Attractive Unity”: A minimum goal towards the New Sudan

“Attractive Unity”: A minimum goal towards the New Sudan

Sunday 26 August 2007.
By John G Nyuot Yoh*

August 23, 2007 — During the past couple of years, Sudanese and non Sudanese academics, intellectuals and politicians have been engaged in intense debates dealing with different aspects of the Comprehensive Peace agreement (CPA), which was signed in January 2005 between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the National Congress Party (NCP), a document which brought to halt the long running conflict in Africa between north and south Sudan. The main features of the agreement include granting the right of self-determination to the people of Southern Sudan, working to promote and cement an attractive unity for Southern Sudanese during the six year interim period and to establish a united democratic secular Sudan through a country wide transparent and inclusive electoral exercise.

The agreement has created ‘one state-two systems’ in Sudan, a model which is unique in its features, and can only be compared in part to the Hong Kong-mainland China model. The challenging task of operationalisation and sustaining this system lies in that, it has generated serious debates and has put the Sudanese elites, as Wathig Kamier put it in his recent master-thought provoking piece on the topic, into a difficult task of transcending and transforming the ‘one country-two systems” model into “one-country-one system”, a goal which is a vital condition for maintaining the country’s unity. Secondly, the role of the SPLM, in collaboration with other political forces in the country, in bringing about and leading the transformation.

In terms of the Naivasha consensuses, the use of the term “attractive unity” was meant to argue that having failed to convince the Islamists in Sudan during the Naivasha negotiations (2002-2005) to separate state affairs from religious politics, there is a need to create unity on new bases in Sudan.

It is therefore imperative that in order to contextualise the concept of “making unity attractive”, its real meaning must transcend the life-span of the CPA, which is six years. It must mean more than the two words- “unity and attractive”, which is, indeed much deeper than what it is often believed to be.

In the context of the CPA therefore, understanding the true meaning of “attractive unity” must be informed by the following realities in Sudan:

Firstly, from historical perspective, the type of the socio-economic and political systems that existed in Sudan prior to CPA era was unattractive and not suitable to attract the marginalized and others who did not accept the Islamic-Arabist systems in the country. Because of unattractiveness nature of that unity, three brutal wars were fought between the centre and the South in particular (1955-1972), (1975-1983) and (1983-2005).

Secondly, the marginalized people who chose to resist the marginalisation politics of the centre, as exercised by the riverine Jallaba elites, during the past decades, which was manifested in terms of segregated socio-economic and political underdevelopment and exclusion, did not only include the dissatisfied from Southern Sudan, but also the Beja, Nuba, Angessena, Darfurians, Kordufanians and others from other regions of Sudan who believe that the unity which was created in January 1956 was not attractive to them due to its discriminatory nature. Some therefore argue that, the January 2005 attempt through the Naivasha consensus to make unity attractive on new bases, ought to be looked at as a point of departure to right direction, not only to Southern Sudanese, but also to others who refused to accept the old dispensation, and are not willing to join the old Sudan unity, unless its attractiveness has become tangible and inclusive.

Thirdly, attractive unity is a desire of all the Sudanese who are in tune with inevitability of progressive-sustainable transformation in Sudan. A good example of this desire is expressed in contents of all the agreements which were signed by the National Congress Party (NCP) (imposing itself as the de-facto center of power in the country) with marginalized and opposition groups in Naivasha, Abuja, Cairo and Asmara. In all these agreements, the parties accepted the principle of making unity attractive to or what is referred to by some as ‘voluntary unity’ to the Sudanese who are dissatisfied with the status quo. This new way of thinking, one must admit, is a paradigm shift both in content and in spirit from the old Sudan way of thinking, meaning that the progressive forces in Sudan such as the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), which pioneered this way of looking at things, are urging every Sudanese to move away from the old Sudan to a new dispensation. In fact, some of the key concepts in these agreements include: decentralized democratic transformation, citizenship, multi-cultural, equitable share of power and wealth between the center and the regions, respect of human rights and the exercise of self-determination.

Fourthly, the Naivasha process, which resulted in Abuja, Cairo and Asmara consensuses has interpreted ‘making unity attractive’ in short and long term perspectives. For example, for Southern Sudanese who believe that the “political north” have not been willing and successful in making unity attractive for the past five decades, and are not expecting it to do so within six years of the interim period, attractive unity to them would mean a short term kind of ‘wait and see’ attitude until July 2011 when they will have voted in an internationally supervised referendum to choose whether to remain part of the confederation as it is to day, or opt for an independent state of their own. In other words, they are saying if the “north” (including NCP), failed to provide the incentives and the dividends for making unity attractive during the interim period, such a unity will be unattractive to many of them.

Fifthly, it would be equally unfair to suggest that the Sudanese progressive forces such as the SPLM, the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM), the Sudan Communist Party (SCP) and other progressive groups in the country, would look at attractive unity from a merely short term perspective and indeed, one would be doing injustice to the CPA which has contextualised the attractive unity as a framework and road map for genuine long term- progressive change and transformation in Sudan. In terms of the CPA interpretation, making unity attractive is a long term perspective, which means creating a New Sudan on new bases, within, but also beyond the Naivasha consensuses and its time frames, to attract all those who have rebelled against the old dispensation. It is true that some of these frameworks are unrealistic, ambitious, and short-term in out look and require substantive good will from the parties to implement them. In other words, the CPA urges Sudanese to adopt new mind shift, and adopt philosophical and long term ideological process of transforming the Sudan into either new attractive nation for all those who have despised the old constitutional and social contracts; opt for confederal arrangements between the centre and the regions, as the CPA has created or the country will disintegrated into small unstable independent entities, some of which will not be sustainable.

Sixthly, it should be emphasised that even if the South chooses to secede in July 2011, it should not necessarily mean that the rest of the marginalized forces, who advocate the New Sudan ideology, will give up the struggle for making unity attractive. This is because it is no longer the South that needs attractive unity, but all those who have been disadvantaged by the old system, who are nowadays the pioneers of the new attractive secular united Sudan. The New Sudanese are the Sudanese who daily join the ranks of the SPLM in different parts of the north, south, east, west and centre. These are those who are convinced that the underdevelopment of the Sudanese socio-political consciousness lies in the refusal by the riverine elites and the religious zealots of the Islamic political parties to accept that Sudan is what it is and every citizen must accept its diversity as it is. However the good news is that, in the long run, even the South, which might choose to secede in 2011, may revise its conditional-secessionist option at later stage, if the attractive unity they have been fighting to achieve since June 1947, become a reality in the remaining parts of the country. Thus, attractive unity, as espoused by those who believe in it, is regarded as the essence of the progressive forces’ revolutionary struggle in Sudan, and means revising and applying new long term perspectives to the manner in which Sudanese have been relating to themselves, their institutional and national socio-economic frameworks.

To the New Sudanese therefore, advocating for an attractive unity is an expression by the marginalized of their rejection of policies of marginalisation, discrimination, religious fanaticism, and all forms of underdevelopment policies. But it also means that the current coalition of anti-change, anti-attractive unity and anti-transformation in the centre (who are guising under the ‘jama al-saf al-watani’- ‘uniting national ranks’, an initiative by former President Sawar Al-Dahab), which has been the beneficiary of the old system, must be held responsible to make unity attractive and it must be forced to have every reason to be worried if it does not take steps to that effect. This is because the rest of the country, the south, far north, east, west, Kordufan, Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile are saying they are not attracted to the current unity paradigm and are determined to replace it through democratic process by the national progressive alliance, if the old Sudan ruling elites do not succumb to the ongoing wave of transformation.

On the other hand, making unity attractive has to be understood to mean opening up political space, not only in the federal centre through transparent participation of the Sudanese in all aspects of political, social and economic life in the country, but also opening up political space in the South, where the SPLM, the guardian of transformation in the country is in power. The SPLM elites are currently in power both in the north and in the south, and have instituted, what can be regarded as a transparent political system in the south, where the federal nature of the government, as stipulated in the two interim constitutions in Khartoum and Juba, is reflective of some of the expirations of the people of the New Sudan. The first burden the SPLM has to carry, is to build itself as a formidable political party, with strong political structures which can withstand socio-economic pressures from the regions (states) and nationalities that form the South. It is imperative therefore that the unity within the South and among the Southern regions and nationalities must be attractive, otherwise, whether the South remains part of the current confederal Sudan or becomes a separate independent state, the type of the unity its leadership will have achieved must be attractive to all those who live in Southern Sudan, otherwise, new complains about marginalisation will resurface in the South. This is the first burden of being a new Sudanese.

The second burden the SPLM is likely to carry, is the burden of protection of the CPA. The Anya-Anya leadership was trapped in the 1970s by General Numieri and the Northern political parties into becoming the sole guardian of the Addis Ababa Agreement. The northern political parties were all against the Addis Ababa Accord, and did everything to trap Numeiri into giving up its alliance with Southerners. All the military coups that were staged against Numeiri’s regime during the period between 1974 and 1982 were repelled and quelled down by Southern Sudanese soldiers who were made to believe that they were protecting the Addis Ababa Agreement and the unity of the country. In fact, Numieri May regime’s strategists made it a point to blackmail the South in every way they could. Unity of the country was linked to South’s acceptance of its guardian role in making the unity attractive. The 3rd March of every year was celebrated as a Unity Day, not in the whole country, but only in the South. When Numeiri and his lieutenants got convinced that the opposition and the pressures against the Addis Ababa Agreement have reached the peak from the Umma National Party of Sadig Al-Mahdi, Democratic Unionist Party of late Sherif Al-Hindi, the National Islamic Front of Dr Hassan Al-Turabi, the Sudan Communist Party of Mohamed Ibrahim Nugud, the Sudan National Party of Father Philip Abbas Ghaboush and other opposition political parties, Numeiri signed the famous “National Pact” agreement with these parties in 1977, hence turning his back to the South and the Addis Ababa Accord.

As a result of the “National Pact”, the Islamist parties in Sudan allied themselves with Numeiri and successfully abrogated the Addis Ababa Agreement. Today, we see the same scenario repeating itself, in the form of the “uniting national ranks” an initiative by General Sawar Al-Dahab, a well-known Sudanese elder, who was once a Defense Minister of General Numeiri’s regime. General Sawar Al-Dahab and Dr Jazuli Dafalah, both members of the National Islamic Front, led the interim government, following the popular up raising against Numeiri regime, between 1985 and 1986, which later on paved the way for election of the “National Pact” signatories into power in June 1986. The burden of the Addis Ababa Agreement was carried by Southern Sudanese leaders, who themselves, as represented then by Joseph Lagu and Abel Alier, became the victims of their attempts to carry the burden of making unity attractive between the north and South and indeed their attempts to force Numeiri to implement the Agreement also were frustrated. Will the SPLM and its leadership become the victims of the burden of the CPA? The repeat of the 1977 is in the making, and unless the SPLM/A made the price of not implementing the CPA by the NCP and the northern political parties higher than the price of implementing it, the SPLM may find itself confronted by the “New National Pact” coalition in 2009, when general national elections are conducted. This is because El-Bashir, El-Mahdi, El-Mirghani, El-Turabi and Nugud have already bought into General Sawar El-Dahab’s initiative. These leaders did actually meet and were paraded on Omdurman TV recently, a typical show of solidarity against the CPA. The question is what is plan B for the SPLM leadership as the “National Pact II” moves on to destroy the CPA?

In the final analysis, moving away from ‘one-state-two systems’ to “one state-one system” requires that the attractive unity paradigm must be seen as a natural outcome of the Naivasha consensuses, in which every political force in Sudan, should accept the new dispensation as an irreversible natural course of creating a new united Sudan or a second republic as some would prefer to call it.

Indeed, some argue that the south will secede, if it does, as a result of historical accumulative resistance of change and transformation by the centre and the traditional-Islamist political forces and not because the NCP or the sectarian parties did not make unity attractive during the interim period (2005-2011) through physical development.

Thus, making unity attractive is a statement of faith by all the progressive forces in the country and acts as a political manifesto for attaining their future goals-namely, creating a united democratic, secular new Sudan, which is voluntarily joined and accepted by all those who believe in it. The role of the SPLM as the pioneer advocate for the creation of New Sudan is imperative, but the ownership of the transformation process, which may take another five decades or more, must transcend the pioneering role of a single political force.

* John Yoh teaches political science at the Department of Political Science, University of South Africa in Pretoria