تقرير يطالب بتجميد اصول وحظر سفر اعضاء بارزين في المؤتمر الوطني !

Quote: السودان-دارفور/تقرير:تقرير يطالب بفرض عقوبات على الحزب الحاكم في السودان من لويس شاربونو الامم المتحدة 30 نوفمبر تشرين الثاني (رويترز) - طالب تقرير لجماعة مناهضة للابادة الجماعية اليوم الاثنين الولايات المتحدة والقوى الكبرى الاخرى بفرض عقوبات على أعضاء رئيسيين في الحكومة السودانية لرفضهم انهاء العنف في دارفور وجنوب السودان. وأبدى عبد المحمود عبد الحليم سفير السودان لدى الامم المتحدة ردا غاضبا من تقرير جماعة "مشروع كفاية" التي تتخذ من واشنطن مقرا لها ووصفها بأنها "مروجة للحرب". وجاء في تقرير مشروع كفاية ان هناك مخاوف من نشوب حرب أهلية جديدة وحذر من ان الانتخابات العامة التي تجري العام القادم واستفتاء عام 2011 حول انفصال منطقة الجنوب شبه المستقلة والغنية بالنفط لن يتسما بالحرية والنزاهة. وألقى التقرير معظم المسؤولية على حزب المؤتمر الوطني الحاكم الذي يتزعمه الرئيس السوداني عمر حسن البشير الذي وجهت له المحكمة الجنائية الدولية في مارس آذار تهمة التورط في جرائم حرب مشتبه بها في اقليم دارفور بغرب السودان. وطالب التقرير بفرض عقوبات. وصاغ تقرير مشروع كفاية جون بريندرجاست المؤسس المشارك للجماعة والمسؤول السابق في وزارة الخارجية الامريكية ومجلس الامن القومي الامريكي. وقال التقرير "دون رد حاسم من المجتمع الدولي بقيادة الولايات المتحدة لن يمكن تفادي نشوب حرب أهلية شاملة." وأضاف "يجب ان يتضمن ذلك جهودا خاصة للوصول الى الصين بسبب هشاشة وضع استثماراتها النفطية في حالة نشوب حرب في الجنوب. على الولايات المتحدة تنظيم حملة دبلوماسية متصاعدة متعددة الاطراف في السودان بهدف التفاوض بشأن السلام الوطني وتعزيزه." وأوصى التقرير "بتجميد اصول تستهدف أعضاء بارزين في حزب المؤتمر الوطني الذين أثروا أنفسهم نتيجة ازدهار صناعة النفط في السودان خلال العقد الماضي." كما أيد التقرير فرض حظر على سفر افراد والامتناع عن تلبية مطلب الخرطوم بتخفيف الديون. ورفض مندوب السودان في الامم المتحدة التقرير. وقال "هؤلاء مروجو حرب تجار حرب في سباق مع الزمن لوقف قاطرة السلام التي تحركت بالفعل صوب مقصدها. ان تقريرهم يكشف عن افلاسهم والحقائق على الارض تهزم عقليتهم المريضة." وأيد تحالف "انقذوا دارفور" وهو تحالف منفصل يضم أكثر من 180 منظمة دينية وسياسية ومدافعة عن حقوق الانسان النقاط الاساسية التي خلص اليها تقرير "مشروع كفاية". وقال جيري فاولار رئيس منظمة "انقذوا دارفور" لرويترز "العمل المنسق المتعدد الاطراف ضروري لتعزيز السلام في السودان وهذا التحرك عليه ان يتعامل مع الواقع وهو أن لب المشكلة هو سعي حزب المؤتمر الوطني للحفاظ على هيمنته على السلطة والثروة." وأضاف "يصعب علي ان أرى كيف تنجح استراتيجية لا تتضمن ضغوطا." ووراء شكوى النشطين المدافعين عن دارفور خيبة أمل في ادارة الرئيس الامريكي باراك أوباما التي احتاجت الى نحو عشرة أشهر لوضع سياسة جديدة في السودان والاعلان عنها وهم يخشون عدم تطبيقها بحسم كاف. وتطالب سياسة ادارة أوباما بتجديد عقوبات اقتصادية امريكية على السودان لكنها تعرض ايضا على الخرطوم حوافز جديدة لانهاء العنف في دارفور والجنوب قبل انتخابات العام القادم. وقال الرئيس السابق لبعثة حفظ السلام المشتركة التابعة للامم المتحدة والاتحاد الافريقي في دارفور في وقت سابق من العام الحالي ان الصراع في الاقليم الواقع في غرب السودان والذي استمر ست سنوات انتهى بدرجة كبيرة. لكن هذا التقييم تناقض مع تقرير حديث لبان جي مون الامين العام للامم المتحدة الذي قال ان القتال بين الجيش السوداني والمتمردين مستمر وان المدنيين لايزالون معرضين للخطر وان قوات حفظ السلام تتعرض لتحرشات متكررة من جانب قوات الحكومة. ويقول دبلوماسيون ومحللون ان معارضة الصين لفرض الامم المتحدة عقوبات على الخرطوم مازالت قوية. كما حذروا من ان اتفاق السلام الذي ابرم عام 2005 بين شمال السودان وجنوبه وانهى حربا استمرت 20 عاما آخذ في الانهيار.

فووق

*

فوق

Dear Faisal
More details
============
The Enough Project •
www.enoughproject.org |
What To Do About Sudan Now
What To Do About Sudan Now
John Prendergast November 2009
Summary
One month after the release of the Obama administration’s Sudan policy, the situation has
further deteriorated. Violence against civilians continues unabated in Darfur and in southern
Sudan, and the ruling National Congress Party, or NCP, continues to act in bad faith and undermine
lasting peace in Sudan. In Darfur, relief organizations clearly do not have access to large
areas of Darfur, and those that do have access to vulnerable populations no longer publicize
their assessments for fear of expulsion. The NCP is blocking the establishment of conditions
for free and fair elections and seeks to undermine a self-determination referendum scheduled
For 2011. Intercommunal violence in southern Sudan is increasing, with growing evidence that
Khartoum’s divide and destroy policies are partly to blame.
At the core of the administration’s new Sudan policy is a set of confidential benchmarks that the
United States will use to evaluate progress toward peace. If the Obama administration is serious
About this strategy, it is clear that the NCP’s actions regarding the delays should trigger an escalating
Set of multilateral consequences. The United States must firmly respond now by forging a
Coalition of nations willing to implement the multilateral pressures and consequences that will
Prevent full-scale war from breaking out again in Sudan.
For Sudan watchers and activists, the advent of the Obama administration provided great promise and,
Indeed, hope. The expectation was that an administration led by former senators—Clinton, Bidden, and
Obama himself—who were advocates of more assertive action on Sudan would construct a strategy
That would help bring about an end to the destructive cycle of warfare in that embattled country. That
Hope was sorely tested by a series of highly publicized missteps by the administration and an unnecessarily
Long policy review which left other nations puzzled, domestic constituencies perplexed, and—
Bizarrely—the ruling NCP praising the administration’s approach.
Finally, 11 months after Barack Obama was elected president, his administration—conspicuously,
Not the president—released the results of the policy review. Advocates for a stronger line both in and
Out of government appeared to have successfully countered the direction that the policy had begun
to take publicly under the stewardship of the President’s Special Envoy Major General Scott Gration,
although the Special Envoy remains firmly in charge of the conduct of day-to-day diplomacy.
The new policy elaborated an approach of deep diplomatic engagement supported by a balanced set
of pressures and incentives. The policy reflected a more sober, experienced, and balanced approach
than what had been articulated publicly by the Special Envoy in fits and starts over the preceding six
months. The key element of leverage was a confidential annex that outlined unnamed incentives as
rewards for progress, and pressures as penalties for undermining the prospects for peace. Much of
the policy review’s contents remained opaque. Not only were the penalties and incentives included
in a confidential annex, so were the benchmarks against which they would be utilized.
Having the sticks and carrots in a confidential document has pros and cons. On the one hand, the
mystery involved leaves the parties guessing as to what the United States is prepared to do. It may
be that the perception and fear of what is unknown far outweighs the reality of the contents of the
document. But the parties will have to put the Obama administration to the test to find that out. On
the other hand, the unwillingness to clearly articulate the penalties could be seen as a potential sign of
weakness by some Sudanese actors. Further, keeping the contents confidential leaves key stakeholders
in Sudan completely unclear on what benchmarks the United States might be using in making its
assessments as to the application of the proposed incentives and pressures.
At this moment, on one core benchmark, there is little need for more evidence or further consultation.
The South's self-determination referendum, the cornerstone of the CPA, is at risk because of the
failure of the two parties to reach an agreement in time for a key constitutional deadline. Khartoum’s
National Assembly, the legislative body of the Government of National Unity between the NCP and
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, or SPLM, has failed to pass legislation governing the referendum
process. December 1 marks the start of recess for the National Assembly, which will not be
reconvened after Sudan’s April 2010 elections, when new representatives are elected. Preparations for
the referendum cannot begin until this law is passed, because the Referendum Commission charged
with conducting the referendum cannot be created until the law is in effect. If the Obama administration
opts to make a sober assessment of the situation that incorporates a historical perspective on
the NCP’s tried and true delay tactics, policymakers cannot ignore that the NCP’s interests are being
served by a delayed referendum.
The Obama administration must recognize that the NCP has effectively driven the disputes over the
referendum law, thrown up obstacles and unreasonable demands, and skillfully manipulated the process
in order to inflame internal SPLM dispute. In short, the contentious referendum law debate has been a
mirror of broader CPA implementation issues, with the South losing out to a stronger and better coordinated
Khartoum government intent on tampering with the peace agreement.
As the United States considers its options going forward, it is essential that the reality of the present
moment be fully understood. The assumption is that at some future point in time some rewards or
penalties will be considered, after extensive reviews of the evidence and consultation with other
countries. This approach ignores the exigency of the current context, which includes a number of
variables that should have already tripped the wires and triggered specific actions.
Black-out in Darfur. Although the Obama administration continues to call what is occurring in
Darfur genocide, the reality is we don’t really know. And we don’t know because the NCP has effectively
cut off all independent outlets for assessment, analysis, and publication of what is happening
presently in Darfur. Relief agencies dealing with sexual violence have been expelled or forced to
suspend their programs, so we no longer have independent means to assess the level and scope of
rape as a war weapon, a critical instrument of genocide.
While the special envoy has made consistently positive and inadvertently misleading statements
about levels of aid, relief organizations clearly do not have access to large areas of Darfur, and those
that do have access to vulnerable populations no longer publicize their assessments for fear of expulsion.
Darfuris struggling to get information out to the world are imprisoned and silenced. Journalists
cannot get travel permits and when they do their visits are stage managed by Khartoum. The NCP’s
recent statements about a plan to force displaced persons to return home in early 2010 should set
alarm bells ringing. The regime’s policy of divide and destroy continues, but it is just a different
phase, and much more secretive.
Does the NCP’s policy of blacking out Darfur undermine peace in Sudan? Yes.
No conditions for free and fair elections. The Sudanese people throughout the country want to
freely elect their leaders. Before the NCP seized power in a 1989 coup, there was a rich culture of
political parties and civil society organizations. The NCP does not want free and fair elections,
because it would almost certainly lose. Flawed elections will undermine broader stability in Sudan
and further confuse the process leading to the referendum. Five months away, it is red alert time for
diplomats. The CPA clearly demands respect for individual liberties, including freedom of expression
and freedom of assembly and association. Yet the NCP has blocked the necessary legal reforms to
allow for a free and fair vote in 2010.
Does the NCP’s policy of obstructing credible elections undermine peace in Sudan? Yes.
Undermining the referendum. Southerners want independence. Every poll and all anecdotal evidence
points to this outcome. The NCP does not want to lose the oil in the South, and therefore is undermining
the terms of and processes related to the referendum. The NCP hopes that the Government of
Southern Sudan will become frustrated and issue a unilateral declaration of independence, thus losing
all international support and creating enough confusion to delay the referendum, perhaps indefinitely,
even if it means going back to war. For the past month, Ali Osman Taha and Riek Machar, the lead
negotiators for the NCP and SPLM respectively on the referendum law, have shuttled between their
parties attempting to reach agreement on core issues related to the referendum—namely the percentage
of votes needed for secession, and the voter turnout percentage to validate the referendum.
Does the NCP’s policy of delaying any deal on the referendum law undermine peace in Sudan? Yes.
Increased violence in the South. The day after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between North
and South was signed, a few long-time Sudan analysts wrote that it would only be a matter of time
before the NCP would begin to undermine the stability of the South through the use of ethnic-based
militias. Predictably, in the run-up to the scheduled election, less than a year and a half away from the
referendum, intercommunal violence erupts again in the South, in the same areas in which it destabilized
the South during the war at the hands of NCP-sponsored southern militias. Is there a smoking
gun yet? No. Is this exactly the pattern of militia attacks we’ve seen the NCP use in the South and
Darfur? Yes. Does the NCP have a motive for promoting intercommunal violence in the South at this
time? Yes. Has the NCP repeatedly used disturbances and divisions in the South to make the case to
international diplomats that an independent South would somehow be ungovernable? Yes.
Does the NCP’s policy of sowing divisions within the South undermine peace in Sudan? Yes.
Implications
The conclusion drawn from these insidious trends is that without a firm response from the international
community, led by the United States, full-scale nationwide war is inevitable. This should involve
a special outreach effort to China because of the vulnerability of its oil investments should war resume
in the South. The United States must, then, organize and lead a multilateral diplomatic surge in Sudan
aimed at negotiating and consolidating national peace. Robust diplomatic engagement with all sides
should be backed by the creation and application—immediately—of multilateral pressures and clear
consequences. If the U.N. Security Council is unable to act because of Chinese and Russian opposition,
then the United States should forge a coalition of countries willing to unilaterally apply certain
measures commensurate with the threat posed to peace in Sudan.
Such a diplomatic surge would include drafting a framework peace deal for the parties in Darfur
based on the extensive civil society consultations to represent the core grievances of the people
there. American stewardship of a multilateral process involving all the key countries with leverage is
critical to a credible peace effort. The surge would also involve the reconstruction of the troika that
helped negotiate the CPA, and should also include China, Egypt, and other countries with serious
economic and security interests in preventing a return to war.
Most importantly, this peace surge needs to be backed by credible pressures. Contrary to conventional
wisdom, there are actually many such diplomatic levers that have not yet been utilized. They include:
• Multilateral asset freezes aimed at key members of the NCP who have enriched themselves as a
result of the oil boom of the last decade in Sudan
• Multilateral travel bans that act as a scarlet letter on the shirts of key officials who aspire to be taken
seriously internationally
• Multilateral enforcement of the U.N. Security Council’s arms embargo through the enhancement
of the sanctions committee or another enforcement mechanism if the U.N. Security Council once
again fails to discharge its duties
• Multilateral support to the International Criminal Court’s cases against key Sudanese officials,
both in terms of existing indictments and a further expansion of the caseload
• Multilateral denial of debt relief that the NCP is aggressively seeking in the context of declining
energy prices
The bottom line is that any one of these measures will have little bite, objectively speaking. But, as history
has demonstrated, the political impact of a slowly growing set of penalties for undermining peace
can alter the NCP’s calculations to the point where senior officials within the party assess that they are
better off changing their policies and behavior than continuing with their destabilizing agenda.
All of these pressures and others should be utilized if at any time Darfur rebel factions or the
Government of Southern Sudan becomes a primary agent of instability and obstacle to peace.
Ultimately, the objective of the diplomatic surge and the pressures that provide leverage for it is the
achievement of a sustainable national peace. This will happen only if the NCP no longer holds absolute
authority in the country, but rather shares it with other parties and constituencies and eventually
allows fully free and fair elections to determine the future leadership of Sudan. In the meantime, averting
a return to full-scale nationwide war is the pressing priority, and the actions of the United States
will have more to do with success or failure than any other single variable.