dithered for two years. Mr Bashir weighed his opponents in the balance and found them wanting. Tragically, the resolution was eventually passed at the hour of his greatest strength - and the people of Darfur are paying the price.

Version of Darfur song


BILAD AL- SUDAN (Sudan's name in Arabic: "Land of the Blacks")

(To the tune of "Sweet Betsy from Pike," an old American folk tune

(explanatory footnotes will be in the final draft distributed with the score)

Oh, have you heard tell of Bilad-al-Sudan
I'll tell you its story as quick as I can
At the end of the Eighties there came a big coup
And the worst of the suffering would quickly ensue

CPA, DPA
Our justice and freedom and peace signed away

The mountains of Nuba resisted Bashir
He taught them a lesson so others would fear
His armies burned churches and murdered imams
The skies were all lit up with bullets and bombs

CPA, CIA
So Salah Abdallah good Gosh got his way

Divide them to conquer was the word in Khartoum
For non-Arab peoples this land has no room
Baggara and Dinka they once had been friends
But Bashir now drove them to serve different ends


CPA, break away
Our friends in the North and the West to betray

The kingdom of Shilluk was next on the list
The power of Khartoum it dared to resist
The troops and planes swept through in April '04
To genocide's victims was added one more

CPA, DPA
"Leave no other culture to stand in our way"

China, Malaysia, they came to their well
And Talisman drooled over what they could sell
But then they encountered a problem from hell
When hit by the lawsuits from David and Mel

CPA, in the way
The pipeline sucks all of their scruples away

Rashidi Free Lions arose in the East
They threatened the source of the wealth of the Beast
The goldmines and pipelines and fees from the Port
Brought Antonov bombers to cut their lives short

CPA, DPA
They search all the time for a trust to betray

So Salah and Taha just kept to their plan
Split Arab, non Arab, set clan against clan
Use Beja to fight the Zaghawa and Fur
And gunships to zap Massaleit and Tunjur

DPA, CIA
Let Salah Abdallah good Gosh get his way

Darfuris had always by Khartoum been screwed
Neglect to protect and deliver no food
And keep them away from the North and South deal
"They'd find out how much we intended to steal"

CPA, giveaway
Impunity goes with the Unity way

Then Colin and Kofi expressed their concern
It sure wasn't nice for a people to burn
The White House was angry, UN resolute
The janjaweed just had to turn in their loot

DPA, rue the day
Political cowardice got in the way

The UN deplored the reports from Sudan
They said "we will help just as much as we can"
We'll tell Mr. Bashir just what we will do
We'll send in our watchdogs, the mighty AU.

If we may, not today
In sending peacekeepers there's always delay

The African Union they trickled in men
While begging for money again and again
Hapless and helpless, no radios, tanks
So victims were ready to give them no thanks

Look away, never say
How bad is the slaughter you see every day

The AU sent Steidle to witness the doom
Came back with the goods on the boys in Khartoum
This angered their friends in Department of State
They warned him his photos would seal his fate

DPA, that's our way
"The price of its flaws let all Darfuris pay"

Canadians pleaded that this had to stop
Paul Martin made speeches right over the top
But when all their offers Khartoum did reject
They gave up the notion that they could protect

R2P, Not For Me
We might really have to fight for it, you see

A rescue by NATO was victims' fond hope
But soon the objections emerged from De Hoop Jaap De Hoop Scheffer
Their stewardship should have meant troops on the ground
With weapons to match GoS round for round

Let's all pray
Save the day
Get fat in Abuja while kids waste away

But Omar the Basher said "be on your guard!"
He pictured Sudan as the white man's graveyard
The crowd in the streets loved his screaming and threat
Made diplomats', counselors' pants go all wet


Gave the nod
To jihad
To fight the protectors of Muslims, by god!


Slovenians sent out their Tomo Kriznar
Journalist, filmmaker, peacemaking star
But when he discovered the facts of their crime
They put him in prison for quite a long time

The AU
Said "you're through"
"Khartoum will soon give you some hard time to do"

A colored mosaic is our human race
The shape of its tiles gives our peoples a face
Diminish one culture reduces us all
So lets take our weapons and answer the call
Let us swear
That we dare
Bash Bashir mash Musa to show that we care

@

***

الأخ بكري عبدالله ( و رابطة أبناء دارفور بكندا )
لكم التحايا و الإحترام

أهو كده الكلام ... أقصد العمل ...
ليكن نشاطكم مسموعا و معروفا في كل أركان الدنيا ...
فنحن نعيش في زمن العولمة و الخبر اللحظي .
قضية درافور بفعل الإعلام العالمي قد حشرت حكومة المركز في جحر لا تستطيع الخروج منه بلا محاسبة .
و لنسمو فوق خلافاتنا ... فهي خلافات وسائل .. لا خلافات أهداف .

'

الأخ محمدين شكرا على المرور ولك التحية.


'

الأخ محجوب(Dorsheed) شكرا على دفع البوست.

Quote: أهو كده الكلام ... أقصد العمل ... ليكن نشاطكم مسموعا و معروفا في كل أركان الدنيا ... فنحن نعيش في زمن العولمة و الخبر اللحظي . قضية درافور بفعل الإعلام العالمي قد حشرت حكومة المركز في جحر لا تستطيع الخروج منه بلا محاسبة . و لنسمو فوق خلافاتنا ... فهي خلافات وسائل .. لا خلافات أهداف .

الأخ العزيز محمد سليمان
شكرا على المرور
نحن هناوناشطون كثر نعمل معا بتناسق وانسجام تام, نحن نؤمن بالمحصلة النهائية, ولذا تجدنا نفضل العمل فى صمت تام, Low profile.
الأخ محمد سليمان اتمنى ان تدرك حجم العمل الذى يقوم به اخوة لك هنا. ولا يساورنى ادنى شك بأنكم وكل اخوتنا فى انحاء المعمورة تبذلون كل ما هو غالى من اجل اهلنا المغلوب على امرهم.
"

Quote: و لنسمو فوق خلافاتنا ...

" دأبت فئة معينة فى الآونة الخيرة على اخراج مجموعة كندا كانها منظومة متنافرة. وللتاريخ هذا ليس صحيحا وانا افتخر واعتز بمجموعة الإخوة التى اعيش وسطها هنا من دارفورين . ومهما كان هنالك من خلاف فى الأهداف فالود دائما محفوظ.
اتركك على عافية ولك تحية الثورة.

Quote: 0 all parties to the agreement, and in particular the Khartoum government, live up to their responsibilities, including the verified disarming of the Janjaweed militias; and that O all who hinder the peace process through violent action are held accountable for their actions; and that O the Darfurian people are brought fully into an inclusive Darfur-Darfur dialogue to continue the ongoing peace process. In order to ensure that the required pressure is maintained, Secretary General Annan should immediately appoint a UN Special Envoy for Darfur to compel implementation, and if necessary strengthening, of the agreement.

Quote: نحن هناوناشطون كثر نعمل معا بتناسق وانسجام تام, نحن نؤمن بالمحصلة النهائية, ولذا تجدنا نفضل العمل فى صمت تام, Low profile.

الحَبِيّبْ بَكرِي .
لَكَ أنبَلْ التَحَايا.
القَضِيّه تِستاهلْ عَمَلْ مُخلِصْ..
تَعطِيّهُ اليَْداليُمني بِدونْ عِلمْ اليُسرَي!

'
ألأخ محمد آدم
شكرا على المرور.

***

Hello Bakri,

The phone number is missing one digit
Can you please update that line

Mahjob

thank you Mahjop
-----------------------------------------------


For more details please contact the following numbers:-,l

1- Metro Toronto area: 416 724-0992
2- 5213 529 905 :Niagra, Hamilton Wentworth

@

قلبنا على دارفور
لكم كل التحايا...





Haggam

فووق ... سيكون يوما حافلاً بإذن الله
أرجو أن يحرص الجميع على الحضور
والشكر لبكرى و الذى يعمل بصمت و بنكران ذات

ندوة سياسية كبري (( تداعيات القرار 1706 السلبيات والايج...ت )) يوم 17/9/2006م

Up

^
^^
^^^

العزيز بكري والاخوة برابطة دارفور

كامل دعمي لكم


شمس الدين السنوسي

ندوة سياسية كبري (( تداعيات القرار 1706 السلبيات والايج...ت )) يوم 17/9/2006م
ندوة سياسية كبري (( تداعيات القرار 1706 السلبيات والايج...ت )) يوم 17/9/2006م

المحترم شمس الدين السنوسي

شكرا على المرور وفى انتظاركم يوم 17 سبتمبر.

*

THREE-PART PLAN FOR DARFUR
(Public Version)
Updated 9 Sept 2006

John Weiss and Elvir Camdzic

I. THE CURRENT CONTEXT
A. Since the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement(DPA) at the beginning of May, not a single Darfuri civilian has been given peace.
B. Violent attacks by armed groups, especially government-supported militias, have increased, by some accounts to double their pre-signing level. This has prompted an accelerating departure of major humanitarian aid organizations. Armed groups from rebel factions who signed the agreement have also repeatedly attacked civilian supporters of factions who refused to sign.
C. Major riots against the signing of the DPA have occurred in the large IDP camps. Inhabitants of the camps, inside Darfur and in Chad, have always favored strong interventions, by NATO, the US, or a seriously empowered and equipped UN force. But few would-be rescuers or policy analysts take into account the expressed wishes of these victims.
D. Four months after the signing, the Bashir government has moved into the final phase of its Final Solution, accompanying its rejection of UN resolution 1706 of 1 Sep 06, which “invited” the GoS to accept a UN role in Darfur, with a full court press of indiscriminate bombing, burning, raping and expulsion. .
E. White House sources stated to the authors of this Three-Part Plan that if Canada took on a lead role in the resolution of the Darfur problem, “that would get a lot of welcome at the Presidential level”

II. OVERVIEW OF THE PLAN
The Plan presented below seeks to achieve goals similar to those outlined in the failing DPA. It can thus be seen as a way of bringing about an atmosphere of security in Darfur and the restoration of its cultures, administration, and civil society but without requiring the voluntary cooperation of the Bashir Government (GoS). In fact, the implementers of this Three-Part Plan would welcome the assistance of the UN, the AU, and NATO, but the Plan can succeed without the cooperation of any of them.

This Plan to end the destruction of lives and cultures in Darfur has three elements:
A. Two sets of Darfur-Darfur conversations, protected deliberations among Darfuris. The first would produce an Interim Administration and a road map for the establishment of security and an accountable government in Darfur. The second, convened after elections and broad based consultations, would constitute a Darfur Regional Government.
B . An Implementation Force that would work in close coordination with that Interim Administration to establish the security necessary for returns to the sites of villages and the support of a relaunching of Darfuri society


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C. A Dual Purpose No-Fly Zone to neutralize the forces threatening the security of Darfur, especially the GoS and its associated militias, Popular Defense Forces, police, and other operatives.

III. PROTECTED DELIBERATIONS

Attendees and facilitators

The first conference of Darfuri leaders would construct a unified Interim Administration for the entire affected region. Canadians would play a lead role in selecting the attendees after consultations with various experts and political figures. They would also facilitate the deliberations with technical/logistical support and procedural counsel. The “road map” meetings in Bonn in December 2001 in which Afghan leaders participated under UN sponsorship provide an instructive example.
This “road map” meeting would be attended by a range of Darfuri leaders extending well beyond those assembled at the peace talks in Abuja: tribal authorities from Arab and non-Arab tribes, leaders of civic organizations, key religious figures, delegates from the Darfuri Diaspora, and militia leaders. It would be especially important to include leaders who have emerged from the social structures that have constituted themselves in the camps: sheikhs, imams, representatives of women’s self-help groups. Ranking Sudanese employees of non-Sudanese humanitarian organizations should also be invited to attend, perhaps as non-voting members.

Representatives of the Khartoum Government, however, including
governors, other administrators, military officers, and security personnel, must be excluded. Their record of subverting, disrupting, manipulating, and delaying negotiations to which they are a party necessitates this exclusion. For the same reasons representatives of the Libyan, Chadian, and Egyptian governments must be excluded.
The constitution of an accountable and representative Darfur Regional Government will take some time and will be the result of both elections and consultations with traditional authorities guided by the outline of the process drawn up at the road map meeting. Not surprisingly, the Bosnian, Afghan, Kosovar, Iraqi, and Congolese cases give useful lessons yielding both commonalities and differences. The Afghan loya jirga has been an especially influential case.

Only when the citizens and stakeholders have successfully inaugurated their own institutions of a Darfur Regional Government and a degree of security permitting returns to village sites has been established would the central government in Khartoum be contacted in order to address such matters as the use of the common infrastructure (e.g., the rail line from Port Sudan), the distribution of revenues, the structure of the national educational system, and other subjects of concern to an authentically federal state.



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The DPA also contains provisions for a Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC). In this DPA case, however, the decisions of the conference would have no legal status: they would only be advisory. The “consultations” would in fact be discussions of decisions already taken by Government authorities or of proposals already formulated. It is hard to imagine that the Bashir government would take seriously any comments made by the parties doing the responding.

Venue

In the first version of this Plan, drawing upon the Bonn precedent, it was recommended that the road map meeting be held outside Darfur . However, given the need for the quickest possible convening of such a meeting, it may be possible to hold such a meeting within Darfur and still to isolate it from destructive outside influence and manipulation. In the case of the negotiations of November 1995 leading to the Dayton Peace Agreement that ended the Bosnian conflict, a set of small buildings at the edge of Wright-Patterson Air Force Base provided a productive location that was isolated and guarded with relative ease. A similar complex might be created at the edge of the El Fashir or Nyala airfields, or possibly also on the grounds of the El Obeid Airport just outside Darfur in Kordofan. Military engineers or private contractors from any of several industrialized countries could construct and equip a suitable set of temporary buildings in less than a week’s time, as is demonstrated by their performance in many humanitarian emergencies.

Securing the Venue
[Send request to [email protected]]



IV. IMPLEMENTATION FORCE

It is clear that no military or police forces now exist within Darfur (or all of Sudan, for that matter) suitable for implementing the decisions of the Interim Administration. An international force with advanced military capabilities will thus be required. In order to establish the required atmosphere of security, the implementation force will need to carry out a number of difficult and risky assignments, the need for which will command quick agreement among a substantial number of the leaders assembled at the road map meeting: the disarmament, arrest, or neutralization of the most dangerous militia units, GoS forces and rebel formations; the enforcement of the ban on flights by Government helicopter gunships and bombers; reconnaissance aimed at mapping areas of rebel and Government control; the collection of records of violations and violators from AU repositories in El Fashir and Nyala; insuring that the Khartoum government does not impede the flow of humanitarian aid.
The indispensable task of protecting civilians also entails risks and difficulties. Any military commander tasked with protecting civilians, however, cannot limit his unit’s activities to guarding perimeters and escort duty. To accomplish his mission with
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due regard for the safety of his own troops, as well as those he is charged to protect, he must take proactive measures to reduce substantially the sources of the threat. In short, he must be prepared for extended combat with well-armed adversaries.


Staffing the Implementation Force will be a principal concern of the Canadian-American teams seeking to carry out this Plan. In the months after Darfur gained world attention in early 2004 Britain and Australia offered to send troops to a humanitarian intervention. NATO reportedly offered to send troops but was turned down by the African Union with the now-discredited slogan “African Solutions for African Problems.” Canadian General Romeo Dallaire has called for a coalition of “middle powers” such as Canada, Germany, Italy, and Japan to intervene to protect civilians, not just to monitor and verify. Respected political analysts have claimed that France would be willing to send a contingent. Slovenia and Denmark have expressed dissatisfaction with the level of concern evinced by their European Union partners and have advocated stronger action. Turkey and South Korea have also been mentioned. Bosnian military specialists are now serving in international missions outside Bosnia; they would seem especially appropriate troops since, like the Rwandans, they have experience the kind of atrocity crimes that have occurred in Darfur since 2003. Finally, AU members with troops already deployed in Darfur such as Rwanda, Ghana, and Senegal might be willing to participate in the expanded mission.


V. THE DUAL-PURPOSE NO-FLY ZONE

The Government of Sudan will express violent opposition to the intrusion upon their sovereignty inherent in this Plan. “Spontaneous” demonstrations of 100,000 in the streets of Khartoum will be fed racist, jihadist, jingoist, and hyperbolic threats to react to the arrival of any intervention force with measures against this “Northern crusade” that will make Darfur a “graveyard” where the crusaders will die in “rivers of blood.” At the very least the GoS will demand an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council --unless that Council happened to be the authorizing agent of the intervention in the first place.

Practical measures the GoS might take to prevent the implementation of the Plan would include arrests of potential participants in the road map meeting; the shutting down of telephone and cell phone relay towers, an action that reliably paralyzes the AU forces who have few radios; the taking of internationals as hostages; and attacks by GoS forces on humanitarian organizations, IDP camps, and advance units of the Implementation Force.
A No-Fly Zone, which could make its presence felt within a very short period of time, could act as a counter to such contemplated GoS moves by posing three kinds of credible retaliatory threats:
1. To GoS assets such as its aircraft and missile sites

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2. To the Government’s authority by making it lose face as a state unable to respond to “forceful monitoring” by aggressive fly-overs anywhere in the country.
3. To troop and militia formations in Darfur itself.

As the only state with the weapons and transport capability to project power globally, the United States would form the core of this No-Fly Zone. Other coalition partners could also join in support after the initial phases of the operation, as occurred in the Bosnian and Kosovar cases and in Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq. America’s specialized surveillance and target acquisition aircraft (AWACS), special operations transport aircraft, anti-anti-aircraft missile systems, Stealth weapons systems, and satellite tactical capabilities are not yet fully engaged in other theaters. High-ranking sources within the American defense establishment have assured the authors that a no-fly zone is well within the operational capability of the USAF.
The no-fly zone could establish threat #1 above most easily if the Sudanese tested the enforcement of ths zone as did Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein. Sudan’s expensive fleet of at least twelve MIG-21s would be at considerable risk of reduction.
The no-fly zone could establish threat #2 above by means of the striking way military aircraft can establish their intrusive and unstoppable presence. The AWACs and other surveillance aircraft usually fly at a relatively high altitude. To someone on the ground they are barely noticeable. But fully loaded fighter-bombers can use a pattern of relatively low-level flights producing a variety of impressive, attitude-changing acoustical effects, from rolling sonic booms to a deep, long-lasting roar tht seems to dwell on the horizon for many minutes. Air Force planners understand the techniques for mapping and
maximizing the psychological effects of such flyovers, whether over a janjaweed
base, an IDP camp, or a politically vital urban agglomeration such as the capital, Khartoum, or its sister across the river, Omdurman.
The no-fly zone would establish credible threat #3 above by providing the “close air support” demanded by Kofi Annan in his list of requirements for the
success of any UN intervention in Darfur. Ad hoc coalition ground troops charged by the Darfuri Interim Administration with peace enforcment operations would also need such support. Armored, low-flying aircraft of the A-10 “Warthog” type would be effective against militias mounted on horses or camels as well as against armored personnel carriers or trucks armed with machine guns. Precision-guided munitions (PGMs) delivered by aircraft based at Djibouti, on carriers in the Red Sea, or at French-operated bases in Chad could be effective against fixed GoS positions such as the militia barracks (and headquarters of janjaweed leader Musa Hilal) at Misteriha or the helicopter gunship port at El Geneina.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

The UN Role

President Bashir will react to the final application of UN pressure, a Security Council demand for a UN role in Darfur, in one of three ways:
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1. He will refuse again to allow any UN role whatsoever.
In this case, the Three-Part Plan may be implemented immediately.The UN may be requested to take charge of its implementation, but in the anticipation of the rejection of that request the US and Canada can be expected to mobilize an ad hoc coalition already put together in anticipation of such a refusal.
2. He will “relent” and permit blue-hatted troops to enter Darfur, but with only a Chapter 6 observe-and-monitor mandate and a side agreement by the UN to collect no information about individual war criminals. .
The authors of this Plan consider this move to still be a possibility. It is clearly unacceptable and has zero probability of advancing the DPA or reducing the suffering of the victim population. If the UN accepted it, the US and Canada should explain their reasons for rejecting it and proceed to the implementation of the Three-Part plan.
3. He will accept a Chapter 7 intervention with a protection mandate and the authorization to use force. In the months since a strategy meeting held in Washington on 4 November 2005 almost all the organizations grouped in the Save Darfur Coalition and certain other activist groups have come to agree that this intervention action is the one to advocate. Should an adequately equipped and trained UN force genuinely capable of protection(in the military sense described above) and reconstruction actually appear in sufficient force in Darfur, hope that the genocide may be stopped will find some real measure of justification.
But that such a force will appear at all in the western Sudan is highly
unlikely, that it will appear quickly enough to spare the victims at least six more months of suffering is impossible. The UN’s own estimates place the arrival of a fully permitted protection force at January 2007 at the earliest.
In the event of a UN protection force agreement by Sudan, we thus propose the immediate implementation of the Three-Part Plan as a “bridging force” --a concept first introduced in the International Crisis Group’s Briefing on Darfur of July 2005 --to bridge the gap between the end of the failed AU mission (i.e., now) and the arrival of a mission-capable UN force.

Public Diplomacy and Media Relations
The political nature of both the goal of Darfur policy and the tactics used to accomplish those goals must be kept in mind at all times. Resources invested in the management of the road map meeting, the support of the Interim Administration, and the political empowerment of Darfuri citizens must at least equal those invested in the military aspects. As an example of just one such political consideration, the elimination of the hundreds of ways the GoS impedes and exploits the delivery of humanitarian aid must be seen as a necessary result of the forced reduction of its power and presence in Darfur.
Resources must also be invested in facilitating access to events in Sudan by Middle Eastern and African press, radio, and television. If embedding Al Jazeera journalists in the Implementation Force units proves impractical, civil affairs officers and civilian public relations experts must find substitutes. After all, Al Jazeera’s most ambitious attempt to cover the Darfur genocide, a documentary film produced in early 2004, resulted in the closing of its Khartoum office and the prosecution of its staff.

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Particular care must be taken to avoid the appearance of Arab-bashing on the part of intervening forces. The racist Arabism deployed by one of the strongest factions in the Khartoum government is a peculiarly Sudanese concoction, no more characteristic of other Arab regimes than was Nazism characteristic of other German-speaking regimes. That the intervention is somehow an attack against Islam may be effectively refuted by the fact that almost all Darfuris are Muslims.

Planning for Intervention: How Public?
Planning for the three-part intervention on the part of coordinating task forces of Canadians and Americans should begin immediately. We find it instructive that American troops and aircraft were attacking in force in Afghanistan only 27 days after September 11th. To what extent such planning should be made public is difficult to determine, however. There are arguments for quiet planning as well as for a warning to Khartoum that, for once, one of the populations that took “Never Again” as a motto actually means what it says. In any case, the longest-ruling genocidal regime in history, the Bashir government of Sudan, needs to be decisively deterred from carrying forward with its challenge to our claim to value variety of cultures as part of our common humanity.

Likely Political and Armed Responses of the Bashir Regime and Others
It is certain that the Bashir regime will attempt to mobilize its population by using appeals to the Islamic jihad tradition. In 1991, after all, Bashir proclaimed himself “imam of the jihad” against the peoples of the Nuba Mountains. In the case of the Nuba Mountains, inhabited by both Christians and Muslims, this tactic was only partly successful. A significant number of officers of the Sudanese army resisted attacking fellow Muslims, which caused a slowdown in execution and strategic reorientation of the battle plan.
The memory of this history helps to indicate why the GoS has made such heavy use of janjaweed militias. Although they are drawn from many sources, the smaller, more recently arrived Arab clans in Northern Darfur, ethnic groups more vulnerable to the appeals of the “Arab Gathering” and other racist ideologies, have provided a disproportionate number of the jj militias. These militias then were supported by the mercenaries and professionals flying the Antonov bombers and armed helicopters. In fact, the largest ethnically and linguistically uniform group of Arabs in Darfur, the Rizeigat of the South, have remained largely neutral in the conflict between rebels and Government. Their leaders, moreover, would be allocated major roles in the “protected conversation” meetings and the Interim regime.
Crowds in the streets of Khartoum and Omdurman will most likely be turned out in force, as they have been in the past, to be treated to feasts of rodomontade and warlike rhetoric. Directing the anger of crowds to “invaded” Darfur and translating it into militarily or politically effective operations may not be easy. In the first place, the Popular Defense Force units that might be formed as the result of the claims of a foreign “white” invasion do not have an impressive military record. The past record of using such units in the wars against the South and other areas has shown that the PDF formations often behave poorly and suffer heavy casualties.



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Drawing on the recruits from “the street” who attended these gatherings, the GoS might train “insurgents” to attack Implementation Force units or civilian concentrations in Darfur or even abroad, using terrorist tactics. Any action that attempts to help Darfuri victim groups to reverse their radical diminution and escape the life of the camps must weigh the benefits of success in this attempt, the reversal of a genocide against 2.5 million people, with the possible costs from terrorist attacks. Against this consideration must be placed, however, the knowledge that the GoS is already training selected janjaweed in advanced terrorist tactics, in Sudan as well as in other countries. Evidence to this effect gathered by the authors of this report was submitted in early 2006 to US counterterrorism analysts. At the same time, of course, the GoS has posed as a leader in the war against terror, even hosting a conference on this subject in November 2005.

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up ustaz bakri
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dr mustafa mahmoud

شكراً يا بكرى

والباقى بالتلفون

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قال الشاعر الكبير نزار قباني
حينَ يصيرُ الناسُ في مدينةٍ
ضفادعاً مفقوءةَ العيونْ
فلا يثورونَ ولا يشكونْ
ولا يغنّونَ ولا يبكونْ
ولا يموتونَ ولا يحيونْ
تحترقُ الغاباتُ ، والأطفالُ ، والأزهارْ
تحترقُ الثمارْ
ويصبحُ الإنسانُ في موطنِه
أذلَّ من صرصارْ

An essay in the Cornell Daily Sun intended to prepare the way for a series of international conferences on “Plan B”, a Three-Part intervention in Darfur enabled by an enforced no-fly zone,to be held at several universities within the next six weeks.]


What to do About Darfur... And Why We Won't Do It
Guest Room

By John H. Weiss

Sep 8 2006

Deckhead: Guest Room

As a faculty member who once served as an artillery officer, I have been able to profit from military officers and NCOs I have met on the University-ROTC Relations Committee. I have also been able to make contact with many who have returned from Iraq or who are now serving there. It is not a painless experience: tough questions are put to me, with all the straight-shooting style and professionalism that I have come to expect.

Recently, an African-American field-grade officer serving in Iraq, learning about my work to reverse the Darfur genocide, posed me one of the toughest questions. Several of them, actually. First, he wondered why people considered military personnel to be uninformed about political developments in the rest of the world. Nor were they supposed to care. As an officer, he was of course limited about what he could do or say while he was in uniform, but did that signify that he did not care?

The case that bothered him most was Darfur. Because he naturally and unreservedly owed his first loyalty to the United States, was he supposed to be indifferent to the fate of Darfuris, whose skin was the same color as his own even if their various cultures were radically different? He knew the history of Kosovo, where, in 1999, Europeans and Americans had stopped a genocide-in-the-making directed against other white Europeans despite the refusal of the United Nations to authorize the intervention. He knew what had happened in Afghanistan, in the months after our successful attack on that country’s disgusting regime, hosts of Al Qaeda. We had a political strategy as well as a military strategy. We gathered up a wide range of non-Taliban leaders and took them to Bonn where, with the help of United Nations experts, they had formed an Interim Administration. That Interim Group then returned to Afghanistan where, working with American troops, they began to establish security and set the conditions for a more broadly based and accountable group to meet in a grand council, a loya jirga. Elections played a role in strengthening the legitimacy of the group as did a certain realistic acknowledgement of power relations that brought the inclusion of traditional clan leaders and warlords. Sure, he said, the place was not yet a Switzerland or a Canada, but the generalized oppression had ended, and Taliban-targeted groups like the Shiite Hazaras were no longer facing a deadly discrimination.

I felt that in reply I had to shoot as straight as I could. I began by recounting the history of Darfur rescue policy, a sad tale of calculated naïvete, deception of self and others, conscious adoption of policies known to be ineffective, and diversionary strategies such as concentration on “awareness-raising,” divestment campaigns and fund-raising for humanitarian aid. The would-be rescuers were not only UN diplomats, Canadian prime ministers and American State Department professionals. The broadest coalition of religious, ethnic and political groups in America’s recent history had been asking for someone, somehow, to “do more for Darfur” since the summer of 2004. A fury of frustration was building among American, Canadian and British rescuers. Nothing seemed to deter the longest-ruling genocidal regime in history, that dominated by Omar al-Bashir and his co-conspirators. They launched their first genocide against the peoples of the Nuba mountains, both Christian and Muslim, almost immediately after they seized power in 1989. They kept rolling on, using genocide as their “counterinsurgency” (and Arabization) policy, outdoing Hitler in the number of victim peoples and cultures attacked by a factor of ten.

But my interlocutor in Iraq already thought he had the answer: nobody cared enough to put their non-violent purity or their clean-solution sainthood on the line. As he said to me in a familiar lament, “Every democratic nation in the world deplores genocide. And every democratic nation in the world refuses to take the risks necessary to stop it.” Especially when it’s the Fur, Massaleit, Zaghawa, Dajo and Tunjur people, Muslims mostly of the tolerant Hanafi tradition and speakers of Arabic as a lingua franca as well as their own languages. Who had ever heard of these people before?

What if it were Canadians now facing the final phase of the Final Solution that the Sudanese Government launched last week? Would we continue to promise that no violation of Sudan’s sovereignty would ever occur, a mantra repeated by UN diplomats and by all the employees of our own State Department and Ottawa’s Ministry of External Affairs? This despite all the wonderful papers and speeches, especially from Canadians, about the nations’ “Responsibility to Protect” fellow members of the human race victimized by their own governments. As my friend in Iraq, commanding a unit that has seen real combat, pointed out, “You academic and government guys can play with abstractions and metaphors better than I can, but I’ve never seen a sovereignty bleeding, raped, starved, or driven from its home. But I’ve sure seen real people have that done to them, and I’d like somebody to give me a chance to neutralize the perpetrators.”

I wish that he would get that chance. But in a world, in America and Canada and elsewhere, where all but a tiny minority of would-be Darfur rescuers have never heard a shot fired in anger, never worn a uniform, never lost a friend to a genocide (or been a witness to this crime as it was happening), or even missed a meal they did not want to miss, a political-military plan that involves risks, complicated options and a need for imagination has little appeal. When you have experienced one or all of those things, however, developing that plan in an atmosphere of criticism and debate seems a compelling task.

John H. Weiss is a Professor in the history department.

Dr. Mustafa Mahmoud
Ustaz Hashim Bedreldeen
Welcome..,o
"Down down with The facist government of Khartoum "

down down the islamist ingaz fascist mafia gang

فوق

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الحاكم والعصفور



أتجوَّلُ في الوطنِ العربيِّ

لأقرأَ شعري للجمهورْ

فأنا مقتنعٌ

أنَّ الشعرَ رغيفٌ يُخبزُ للجمهورْ

وأنا مقتنعٌ – منذُ بدأتُ –

بأنَّ الأحرفَ أسماكٌ

وبأنَّ الماءَ هوَ الجمهورْ

أتجوَّلُ في الوطنِ العربيِّ

وليسَ معي إلا دفترْ

يُرسلني المخفرُ للمخفرْ

يرميني العسكرُ للعسكرْ

وأنا لا أحملُ في جيبي إلا عصفورْ

لكنَّ الضابطَ يوقفني

ويريدُ جوازاً للعصفورْ

تحتاجُ الكلمةُ في وطني

لجوازِ مرورْ

أبقى ملحوشاً ساعاتٍ

منتظراً فرمانَ المأمورْ

أتأمّلُ في أكياسِ الرملِ

ودمعي في عينيَّ بحورْ

وأمامي كانتْ لافتةٌ

تتحدّثُ عن (وطنٍ واحدْ)

تتحدّثُ عن (شعبٍ واحدْ)

وأنا كالجُرذِ هنا قاعدْ

أتقيأُ أحزاني..

وأدوسُ جميعَ شعاراتِ الطبشورْ

وأظلُّ على بابِ بلادي

مرميّاً..

كالقدحِ المكسورْ

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وسيشارك فى الفقرة الغنائيةالفنان وليد عبدالحميد "بيركشن" وفرقته الغنائية, وليد عبدالحميد معرووف فى الوسط الغنائى الكندى ولديه العديد من الانتاج الفنى وهو يعرف هنا بوليد KUSH وسنعود لسرد تجربته الغنائيه فى بوست اخر

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الإخوة الأفاضل



Shao Dorsheed

محمدين محمد اسحق

Mohamed Suleiman

Mohamed Elgadi

Mohamed Adam

Kostawi

حيدر حماد

ابراهيم بقال سراج

Shams eldin Alsanosi

Mustafa Mahmoud


Hashim Badr Eldin

Ahmed Mohamedain

شكرا على المرور وعلى موعدنا 17 سبتمبر.

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