اغتيال قرنق ( اعادة فتح الملف) فرضية سوء الاحوال الجوية ضحك علي العقول

حالة الطقس في اقليم طيران عنتبي ( عنتبي و ما جاورها في نطاق 75 ميل -حوالي 50 ميل بحري ) عند قيام الطائرة

History for Entebbe, Uganda
on Saturday, July 30, 2005
Jump to data by:
Date: January February March April May June July August September October November December 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996
Airport Code:
Latest visited Airport Codes: HUEN | 63612
« Previous Day Daily | Weekly | Monthly | Custom | Trip Planner Next Day »


Daily Summary
Actual Average Record
Temperature
Mean Temperature 73 °F / 22 °C -
Max Temperature 77 °F / 25 °C - - ()
Min Temperature 68 °F / 20 °C - - ()
Cooling Degree Days 8
Growing Degree Days 23 (Base 50)
Moisture
Dew Point 66 °F / 18 °C
Average Humidity 82
Maximum Humidity 94
Minimum Humidity 73
Precipitation
Precipitation 0.00 in / 0.00 cm - - ()
Sea Level Pressure
Sea Level Pressure 30.06 in / 1018 hPa
Wind
Wind Speed 10 mph / 16 km/h (NNE)
Max Wind Speed 12 mph / 19 km/h
Max Gust Speed -
Visibility 6 miles / 10 kilometers
Events


Key: T is trace of precipitation, MM is missing value
Source: NWS Daily Summary


Show full METARS (help) - Comma Delimited File
Time(EAT) Temperature Dew Point Humidity Sea Level Pressure Visibility Wind Direction Wind Speed Gust Speed Precipitation Events Conditions
9:00 AM 69.8 °F / 21.0 °C 64.4 °F / 18.0 °C 83% - / - 5.6 miles / 9.0 kilometers North 11.5 mph / 18.5 km/h - N/A Scattered Clouds
10:00 AM 73.4 °F / 23.0 °C 66.2 °F / 19.0 °C 78% - / - 5.6 miles / 9.0 kilometers North 11.5 mph / 18.5 km/h - N/A Scattered Clouds
12:00 PM 77.0 °F / 25.0 °C 68.0 °F / 20.0 °C 74% 30.12 in / 1020 hPa 7.0 miles / 10.0 kilometers NNW 9.2 mph / 14.8 km/h - N/A Scattered Clouds
2:00 PM 75.2 °F / 24.0 °C 68.0 °F / 20.0 °C 78% 30.06 in / 1018 hPa 5.6 miles / 9.0 kilometers NNW 6.9 mph / 11.1 km/h - N/A Scattered Clouds
4:00 PM 75.2 °F / 24.0 °C 66.2 °F / 19.0 °C 73% 30.04 in / 1017 hPa 7.0 miles / 10.0 kilometers SE 5.8 mph / 9.3 km/h - N/A Mostly Cloudy
6:00 PM 73.4 °F / 23.0 °C 66.2 °F / 19.0 °C 78% 30.04 in / 1017 hPa - East 10.4 mph / 16.7 km/h - N/A Overcast
8:00 PM 69.8 °F / 21.0 °C 66.2 °F / 19.0 °C 88% 30.06 in / 1018 hPa 7.0 miles / 10.0 kilometers East 5.8 mph / 9.3 km/h - N/A Mostly Cloudy
10:00 PM 69.8 °F / 21.0 °C 64.4 °F / 18.0 °C 83% 30.06 in / 1018 hPa 7.0 miles / 10.0 kilometers North 5.8 mph / 9.3 km/h - N/A Overcast
11:00 PM 68.0 °F / 20.0 °C 66.2 °F / 19.0 °C 94% 30.09 in / 1019 hPa 7.0 miles / 10.0 kilometers North 5.8 mph / 9.3 km/h - N/A Overcast
Astronomy
[Extended View] [Normal View]
July 30, 2005 Sun Rise Sun Set
Actual Time 6:53 AM EAT 7:00 PM EAT
Civil Twilight 6:31 AM EAT 7:21 PM EAT
Nautical Twilight 6:05 AM EAT 7:47 PM EAT
Astronomical Twilight 5:40 AM EAT 8:12 PM EAT
Moon (7/30) 2:01 AM EAT (7/30) 2:25 PM EAT
Length of Day: 12h 07m
Length Of Visible Light: 12h 51m
Moon Phase: Waning Crescent, 28% of moon illuminated
Star Chart
7 / 30 8 / 5 8 / 13 8 / 19 8 / 26
New First Quarter Full Last Quarter


- Definitions of Astronomy

ما يهمنا هنا مدي الروئية و سرعة الرياح و السحب المنخفضة

2:00 PM 75.2 °F / 24.0 °C 68.0 °F / 20.0 °C 78% 30.06 in / 1018 hPa 5.6 miles / 9.0 kilometers NNW 6.9 mph / 11.1 km/h - N/A Scattered Clouds


عند قيام الطائرة


مدي الرؤيا تسعة كيلوميتر
الضغط الجوي 1018(يحدد ارتفاع الطائرة قياسا بمستوي سطح البحر)

السقف الجوي يوضح وجود سحب متفرقة
سرعة الرياح حوالي عشرة عقد

الأجهزة الملاحية الموجودة علي طائرة الرئاسة اليوغندية
THE OMEGA NAIVIGATIONAL SYSTEM

جهاز ملاحة جوية الكتروني يتم تغذيته بمعلومات نقطتي القيام و الوصول قبل قيام الطائرة يعمل بمساعدة نظام الGPS
THE ADF
OR THE AUTOMATIC DIRECTION FINDER

عبارة عن بوصلة ذات تذبذب عالي يلتقط الاشارات من محطة ارضية )محطة مطار لدوار الكيني) في حالة الطائرة المنكوبة وهو يبعد حوالي 45 كيلو من معسكر NEW SITE

ACAS - Aircraft Collision Avoidance System: Early relative of the now operational TCAS (Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance

System) which warns pilots of potential conflicts with other aircraft

جهاز تحذير حالة اقتراب الطائرة من اي جسم في خط الطيران المتبع

SIGMET - Significant Meteorological Advisory: Broadcast to pilots advising them of, for example, thunderstorms or heavy turbulence

هذه النشرة الجوية الخاصة بالطيران يتم بثها عند توقع حدوث زوابع رعدية او اي ظاهرة طقسية من شأنها التأثير علي سلامة الطائرة

(بحثت عن وجود هذه النشرة في ملفات مطاري عنتيبي و لودوار فلم اعثر علي ما يدل علي بثهما)

يتم الطيران في حالات الطيران المنخفض8500 feet or below
اما عن طريق الـطيران المرئ VFR حيث يعتمد الطيار علي مدي الرؤيا وتتبع خط اساسه العلامات الأرضية مثل المدن و الجبال و الانهار و تتبعها حتي الوصول

او الإعتماد الكلي علي اجهزة الملاحة
يمكن معرفةكيف تم طيران الطائرة المنكوبة من تسجيلات برج المراقبة او ال FILED FLIGHT PLAN
او من الصندوق الاسود ان وجد
DFDR - Digital Flight Data Recorder: Records hundreds of performance parameters while an aircraft is in flight, too often used to determine what went wrong. Records 1/2 hour of data on a digital "loop" format

Lodwar, Kenya Page
World:Kenya:Rift Valley ProvinceLatitude 3.1167 Longitude 35.6000 Altitude (feet) 1568
Lat (DMS) 3° 7' 0N Long (DMS) 35° 36' 0E Altitude (meters) 477
Time zone (est) UTC+3
Approximate population for 7 km radius from this point: 942

نيو سايت يبعد حوالي 45 كيلو عن مطار لودوار و يعتبر مطار مناوب في حالة تعذر الهبوط في نيوسايت هيليبورت


Nearby Cities and Towns
West North East South
Kakuma (56.8 nm)
Lorugumu (25.2 nm) Lokwakangole (30.8 nm) Angorangora (31.4 nm)
Loichangamatak (29.2 nm)
Muriling (44.7 nm)

Nearby airports:Code IATA Name City Distance Bearing Airlines
HKLO LODWAR 0 nm E 58

مميزات طائرة رئاسة الجمهورية اليوغندية

Mi-17 [Mi-8MT] HIP H
The MI-17 is a multirole helicopter used to resupply CLF guerrillas or insert PSOC detachments. It can also be very heavily armed with an extensive array or rockets, misslies and guns. It is often used to air assault infantry forces to attack the point of penetration, reinforce units in contact or disrupt counterattacks. Additional missions include; attack, direct air support, electronic warfare, airborne early warning, medevac, search and rescue, and minelaying.

The Mi-17 helicopter, developed at the Mil Design Bureau from the Mi-8 helicopter, is in serial manufactured at the Kazan Helicopter Production Association. The designation Mi-17 is for export; the Russian armed forces called it Mi-8MT. The Mi-17 can be recognized because it has the tail rotor at the starboard side, instead of the port side. The Mi-17 added a number of improvements to its predecessor, including a vibration damper to increase comfort for crew members and passengers. The helicopter features a high thrust-to-weight ratio pair of TVZ-117MT or TVZ-117VM shaft-turbine engines with a takeoff power of 1,900 hp. The Mi-17 is capable of single-engine flight in the event of loss of power by one engine (depending on aircraft mission weight) because of an engine load sharing system. If one engine fails, the other engine’s output is automatically increased to allow continued flight.

The Mi-17 is capable of carrying cargoes in the cabin (including long cargo) with half-open or removed doors, external loads, or passengers (24 people). The Mi-17 can carry up to 30 troops and up to 20 wounded; it can also be used for in-flight unloading of special cargoes. The transport version of the MI-17 helicopter is intended to carry cargoes (loads) in the cargo compartment, including long-size cargo with partially- opened or removed cargo doors, external loads, or executives (up to 24 persons). Interior seats are removable for cargo carrying. The rear clamshell doors open, an internal winch facilitates loading of heavy freight. Floor has tiedown rings throughout. The aircraft carries a rescue hoist capable to 150 kg.

External stores are mounted on weapons racks on each side of the fuselage. The Mi-17 has six external hardpoints. The Mi-17 is provided with missiles, bombs, small arms and cannons. It carries four missile launchers of the B8V20 type, with missiles launched with the aid of an on-board PUS-31-71 electrical fire control system. The BDZ-57KRVM bomb carrier is used for the attachment of bombs up to 500kg. Not all vailable munitions are employed at one time, mission dictates weapon configuration. The helicopter carries four UPK-23-250 gun containers with GSh-23L 23mm guns and pivoted mounts (eight units). The forward and aft hemispheres are protected by PKT machine-guns with independent power supply and remote control circuits.


The helicopter may be provided with longrange communication equipment and a radar, and it can carry equipment with phased-array antennas for suppression of enemy electronic attack and air defence facilities, such as airborne radars, air defence (artillery) weapons control radars, surveillance and target detection radars and missile radar homing #########. The ECM equipment can work both in the reconnaissance and ECM modes or in the reconnaissance mode.
VARIANTS
Mi-17: A mid-life upgrade of the widely proliferated Mi-8 HIP H medium assault/ transport helicopter. Initially, only the export version was known as the Mi-17. The only visible differences between this variant and the older Mi-8s is that the tail rotor is on the portside rather than the starboard side, and crew armor plating.
Mi-17P: A descendent of the HIP K airborne jamming platform characterized by large rectangular antennas along the aft fuselage. The Mi-17P (Mi-8MTPB `Hip-K derivative') is provided with long-range communication equipment and a radar, and it can carry equipment with phased-array antennas for suppression of enemy electronic attack and air defence facilities, such as airborne radars, air defence (artillery) weapons control radars, surveillance and target detection radars and missile radar homing #########. The ECM equipment can work both in the reconnaissance and ECM modes or in the reconnaissance mode.
Mi-171/-17M/-17V: Also known as Mi-8MTV, and a descendent of the HIP H. The engines are upgraded to 2x 2,070-shp Klimov TV3-117VMAs to allow greater rates of climb and hover ceilings, yet performance characteristics remain virtually unchanged from the baseline Mi-17.

Specifications
Country of Origin Russia
Builder Mil
Date of Introduction 1981 (as Mi-17)
Role
Similar Aircraft
Length Length (rotors turning): 25.4 meters
Length (fuselage): 18.4 meters
Height 5.7 meters
Width 2.5 meters
Main Rotor Diameter 21.3 meters
Tail Rotor Diameter 3.9 meters
Cargo Compartment Dimensions Floor Length: 5.3 meters
Width: 2.3 meters
Height: 1.8 meters

Weight Maximum Gross: 13,000 kg
Normal Takeoff: 11,100 kg
Empty: 7,100-7,370 kg (variant dependant)
Blades Main rotor: 5
Tail rotor: 3
Engine 2x 1,950-shp Isotov TV3-117MT turboshaft
Fuel Internal: 445 liters
Internal Aux Tank: 915 liters ea.
External Fuel Tank:
Port Tank: 745 liters
Starboard Tank: 680 liters
Maximum speed 250 km/h
Cruising speed 240 km/h
Range Normal Load: 495 km
With Aux Fuel: 1,065 km
Ceiling Service: 5,000-5,700 meters (variant dependant)
Hover (out of ground effect): 1,760 meters
Hover (in ground effect): 1,900-3,980 meters (variant dependant)
Vertical Climb Rate 9 m/s
Armament 2x 7.62-mm or 1x 12.7-mm MG
4-6 - AT-2C or AT-3 ATGMs
4-6 - 57-mm rocket pods (16 each)
2 - 80-mm rocket pods (20 each)
4 - 250-kg bombs
2 - 500-kg bombs
1 - 12.7-mm MG pod
2 - Twin 23-mm gun pods
1,830 - Additional fuel tanks (liters)
Most Probable Armament: fitted with 2x 7.62-mm machineguns or possibly 2x 23-mm GSh-23 gun packs in cabin, 57-mm rockets, and AT3/SAGGER ATGMs.

Loaded combat troops can fire personal weapons through cabin windows from inside cabin.

Standard Payload Internal load: 4,000 kg
External on sling only: 3,000 kg
Transports 24 troops and cargo, or
armaments on 6x external hardpoints.
Survivability/Countermeasures Main and tail rotor blades electrically deiced. Infrared jammer, chaff and flares.
AVIONICS The Mi-17 is equipped with instruments, avionics, Doppler radar, and a fully functioning autopilot for operation in day, night, and instrument meteorological conditions.
Crew 3 (2x pilots, 1x flight engineer)
Cost
User Countries At least 22 countries

محور لودور نيوسايت عنتبي يوم السبت 30 يوليو 2005





ضغط جوي منخفض

درجة حرارة معتدلة

سرعة رياح تتأرجح بين 5 و 20 عقدة ( مثالية للطيران البصري)

الاخ الفاضل ابراهيم
آسف للمقاطعة ومتابعين معاك....سأرد لاحقا..
مع الود الاحترام

من تقرير صحيفة النيويورك تايمز
الذي فضح الحكومة اليوغندية بأشارته عن عدم صلاحية الطائرة الرئاسية
chopper, in which the Sudanese first Vice President Lt. Gen. Dr John Garang met his death, was involved in six 'crash incidents' eight months earlier and was not airworthy.

Garang was returning to his base in New Site, southern Sudan, after holding talks with Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni.


According to a source close to Uganda's Presidential Guard Brigade who spoke to this reporter on condition of anonymity, the latest crash was in a potato garden in Wakiso district and involved the Ugandan President, Yoweri Museveni.

Yesterday The Monitor also reported that the parliamentary committee on Presidential and Foreign Affairs had recommended the purchase of a new chopper instead of overhauling the one that took Garang's life. The Paper quoted an MP and member of the Presidential and Foreign Affairs' committee, Mr. Aggrey Awori, saying "This helicopter had structural problems. It was unfit to fly at night. I told the State House Comptroller [Richard Muhinda] that we should buy a new helicopter at $5 million but he insisted that they could repair it for $2.5 million", adding, "I told him [Muhinda] that they were taking a chance with the President's life. I even argued with the Presidential Guard Brigade [PGB] recently over the same issue."

However, in a telephone interview Ugandan Defense and Army Spokesman, Lt. Col. Shaban Bantariza said that the allegations of six crash incidences involving the fateful chopper were a hoax. "Dismiss the rumours. That is not true. Not true at all," Bantariza emphasised.

Bantariza further dismissed allegations that the chopper's flying hours had expired. "The helicopter had been overhauled about a month ago. Now it has a flight time of eight years," he said.

"I don't have the figures of the helicopters flight time before it was taken for re-servicing. But normally the pilots and other flight technical teams notify the Army Commander about the need for overhauling the helicopter and the latter endorses it. This is what happened to the helicopter in which Garang crashed," Bantariza added.

However, a source close to the Ugandan Ministry of Defense told this reporter that after its involvement in the six crash incidents, the chopper was put on hold for the last eight months until it was cleared to airlift Gen. Garang to New Site in the Sudan.

After the death of Dr. Garang the Ugandan president Mr. Yoweri Museveni issued a statement saying, "It has now been confirmed that our dear brother, Dr John Garang, 1st Vice President of the Sudan and President of Southern Sudan, with others, died in a helicopter crashâ-oeHe was aboard our Presidential helicopter M1-172 (VIP version) piloted by Colonel Nyakairu and Capt. Kiyimba. Major Kigundu was the flight Engineer. The helicopter was a recently overhauled executive helicopter that has served us well for the last 8 yearsâ-oeI have decided to create a panel of three (3) experts to look into this crash. The Minister of Transport will name the team. We have also approached a certain foreign government to rule out any form of sabotage or terrorism", the statement seen by The New Times reads in part.

Media reports indicate that the presidential chopper that killed the founder and leader of the twenty three-year SPLM/A rebel organization crashed in southern Sudan due to poor weather conditions. The Nation and The East African Standard had reported that after realizing that the weather was bad and the helicopter couldn't land, the pilots wanted to fly back to Entebbe but the chopper lacked sufficient fuel.

In the interview Bantariza also dispelled assertions that the chopper could have been brought down by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), a rebel outfit that has been fighting the government of President Yoweri Museveni for the last eighteen years.

"LRA rebels have no technology to shoot down the ultra-modern presidential chopper. The crash wasn't in their area of operation. The crash was in the far east of Imatong hills. Far away from the rebels," Bantariza said. During his meeting with President Museveni Gen. Garang gave an ultimatum to Joseph Kony's LRA to leave southern Sudan.

"Kony doesn't have the capacity to shoot the helicopter at night. He wasn't even in the area of the crash," said Bantariza.

Asked whether the helicopter was junk, Bantariza replied: "The helicopter had been functional and in better condition and had just been overhauled about a month ago." He added that president Museveni had been using the chopper while touring parts of northern Uganda, recently.

When contacted over the matter the Ugandan Presidential Guard Brigade (PGB) Spokesman Lt. Edison Kwesiga, told this reporter that the presidential chopper had never been involved in any crash incidents as alleged. "Not true. Not true. Learn from me the helicopter has never crashed," Kwesiga said.

The presidential chopper belonging to the Ugandan military crashed into the mountainous terrain of Imatong hills, killing all 14 people on board that included seven crew members and six companions.

According to the Uganda Defense Ministry Website, "Gen.Garang had been in Uganda for a two-day official visit. On Saturday he left President Yoweri Museveni's country home in Rwakitura, Mbarara where Museveni introduced him to envoys who included the US Ambassador Mr. Jimmy Kolker, Mr. Tore Gjos of Norway, Mrs. Yoke Brandt of the Netherlands and British High Commissioner, Mr. Francois Gordon.

من الذي اخفي هذه الاجهزة المهمة و التي هي المرجع في حوادث الطائرات؟



Quote: وكشف (سراج الدين) عن إختفاء بعض أجهزة الطائرة مثل جهاز الخرائط، وجهاز آخر يوضح مدى ارتفاع الطائرة عند وقوع الحادث..!! يذكر أن (أوغندا) كانت قد أرسلت (جنرالاً) كان يشغل مقعد الجيش الأوغندي بصحبة آخرين إلى (نيو سايت) ومنه إلى موقع تحطم المروحية مباشرة بعد إعلان مقتل الدكتور (قرنق).

دفتر الأحوال الميكانيكية الارضي log book (في العادة ان هناك نسختين احداهما علي الطائرة والآخر في القسم الهندسي)
تسجيلات المراقبة الجوية لمطار عنتبي او المحطة الأرضية التي كانت تتولي الإتصال بالطائرة
نسخة برنامج الرحلةthe flight plan
الصندوق الاسود ان وجد
جهاز التسجيل الصوتي لكابينة القيادةthe cockpit voice recorder
تقارير الطقسthe enroute terminal forcast
وصل تموين الوقود
شهادة صلاحية الطيران the airworthness certificate
عينة من حطام الطائرة للكشف عن متبقيات اي متفجرات
استيضاحات شهود العيان بدء من حاملي العفش وتموين المرطبات واي شهود آخرين


وقوع الحادث داخل الأراضي السودانية يعطي حق التحقيق لحكومة السودان حسب اتفاقية الطيران الدولية ويعطي حق المشاركة ليوغندا بإعتبار ان الطائرة تابعة لها

الفرضيات
فرضية رداءة الطقس وتأثيره علي سلامة الطائرة
فرضية العطل الميكانيكي
فرضية الإصابة بنيران ارضية
فرضية وجود مواد ناسفة علي متن الطائرة
فرضية نفاد الوقود
فرضية الإصتدام بالجبال
فرضية وقوع أعمال عنف داخل الطائرة
فرضية العبث بأجهزة الطائرة الملاحيةnavigational aids calibaration settings وهذه الفرضية الأخيرة هي التي استمد منها موسفيني تصريحاته الأخيرة

ايوا يا استاذ ابراهيم عدلان ما وصلنا لجديد عايزين نعرف الراجل دا مات فعلا مقتول ولا الحادث عرضي
حسب التقارير الشفناها بيقولوا لسوء الاجواء بس الناس بتقول انها مكيدة امريكية بالتامر مع ناس من الحركة عايزين نعرف الحقيقة

الأخ العزيز ابراهيم لك تحياتي واشواقي وسائلين منك بشده
بخصوص الموضوع فانا عندي ملاحظه تبدأ من مداخلتك قبل الأخيره

Quote: من الذي اخفي هذه الاجهزة المهمة و التي هي المرجع في حوادث الطائرات؟ Quote: وكشف (سراج الدين) عن إختفاء بعض أجهزة الطائرة مثل جهاز الخرائط، وجهاز آخر يوضح مدى ارتفاع الطائرة عند وقوع الحادث..!! يذكر أن (أوغندا) كانت قد أرسلت (جنرالاً) كان يشغل مقعد الجيش الأوغندي بصحبة آخرين إلى (نيو سايت) ومنه إلى موقع تحطم المروحية مباشرة بعد إعلان مقتل الدكتور (قرنق).

اظن المقصود هنا الجهاز المعروف بال Radio Altimeter والذي يقيس الأرتفاع بنظريه الرادار
ويقوم بالقياس بدرجه يعتمد عليها حتى ارتفاع 5000 قدم من سطح الارض والذي يعتمد عليه في حالات الطيران المنخفض وفوق الجبال وفي راي هو الذي تم اللعب عليه او تعطيله ليعطي قراءات خاطئه
وايضا اللعب علي ال Altimeter العادي لاعطاء قراءات خاطئه ايضا وارد.. ياريت لو تتحصل علي
تقرير اللجنه الوطنيه وتراجعه لتكتشف اشياء مذهله عن عدم الدرايه والتخبط والطريقه الفجه
التي اقحمت في التقرير لابعاد الشبهة عن تورط النظام.. وعدم اتباع الطرق العلميه المعروفه في التحقيق وبالتالي لن تجد اي اشاره للتوصل لاي نتيجه عن اي جزئيه تم التحقيق فيها..وبجيك راجع
ولك مودتي
عزالدين
في حوادث الطائرات

Quote: ياريت لو تتحصل علي تقرير اللجنه الوطنيه وتراجعه لتكتشف اشياء مذهله عن عدم الدرايه والتخبط والطريقه الفجه التي اقحمت في التقرير لابعاد الشبهة عن تورط النظام.. وعدم اتباع الطرق العلميه المعروفه في التحقيق وبالتالي لن تجد اي اشاره للتوصل لاي نتيجه عن اي جزئيه تم التحقيق فيها..وبجيك راجع

حصلت على التقرير وهو من أربعين صفحة(باللغة الانجليزية)وسأقوم بنشرة إذا تفضل الاخ ابراهيم وطلب ذلك..(ربما لدية تسلسل منطقى للاحداث ولا يريد قطعة)وعلى العموم جاهزين وتحت الخدمة..
تحياتى

الاخ ابوادريس
احاول هنا اثبات ان فرضية سوءالاحوال الجوية لا اساس لها من الصحة و قرائن احوال الطقس تدحضها

الاخ مكي ارجو انزال تقرير اللجنة الوطنية

للأهمية والشكر للعزيز إبراهيم عدلان

THE REPORT PART -1

http://www.sudancommission.org/downloads/Part_One.pdf

بل ان هناك ثمة شخص نزل فى مطار عنتيبى
اختفى هذا الشخص ولم تشر له التقارير حتى الان
ماهى علاقته بالدكتور
من هو ؟ لماذا نزل فى عنتيبى ؟
وكيف تسنى له ركوب طائرة رئاسية فى المقام الاول ؟
ماهى جنسيته؟
هل هو سودانى ام يوغندى ؟
الاجابة عن كل هذه الاسئلة وغيرها هى مفتاح اللغز
هذا الشخص حدثنا عنه احد شهود العيان
اضف الى ذلك حين تتايع التقرير لا تجد وضوحا فى كثير من مبنياته
لاننى على صعيد شخصى قمت بترجمة التقرير ابان عملى فى صحيفة الخرطوم العام الفائت
ولم نلمح اى ما يفيد سوى ان الطقس هو المسؤول عن تحطم الطائرة ؟؟؟؟
وظل هذا السؤال يلاحقنى لماذا وفى هذا التوقيت بالتحديد؟

Just before his April 30, 2007 suspicious death,
Brig. Noble Mayombo was doing a complex investigation into the equally suspicious July 30, 2005 death of Col. John Garang the president of southern Sudan who died in a helicopter crash on his way from Rwakitura.

Mayombo’s draft finding was that Museveni’s Mi-172 chopper in which Garang died was actually brought down-and never crashed due to bad weather as it is conventionally believed. Instead, Mayombo’s preliminary finding was that Garang’s death was a carefully choreographed assassination.

Mayombo’s theory was that Garang could have been bumped off by extremist elements within the Khartoum regime who bitterly feared that the south under Garang would soon secede.
Mayombo maintained that these elements had all along been looking for Garang to kill him and that they even wanted to kill him in Nairobi on the eve of the January 9, 2005 signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the long civil war.

Mayombo maintained that Garang had come to Rwakitura with a bomb/fireproof briefcase in which he carried essential documents because he knew he was a target for these elements. Garang’s wife Rebecca recently re-echoed this assassination theory when she said her husband was actually killed. But our purpose today is not to reopen this controversy. Rather our purpose is to show you how a preliminary report into the death of Mayombo says his demise could be associated with that of Garang.

Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1. Introduction
1.1.1 This is the final report of the Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission on
the probable cause of the crash of JSC Kazan helicopter M i -172 AF 615 which claimed the
life of the First Vice President of the Sudan and the President of the Government of Southern
Sudan, Dr. John Garang de Mabior and 12 other persons on board, at Zulia Mountain Range,
Northern Uganda, on 30 July 2005.
1.1.2 The report consists of three parts. Part I of the report deals with the appointment,
mandate, objectives and the approach and methodology of the Sudan National Inquiry and
Investigation Commission. It also includes chapter on Activities and Actions of the
Commission and the interviews conducted. Part II is solely dedicated to the entire report of
the Joint International Technical Committee (JITC), comprised of the Sudan, Uganda, Kenya
and the United States of America. US representative, Mr. Dennis Jones, led the JITC as the
Investigator –in-Charge.
1.1.3 The Report was completed and signed by the representatives of the states members of
the JITC and delivered to the Sudan – Uganda Joint Investigation Commission on Tuesday 4
April, 2006, the body of which represents the entirety of part II hereof. Part III of this report
deals with the overall recommendations, which the Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation
Commission thought necessary to bring to the Government in order to avoid future accidents.
As such, there are chapters dealing with limitations, future trends in relevant accident
Investigations and recommendations as to operation of the presidential flights, in addition to
the overall recommendations to aviation industry in the Sudan.

1.2. Appointment of Sudan Commission
1.2.1 At about 7.09pm of Saturday 30 July 2005, the Sudanese nation lost their First Vice
President of the Republic (FVP), Dr. John Garang de Mabior in the crash of the Ugandan
Presidential Helicopter MI-172 inside Uganda, 8 kilometers from the Sudan-Ugandan
borders. Dr. John Garang de Mabior was then returning from a short private visit to Uganda
and heading for New Site in Southern Sudan. He was with an entourage of five Sudanese:
(two communication officers, three guards) and seven Ugandan nationals, composed of two
pilots, one flight engineer, a flight attendant, one protocol officer, one signalist and one
guard.
1.2.2 On the 8th day of August 2005 the President of the Republic of the Sudan, Field
Marshal Omer Hassan Ahmed El Bashir issued a Presidential Decree No. 179/2005, forming
a Commission of Inquiry and Investigation into the causes and conditions of the crash, “this
commission is referred to throughout this report as the Sudan Commission”. The Presidential
Decree No. 179/2005 was issued pursuant to article 58(1) of the Interim National
Constitution of the Republic of the Sudan 2005 and in accordance with article 3(1) of the
Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1954.
1.2.3 The former Vice President of the Sudan, Mr. Abel Alier was appointed Chairman of the
Sudan Commission with six members, representing the central Government and the Sudan
People’s Liberation Movement /Army. The members are:
2
Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE
- Prof. Shamboul Adlan Mohamed;
- Major General, Engineer El Haj El Khidir Ahmed;
- Ambassador Sirajuddin Hamid Yousuf;
- Major General (SPLA) Gier Chuang Aluong;
- Mr. Dengtiel Ayuen Kur;
- Brigadier General (SPLA) Aleu Ayieny Aleu;
1.2.4 Presidential Decree number 179/2005 co-opted the SPLM/A team formed on 02 August
2005 by the First Vice President Lt. General Salva Kiir Mayardit, Chairman of the SPLM
and SPLA Commander- in –Chief.

1.3. Mandate of the Sudan Commission
Mandate of the Sudan Commission
1.3.1 The terms of reference of the Sudan Commission as contained in the Presidential
Decree No. 179/2005 are to carry out a full inquiry and investigation into the causes and
conditions that led to the fall and crash of the helicopter and the death of all on board,
including:
- Inquiry and investigation about the condition of the helicopter at the time of take-off
from the technical point of view;
- Inquiry and investigation about all precautions taken for safe flight and compliance
with safety requirements for the loss flight;
- Inquiry and investigation into the causes leading to the cut of communication between
the Air traffic Control Tower and the helicopter and what measures were taken
subsequently;
- Inquiry and investigation into the measures taken in the search for the helicopter and
how the location of the crash was accessed;
- Inquiry and investigation into the causes leading to the crash of the helicopter,
location and the condition of the helicopter itself at the time it was found.
1.3.2 In carrying out its mission, the Sudan Commission was authorized by its terms of
reference to summon any person or persons to appear before it, should it have reason to
believe that such a person or persons might have any information that could be helpful in the
investigation. In addition, such a person or persons were required, before their statements
were taken, to be sworn in according to his/her religion, creed or beliefs. The Sudan
Commission was also empowered to:
- Request or order the handing over of papers, records, documents, exhibits and any
other field pointers that were necessary for the investigation,
- Request technical expertise from Sudan or other countries through available legal
channels, seek assistance from experts in aviation, weather, avionics and other safety
procedures that could be of assistance to Sudan Commission;
- Visit the site of take-off and the site of the crash or assign others to see and assess the
conditions and circumstances leading to the crash of the helicopter and the death of
all on board;
- Order the arrest of any person failing to appear before it without a convincing reason
after receiving summons,
- And to exercise all powers it deemed necessary for the successful discharge of its
mission in accordance with provisions of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1954.
1.3.4 The Chairman and members of the Sudan Commission took oath before the President
of the Republic Field Marshal Omer Hassan Ahmed El Bashir, First Vice President
3
Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE
Lieutenant General Salva Kiir Mayardit and the Chief Justice in Khartoum on 16 August
2005 this being in accordance with article six of Commissions of Inquiry Act 1954. In
accordance with the provisions Presidential Decree, No. 179/ 2005, the Sudan Commission
was required to present its report on the result of its inquiry and investigations to the
President of the Republic within one month from the commencement of its work. However,
the Sudan Commission was granted, at its request, several extensions to its mandate.
1.3.5 The Sudan Commission officially started its work on August 16, 2005 and continued
working until 17th April 2006. In discharging its responsibilities, the Sudan Commission
established its own rules of procedure and sought the expertise of a team of experts to form a
Technical Committee under it. The Technical Committee was composed of experts relevant
to the tasks to be discharged. It included surveyors, ballistics and explosives experts,
meteorologists and flight operations experts as follows:
- Brigadier Riak J. Machuor, SPLM/A representative, Uganda.
- Brigadier Abdul Rahman Mohamed , Inspector of Ammunition and Explosives.
-Engineer Sirekhatim Kambal, Consultant Engineer, Civil Aviation Authority.
- Colonel Police/Pilot Mohamed Azeim El Nour, Presidential Flight.
- Colonel Kamil Mohamoud El Bakri, Civil Aviation Authority.
- Captain John Manak Apac, Pilot.
- Brigadier Engineer ( R) Ali Elhussien Ahmed, University of Sudan
- Mr. Napoleon Adok Gai, SPLM/A IT Specialist.
- Mr. Mohammed Alamin Rustom, CAA, Khartoum.
- Mr. Musa Ahmed Fota, Meteorologist.
- Lieutenant Abu Elhassan Ali Idriss, Surveying Engineer.
- Lieutenant Mohamoud Abdelgadir Abdallah, Explosives and Propellant Engineer.
- Engineer Abdelrahim Mohamed Alamin, Avionics Engineer.
- Engineer Osama A. Rahman Adam, Surveyor Engineer.
- Mrs. Nazik Mohamed Abdulrahman ElGhazali, Head of Computer Section, Civil
Aviation Authority of the Sudan.
- Mr. Murtada Fayed, Administrator, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Khartoum.
- Mr. Mudawi Musa, Protocol, the Republican Palace.
- Mr. Mohamoud Sirelkhatim, Protocol, the Republican Palac

1.4. Objectives of the Sudan Commission
1.4.1 According to the mandate prescribed in the Presidential Decree 179/2005, the Sudan
Commission’s objectives are:
1.4.1.1 Generally and specifically, to achieve the aims of the mandate of the Presidential
decree,
1.4.1.2 Generally and specifically, to determine the cause of the crash of the Ugandan
Presidential Helicopter Mi 172 - AF 615 in the Zulia Mountain Range in the North East of
Uganda territory,
1.5. Approach and Methodology
1.5.1 In carrying out its responsibilities, the Sudan Commission resolved to:
- Visit the site of the crash,
- Visit Russia where the helicopter was manufactured, overhauled and collect relevant
data and analyze the same,
4
Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE
- Take the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) and the Flight Data Recorder (FDR), for a
read out in Russia,
- Conduct interviews with eyewitnesses, officials of the Ugandan Government,
soldiers, ministers and foreign Ambassadors where relevant,
- Work with others such as the Ugandan Government, the Kenyan Government and the
United States America Government, to the extent that the Commission’s mission may
be fully fulfilled.
- Adopt an analytical method of retrieving technical information and benefited from the
expertise of other parties that formed the Joint International Technical Committee
involved in the investigation, in order to give the investigation report, when
completed and released, the regional and international dimension it requires.
- Adopt standards and recommended practices laid down in Annex 13 of the Chicago
Convention.
1.5.2 In preparing to carry out its responsibilities the Sudan Commission quickly realized that
its terms of reference would not be fulfilled unless full cooperation of the Uganda
Government was secured, institutionalized and operationalized. The Sudan Commission had
to travel to and to operate in Uganda for the following reasons:
- The helicopter that crashed was Ugandan Government property. It was registered in
Uganda as AF 615.
- The helicopter took-off from a Ugandan Airport and crashed within Uganda.
- To gather information about the precautions taken for the safe flight and any
compliance with safety requirements for the helicopter operation were in Uganda.
- The Air Traffic Control Center in Entebbe Airport from which the helicopter took off
for New Site was in Uganda.
- Documents about the helicopter and the crew were in Uganda.
- The black boxes, the Flight Data Recorder (FDR) and the Cockpit Voice Recorder
(VCR) were in the possession and control of Uganda and SPLM in Uganda.
- It was found essential, for the purposes of transparency, justice and credibility, to
work not only with Uganda but also with others, Kenya in the region and the USA at
the international arena.
- The Sudan Commission adopted the standards and recommended practices laid down
in Annex 13 of the Chicago Convention, in the investigation.
1.5.3 At the time the Sudan Commission arrived in Uganda, technical teams from the SPLM,
the Government of Uganda, Kenya, the Russian Federation, the United Nations and USA had
already started (in New Site) investigating into the causes of the crash. The technical
committee, in addition to others, included the following:
- Mr. Dennis Jones, a US national and Chief Investigator from the US National
Transportation Safety Board.
- Mr. Peter Wakahia, Chief Accident Investigator, Kenya.
- Mr. John Ochang, Kenya Police Air Wing, Kenya.
- Mr. Peter Munyao, Accident Investigator, Kenya.
- Mr. Edgar Lopo, Kenya Air force, Kenya.
- Brigadier Riak Jeroboam, SPLM/A, Sudan.
- Aleu Ayieng, SPLM/A Military Engineer (Explosives and Ballistics).Sudan.
- Dr. Dau Aleer, SPLM/A, (Medical Expert). Sudan.
- Dr. Kuol Deng Kuol, SPLM/A, Sudan.
- Dr. Njue Moses Gachoki, Kenyan Government Chief Pathologist. Kenya.
5
Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE
- Mr. Kalistratov Yuri, Kazan Helicopters, the Russian Federation.
- Mr. Safarov Ra####, Kazan Helicopters, the Russian Federation.
- Mr. Manokha Peter, Kazan Helicopters, the Russian Federation
- Mr. Sebulika Busulwa, Uganda Civil Aviation Authority, Uganda.
- Mr. Barry Kashambo, Uganda Civil Aviation Authority, Uganda.
- Major Pascal Mangeni, Uganda Peoples Defence Force, Uganda.
- S/Sgt. G. T. Nakitale, Kenya Air Force, Kenya.
- Lieutenant Colonel Christian Ilonga, United Nations.
1.5.4 The Sudan Commission held its first meeting with the Ugandan Ministerial
Commission in Kampala on August 18, 2005 and both commissions decided to establish a
Joint Commission, co-chaired by the Chairpersons of both Commissions and assisted by a
joint international technical committee, composed of members from Sudan, Uganda, Kenya
and the United States of America. Mr. Dennis Jones, an American national representing the
National Transportation Safety Board of the United States, was appointed by the Joint Sudan-
Uganda Commission as the investigator–in-charge, with specific terms of reference. Mr.
Jones led the joint technical investigation as one of the members of The Joint International
Technical Committee. The Sudan Commission also agreed that the investigation would be
conducted under the guiding principles of Annex 13 of the Chicago Convention 1948 to
which the Sudan, Uganda, Kenya and the United States are signatories.
1.5.5 On 21 August 2005, the Sudanese technical committee visited the site of the crash of
the helicopter for survey, inspection, study and it rendered reports and findings. They also
met with the SPLA eyewitnesses, then present in New Cush and New Site at the time. These
technical experts, each in his field of expertise, prepared and made written reports to the
Sudan Commission. Copies of these reports were supplied to the Chairman of the Ugandan
Ministerial Commission and to the Investigator-in-Charge.
1.5.6 The Joint International Technical Committee continued its meetings in Entebbe through
out the period of the investigation. It examined various aspects relevant to the investigation
such as the helicopter airworthiness, meteorological aspects, human factors and air traffic
control. The committee also interviewed Air Force pilots, engineers, technicians and
administrators. It made a number of preliminary and progress reports to the Joint Sudan
Uganda Commission.
1.5.7 The Sudan Commission itself conducted interviews with leading and relevant figures in
Uganda, Sudan and Kenya, including some of the leadership of the SPLM/A, in Khartoum,
Juba (in Sudan), Kenya and Uganda.
6

Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE
CHAPTER TWO
THE ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT BY
THE SUDAN NATIONAL COMMISSION
2.1 On August 16, 2005, the Sudan Commission convened its first organizational meeting in
which the members met to know each other, took notice of and familiarized themselves with
the specifics of their mandate as contained in the Presidential Decree 197/2005.
2.2 On Monday, August 15, 2005, the Sudan Commission convened its second meeting in the
presence of all the seven members. In this meeting, the three officers representing the
SPLM/A briefed the Sudan Commission of the information they had about the helicopter
crash. They stated, inter alia, the following:
2.2.1 The debris of the crashed helicopter was discovered by officers and soldiers of
SPLM/A, on Sunday morning of July 31, 2005, at 8:45 am.
2.2.2 On Monday, August 2, 2005, the Chairman of SPLM and Commander- in
-Chief of the SPLA, HE Salva Kiir Mayardit issued a decree forming a technical
committee of four persons to investigate the crash. The committee consists of:
- Major General Gier Chuang Aluong.
- Mr. Dengtiel Ayuen Kur.
- Cde Riak Jeroboam Machuor.
- Cde Angok Majok Kuol.
2.2.3 The body of the late First Vice President was identified by SPLA soldiers at the
site of the crash and later confirmed by relatives and others close to him at New Site.
2.2.4 Identification of the rest of the bodies was completed on Monday, August 8,
2005 by a forensic team comprised of Uganda, Sudan (SPLM/A), Kenya and the
United States of America as evidenced by the statement signed by Major General
Gier Chuang from SPLM/A, Dr. Ruhakana Rugunda, Minister of Internal Affairs of
Uganda and Mr. Dennis Jones, Chief of Regional Operations and General Aviations
Division of the US National Transportation Safety Board. The funeral of the late First
Vice President and the rest of the Sudanese victims took place in Juba, on Saturday
August 6, 2005. Bodies of the Ugandan victims were handed over to the Uganda
Minister of the Interior at New Site, for burial in Uganda.
2.2.5 On appointment on Wednesday August 3, 2005, the SPLA investigation team
reported to New Site and conducted successive meetings, starting as of 8.8.2005 with
teams from Uganda, United States, Russia (Kazan representatives) and Kenya. These
other teams had also reported to New Site following an appeal by the SPLM/A,
Uganda and the Government of the Sudan for international support and assistance in
the investigation.
2.2.6 The technical committees visited the site of the crash in the presence of
observers from the United Nations on Friday August 12, 2005.
2.2.7 The SPLM/A and the Ugandan technical committees inspected the wreckage of
the crashed helicopter and rendered reports.
7
Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE
2.2.8 The three SPLM/A officers in their testimony attached a map, indicating the site
of the crash.
2.3 In the same meeting, Major General Engineer (R) El Haj El Khidir Ahmed, member of
Sudan Commission and Chairman of the Ministerial Investigation Committee formed by the
Minister of Aviation, briefed the Sudan Commission of the actions taken since establishment
of the Ministerial Committee, on Monday August1, 2005 and handed over to the Sudan
Commission satellite photographs of the site of the crash.
2.4 On Tuesday August 16, 2005, the Sudan Commission adopted its Rules of Procedure
(Appendix 1). In the same meeting, the Chairman of the Sudan Commission named the
members of the Sudan Commission who were to accompany the Black Boxes, the Flight
Data Recorder (FDR) and the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) to Russia, and also the
specialized technical committee, to be affiliated to the Sudan Commission.
2.5 On the evening of Tuesday August 16, 2005, the Chairman and members of the Sudan
Commission took oath before the President of the Republic, Field Marshal Omer Hassan
Ahmed El Bashir and the First Vice President Lieutenant General Salva Kiir Mayardit, in
Khartoum, in accordance with article 58(1) of the Interim National Constitution of the
Republic of the Sudan, 2005 and the provisions of section 3(1) of the Commissions of
Inquiry Act, 1954.
2.6 On the morning of Wednesday August 17, 2005 both the members of the Sudan
Commission and the members of its technical committee flew to Uganda being the place of
registration of the helicopter M I – 172, AF 615 and its place of the crash.
2.7 On Thursday, August 18, 2005 a joint meeting between the Sudan Commission and its
technical team took place and the nature of the mission and the mandate of the Sudan
Commission and the technical committee were explained and discussed. The necessary
guidelines were distributed to the following working groups:
2.7.1 The Surveyors Team.
2.7.2 The Explosives and Ballistics Team.
2.7.3 The Avionics and Navigation Team.
2.7.4 The Wreckage Area Team.
2.7.5 The Operations Team.
2.7.6 The Intelligence and eyewitnesses Team.
2.8 On the evening of Thursday August 18, 2005, the Sudan Commission met with the
Ugandan Ministerial Commission.
2.8.1 Ugandan Ministerial Commission members:
- Mr. John Nassasira, Minister of Transport, Housing and Communication.
- Mr. Dr. Rukahana Rugunda, Minister of the Interior.
- Mrs. Beatrice Wahudeya, Minister of the Presidency.
- Major General James Kazini, Ministry of Defence.
- Mr. Ambrose Akandonda, Director of Civil Aviation Authority and others.
In that meeting the two sides agreed on the methodology of joint work, which included:
8
Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE
2.8.2 Formation of the Sudan-Uganda Joint Commission to be chaired by both
chairperson of the Sudan Commission HE Abel Alier, and Chairman of the Uganda
Ministerial Commission Mr. John Nassasira.
2.8.3 The Joint Commission was to perform its functions through a joint international
technical committee comprised of both Sudan and Uganda in addition to others. The
Sudan Commission affirmed the appointment of Mr. Dennis Jones as investigator-incharge.
2.8.4 The two recording devices, namely the CVR and the FDR were to be dispatched
as speedy as possible to Russia for read out.
2.8.5 General cooperation and collaboration between the two Commissions was
agreed upon.
2.9 On Friday, August 19, 2005 the Joint Commission convened a joint press conference and
issued a joint press statement.
2.10 On Saturday August 20, 2005 the assisting joint technical team flew by a plane,
chartered by the Uganda Government to the site of the crash. On the morning of August 21,
2005 the team left New Site for New Cush and moved thereafter on foot to the site of the
crash.
2.11 On Monday August 22, 2005 the delegation of the Joint Sudan-Uganda Investigation
Commission and the joint technical committee traveled to Russia, carrying with them the two
recording devices (the FDR and the CVR). The delegation also included some members of
the joint technical committee from Kenya and the United States of America.
2.12 On Wednesday 24 August 2005 the joint technical committee delivered their reports on
their visit to the site of the crash as follows:
2.12.1 The Surveyors Report.
2.12.2 The Explosives and Ballistics Report.
2.12.3 The Intelligence and Eyewitnesses Report.
2.12.4 The Wreckage Area Report.
2.12.5 The Operations Report.
2.12.6 The Site Photographic Report.
2.13 On Wednesday, 24 August 2005 through to Friday 26 August 2006, the Joint
International Technical Committee representing Sudan, Uganda, Kenya and the United States
of America, continued their sessions on the retrieval of recordings from the CVR at the
specialized centre of the Interstate Aviation Committee in Moscow, Russia. (Appendix 2).
The Flight Data Recorder “FDR” was found burnt externally and internally and was thus
useless as a source of information. The CVR contained good quality information.
2.14 On Sunday, 27 August 2005, the Chairman of the Sudan Commission provided copy of
the preliminary report prepared by the Sudan technical committee to the chairman of the
Ugandan commission, and to the Investigator-in-Charge.
2.15 On Monday, 28 August 2005, the Sudan Commission received information from the
Embassy of the Sudan in Moscow about the crashed helicopter.
9
Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE
2.16 On Saturday, 31 August 2005, the Joint Sudan-Uganda Investigation Commission
convened a meeting for a general discussion of the report of the joint delegation to Russia on
the CVR and FDR recorders. The Joint Commission agreed to form joint sub-groups for the
completion of investigation, including transcription of the CVR.
2.17 On Thursday, September 1, 2005 the joint sub-groups started their work at Entebbe
Airport chaired by Mr. Dennis Jones. The sub-groups were divided as follows:
2.17.1 The Weather Group.
2.17.2 The ATC Group.
2.17.3 The Operations Group.
2.17.4 The Airworthiness Group.
2.18 On Monday, September 5, 2005, the representative of the Sudan Commission
Ambassador Sirajuddin Hamid interviewed the Ambassador of Norway in Kampala.
2.19 On Wednesday, September 7, 2005, a delegation from the Sudan Commission
comprised of its Chairman, Ambassador Sirajuddin Hamid and Mr. Napoleon Adok Gai met
with the American Ambassador in Kampala, Mr. Jimmy Kolker accompanied by his deputy,
Mr. William Fitzgerald and his counselor, Mr. Nathan Holt. The Sudan Commission
requested the US Ambassador to ask Mr. Dennis Jones to come to Kampala to join the Joint
International Technical Commission.
2.20 On Thursday, September 8, 2005, Ambassador Sirajuddin Hamid, member of Sudan
Commission, interviewed Mrs. Yoka Brandt, the Ambassador of the Royal Kingdom of the
Netherlands, in Kampala.
2.21 On Friday, September 9, 2005, a delegation from the Sudan Commission consisting of
its Chairman, Ambassador Sirajuddin Hamid and Mr. Napoleon Adok Gai interviewed the
Ugandan Minister, Mr. Agar Didi who saw off the First Vice President Dr. John Garang on
his Entebbe-New Site flight on 30 July 2005. Mr. Agar emphasized that the First Vice
President stayed in the airport for a brief time.
2.22 On Friday, September 9, 2005, in Nairobi a delegation from the Sudan Commission of
Investigation, consisting of its Chairman, Ambassador Sirajuddin Hamid and Mr. Napoleon
Adok Gai interviewed Mrs. Rebecca de Mabior, wife of the late Dr. John Garang de Mabior.
2.23 On the evening of Friday September 9, 2005 in Nairobi a delegation from the Sudan
Commission consisting of its Chairman, Ambassador Sirajuddin Hamid and Mr. Napoleon
Adok Gai interviewed three members of the medical team that identified, with the help of
relatives and those known to them, bodies of the 12 victims at New Site (the body of the late
Dr. John Garang had already been removed on the First of August). The doctors were Prof.
John Adwok, Dr. Dau Aleer and Dr. Kuol Deng Kuol. The number of victims of the crash
was identified as thirteen (13).
2.24 On the evening of Friday, September 9, 2005, the delegation of the Sudan Investigation
Commission issued a press release on the purpose of their visit to Nairobi in order to
complete and affirm the medical records of the Commission and to meet with the medical
team members.
2.25 On Saturday September 10, 2005, the Sudan Commission received the first draft of the
CVR transcription.
10

2.26 On Sunday September 11, 2005 the Sudan Commission received the Joint Sudan-
Uganda meteorological report on the status of weather on the day of the crash at both
Entebbe Airport and the site of the crash. (Appendix 3).
2.27 On Monday, September 12, 2005 the Sudan Commission received the Joint Sudan-
Uganda air traffic control report. (Appendix 4).
2.28 On Tuesday, September 13, 2005 the joint sub-group on Operations interviewed the 14th
passenger, Lieutenant Frank Kato who was asked by the crew to stay behind at Entebbe
Airport and did not proceed with the other passengers aboard the helicopter flight AF605 to
destination.
2.29 On Wednesday, 14 September 2006, the Chairman of the Sudan Commission addressed
a letter to the Chairman of the Ugandan Commission emphasizing the importance of handing
over the Helicopter Log Books to the concerned investigation team so that they could
continue with their work.
2.30 On Thursday, September 15, 2005 the Lieutenant Frank Kato was interviewed once
again by the Chairman of the Sudan Commission and Ambassador Sirajuddin Hamid. He
affirmed that he was the 14th passenger who remained behind on the Entebbe New Site flight.
2.31 On Thursday, September 15, 2005, Chairman of the Sudan Commission wrote to HE the
President of the Republic of the Sudan, seeking extension of the Mandate of Sudan
Commission.
2.32 On Friday, September 16, 2005 the Sudan Commission received the second draft of the
CVR transcription.
2.33 On Wednesday, September 21, 2005 the Chairman of the Sudan Commission notified
the members of the Sudan Commission of the approval of HE the President of the Republic
of the Sudan to extend the period of the Mandate of the Sudan Commission for an additional
period of three months.
2.34 On Thursday, September 22, 2005 the joint technical teams issued their preliminary
report for the period from 1.9.2005 to 21.9.2005. All parties to the investigation process
agreed on a recess of 15 days.
2.35 On Friday, September 23, 2005 the Sudan Commission left Kampala for Khartoum.
2.36 On September 26, 2005 the Chairman of the Sudan Commission addressed the Director
of the National Survey Department to avail the Sudan Commission with an official map for
the Sudan.
2.37 On Sunday, October 9, 2005 the Sudan Commission held in Khartoum a joint meeting
with members of the assisting technical team to discuss and evaluate the preliminary report
of the Joint Technical Teams.
2.38 On Monday, October 12, 2005 the Chairman of the Sudan Commission presented a
preliminary report on the work of the Sudan Commission to HE the President of the Republic
through the Minister of Presidential Affairs.
11
Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE
2.39 On Wednesday, October 12, 2005 the Sudan Commission left Khartoum for Kampala to
continue its work.
2.40 On Friday, October 14, 2005 the Joint Commission listened to a briefing from Mr.
Dennis Jones in his capacity as Investigator-in-Charge and he provided some examples of the
written reports of previous investigation commissions.
2.41 On Saturday, October 15, 2005 Mr. Dennis Jones, the Investigator-in-Charge filed a list
of 37 requirements demanded from the Government of Uganda so that the Joint International
Technical Committee could effectively continue to perform their work.
2.42 On October 15, 2005, the Uganda Air Force provided the technical documents
“Helicopter Log Books”, pertaining to the crashed helicopter.
2.43 On Saturday, October 15, 2005 the Investigator in Charge, Mr. Dennis Jones traveled
back to the United States for family reasons. The Kenyan Mr. Peter Wakahia took over as the
Acting Investigator- in - Charge.
2.44 On Sunday October 16, 2005 the Joint teams representing Sudan, Uganda and Kenya
met and decided to proceed with the work, based on three joint working groups as follows:
2.44.1 ATC/CVR Working Group.
2.44.2 Airworthiness Group.
2.44.3 Operations Group.
2.45 The joint working groups continued working until Thursday November 27, 2005 and
issued their preliminary progress report covering its work for the preceding period.
2.46 On October 30, 2005 members of the Sudan Commission returned home on the occasion
of Eid El Fitr.
2.47 On Thursday, November 10, 2005 the Chairman of the Sudan Commission issued a
press release on the progress of work of Sudan Commission.
2.48 On Friday, November 10, 2005 the Sudan Commission left Khartoum for Kampala,
Uganda for the third time.
2.49 On Sunday, November 13, 2005, the Sudan Commission held a meeting in Kampala in
which it named its representatives to the joint interviewing committees in Entebbe Airport’s
CAA offices; the committees were to interview some of the Ugandan leading personalities.
2.50 On Wednesday morning, November 16, 2005 the joint international investigation team
reviewed and agreed on the questions to be put to the Ugandan Chief of Protocol, the
Representative of the Presidential Press Unit in Uganda and the SPLM/A representative in
Uganda.
2.51 On Wednesday evening, November 16, 2005, the Sudan Commission interviewed the
Ambassador of Sudan to Uganda HE Hassan Jadkarim and his deputy Minister
Plenipotentiary Mr. Mohammed Isa Adam. The Sudan Commission received copy of the
memorandum delivered by Ambassador Hassan Jadkarim to the Government of Uganda
immediately after the helicopter crash.
12
Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE
2.52 On Thursday, November 17, 2005, and in accordance with the agreed programme, the
sessions of witness interviewing started with the following witnesses:
2.52.1 The Uganda Chief of Protocol HE Ambassador Ahmed Ssenyomo.
2.52.2 The Representative of SPLM/A in Uganda Brigadier Riak Machuor.
2.52.3 The head of the Ugandan Presidential Press Unit.
Sudan Commission was represented in this session by Ambassador Sirajuddin Hamid.
2.53 On Friday, November 18, 2005, and in accordance with the agreed programme, the
Ugandan Air Force Chief Pilot was supposed to appear before the interviewing committee
but failed to do so on more than one occasion.
2.54 On Tuesday, November 22, 2005, the Sudan Commission addressed a letter to the
Chairman of the Ugandan Ministerial Commission requesting him to assist the interviewing
committees to obtain information from departments of governments relevant to the
investigation.
2.55 On Wednesday, November 23, 2005, the representatives of the four countries
participating in the Joint International Technical Committee (Sudan, Uganda, Kenya and the
United States) met at Sheraton Hotel in Kampala and dealt with the following issues:
2.55.1 The problems which faced the interviewing committees during its work.
2.55.2 The importance of writing a progress report of the work so far completed.
2.55.3 Approval was made for the travel of Mr. Dennis Jones to the United States to
take with him the following equipments for further advanced laboratory testing
namely: the Pointed Circuit board for Weather Radar, the Radio Altimeter, the
Barometric Altimeter and a- not identified panel.
2.55.4 That Mr. Jones should conduct in the United States a sound spectrum analysis
of the CVR and to get information from Russia on pilots’ records of training and
related matters.
2.55.5 The Joint Sudan-Uganda approved that the Kenyan Mr. Peter Walkahai takes
over the responsibility of the Investigator in Charge and to continue with the work
until Christmas time when the teams would go for recess.
2.56 On Saturday, November 26, 2005, the Chairman of the Sudan Commission issued two
letters to the minister Gier Chuang requesting:
2.56.1 The names of Sudanese and Ugandans who were aboard the crashed
helicopter.
2.56.2 Any information on the three suit cases of the late First Vice President, which,
were left in Entebbe when he left for Rwakitura on 29th July.
2.57 From Saturday, November 26, 2005, until Wednesday December 7, 2005 the joint
international group continued transcription of the CVR through the third reading. At the end
of this period the group handed over the final signed copy of the CVR transcription to Sudan
Commission and Uganda Ministerial Commission.
2.58 On Thursday, December 1, 2005, the first interviewing session of the Ugandan Chief
Pilot took place before the joint international group in which Captain Pilot John Manak
represented the Sudan.
13
Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE
2.59 On Friday, December 2, 2005, the second interviewing session of the Ugandan Chief
Pilot took place.
2.60 On Saturday December 3, 2005 the Chairman of the Sudan Commission issued a letter
to the member of Sudan Commission, Minister Gier Chuang requesting the attendance of
three SPLM/A officers for interviewing.
2.61 On Sunday, December 4, 2005, Captain/ pilot Mohammed Azeim delivered to the
Sudan Commission at its request a diagram stating the distances of specific areas and towns
in and on the flight route of the crashed helicopter, from Entebbe to New Site. (Appendix 5).
2.62 On Monday, December 5, 2005, the international joint group interviewed the Ugandan
second pilot and two other engineers.
2.63 On Monday evening, December 5, 2005 the Sudan Commission held a meeting to
programme and discuss the schedule of interviewing sessions for some of the Sudanese top
officials in both the Government and SPLM/A.
2.64 On Wednesday, December 7, 2005, the Sudan Commission interviewed Brigadier Riak
Machuor, the SPLM/A Liaison officer in Uganda.
2.65 On Monday, December 12, 2005, the Investigator-in-Charge, Mr. Dennis Jones
submitted to the Sudan Commission a progress report covering the performance of the Joint
International Technical Committee for all the period through to the middle of December
2005. (Appendix 6).
2.66 On Thursday, December 15, 2005, the Joint Sudan Uganda Investigation Commission
convened a meeting in the office of Mr. John Nassasira for the discussion of the progress
report, prepared by the Investigator- in - Charge.
2.67 On Friday, December 16, 2005, the joint press release was signed by the Co-
Chairpersons of Joint Sudan-Uganda Investigation Commission on the condition that it
should be released only after the progress report was submitted to the Presidents of the
Republic in Sudan and Uganda.
2.68 On the evening of Friday, December 16, 2005, the Sudan Commission left Kampala for
Khartoum.
2.69 On Saturday, December 17, 2005, the Chairman of the Sudan Commission wrote to the
President of the Republic, requesting extension of the period of mandate of Sudan
Commission.
2.70 On Monday, December 19, 2005, the Sudan Commission prepared and agreed on the
questions to be directed to some of the Sudanese leading personalities.
2.71 On Tuesday, December 20, 2005, the former Minister of Presidential Affairs, Dr. El
Tayeb Ibrahim Mohammed Kheir was scheduled for interviewing but could not come as he
was on trip out of Khartoum.
14
Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE
2.72 On Tuesday, December 20, 2005, the Sudan Commission interviewed the former
Minister of Aviation, Mr. Ali Tameem Fartak, accompanied by assistants from the Civil
Aviation, namely Eng. Sirelkhatim Kambal and Captain Abdelmuuti Hussein.
2.73 On Wednesday, December 21, 2005, the Sudan Commission conducted interviews with:
2.73.1 Mr. Abdulbasit Sabdarat the former Minister for Information.
2.73.2 Major General Dr. El Tayeb Ibrahim Mohammed Kheir the former Minister
for Presidential Affairs.
2.73.3 The Sudan Commission requested the presence of General Police Essmat
Ahmed Babikir, Executive Director of the Presidential Palace to appear before it for
interview on arrangements for the trip of the First Vice President Dr. John Garang to
Rumbek and East Africa. General Essmat said he was not involved in the travel
arrangements.
2.73.4 The Sudan Commission caused to be published in the media, its preparedness
to interview any citizen who might wish to provide information relevant to the course
of investigation. Only one person responded to be interviewed
2.74 On Thursday, December 22, 2005, the Sudan Commission interviewed General Police
Essmat Ahmed Babikir, Executive Director of the Presidential Palace.
2.75 On Tuesday December 27, 2005 the Chairman of the Sudan Commission received a
letter from the Presidency extending the mandate of Sudan Commission.
2.76 On Wednesday, December 28, 2005:
2.76.1 The Chairman of the Sudan Commission issued a letter to the Minister of
Defence to appear before Sudan Commission.
2.76.2 The Sudan Commission received a compendium of the statements issued by
Mr. Abdulbasit Sabdarat on the issue of the helicopter crash.
2.76.3 The Sudan Commission represented by its Chairman and one of its members,
El Haj El Khidir, listened to the statement of the private citizen Atanasas Ochan.
2.77 On Thursday, December 29, 2005, the Chairman of the Sudan Commission received a
letter from the office of the First Vice President, regarding interviewing of some officers of
SPLM/A, previously requested by the Sudan Commission.
2.78 On Thursday, December 29, 2005, the Sudan Commission interviewed the Director of
the CAA Search & Rescue Department, Mr. Suleiman Abdelrahim. (Appendix 82).
2.79 On Saturday, December 31, 2005, the Sudan Commission interviewed Brigadier
General Yassir Saied Arman, SPLM/A spokesperson.
2.80 On Saturday, December 31, 2005, the Joint press communiqué of the Sudan Uganda
Joint Investigation Commission, signed on 16.12.2005 was released.
2.81 On Sunday, January 8, 2006, the Sudan Commission traveled to Juba and interviewed:
2.81.1 Mr. Nhial Deng Nhial, Minister, Government of Southern Sudan.
2.81.2 Mr. Paul Mayom Akech, Advisor, Government of Southern Sudan.
2.81.3 Brigadier Atem Aguang Atem.
2.81.4 Colonel Peter Gatwich.
2.81.5 Lieutenant Matiop Manyuon Adier.
15
Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE
2.82 The Chairman of the Sudan Commission wrote to Ambassador Hassan Jadkarim in
Kampala to convey a message to Mr. Dennis Jones through the US Embassy in Kampala and
to the Kenyan team, through the Kenyan High Commission in Kampala to keep the time
schedule to resume work on 14th February 2006.
2.83 On Wednesday, January 18, 2006, the Chairman of the Sudan Commission wrote to the
Advisor of the President, Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismail, requesting him to appear before the
Sudan Commission for interview.
2.84 On Saturday, January 28, 2006, the Sudan Commission interviewed Dr. Mustafa Osman
Ismail in his capacity as the former Minister of Foreign Affairs.
2.85 On Saturday, January 28, 2006, the Sudan Commission met with the assisting technical
committee to discuss the contents of the CVR transcription.
2.86 On Monday, January 30, 2006, the Sudan Commission interviewed the former Minister
of Defence General Bakri Hassan Salih. The interview centered on the arrangements made by
the Palace for the trip of the First Vice President to Rumbek and East Africa, role of the
Army in the search and rescue after disappearance and crash of the helicopter that carried the
First Vice President.
2.87 On Wednesday, February 1, 2006, the Sudan Commission met to discuss its master file.
2.88 On Saturday, February 11, 2006, the Sudan Commission, represented by Major General
El Haj Elkhidir and Captain / pilot John Manak interviewed Colonel Kamil El Bakri on the
satellite photographs.
2.89 On Thursday, February 16, 2006, the Sudan Commission represented by its Chairman
interviewed Lieutenant Taban Dejango Tombe in Juba. He affirmed under oath counting the
number of the victims of the helicopter crash as a total of thirteen.
2.90 The Sudan Commission received information that Mr. Dennis Jones would delay
coming to Kampala and that he would be with the rest of the Joint International Technical
Committee as from Monday 27.2.2006.
2.91 On Friday, February 17, 2006 the Sudan Commission left Khartoum for Kampala. The
Chairman of the Sudan Commission arrived Kampala from Juba on the same day.

2.92 On Sunday, February 19, 2006, the Sudan Commission convened a meeting at its seat in
Kampala to discuss its plan of work and the way forward.
2.93 On Monday, February 20, 2006, and Tuesday February 21, 2006 the Sudan Commission
met to discuss the final structure and shape of its Report.
2.94 On Saturday and Sunday, February 25th and 26th 2006, the meetings of the Sudan
Commission continued to analyze the information it had up to that point compiled.
2.95 On Tuesday, 28 February, 2006, members of the Sudan Commission and its technical
committee met Mr. Dennis Jones, the Investigator-in-Charge in Entebbe, on the resumption
of work of the Joint International Technical Committee.
16
Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE
2.96 On Tuesday, 28 February 2006, Mr. Dennis Jones delivered a presentation on the tasks
he completed in the USA. The Sudan Commission also took note of the Sound Spectrum
Analysis report which was done in the USA.
2.97 On Wednesday, 1 March, 2006, the Joint International Technical Committee started
analyzing the information pursuant to Annex 13 of the ICAO.
2.98 On Friday, 10 March 2006, the chairman, two members of Sudan Commission visited
the crash site in order to check and to affirm some information.
2.99 On Tuesday, 14 March 2006, the Chairman of the Sudan Commission addressed Mr.
John Nassasira to convene a meeting for the Joint Commission.
2.100 On Tuesday, 14 March 2006, the Chairman of the Sudan Commission wrote a letter to
the Commander of UPDF requesting him to send three soldiers for interviewing as advised.
2.101 On Thursday, 16 March 2006, the Chairman of the Sudan Commission wrote to Mr.
Dennis Jones attaching copies of the interviews conducted in Khartoum for some Sudanese
leadership and others.
2.102 On Monday, 20 March 2006, the Sudan Commission received from the Protocol
representative, the protocol procedures followed in arranging visits of the President of the
Republic of the Sudan.
2.103 On Monday, 27 March 2006, a letter from the Chairman of the Sudan Commission to
the Chairman of Uganda Ministerial Commission asking for urgent meeting for the Joint
Sudan Uganda Commission.
2.104 On Friday, 31 March 2006, a letter from Minister John Nasasira to the investigator-incharge,
Mr. Dennis Jones, about shifting the date of the presentation of the draft of the final
report to be on the 12th of April 2006.
2.105 On Sunday, 9 April 2006, a letter from the Chairman of Sudan Commission to the
Chairman of the Uganda Ministerial Commission stating that the Sudan Commission had no
comment about the report of the JITC and asking for confirmation of the meeting of the Joint
Sudan-Uganda Commission.
2.106 On Wednesday, 12 April 2006 the Joint Sudan-Uganda Investigation Commission
convened a lengthy meeting at Sheraton Hotel in Kampala, Uganda, that continued until the
early hours of Thursday, 13th April 2006. The meeting was fully dedicated to the discussion
and drafting of the final joint statement of the Joint Sudan-Uganda Investigation
Commission. The Sudanese and Ugandan parties to the meeting agreed to adopt the Joint
International Technical Committee Report. They also agreed to attach to the Technical
Report the full endorsement of the Sudan with no comment and the comments of Uganda as
addendum. The two parties agreed to release the final joint statement on Tuesday, 18 April
2006. (Appendix 7).
17
Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE

CHAPTER THREE
INTERVIEWS BY THE COMMISSION INTERVIEWS BY THE COMMISSION
3.1 Minister Abdel Basit Sabdarat
Khartoum, 21st December 05, under oath
3.1.1
Abdel Basit, then acting Minister of Information, was contacted by Vice President, Ali
Osman Mohamed Taha and asked him to proceed immediately to the house of the President.
That was on Sunday evening, 31st July, 05, between 9:30 pm and 9:45 pm. The President
informed Minister Sabdarat about a telephone message from the Ugandan President, Yoweri
Museveni. The gist of the message was that the First Vice President [FVP], Dr. John
Garang’s helicopter had gone missing from the evening of Saturday, 30th; Uganda had
conducted search on Sunday, 31st, from morning to evening without success.
3.1.2 The President decided to contact some leaders of the SPLA in Khartoum and Nairobi.
He phoned Lt. General Salva Kiir in Nairobi. Commander Nhial Deng Nhial and
Commander Paul Mayom, then in Khartoum, came to the President’s house, between 10:30
pm and 11:00 pm. A press release was issued that night about the loss of the First Vice
President’s helicopter.
3.1.3 Commander Yassir Saied Arman issued a statement in Kenya to the Gezira Television.
He said the helicopter of the First Vice President had safely landed in one of the SPLA
camps and all on board were safe. In Khartoum the Minister of Information had directed the
media not to publish news of the safe landing of the helicopter.
3.1.4 On the morning of Monday 1st August 05, news of the crash of the First Vice
President’s helicopter and his death were made public in Khartoum

3.2 Ali Tamim Fartak,
Former Minister for Civil Aviation
Khartoum, 20th December 05, under oath
3.2.1 Mr. Ali Tameem Fartak said a colleague, John Angol, first informed him on Sunday at
5:30 pm that the First Vice President’s helicopter was lost while on his way from Uganda to
Southern Sudan. On Monday morning, 1st August between 8:20 am and 9:00 am the Palace
issued a press statement announcing the crash of the First Vice President’s helicopter inside
Sudan and his death in the crash.
3.2.2 Mr. Ali Tameem said, as the Minister of Aviation, he constituted a technical
investigation committee on 01/08/2005, vide ministerial order number 09/2005. The
committee, chaired by Major General El Haj El Khidir, was directed to go to the site of the
crash as quickly as possible. It did not move to the site on Monday 1st August, for a variety of
reasons. The place of the crash was under the control of SPLA; it was also essential to
establish cooperation with the government of Uganda which owned the helicopter that
carried the FVP; it was also necessary to name representatives of the SPLM in the technical
committee and Commander Nhial and his colleagues had not then recovered from the shock
of the loss of Dr. John Garang to be able to name SPLA representatives in the committee. So
18
Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE
representatives of the SPLM were not named. In the meanwhile the President of the Republic
constituted the national commission of inquiry to investigate into the causes of the crash.

3.3 Dr. El Tayeb Ibrahim Mohamed Kheir,
Former Minister of Presidential Affairs
Khartoum, 21st December 05, under oath
3.3.1 On 21st December, 2005, Dr. El Tayeb Ibrahim appeared before the Commission of
Inquiry in Khartoum. He was asked to assist in answering some questions, relevant to the
investigation, in particular to provide reasons that led or contributed to the crash; Whether
the Presidency undertook arrangements for the trip – to the South and onward to East Africa?
Were Sudan Embassies in Nairobi and Kampala informed about the trip? What type of
contacts were maintained, if any, by the Government with the First Vice President? When did
the government first learn of the loss of the First Vice President’s helicopter? What steps, if
any, were taken by the government for search and rescue?
3.3.2 Dr. El Tayeb said as a general rule when the First Vice President wishes to travel, the
administration in the Presidency is informed by the office of the First Vice President. If the
notification is through that channel, the Executive Director takes it up and he informs the
Minister of the Presidential Affairs about the trip. Sometime the First Vice President makes
the notice for the trip direct to the Minister of Presidential Affairs, to take the necessary
action for arrangements for the trip. In practice, the First Vice President’s trips require
preparation, according to the nature of trip. It sometimes requires an advanced team to visit
the area, which he intends to visit. When the preparations are completed, the protocol section
of the Presidency takes over execution of the program of the trip. If the trip requires a
helicopter, the government must provide one.
The First Vice President came to Khartoum on 8.7.05 to take the oath of office on 9.7.05. He
spent about 14 days in Khartoum and this period was crowded with many things to do. He
did not have time to establish direct contact with the office of the minister for building close
official relationship. Two senior officers, Nhial Deng and Paul Mayom of the SPLM, were
appointed to work with the Presidency and the central government generally.
3.3.3 Dr El Tayeb said he was not informed directly of the First Vice President’s trip to the
South; neither was the office of the Executive Director of the Palace informed. The news
about the trip reached Dr. El Tayeb on Thursday and the trip was on Friday, the next day. Dr
El Tayeb said it was the President who informed him about the trip. Based on this
information, Dr El Tayeb said he contacted Commanders Nhial and Paul to prepare with him
for the trip. As is the practice, Dr El Tayeb wanted to move quickly to select members of the
advanced team, consisting of members of protocol and security. Commander Nhial and
Advisor Paul told him that the First Vice President did not need personnel, or a plane from
the Palace. For these reasons, the Palace stopped arranging for the trip to Rumbek, Kenya
and Uganda.

3.4 Major General Bakri Hassan Salih,
Minister of Presidential Affairs and Former Minister of Defence,
Khartoum, 30th January 06, under oath
3.4.1 The commission asked General Bakri whether he was aware of preparations for the trip
of the First Vice President to the South and to East Africa; when did he learn about the
19
Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE
disappearance of the FVP’s helicopter? What steps did he take as the Minister of Defence
then, after learning of the disappearance and the crash of the FVP’s helicopter? And when
was the news of its crash made? Whether he had personal contacts with the FVP or his
assistant, ADC Amat Malwal in Rumbek and in East Africa? Whether he had discussed any
plans for the FVP’s visit to Unity State, on his return from East Africa? Whether he knew the
date and time of return of the FVP to Sudan? Whether General Bakri, as an experienced
public official, had an idea about the type of arrangements generally required for the trip of
the FVP and even the President, inside the country or abroad?
3.4.2 General Bakri said his first information about the loss of the First Vice President’s
helicopter was about 10:00 am of the morning on Sunday, 31st July, 05. The information was
from Cairo. On the basis of this information he contacted the Chief of Staff of the SPLA, Lt.
General Oyai Deng Ajak, in Rumbek and asked him about their condition and health.
General Oyai talked about the arrival of the newly appointed governor of the Unity State in
Bentiu and the problems caused by it and he talked about the pending visit of the FVP to the
Unity State. In that phone conversation, General Oyai did not mention anything connected
with the loss of the helicopter of the FVP. So General Bakri said he preferred not to open the
subject; after all the news from Cairo might be a mistake.
3.4.3 In the evening of Sunday, about 11:30 pm, General Bakri contacted General Oyai again
and asked him what news he had; General Oyai said he had no good news and that General
Bakri should reach Lt. General Salva Kiir who would give whatever news he had. Contact
was made with Lt. General Salva’s assistant in Nairobi who disclosed to General Bakri that
the FVP was wounded. Salva’s assistant asked for the telephoned of the President of the
Republic who later disclosed the news from Salva that the helicopter had crashed and the
FVP, Dr. John Garang, had died as a result of the crash.
3.4.4 About the trip of the FVP to Rumbek and East Africa, General Bakri said they in the
Ministry of Defence knew nothing about it. He said an Antinov plane was ready in Khartoum
to help; the area of New Site was far away from the authority of the Sudan Army; the Army
could not be helpful there. The American government had requested through Dr. Mutrif
Siddig, Under Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to help the Sudan Government
with a plane from Djibouti, for search and rescue; General Bakri said the Ministry of Defence
gave the go ahead for the American plane to enter Sudan. He did not know whether the
helicopter was sent to Sudan or nor.
3.4.5 General Bakri said search and rescue was a technical subject to address. He said
according to his knowledge, the army usually uses all its planes and facilities and troops on
the ground, nearest to the place of the crash; these are normally mobilized for rescue. He said
he did not talk to Lt. Col. Amat Malwal but Martin Malwal tried to reach Amat by mobile
phone but there was no reply. Asked whether General Bakri knew the date of return of the
FVP to country. He said he did not know the date of the trip and return, adding that the
General Headquarters of the Army had no role to play in the trip and return.

3.5 Lt. General Essmat Ahmed Babikir,
Executive Director, Republican Palace
Khartoum, 22nd January 06
20
Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE
3.5.1 He said he was not informed about the trip of the First Vice President, Dr. John Garang,
to Rumbek and East Africa. He said instructions would normally come to him from the
Minister of Presidential Affairs.
3.5.2 He said either Commander Nhial Deng Nhial or Advisor Paul Mayom did not contact
him about the First Vice President’s trip to Rumbek and Uganda.
3.6 Major General Yassir Saied Arman,
Spokesman of SPLM/A,
Khartoum, 31st December 05, under oath
3.6.1 Major General Yassir Saied Arman said he was the official spokesperson of the
SPLM/A. When the crash of the helicopter occurred on 30th July, he said he was in Kenya, on
a mission assigned to him by the leader of the SPLM/A, Dr. John Garang who was planning
to meet leaders of Sudan Liberation Movement and Justice and Equality Movement. The
meeting was to take place in Nairobi or New Site. Dr. John was to contact General Yassir
Arman that evening of Saturday, 30th July, at 7 pm. The contact did not take place.
3.6.2 Lt. General Salva Kiir confirmed the disappearance of the helicopter when General
Yassir Arman contacted him on Sunday morning, 31st July. Ugandan officials in the first
contact with the SPLM/A leaders maintained that the helicopter was qualitatively and
technically equipped that nothing would adversely affect it and those on board. Some of the
leaders of the SPLM/A were in Nairobi, debating whether to make the loss of the helicopter
public or not. Some feared public disclosure of the loss would put the life of the SPLM/A
leader in jeopardy because parts of the route of the flight had security problems in particular
from the Lord Resistance Army (LRA). SPLM/A leaders agreed to coordinate with the
government leaders in Khartoum who had already announced the news of the crash. That was
on Monday, 1st August.

3.7 Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismail
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and currently Presidential Adviser
Khartoum, 28th January 06, under oath
3.7.1 Dr. Mustafa was asked by the commission whether he could help in providing any
information relevant to the commission’s investigation into the causes of late First Vice
President’s helicopter crash; arrangements for the trip of the FVP to East Africa and whether
Sudan Embassies in Nairobi and Kampala were informed of the trip; what steps were taken
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after news of the loss of the helicopter was made public;
whether there was search and rescue launched; whether the government of Sudan, through its
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was in touch with the Uganda government to exchange
information and cooperate in search and rescue efforts.
3.7.2 Dr. Mustafa said he was in constant and close contact with the FVP, Dr. John Garang
since he took the oath of the office as First Vice President of the Republic; Dr. Mustafa said
Dr. John Garang informed him of a pending visit by him to some of the neighbouring
countries; the visit was to be private, more to review some of his relations as leader of
SPLM/A with the leaders of those countries. Dr. John Garang impressed on Dr. Mustafa not
to inform Sudan Embassies in those neighbouring countries about the visit, nor even the
21
Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE
officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at that particular time when his visit would be
private.
3.7.3 Dr. Mustafa said he was informed by the President about the loss of the First Vice
President’s helicopter.

3.8 Madame Rebecca Nyandeng de Mabior,
wife of the late First Vice President, Dr John Garang de Mabior,
Nairobi, September 2005
3.8.1 In late August 2005 in Kampala, the Chairman of the Commission of Inquiry met and
provided Madame Rebecca with a number of questions to answer, in connection with the
helicopter crash.
3.8.2 The questions centered around the return trip of the First Vice President from Uganda
to New Site; whether she was in direct contact with Dr. John when he was preparing to fly
back to New Site, on Saturday, 30th July; whether she knew what time he was arriving at
New Site; whether she saw lights of an aircraft in the air that evening; what the weather was
like that evening at New Site; whether she had information about the loss of the helicopter
and what steps were taken to search for it; when did she get the news of the crash?.
3.8.3 In September, (09/09/05) the Chairman of the Sudan Commission and Ambassador
Sirajuddin Hamid visited Madame Rebecca in her home in Nairobi. They received written
answers to the questions presented to her in Kampala, in August.
3.8.4 Responding to the questions she said she did not talk directly to Dr. John in Entebbe
Airport when he was preparing to fly back to New Site that Saturday, 30th July. She did talk
to one of the security personnel of Dr. John, at about 4:50 pm. The security personnel said
the helicopter would take-off at 5:00 pm (East African Time) and it was expected to arrive in
New Site at about 7:00 pm. She said she went to the football ground where the helicopter was
to land, to receive him. But he did not arrive as expected. She said she did not see any lights
of an helicopter in the skies of New Site that Saturday evening. The weather condition at
New Site, she said, was clear and normal for flight landing. There was no sufficient and
concrete source of information to confirm that the helicopter had lost contact with the
Control Tower at that time. She said she was informed of the crash by Retired Lt. General
Daniel Awet Akot at 5:30 am [East Africa Time], Monday, 1st August, 05.

3.9 Brigadier General Riak Jeroboam Machuor,
Wednesday 7th December, 2005,
Kampala, (Statement on Oath)
3.9.1 Brigadier (SPLA) Riak Jeroboam Machuor is SPLM/A representative in Uganda. He
was informed by the Sudan Embassy about the First Vice President, Dr. John Garang’s visit
to Uganda and was invited to work with the Embassy, which he accepted.
3.9.2 No body informed Brigadier Riak when the First Vice President arrived Entebbe from
New Site on Friday, 29th July and proceeded to Rwakitura in Western Uganda. Riak was not
also informed of the First Vice President’s arrival at Entebbe Airport from Western Uganda
and departure to New Site, the same day, 30th July 05.
22
Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE
3.9.3 About the First Vice President’s helicopter crash, Brigadier Riak said he learned about
it from somebody from Nairobi; at midday 31st July 2005.
3.9.4 Brigadier Riak said he had learned of the helicopter disappearance, on Saturday night,
30 July 2005 from Mr. Donald Massembo of Uganda Internal Security Organization. Riak
said he tried to reach Madam Rebecca and others from New Site but most of them could not
be reached; He said he managed to talk to Brigadier Atem Aguang about 2:00 am, on
Sunday. Atem was at New Cush then when Riak contacted him.
3.9.5 About the three pieces of luggage of the First Vice President that were left behind in
Entebbe on 29 July when he proceeded to Rwakitura in Western Uganda; Riak said the
luggage was left in the Imperial Resort Hotel [Entebbe], in Museveni Suit, which was booked
for Dr. John. Guards provided by the State House guarded the three pieces of luggage in
Museveni Suit. Riak believed these guards would, under all circumstances keep VIP’s
belongings under very close guard.

3.10 Commander Nhial Deng Nhial,
Minister of International Cooperation, Government of Southern Sudan [GOSS],
Juba, 8th January, 2006, under oath.
3.10.1 Commander Nhial defined his responsibilities in Khartoum from April to September
2005 and also the responsibilities of those under him, as his assistants. He also drew attention
of the commission to some of the policy contexts within which the SPLM functioned. He
said the advanced team he led to Khartoum in April had defined responsibilities to discharge:
first to prepare for the coming of the SPLM officers to Khartoum and second, after
establishment of the Presidency under the Interim Constitution, to secure offices and living
accommodation for the First Vice President, Dr John Garang in Khartoum, and related
matters.
3.10.3 As the overall leader in Khartoum, Commander Nhial said he had two assistants:
Brigadier General Yassir Arman for SPLM political work in Khartoum and Advisor Paul
Mayom, for the headquarters of the First Vice President, Dr. John. Paul Mayom had frequent
meetings with the Minister of Presidential Affairs, Dr. El Tayeb Ibrahim Mohamed Kheir.
According to Commander Nhial, Dr. El Tayeb and Paul were working together on such
things like the offices and accommodation of the Chairman and other related matters.
3.10.4 About arrangements for the trip of Dr. John Garang to Rumbek, Commander Nhial
said as a matter of routine in the SPLM/A, information is not given except to persons directly
involved in that particular subject. He said that in most cases no one knew when and where
the Chairman traveled. People involved in the arrangements for the trip would normally be
those traveling with the Chairman. He added he was not directly involved in the
arrangements for the trip of the Chairman to Rumbek and East Africa. He said neither the
Minister of Presidential Affairs nor the Executive Director contacted him about the First Vice
President’s trip.

3.11 Paul Mayom,
Advisor to the President of the Government of Southern Sudan [GOSS],
Juba, 8th January, 2006, under oath.
23
Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE
3.11.1 The Commission of Inquiry asked Advisor Paul Mayom what his responsibilities were
in Khartoum in 2005; whether he was involved in the arrangements for the trip of the First
Vice President, Dr. John, to Rumbek and then to East Africa; whether he contributed in these
arrangements, together with the Minister of the Presidential Affairs, Dr. El Tayeb Ibrahim
Mohamed El Kheir and the Executive Director of the Palace, Lt. General Essmat Ahmed
Babikir.
3.11.2 Paul Mayom said he personally did not have any direct communication with Dr. El
Tayeb or Lt. General Essmat on issues such as the trip of the First Vice President inside or
outside the country. He said he did not remember whether if any of the two discussed with
him a trip of the FVP to any location. What he had discussed with Dr El Tayeb was office
and house accommodation for the First Vice President.
3.11.3 Paul acknowledged that he had come to know on Thursday evening, 21st of July that
the First Vice President was traveling to Rumbek the following day. He did not know in
Khartoum that the First Vice President would also be traveling to East Africa.
3.11.4 Answering a question about who owned the aircraft that transported the First Vice
President from Khartoum to Rumbek, Paul said it belonged to a private company and was
hired by SPLM/A.
3.11.5 Paul said while the First Vice President was in Uganda, that was on the same day of
the helicopter crash, officers Amat Malwal and Ali Mayan were instructed by the FVP to
contact him (Paul) to contact General Bakri, to give him a message. The message was that
Dr. John wanted General Bakri to know that he would go to Bentiu, Unity State, the next
day, Sunday, 31st July. From this message, Paul said he realized that Dr. John was in Uganda
and he was proceeding to some place in the Southern Sudan from where he would travel to
Bentiu. Paul said he failed to get to General Bakri, despite all efforts to reach him. So he
contacted Mohamed Hassan El Fadil and delivered Dr. John’s massage to him, for General
Bakri. According to Paul, Mohamed Hassan El Fadil contacted him during the same day to
inform him that the message was delivered to General Bakri.
3.11.6 So the arrangement for visit to Bentiu was that the FVP would proceed to Rabkona on
Sunday, by helicopter and from there by cars to Bentiu. Paul said he and Nhial failed by
phone to link with Ali Mayen or Amat Malwal, to convey these arrangements to them. The
message of Dr. John to Bakri was first conveyed to Paul by Amat, between 10:30am and
11:00am and it was conveyed again to Paul by Ali Mayen, at about 1:00 pm.

3.12 Brigadier Atem Aguang Atem’s Statements,
Commander of New Cush and New Site troops, New Cush, 22nd August 05 and affirmed
before the Commission in Juba, 8th January, 2006.
3.12.1 Brigadier Atem Aguang Atem, commander of SPLA troops in New Cush and New
Site was interviewed by the Sudan technical committee that traveled to New Cush in 22
August 05. According to Brigadier Atem Aguang, it began to rain in New Cush at 3:30pm,
Sudan Local Time, Saturday 30th July, 2005; at about 6:30pm he heard a sound of a
helicopter; it was coming from the direction of Uganda toward the mountain, south of the
New Cush Camp. The sound disappeared at the mountain. At that time, according to
Brigadier Atem, the mountain was covered by heavy clouds that it was not possible for
anybody to see the mountain itself. According to his description of the weather, the mountain
24
Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE
of Lotuke was clear while the mountain of New Cush was covered with clouds. According to
him, he noted light at about 7:55pm, toward the direction of the east.
3.12.2 At 3:50 am, on Sunday, 31st July, Major Johnson Gok Dal, commander of troops in
New Site, arrived New Cush with three vehicles full of soldiers from New Site Camp.
Johnson said the First Vice President was supposed to arrive at New Site in the evening of
Saturday but did not. Madame Rebecca had directed him to launch a search for the
helicopter. Major Johnson asked Commander Aguang to join him in the search. And indeed
search was launched at different directions, including the area of Lotuke, up to Uganda
borders. Madame Rebecca thought the helicopter might have made an emergency landing in
Latuke. The search team also contacted Ugandan camps of wildlife rangers. Commander
Deng Dau in New Site, ordered Brigadier Chol Biar to join the search teams as requested by
Major Peter Gatwich Gai.
3.12.3 It was directed by the Commander of the search and rescue and agreed by all the
officers leading the search team, that whoever found the target must fire three bullets into the
air as a sign that the target was found so that the troops would converge in one place. At 8:45
am, Sunday, 31st July, the target was found by Lt. Matiop Manyuon Adier. He was joined by
Lt. Taban Dejango Tombe; and then Major Peter Gatwich, leader of the search and rescue
troops. Others joined them later at the crash site.
3.12.4 Commander Atem dispatched a medical team from New Cush to collect the bodies of
the victims of the crash.
3.12.5 Commander Atem said he saw the light at 19:45 pm, Sudan local time, (Saturday July
30th); the light was at the direction where the helicopter crash took place; according to him he
never heard sounds of explosions or bullets before and after the appearance of the light; when
asked whether there were any enemy camps in the area, he replied: “absolutely no”. He
added that the nearest camp of Uganda Wildlife Rangers was 16 Km away and they were
armed with Kalashnikovs.
3.12.6 According to Commander Atem, the mountains were covered with clouds and
visibility was poor at the time the sound of the helicopter was heard at New Cush. He
wondered why somebody should fly during a bad weather but was relieved when he heard
the sound of the helicopter turn right and did not enter the cloud.
3.12.7 Brigadier Atem affirmed his statements of New Cush on oath in Juba.
3.13 Statements of Major Peter Gatwich Gai
In New Cush, 22nd August 05 and affirmed under oath in Juba, 8th January, 2006.
3.13.qasoldiers in search in the forest.
3.13.3 At 08:45 am, according to Major Peter, he heard the signal and headed for the crash
site, arriving at 09:00 am. The helicopter was burning and the bodies of the victims were
scattered with their limps dislodged.
3.13.4 Major Peter Gatwich said there were clouds, it was raining and dim in the evening of
Saturday, 30th July and early Sunday morning.

3.14 Statements of Lt. Matiop Manyoun Adier
In New Cush, 22nd August 05 and affirmed under oath in Juba, 8th January, 2006.
3.14.1 Lt. Matiop told the commission he was the first person to reach the site of the crash on
31st July, Sunday morning, at 8:45 a.m. He said he was then joined by Taban Dejango
Tombe, followed at 9:00 am by the commander of the search teams, Major Peter Gatwich
Gai.
3.14.2 On arrival at the site, Matiop said, he fired three bullets into the air.
3.14.3 According to Lt. Matiop, it had rained in New Cush that evening of Saturday, 30th
July, 05.
3.14.4 [Text of the interview is in Appendix No-]
3.15 Statements of Lt. Taban Dejango Tombe
In New Cush, 22nd August 05 and affirmed under oath in Juba, 16th February, 2006.
5.15.1 Lt. Taban Dejango Tombe told the chairman of the Commission that he was a member
of the search teams of the SPLA from New Site. They started the search from the early
morning of Sunday, 31st July 05. The commander of the search teams told them to spread out
in the forest at different directions toward Uganda. Any body who would find the target, “the
helicopter”, should fire three bullets into the air, as a sign that “the target” was found.
3.15.2 Lt. Taban said that Matiop found the “target” and he fired three bullets into the air.
According to Lt. Taban, he reached the site and began to count the bodies of the victims of
the crash. There were 13 bodies, including that of the Chairman and SPLM/A Commander-
In-Chief, Dr. John Garang.

3.16 Ambassador Hassan Jad El Karim
Sudan Embassy in Kampala,
Kampala, 11th November 05
3.16.1 Ambassador Hassan Jad El Karim was asked by the commission whether the Embassy
was informed by Khartoum about the visit of the First Vice President, Dr. John Garang, to
Uganda; was the Embassy in contact with the SPLM/A on this subject?
26
Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE
3.16.2 Ambassador Hassan said he arrived in Kampala from Khartoum on Saturday, 30th
July. Ambassador Hassan asked the acting head of Mission Minister Plenipotentiary
Mohamed Eissa to reply questions posed by the commission.
3.16.3 Minister Plenipotentiary Mohamed Eissa said there were messages from the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, addressed to Embassies of Kampala and Nairobi to expect a visit from the
First Vice President. The Minister Plenipotentiary said that these messages which they
received in July meant they in the Embassy should prepare to receive Dr. John Garang.
According to Minister Plenipotentiary, he contacted representatives of the SPLM/A in
Uganda, Brigadier Riak Machuor and his assistant, to inform them of the message received
from Khartoum. It was made clear by Khartoum that there was need to cooperate and
coordinate with SPLM/A. After that conversation with Riak, a message was sent by the
Embassy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs containing a number of queries. For instance
what was the nature of the visit and what was required to be done by the Embassy. According
to the Minister Plenipotentiary, there was no response from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
They, in the Embassy did in turn contact the Embassy of Sudan in Nairobi on the same
subject. Nairobi Embassy confirmed it had received the message from Khartoum about the
visit of the First Vice President to Kenya. According to Mr. Mohamed Eissa, Khartoum did
not also reply queries and questions raised by the Nairobi Embassy.
3.16.4 The First Vice President arrived Entebbe from Sudan and proceeded to President
Museveni’s country home in Rwakitura. Sudan Embassy was not informed of the arrival of
the First Vice President and his return to the Sudan.

Thanks
Evereythings was v.clear. D.grang is KILLED
Godbless his soul

3.17 Mr. Suleiman Abdel Rahman Ahmed
Director of Search and Rescue Directorate, Civil Aviation Authority
Khartoum, 29th December 06.
3.17.1 Suleiman Abdel Rahman is the Director of Search and Rescue Department, Sudan
Civil Aviation Authority. He was interviewed by the Commission on the role, which the
Department of Search and Rescue played in the search for the helicopter that carried the First
Vice President and got lost on its way from Entebbe Airport to New Site, on 30th July, 2005.
3.17.2 What, he was asked, were the normal procedures followed and actions taken when an
aircraft got lost or had crashed; when was he informed about the First Vice President’s
helicopter.
3.17.3 He said he heard about the crash of the helicopter two days after the event. He said the
Search and Rescue Department has severely limited facilities. Their source of information is
the Air Traffic Control Center which did not alert him in the Department of Search and
Rescue about the disappearance and the crash of the First Vice President’s helicopter.
3.17.4 He said that there were no facilities for search and rescue outside Khartoum area.
None existed in the Southern Sudan. The question, he said, is how to reach as quickly as
possible to the place of the crash. This is the same concern in the Northern regions of the
Sudan, including western Sudan.
3.17.5 Sayed Suleiman said he had no information about this particular helicopter and its
movements.
27

Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE
3.18 Col. Kamil Mahmoud El Bakri
Khartoum, 15th February 06.
3.18.1 He was interviewed by one member of the commission, General El Hag El Khidir and
Pilot John Manak, member of the technical committee.
3.18.2 Col. Kamil was a member of the committee established on 1st August 2005 by the
Minister of Civil Aviation. General El Hag El Khidir who had in the course of his
investigation requested Col. Kamil to obtain satellite photographs of the site of the crash
headed that committee before it was dissolved.
3.18.3 According to Col. Kamil, he requested the Military Intelligence Department to assist
him get the photographs. He said he got the photographs through the Military Intelligence
that in turn obtained them from an international NGO.
28

Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE
CHAPTER FOUR
THE SUDAN NATIONAL COMMISSION’S
OVERALL FINDINGS
4. Findings
4.1 The Sudan Commission concludes from the “general Pathological Report” the following:
4.1.1 The number of victims who died in the crash was 13 persons including the First
Vice President of the Sudan Dr. John Garang.
4.1.2 The bodies were inspected by medical specialists from Kenya, Uganda, Sudan
(SPLM/A) and the United States of America.
4.1.3 Due to the fact that the bodies of the victims were extensively burned, the
identification process involved medical experts, interviewing of some members of
families and those who knew the victims.
4.2 The Sudan Commission concludes from the “Field Notes of Explosives and ballistics
Group” the following:
4.2.1 The report was prepared by Mr. Edward C. Kittel (chief Explosives Division,
Department of Homeland Security, USA), Mrs. Robinah Kirinya (Government
Analyst, Ballistics, Government Analytical laboratory, Uganda), Brigadier Aleu
Ayieny, Military Engineer, SPLM/A (Sudan).
4.2.2 The inspection conducted by the said committee of three persons representing
USA, Uganda and SPLM/A Sudan revealed that “It is the opinion of the Explosives
and Ballistics Team that there is no evidence that either an explosive device, firearm
or missile was involved in the crash of this helicopter”
4.3 The Sudan Commission concludes from the report titled “ Summary of Wreckage
Distribution” the following:
4.3.1 The report was prepared by specialists representing Uganda, Kenya and the
United States.
4.3.2 The helicopter collided against a terrain of an altitude of 1598 meter at
coordinates North 04 degrees, 04’ minutes, 38.8 seconds and East 33 degrees, 55
minutes, 53.3 seconds.
4.3.3 The wreckage was scattered over an area of 120x60 meters in the direction 020
degrees magnetic heading.
4.3.4 The helicopter disintegrated during the impact sequence. Fire occurred during
the impact sequence.
4.4 The Sudan Commission concludes from the report titled “ Letters issued by the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of the Sudan to the Embassies of Uganda, Kenya, USA, the Netherlands in
Khartoum, the following:
4.4.1 That the Government of the Sudan welcomes the assistance and contribution of
the international community in the process of the investigation of the helicopter crash.
29
Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE
4.5 The Sudan Commission took note of “Satellite Photographs of the crash site” secured
through the Chairman of the Ministerial Committee t and member of the Sudan Commission
Major General El Hag El Khidir.
4.6 The Sudan Commission concludes from the report titled “ Structure, Systems, Power
Plants. On-site observations” the following:
4.6.1 The report was prepared by experts from Uganda (Ahmed Sebuliba-Busulwa,
Civil Aviation Authority), Kazan Helicopter Plant,( Yury kalistratov) SPLM
(Dengtiel Kur), and the American National Transportation Safety Board, (Mr. Alex
Lemishko ), and the Kenyan Government (John Patrick , Helicopter Engineers and
Pilot).
4.6.2 That the airframe components were found severely fragmented along the
wreckage debris path.
4.6.3 Both engines exhibited extreme post-impact fire damage.
4.6.4 The main rotor hub and blade assembly was found attached to the top of the
main transmission and drive continuity was established.
4.6.5 Flight control continuity was established from the bottom of the fixed controls
upwards to the pitch change links.
4.6.6 Tail rotor drive continuity was established from the tail rotor mast rearward
through the 90 degree and 45 degree gearboxes. The tail rotor drive shaft rotated
freely by hand.
6.6.7 All three-tail rotor blade roots were found attached and secure within their
respective blade grips.
4.6.8 The CVR and FDR casings displayed some thermal damage.
4.5.9 Other than impact forces and post-impact fire damage no pre-impact anomalies
were discovered.
4.7 The Sudan Commission concludes from the report titled “Statement Issued by the Joint
######### of the Investigation Teams of Uganda and Sudan” that both teams of investigation
agreed to work together.
4.8 The Sudan Commission concludes from the Reports of the Sudanese Technical Team at
the Crash Site the following:
4.8.1 The visit of the Sudanese technical team to the site of the crash took place on
21st august 2005.
4.8.2 The Highest impact point was at:
Latitude: 04º 04′ 38.987″
Longitude: 33º 55′ 53.987″
Height: 1654.987 meters.

4.8.3 The First Impact Point:
Latitude: 04º 04′ 38.95″
Longitude: 33º 55′ 53.36″
Height: 1647 meters.
4.8 4 The distance of the first impact Area “FIA” from New Site is 20861 meters.
4.8.5 The distance of the first impact Area “FIA” from New Site airstrip is 29872
meters.
4.8.6 The distance of the first impact Area “FIA” from Entebbe is 475401 meters.
4.8.7 The First Impact Area “FIA” was at a height of 5350 feet on a very steep
vertical side of the mountain.
4.8.8 The main Altimeter was reading that the last helicopter altitude was 5320 feet
from sea level.
4.8.9 The radio altimeter reading was 30 feet.
4.8.10 The Gyro-indicator showing a helicopter bank of 5 to 7 degrees.
4.8 11 The helicopter hit some trees at the edge of the mountain by one of its main
rotor blades and then by its undercarriage.
4.8.12 The helicopter main parts jumped by the engine force to the last of wreckage
distribution path.
4.8.13 Even if the helicopter was equipped with an Enhanced Ground Proximity
Warning System “EGPWS” , this system cannot detect and give warning to the pilot
of the ground proximity because the area before the FIA is very steep, nearly vertical,
that would make a sudden change of radio altitude, that is to say from a radio altitude
reading to a very low one.
4.8.14 The area was under the control of the SPLA troops. The Ugandan Wildlife
Rangers was at 15 kilometers from the crash site. The Ugandan Forces or troops were
at 35 kilometers from the crash site. The Guard of Dr. John Garang was armed with
A.k. 47 and pistols.
4.8.15 Fire light was observed during the period from 19:45 pm up to 23:00 pm.
4.8.16 No sounds of explosions, machine guns or bullets were heard at the site during
that period.
4.8.17 The wreckage of the helicopter was distributed along the path of destruction
over an area of 115 meters long and 66 meters wide.
4.8.18 No fragments of explosives were found on the wreckage of the helicopter and
the surrounding trees.
4.8.19 The helicopter was flying at a cruising speed of 220 kilometers per hour.
31
Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE
4.8.20 The time taken from Entebbe airport to the crash site was 2 hours and 20
minutes.
4.8.21 The sun sets at New Cush at 06:50 – 07:00 pm meaning that the helicopter
crashed after sunset.
4.8.22 The engines temperature gauges and the artificial horizon found at the crash
site indicate that the helicopter was steadily maintaining its altitude and no technical
malfunctions up to the time of the crash were experienced.
4.8.23 The sound of the helicopter was heard at 18:30 pm on Saturday 30 July 2005
coming from the direction of Uganda and then diverted to the west. There was no
information about the First Vice President flight to the SPLA Command at New
Cush.
4.9 The Sudan Commission concludes from the document titled “ CVR/FDR Examination at
Russia” the following:
4.9.1 The examination was conducted in the presence of representative from Sudan,
Uganda, Kenya, USA, and Russia at the Inter State Aviation Committee in Moscow.
4.9.2 The CVR P-507 case exhibited thermal damage.
4.9.3 The CVR P-507 internal cassettes was serviceable during the accidental flight
and recorded all the acoustic information during the last three minutes of the flight.
4.9.4 The CVR information was of good quality and could be used for the
investigative purposes.
4.9.5 The FDR SARPP-12-DIM case exhibited thermal damage.
4.9.6 The photo tape media that was found inside the FDR was melted on the
receiving spool.
4.9.7 The reading of the FDR information was not possible.
4.10 The Sudan Commission concludes from the report titled “Information Obtained from
Kazan Factory about the Helicopter” the following:
4.10.1 The Ugandan Chief Pilot late Mr. Peter Nyakairu and the Ugandan Flight
Engineer, late Mr. Patrick Kigundu both attended full training courses for M I- 72 in
the period from 8 October 1997 to 20 November 1997.
4.10.2 The co-pilot, late Mr. Paul Kiyimbe did take a similar course to that of the
Chief Pilot.
4.10.3 The three of the crew attended at Russia a training course on raising the level
of pilot’s skill for M I – 72 Helicopter for a period of three weeks in the years 2000,
2001, 2002, 2003, 2005 and the last one was at the period from 17 January 2005 to 11
February 2005.
32
Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE
4.10.4 The helicopter M I – 72 bearing the serial number 627CO1, registration AF
615 Uganda was subjected during the period February-July 2005 to an overhauling
and modernization at Kazan Factory in Russia. After air, Colonel Pilot Turyagynda
signed tests preliminary acceptance certificate on 5 July 2005 at total flown time of 2
hours and 05 minutes after the overhaul. Then the helicopter was packed and sent to
Uganda and the Chief Pilot late Nyakairu signed the final acceptance test on 21 July
2005. The helicopter was since then put into operation under the Ugandan Air Force
authorities until the date of the crash with 20 total flown hours.
4.11 The Sudan Commission concludes from the “Meeting of the Sudan Commission with
the Medical Team in Nairobi” the following:
4.11.1 The number of those who died in the crash was 13 persons including the late
Dr. John Garang.
4.11.2 The bodies of the victims were identified by experts from Kenya, USA,
SPLM/A, Uganda and relatives and those others who knew the victims
4.12 The Sudan Commission concludes from the report “ the Weather Report” the following:
4.12.1 Sun set at New Site was at 18:59 pm Uganda Local Time.
4.12.2 Sun set at the crash site was at 19:00 pm Uganda Local Time.
4.12.3 Poor visibility due to darkness, dense low clouds and light rains were present
in the accident area.
4.13 The Sudan Commission concludes from the report titled “Air Traffic Control Report”
the following:
4.13.1 There was no flight plan and the Pilot did not ask for information on the
weather forecast at the destination.
4.13.2 There was no ATC radar at Entebbe Airport.
4.13.3 The helicopter took off with destination Gulu at 17:02 pm.
4.13.4 There was no ATC in Gulu.
4.13.5 The flight was very normal up to the time it was transferred to general aviation
frequency of 118.2 MHZ at 65 nautical miles from Entebbe Airport.
4.13.6 Knowledge by Entebbe’s Air Traffic Tower of the fact that the helicopter did
not land at New Site was only at 1049 U.T.C on Sunday 31 July 2005.
4.13.7 Khartoum Air traffic Control Tower at 1806 U.T.C. on 31 July 2005 inquired
from Entebbe Air Traffic Control if there was any information about the First Vice
President’s helicopter. Entebbe Air Traffic Control replied no news.
4.14 The Sudan Commission concludes from the “interview with the Norwegian Ambassador
to Uganda” the following:
33
Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE
4.14.1 The Ambassadors of USA, UK, Netherlands and Norway requested to meet
with President Museveni in their capacity as the support group for the Betty Bigombi
Peace Initiative for peace in Northern Uganda. That was 14 days prior to the crash
day.
4.14.2 The meeting with President Museveni was on Saturday 30 July 2005 at
Rwakitura. After the meeting of the said Ambassadors with president Museveni, the
President introduced to them late Dr. John Garang as a distinguished guest.
4.14.3 They met with late Dr. John Garang and exchanged views on the CPA for a
period of ten minutes. The Ambassador of the Netherlands stayed for five minutes
more since they had known each other before.
4.15 The Sudan Commission concludes from the “Interview with the Ambassador of the
Netherlands to Uganda Mrs. Yoka Brandt” the following:
4.15.1 She knew the First Vice President since the time she was accredited to Eritrea,
and for that reason their discussion focused on improvement of bilateral ties between
the Sudan and Eritrea.
4.15.2 She provided Ambassador Sirajuddin Hamid with the last photograph taken for
late Dr. John Garang with the four envoys at Rwakitura.
4.16 The Sudan Commission concludes from the “Interview with the US Ambassador to
Uganda” the following:
4.16.1 The Us Ambassador stated that their earlier preliminary reports they made on
most aspects of the crash indicate that there was no foul play or explosives, but this
needed to be backed up by a thorough technical investigation.
4.16.2 The Us ambassador confirmed the purpose of the meeting at Rwakitura with
President Museveni on 30 July 2005.
4.16.3 He asked late Dr. John Garang about the implementation of the CPA and what
was the opinion of the SPLM and the Government of Southern Sudan. He said he was
touched by the reply of Dr. Garang who told him that as of now he represented the
whole of the SUDAN.
4.16.4 The US Ambassador stressed the importance of the involvement of the United
States provided that Mr. Dennis Jones acted as investigator-in-charge. The Sudan
Commission Chairman welcomed the contribution of the US representative but
without prior conditions and that, the Joint International Technical Committee would
choose in a democratic way who would lead the investigation.
4.17 The Sudan Commission concludes from the “ Interview with Mr. Agar Didi” the
following:
4.17.1 He confirmed that he saw off late Dr. John Garang at Entebbe Airport when he
was heading for New Site.
34
Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE
4.17.2 He said that late Dr. John Garang was anxious to leave quickly and for that
reason, he preferred to stand by the helicopter during refueling rather than wait in the
VIP Lounge.
4.17.3 He stated that late Dr. John Garang told him hat the National Unity
Government in Sudan would be formed within two weeks.
4.18 The Sudan Commission concludes from the “Interview with Lieutenant Frank Kato ”
the following:
4.18.1 He stated that the number of persons on board the helicopter from Rwakitura
to Entebbe airport was 14 persons. By instructions from the pilot in Entebbe due to
the heavy weight of the helicopter, he was asked not to get into the plane to keep the
number of all the persons on board from Entebbe to New site at thirteen (13) persons.
4.18.2 He stated that the destination of the helicopter was New Site because late Dr.
John Garang had asked the pilot whether he knew the coordinates of New Site.
4.19 The Sudan Commission concludes from the “ Interview with the Ugandan Chief of
Protocol ambassador Ahmed Ssenyomo” the following:
4.19.1 That all the arrangements for the reception and travel of the First Vice
President Dr. John Garang were the responsibility of the State House of Uganda and
his role was only ceremonial. He was only informed of the arrival of Dr. John Garang
to Uganda at 8:00 am of Friday 29 July 2005. Ambassador Ahmed said the First vice
president of the Sudan arrived at 11:00 am that day. State House of Uganda did not
provide him with the details of the visit.
4.19.2 He did not participate in seeing off the First Vice President at Entebbe airport.
He was involved at the ceremony arranged for the new UK High Commissioner to
present his credentials to President Museveni at Mbarara on Saturday 30 July 2005.
4.20 The Sudan Commission concludes from the “Interview with the Protocol Chief
SPLM/A in Uganda, Mr. Riak Machuor” the following:
4.20.1 He was first notified of the visit of Dr. John Garang through the Internal
Security Organization of Uganda on the morning of the day of the visit. He later
confirmed the information of the visit by direct contact with Lokichokio.
4.20.2 He confirmed that three suitcases and one plastic bag “kavera” of the luggage
that came on board the First Vice President’s aircraft was taken and kept in Entebbe
Imperial Resort Hotel, under the guards of the State House, and were later on
collected by soldiers from State House.
4.20.3 The plane that brought the First Vice President to Entebbe was hired from a
private company.
4.20.4 There was no body from SPLM/A to see the First Vice President off at
Entebbe Airport when he was leaving for New Site.
35
Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE
4.21 The Sudan Commission concludes from the “Statement of Preliminary Investigation of
the crash of M I -72 helicopter near New Cush on 30 July 2005” the following:
4.21.1 The work reflected in that statement was performed by about 26 persons and
finally confirmed and signed by Major General Gier Chuang from SPLM/A, Dr.
Ruhakana Rugunda from Uganda and Dennis Jones from the United States.
4.21.2 Forensic experts from Uganda, Kenya, the SPLM/A, and the United States
examined all remains of the victims. These were recovered from the crash site.
4.21.3 The medical experts, families and those familiar with them determined that six
of the bodies were Sudanese, including that of Dr. Garang which had already been
identified and buried.
4.21.4 Seven bodies were determined to be Ugandan, including one female. The
bodies of the Ugandan victims were returned to Uganda on the morning of August 9,
2005.
4.22 The Sudan Commission concludes from the report titled “List of Victims” the
following:
4.22.1 The Sudanese victims who were on board helicopter M I – 72, flight AF 605 that
crashed on Saturday 30 July 2005 en route from Entebbe Airport to New Site, were:
- First Vice President, Dr. John Garang de Mabior.
- Lt. Col. Ali Mayen, Director of Communications.
- Lt. Col. Amat Malual, Communications Officer.
- Lt. Col. Mayen Mabior, Guard.
- Lt. Col. Majok Kuany, Guard.
- Lt. Col. Oboki Obur, Guard.
4.22.2 The Ugandan victims who were on board helicopter M I – 72, flight AF 605 that
crashed on Saturday 30 July 2005 en route from Entebbe Airport to New Site, were:
- Col. Peter Nyakairu, Pilot.
- Capt. Paul Kiyimbe, Co-pilot.
- Major Patrick Kigundu, Flight Engineer.
- Lt. Johnson Munanura, Jet Officer.
- Ms. Lillian Kabajji, Cabin Attendant.
- Col. Hassan Kizza, Signaler.
- Mr. Sam Bakowa, State House Protocol.
4.23 The Sudan Commission concludes from the “The CVR Transcription” the following:
The helicopter AF605 took-off from Entebbe Airport to New Site at 17:00 ULT.
Total persons on board were (14) ???.
Fuel endurance 05:30 hours = 4420 Lit = 3536 Kg.
The distance from Entebbe Airport to New Site 508 Km.
The direction from Entebbe Airport to New Site is 019.
The crew expected to arrive New Site at 19:21 ULT.
The Captain reported to the tower “we shall maintain 5,500 ft above mean sea
level”.
36
Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE
At Entebbe Airport the wind was 140/ 05 knots = CAVOK. It means that the wind
was crossing from the right side at a speed of 5 knots, which was almost calm.
Advanced Moving Map System and Flood Light equipped the helicopter.
The Crew was using two GPSs, [AMMS and GPS].
The helicopter had installed two auxiliary tanks.
The quantity of fuel in the auxiliary tanks was 915 X 2 = 1830Lit.
The crew had decided to return to Entebbe after dropping Dr. John at New Site.
The helicopter had enough fuel to come back to Entebbe.
At 65 NM the helicopter AF605 reported to the ACC and the ACC advised them to
change the frequency to 118.2 [long-range frequency for Entebbe VHF], for
contact.
The crew changed to frequency 118.2 but they did not contact the Tower through
this frequency, through out the journey.
The crew talked about New Site strip. They said that the place was dusty; dust and
night were two evils, which should not be combined. The crew knew that they
would land at night in a dusty area.
At New Site, there are neither navigation equipments nor radio station.
The crew had no information about New Site.
After 49 minutes 13 seconds from departure time, an helicopter flew over the
helicopter AF605 [Papa India Gulf] “this is last one. This one is for a lady”.
The crew showed the flight engineer how to use the microphone.
After 01:10:00
1) The ground speed was 120 NM.
2) There were rainy clouds.
After 01:10:00, the remaining fuel was 3200 Liters = 4 hours.
The fuel endurance was (5:30). 3200 + 1000 = 4200 Lit.
At take-off time, the pilot reported to the tower that the fuel endurance was 4:00
hours but the actual fuel endurance was 5:30 hours. The pilot gave the tower wrong
information.
After 1:22:00, the crew talked about a mountain ahead of them. The helicopter lost
height. The copilot asked the pilot to stop losing height and to climb higher because
of the range of mountains. Here the helicopter descended [losing height], climbed
and flew over a mountain area.
The helicopter was unstable.
The mountain was about 2000 meters.
Dr. John asked the pilot whether he could land at Soroti or Moroto, and when Dr.
John felt the Pilot appeared to express surprise “ooh” he asked the Pilot “will you
be able to make it?” The Pilot replied, “I will try, Sir. If we are not able we will let
you know.” This suggestion came after 1:35:31 from take-off time.
The captain assured Dr. John that he would try and if he could not make it, he
would let him know “I will tell you when we are not able to make it”.
The distance of Soroti from the point where the First Vice President made his
suggestion is 135 km.
Moroto is 130 km.
The site of the crash is 164 km; Entebbe is 334 km.
At 60 NM before New Site and 50 miles before the crash point the helicopter
maintained direction 019. It means that the helicopter was in the right direction to
destination. However, there was a difference of 2 miles between the two GPSs; one
37
Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE
read 65 NM while the other 63 NM. [ I think the difference was due to the different
coordinates put in the GPS]
At 65 miles, the crew talked about High Mountain in the route of the helicopter.
Before 21 minutes from the crash moment, the crew compared between this journey
and Nairobi journey and they said that the difference was just 10 minutes.
Before 18 minutes from the crash moment, the crew talked about bad thing coming
[some rain where they were going and the tall hills were still ahead of them near the
border].
The helicopter flew over Kidepo Valley.
The crew reduced the map scale to look at the terrain.
The copilot talked about the ground “I can see the ground so near”. He suggested
climbing higher because he can see the ground so near.
He looked down and suggested to descend when they cross the border.
The copilot talked about the flood light “that floodlight of ours, does it have time
limit?
The cabin attendant talked to the captain about the boiler.
The crew talked about a mountain in front of Kidepo Valley.
Before 9 minutes from the crash time, the bearing was 019, it means that the
helicopter was still following the flight route.
Before 8 minutes, the ground speed was 137 NM 246 Km/h, which was very fast.
At this point, the maximum limitation of the speed at the height of 1000 meter is
230 Km/h permissible speed. At 2000 meter, the maximum speed is 195 Km/h. The
helicopter was out of limit.
8 minutes before the crash:
- The copilot talked about very thick, thick, thick clouds
- The crew talked about rain and raise. The cloud was still ok we can see the
ground. This is the corridor for entering Kidepo valley.
Before 7 minutes, the copilot screamed: “we have passed so near it. It is a tall one;
it is 2000 or 1500 meters”. The pilot had nearly crashed into a mountain: This was
about 20 miles from New Site.
Before 7 minutes, the crew said “we can even go through these clouds here”.
Before 6 minutes the direction of the helicopter was still 019.
Before 5 minutes, the copilot suggested to fly through one of the clouds because
under it was clear and he was telling the pilot that there were no mountains. The
mountains were at the end of the valley. He talked about leaving the valley behind.
“we can descend just under it (cloud)”.
Before 4 minutes from the crash time the ADC Amat talked with the pilot about the
location of the helicopter and the remaining distance to New Site. He talked from
the microphone of the cabin attendant.
The pilot asked Amat to enter the cockpit; he said “you come in front (to look at the
coordinates)”.
Before 3 minutes the copilot remarked to the pilot about some low clouds and
inquire from the pilot in command whether to change the direction a bit to avoid the
low clouds.
Before 3 minutes, the bearing read 019 at the same direction the helicopter exactly
on track, 15 miles from New Site.
Before 2 minutes 22 seconds, Amat entered the crew cabin and asked the captain
about arrival time. The pilot told him 15 miles.
38
Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE
The pilot asked Amat about New Site ground surface “do you have high ground
where we land?” “Very high ground” Amat answered. Actually, New Site is a flat
area; maybe Amat saw the mountain under him when he was talking.
Amat stopped talking exactly 2 minutes before the crash time but he was standing
behind the crew. The pilot reminded Amat not to forget to show him New Site.
“Alright thank you”.
Within I minute 53 seconds the pilot asked the copilot 7 questions about :
1. G.P.S?
2. Miles remaining?
3. Look and tell me how many?
4. How many more until now?
5. How high are we?
6. Check, my friend, the altimeter?.
7. Distance.?
The copilot within the 2 last minutes answered the pilot
- exactly on track sir;
- we are remaining 14 miles sir;
- bearing now 018;
- height 5500 ft sir;
- Altimeter still above 300 where it stopped;
- Distance 11 miles bearing 018;
Screaming Voice (DANGER).
The last conversation took 1 minute 53 seconds before crash.
The helicopter was piloted by the pilot in command.
The copilot at that time was just a navigator.
The copilot was concerned with G.P.S.
The captain in command was panicking at that time.
The helicopter entered the clouds; that mean the visibility was nil.
The helicopter was flying through valley because the radio Altimeter read above
300 m; that means the helicopter before the moments of crash was flying in altitude
more than 300 meters above the ground. That was before 19 seconds from the crash
time.
The helicopter descended to cross under the clouds.
The speed increased to 246 Km/h.
The crew did not see the mountain in front of them.
The crew did not use the AMMS caution red – yellow.
Orange colour to avoid the mountain.
The helicopter took-off at 5:00 PM.
The time from take-off till the crash is 2:08 hours.
The crash occurred at 07:08.
4.24 The Sudan commission concludes from chapter five of this report titled “interviews by
the commission” the following:
4.24.1 That all the relevant departments within the Presidential Palace were not involved in
the travel arrangements of the First Vice President late Dr. John Garang de Mabior from
Khartoum to Rumbek and thereafter to East Africa.
39
Sudan National Inquiry and Investigation Commission PART ONE
4.24.2 That the arrangement of the trip of the First Vice President late Dr. John Garang de
Mabior from Khartoum to Rumbek and thereafter to east Africa, was made by the personal
aides who traveled with him. The former Minister for Presidential Affairs stated when
interviewed, that he wanted to make the usual official arrangements but Nhial Deng Nhial
and Paul Mayom did not accommodate what he wanted on the basis that the trip is especially
private. Nhial Deng Nhial and Paul Mayom denied that.
4.24.3 That the relevant Protocol Departments within the Presidential Palace did not apply
the minimum level of conditions or constraints for security and safety purposes on the travel
plans of the top political and executive personnel in the Republic of the Sudan. There is no
law, or administrative regulation providing for inherent powers for the Protocol Department
at the Presidential Palace to stop, change or amend travel arrangements of the country’s top
officials. The protocol system within the Presidential Palace requires substantial review.
4.24.4 That given the circumstances in which the trip of the late First Vice President took
place, there was little room for follow up and contact by Minister for Presidential Affairs,
who was then Minister of Defence, of the movements of the late First Vice president.
4.24.5 That on hearing the news of the loss of the helicopter of the First Vice President most
of the top officials, led by the President of the Republic himself, were fully engaged in
following up the developments since the loss of contact with the helicopter until discovery of
the wreckage.
4.24.6 That, the capabilities of the relevant organs and institutions within the State in terms
of search and rescue are weak and not up to the standard. The situation in this respect calls
for remedy.
40

Quote: After 1:22:00, the crew talked about a mountain ahead of them. The helicopter lost height. The copilot asked the pilot to stop losing height and to climb higher because of the range of mountains. Here the helicopter descended [losing height], climbed and flew over a mountain area.

بدأت الطائرة في فقدان الارتفاع مبكرا مما يؤكد عدم سلامة الطيار الآلي مما استدعي قائد الطائرة للتدخل بدليل طلب مساعد الكابتن للارتفاع

Quote: The helicopter collided against a terrain of an altitude of 1598 meter at

اصتدام الطائرة في هذا الارتفاع يؤكد عدم أهلية جهازي الانذار المبكر و ال radio altimeter

Quote: there was a difference of 2 miles between the two GPSs;

Within I minute 53 seconds the pilot asked the copilot 7 questions about :
1. G.P.S?
2. Miles remaining?
3. Look and tell me how many?
4. How many more until now?
5. How high are we?
6. Check, my friend, the altimeter?.
7. Distance.?
The copilot within the 2 last minutes answered the pilot
- exactly on track sir;
- we are remaining 14 miles sir;
- bearing now 018;
- height 5500 ft sir;
- Altimeter still above 300 where it stopped;
- Distance 11 miles bearing 018

دليل آخر علي فقدان كل اجهزة الملاحة الآلية في وقت واحد و ان الكابتن واجه مشقة في السيطرة علي الطائرة قبل ارتضامها بالجبل

Quote: After 49 minutes 13 seconds from departure time, an helicopter flew over the helicopter AF605 [Papa India Gulf]

وجود طائرة هليكوبتر اخري في خط سير الطائرة يلقي بأسئلة لأ اجابات لها خصوصا ان كانت الطائرة تابعة لسلاح الجو اليوغندي

Quote: The copilot talked about the flood light “that floodlight of ours,

الاضواء الكاشفة التي رأها مساعد الكابتن ربما كانت لطائرة الهلكوبتر الاخري

http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?id=WAS05RA013&rpt=fa


التقرير اليوغندي الرسمي حجب كثيرا من المعلومات

UP
until I come back