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سري للغاية/استراتيجية المؤتمر الوطني إلنتخابات 2015 / ص 2
صفحه 23
واكون شاكرا اذا استطاع احد انزال الوثيقه كامله

اسماء السودانيون المتواجدين في المملكه المتحده
واعتقد انهم مؤتمر وطني
واستراتيجة الانتخابات 2015

SUDAN DEMOCRACY FIRST GROUP and SAFERWORLD
POLICY BRIEFING
NOVEMBER 2014
SUDAN: THE ELUSIVE ROAD TO GENUINE NATIONAL
DIALOGUE AND LASTING PEACE
Executive Summary
A series of initiatives by the Sudanese government, opposition groups and international mediators over the
last ten months have created a glimmer of hope that a comprehensive resolution to Sudan’s conflicts may be
possible. These potentially positive steps include: the national dialogue process launched by President alBashir
in April; the Paris Declaration signed between the National Umma Party and the Sudan Revolutionary
Front (SRF) on 8 August; the 4 September Addis Ababa Agreement on National Dialogue and Constitutional
Processes between representatives of the government’s dialogue mechanism and the Paris Declaration
signatories; and the 16 September 2014 African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) communique,
calling for a synchronized mediation of the separate processes for resolving the conflicts in Blue Nile/South
Kordofan and Darfur regions. However, bringing about an end to the armed conflicts, and subsequent steps
towards a negotiated, national, inclusive and comprehensive dialogue continues to be blocked by the
intransigence of the ruling National Congress Party (NCP).
A comprehensive, inclusive and accountable dialogue is one in where all Sudanese political, social and
religious stakeholders can participate. The main aim of any national dialogue must be to address the root
cause of conflict in Sudan: the relationship between the centre and the peripheries. The process cannot
therefore treat the ‘distinct’ armed conflicts in Darfur, Blue Nile and South Kordofan in isolation from one
another. Instead, all national political issues (such as power and wealth sharing, and constitution making)
must be elevated to a national level. Furthermore, any agreements signed to bring about an end to
fighting must not prejudice the national process that will take place after the silencing of the guns. The role
of civil society and public participation must be guaranteed from the start, and this guarantee should be
coupled with international investment in the capacity of civil society to play a positive role.
Any national dialogue process must be underpinned by a conducive environment, which guarantees the
constitutional rights and freedoms of all citizens. A credible process is impossible in the current context of
widespread armed conflicts marked by atrocities against civilians, systematic violations of human, civil
and political rights and the absence of political freedoms. The ongoing detention, arrest and torture of
political opponents and activists must also cease. Furthermore, the push to hold elections in the April 2015–
prior to an end to the conflicts and agreement on a permanent constitution – will fuel, not alleviate, the
causes of conflict. The international community must not be cornered into supporting or legitimizing any
sort of electoral process aimed exclusively at extending the life of the current regime, while the Sudanese
people continue to suffer the consequences. SDFG and Saferworld Policy Briefing November 2014
SUDAN: THE ELUSIVE ROAD TO GENUINE NATIONAL DIALOGUE AND LASTING PEACE
Page 2 of 6
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
A Comprehensive Approach to the Peace
Negotiations
and#61623; Publically support and encourage the African
Union’s efforts, as called for in 456th meeting of
the AU Peace and Security Council on 12
September 2014, to synchronize the
negotiations on Darfur and the Two Areas
between the Government and the armed groups
of the Sudan Revolutionary Front. Call for
renewed efforts, including new security
arrangements with the Darfur groups outside of
the DDPD.
and#61623; Stress that peace negotiations between the
parties must not prejudice a national dialogue,
and call for the transfer of all national political
issues (such as power and wealth sharing,
constitution-making, accountability for past
rights violations and redress to victims, national
reconciliation and other transitional
arrangements), to a comprehensive, inclusive
and accountable national dialogue.
Supporting Elections with Integrity
and#61623; Do not lend any political, technical or financial
support to the elections scheduled for April
2015, including support for international
election monitoring, until a transparent and
inclusive national dialogue, constitution-making
process, and agreement on transitional
governance arrangements have taken place.
Supporting a Comprehensive, Inclusive and
Accountable National Dialogue
and#61623; Publically support steps taken under the Addis
Ababa Agreement and the AU PSC
Communiqué, towards a comprehensive,
inclusive and accountable national dialogue,
including the new role of the AUHIP.
and#61623; Call for and support a process leading to an
agreed dialogue Framework between all
stakeholders on the structure, modalities,
ti####ble and content of the national dialogue.
and#61623; Offer technical and financial support only if a reintroduced
alternative national dialogue process
meets the criteria of a comprehensive, inclusive
and accountable process. This should include:
taking place in a conducive environment, which
comprises respect for fundamental freedoms –
expression, association, and the media – release
of political detainees and an end to arbitrary
arrests; guarantees the wide participation and
trust of key stakeholders; has a realistic
ti####ble; is based on consensus building and
not majoritarian voting; and addresses the root
causes of conflict at the national level.
and#61623; Call for and support civil society inclusion at
every stage of the national dialogue, as well as
effective public participation mechanisms, in
particular for those most affected by the
conflict, which will ensure the national dialogue
process is legitimate and serves the needs and
demands of all of Sudan’s citizens.
and#61623; Condemn the recent wave of arrests of activists
in September and the continuing censorship of
the media as undermining the creation of a
conducive environment, as well as the faith
among key stakeholders and the Sudanese
public that a comprehensive, inclusive and
accountable national dialogue is possible.
Support to Civil Society:
and#61623; Invest in the capacity of civil society to work
with other change actors to better articulate an
alternative, viable vision for a democratic, just
and peaceful Sudan.
Debt Relief and Sanctions
and#61623; Publically state that debt relief and the removal
of sanctions, as well as any new economic
support package and concessionary loans, will
only take place following a nation-wide
cessation of hostilities and a comprehensive,
inclusive and accountable national dialogue held
in a conducive environment.
Increasing Humanitarian Assistance
and#61623; Increase the vital humanitarian support to
conflict-affected populations in Darfur and the
Two Areas, as well as refugees from these
conflicts, and press for unhindered
humanitarian access to areas beyond
government control, if necessary through a
mechanism similar to UN Security Council
Resolution 2165 (2014) on Syria.SDFG and Saferworld Policy Briefing November 2014
SUDAN: THE ELUSIVE ROAD TO GENUINE NATIONAL DIALOGUE AND LASTING PEACE
Page 3 of 6
Towards a Comprehensive Approach
Since January 2014, the Government of Sudan (and
the NCP) has been leading a national dialogue process
whose stated aims are resolving the armed conflicts,
achieving political freedoms, alleviating poverty and
the economic crisis, and addressing the national
identity crisis. In April, the Government held
roundtable meetings with opposition parties, created
a “7+7 Committee” with some opposition and
government-allied parties to oversee the process, and
drew up a “roadmap” and timeframe for the national
dialogue. These political shifts by the government and
the NCP have been driven by several factors: the
economic crisis precipitated by the secession of South
Sudan and the loss of oil revenue (compounded by
international sanctions); the continuing conflict in
Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile; increasing public
discontent seen in the 2013 September protests;
growing divisions within the Party over its future
leadership; and the pending deadline of elections in
April 2015, which the NCP needs to legitimize its rule.
However, since the formal launch of the national
dialogue process in April, the government has done
everything in its power to undermine its own
commitments to respect constitutionally guaranteed
freedoms of expression, association and assembly. The
imprisonment of opposition politicians, and detention
and torture of activists, high levels of press censorship,
and constraints on the operating space for political
parties, suggest the Government, or at least key
elements within it, are not committed to genuine
change. Continued violence in Darfur, South Kordofan
and Blue Nile in the form of the deliberate targeting of
civilians by aerial bombardments and government
forces, as well as the denial of humanitarian access to
war victims in these areas also dent the government’s
credibility in leading a genuine national dialogue
process. The current national dialogue instead appears
to be a means to position the NCP and its allies for the
2015 elections, and to improve its image among
international actors to lift sanctions, obtain debt relief
and, gain access to new concessionary loans.
In parallel, opposition groups have been working to
build alliances and coalitions to counter the
government’s flawed national dialogue process. The
Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) signed the “Paris
Declaration” with the National Umma Party on 8
August 2014, uniting, at least on paper, the armed
opposition from the peripheries with the traditionally
most significant opposition party from the centre,
around a shared vision for a genuine national dialogue.
Their agreement created a new block spanning
religious, secular and ethnic divides. Efforts by the
Paris Declaration signatories to define an alternative
national dialogue process were further strengthened
by the endorsement of the African Union High-Level
Implementation Panel (AUHIP) of the 4 September
“Addis Ababa Agreement on National Dialogue and
Constitutional Process”. This document was signed by
both the “Paris Group” and the AUHIP on one side,
and the NCP-led “7+7” national dialogue steering
committee and the AUHIP on the other. The African
Union Peace and Security Council subsequently
endorsed the Addis Ababa agreements, thus giving an
international recognition of the shared general
principles on the way forward for the SRF, NUP and
the 7+7 committee. The government of Sudan has not,
however, since shown any willingness to abide by the
Addis Ababa Agreement.
Ending the Armed Conflicts
There is an emerging consensus that the first step to a
comprehensive, inclusive and accountable national
dialogue process is a nationwide cessation of
hostilities and guarantees for the participation of the
armed groups, alongside the full range of other
political actors. On the one hand, the SRF must be
included because they represent some of the
communities most affected by war, and are fueled by
grievances which are key drivers of conflict. On the
other hand, if excluded, the SRF will continue to
pursue violent means for change. Moreover, without a
peaceful environment, it will be impossible for all parts
of Sudan’s diverse society, including those most
affected by the conflict, to engage in a participatory
process of dialogue.
The African Union Peace and Security Council
communiqué from 17 September urged “all
international actors with a mediation mandate to pool
their resources together, as well as harmonize their
interventions”. It also endorsed negotiations on a
cessation for hostilities “under the auspices of the
AUHIP and in collaboration and coordination with the
Joint Special Representative/Joint Chief Mediator” and
requested that negotiations “for the Two Areas and for
Darfur should be conducted in a synchronized
manner”. Whilst better coordination is progress
towards a comprehensive approach, the communiqué
does not mandate a unified negotiation process or
platform. Furthermore, the Government continues to
reject negotiating with the SRF as a single entity, and SDFG and Saferworld Policy Briefing November 2014
SUDAN: THE ELUSIVE ROAD TO GENUINE NATIONAL DIALOGUE AND LASTING PEACE
Page 4 of 6
has reiterated its commitment to the Doha Document
for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) as the basis for all
negotiations on the Darfur region, despite this
agreement having been rejected by the SRF’s three
Darfuri armed groups.
According to the United Nations, some 6.9 million
people are in need of humanitarian assistance across
the country, with over half of those in need being in
Darfur.
1
The ongoing conflicts in Darfur and the Two
Areas continue to put millions of civilians at risk, in
particular because of the government’s forcible
displacement of civilians, limiting their ability to plant
and harvest crops. Between September 2011 and
September 2014 some 372, 8112
people were forced
to flee their homes in Blue Nile, while in South
Kordofan, 116, 000 people were newly displaced in
SPLM-North controlled areas between January and
May 2014, adding to the 436, 000 persons displaced
between 2011 and 2013.
3
In Darfur, some 431, 291
persons were displaced between January and 31
October of this year.
4 Moreover, the ongoing civil war
in South Sudan has resulted in almost 100, 000
civilians seeking refuge in Sudan.
5

The key challenges to the peace negotiations are
therefore:
and#61623; Securing arrangements for unhindered
humanitarian assistance to all conflictaffected
populations;
and#61623; Guaranteeing robust security arrangements
for all the armed groups, including
autonomous armed groups outside the
control of government, in order to secure a
permanent, nationwide cessation of hostilities
and ceasefire agreement;
and#61623; Securing commitment, and the necessary
guarantees and conditions, from the
government and the armed groups on their
participation in a comprehensive, inclusive
and accountable national dialogue process.
National Dialogue for Lasting, Just Peace

1
http://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-humanitariandashboard-30-september-2014http://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-humanitariandashboard-30-september-2014
2
http://democracyfirstgroup.org/News/BN%20Infographic%20Shttp://democracyfirstgroup.org/News/BN%20Infographic%20S
ept%202014.pdf
3
http://democracyfirstgroup.org/News/SK%20Infographic%20Shttp://democracyfirstgroup.org/News/SK%20Infographic%20S
ept%202014.pdf
4
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Situatiohttp://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Situatio
n_update_on_displacements_in_Darfur_31%20October14_A3.
pdf
5
http://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-humanitariandashboard-30-september-2014http://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-humanitariandashboard-30-september-2014
A comprehensive, inclusive and accountable national
dialogue process cannot take place until all Sudanese
political, social and religious stakeholders – including
internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees and
marginalized populations in the peripheries – are able
to participate. It is widely recognized that at the heart
of conflict in Sudan is the relationship between the
centre and the peripheries. The root causes of the
conflict in South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Darfur must
be solved at the national, and not just the local, level.
Previous attempts to bring peace to Sudan, such as the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Doha Document for
Peace in Darfur, and the Eastern Sudan Peace
Agreement, have all failed to bring lasting peace
because they were regionally-focused, without
addressing the structural causes of Sudan’s many
regional wars.
The international community and Sudanese actors
must seek an end to this piecemeal approach, and
instead support an all-inclusive process. Although a
cessation of hostilities and local level security
arrangements must be agreed to by the SRF and the
government, these negotiations and agreements must
not prejudice any sort of political agreements for
reforms at the national level. As with a cessation of
hostilities and ending the bombing of civilian
population, unhindered humanitarian access is a vital
confidence building measure and a basic requirement
for a conducive environment for a national dialogue.
Furthermore, given the significant differences in the
humanitarian context in Darfur and that in Blue Nile
and South Kordofan, individual arrangements will be
needed for operations on the ground. Furthermore,
central to any dialogue process is a genuine process
for transitional justice and accountability, which must
address the grievances of victims of all the armed
conflicts in Sudan.
While any agreement to end the armed conflicts
depends on the political will of the government and
the armed groups, mechanisms for civil society and
public participation can have a positive impact on the
peace negotiations. However, there are no provisions
in the current negotiations for this kind of
participation. The DDPD did make a number of
provisions for public participation in both the process
that led to the agreement and in the agreement itself.
However, civil society and other stakeholders’
participation in the process become highly politicized,
and even then their contributions were largely ignored
by the parties. Furthermore, attempts to engage civil SDFG and Saferworld Policy Briefing November 2014
SUDAN: THE ELUSIVE ROAD TO GENUINE NATIONAL DIALOGUE AND LASTING PEACE
Page 5 of 6
society, IDPs, and other stakeholders in the DDPD’s
Darfur-Darfur Dialogue to promote local peacebuilding
have made little progress.
Although no direct participants in a negotiation
process between the belligerents, engaging civil
society in an informal way must be incorporated into
the peace processes, and be supported by both the
AUHIP and the parties. There also needs to be a
commitment the inclusion of civil society actors and
public participation mechanisms in any future national
dialogue process. The international community must
therefore continue to invest in building the capacity of
civil society to play a positive role in supporting any
future inclusive national dialogue process.
The process cannot be exclusively focused on elites
based in Khartoum – a dialogue between the NCP and
other political parties – but must include a
representative cross-section of Sudanese society,
including traditional/tribal leaders, religious groups,
trade unions, IDPs, refugees, women, and youth. Any
process taking place must be held in parallel with a
grass-roots, bottom-up process that includes local
communities, especially in the peripheries.
Furthermore, the NCP-run “societal dialogues”
meetings have not been genuinely representative of
civil society or the grassroots, as the process has been
designed and dominated by the NCP.
Elections after Peace and Constitution
Legitimate elections cannot take place in the current
environment of armed conflict and a lack of civil and
political freedoms. The operating space for political
parties and civil society, especially at the local level, is
highly restricted. The press is gagged from covering
the conflicts in Blue Nile, South Kordofan and Darfur.
There is growing awareness of corruption and
economic mismanagement by the regime, which is
feeding popular discontent, but corruption is another
issue that the media are forbidden to cover.
The government has unilaterally amended the
electoral law, appointed members of the electoral
commission and decided on the calendar of the
elections. Voter and national observer registration are
underway. The national dialogue is due to conclude
within three months in an attempt to lend legitimacy
to what will inevitably be deeply flawed elections.
Indicative of the NCP’s unwillingness to be subject to
genuine democratic process is the government’s
recent attempt to amend the constitution in order to
presidentially appoint rather than directly elect state
governors, and the recent nomination of President alBashir
to stand for another term, which appears to
contravene the current constitution.
For any electoral process to be considered genuine
and constructive, it must be undertaken in an
environment in which all Sudanese stakeholders can
engage and participate. There must be a conducive
environment without the current impunity for abuses
committed by National Intelligence and the Security
Forces, and associated militias, such as the Rapid
Support Forces. A process of national reconciliation –
through a transitional process – must be in place to
insure transparent, free and fair elections are carried
out.
International Support
The role of the AUHIP is to be commended and it
should be given more support in order to increase its
capacity to fulfill its multiple mandates and to create
greater coordination and harmonization among the
different processes. To uphold the primacy of the
humanitarian imperative, AUHIP Chairman president
Thabo Mbeki should visit war victims in government
and rebel areas, as well as refugees, to witness the
humanitarian crisis exposed and hear their
testimonies. Furthermore, the Panel should create a
pool of Sudanese and non-Sudanese experts as a
resource to the negotiations as a whole, accessible by
all the parties. As the negotiations between the
belligerents will have a bearing on a wider national
dialogue, the Panel should support an informal
mechanism for a wider group of stakeholders, such as
the unarmed political opposition and key civil society
groups, to be able to observe and make contributions
to the talks. Furthermore, the Panel must in particular
champion the issues of exclusivity and of public
participation.
The 20 October 2014 conclusions by the European
Union’s Foreign Affairs Council are encouraging. They
set out five clear benchmarks for the national
dialogue: it must be inclusive, comprehensive, held in
a conducive environment, accompanied by confidence
building measures, and with a transparent process,
objectives and time frame. The European Union and
other members of the international community must
continue to clearly outline the requirements for a
genuine process before any support can be provided.
Furthermore, the AUHIP must clearly outline the steps
needed on the side of the Sudanese Government to
create a conducive environment for dialogue.dialogue and Safer world Policy Briefing November 2014
SUDAN: THE ELUSIVE ROAD TO GENUINE NATIONAL DIALOGUE AND LASTING PEACE
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About the Sudan Democracy First Group
Launched in mid-2010, the Sudan Democracy First Group (SDFG) (http://http://www.democracyfirstgroup.orgwww.democracyfirstgroup.org) is a coalition of
democratic, activist, trade unionist and academic Sudanese representing different cultural and ethnic backgrounds. The
organization aims to voice the concerns of voiceless Sudanese from across the country on questions of democratization
and its intersection with peace, justice and development. SDFG focuses on providing Sudanese and international
audiences with information and analysis by publishing regular updates, policy briefs and position papers on major
political and human rights issues. In addition to raising public awareness both inside and outside Sudan, SDFG works to
promote civil society dialogue on crucial issues affecting Sudan, by convening meetings and round tables bringing
together diverse sectors of Sudanese society— particularly those representing marginalized populations.
About Safer world
Saferworld is an independent international organization working to prevent violent conflict and build safer lives. We work
with local people affected by conflict to improve their safety and security. We use this evidence and learning to improve
local, national and international policies and practices that can help build lasting peace. Our priority is people – we
believe that everyone should be able to lead peaceful, fulfilling lives, free from violent conflict. Our programmatic work is
in fragile and conflict-affected states, while our policy and advocacy work seeks to improve national and international
policy and programming on conflict, security and development in such contexts.