SPLM position on UNSC resolution 1593 and situation in Darfur 11 April 2005

SPLM position on UNSC resolution 1593 and situation in Darfur 11 April 2005


05-25-2005, 12:04 PM


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Post: #1
Title: SPLM position on UNSC resolution 1593 and situation in Darfur 11 April 2005
Author: Murtada Gafar
Date: 05-25-2005, 12:04 PM

http://www.splmtoday.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=7148

Sudan People`s Liberation Movement
And Sudan People`s Liberation Army

Oslo: April 11, 2005


1. We want to make the position of the SPLM clear on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1593, which has become a point of contention between the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the current Government of Sudan (GOS). The SPLM unequivocally stands for Justice in Darfur and Eastern Sudan and combating impunity in Darfur to bring an end to the cycle of killing and destruction of livelihoods. The SPLM has a moral and political obligation towards the suffering people of Darfur and will do everything necessary to contribute positively towards achieving a peaceful, fair and just political settlement in Darfur and eastern Sudan so that there is comprehensive peace all over Sudan.

2. The SPLM stands in solidarity with the people of Darfur and with all the marginalized people of Sudan. The SPLM is also conscious of its obligations as a partner with the National Congress Party (NCP) in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed on January 9th 2005, and will work energetically and in good faith to expeditiously implement the CAP in partnership with the NCP and all other Sudanese political forces, to achieve national consensus, effect democratic transformation of the country, make unity attractive and path the way to the New Sudan, and thus deliver the country from its present cross-roads crisis.

3. The SPLM recognize UNSC Resolution 1593 as a de facto situation, and this coupled with the GOS rejection of the resolution creates an unhealthy situation in the country as well as ultimately in the Region. The SPLM therefore urges both the UN Security Council and the current GOS to sit down to agree on the next steps to resolve the impasse in a manner that will achieve both peace and justice in Darfur.

4. The SPLM wishes also to reaffirm its willingness and readiness to help on the two tracts of security and political settlement in Darfur. In this regard the SPLM renews its offer of deploying 10,000 SPLA troops in Darfur drawn from its component of the Joint Integrated Units (JIU`s) that are stipulated in the CPA. Under this scheme, the GOS would also deploy 10,000 troops. From its component of the JIU`s while the AU upgrades its present contingent in Darfur to 10,000 troops. A tripartite command structure from GOS, SPLM and AU would then be formed to command the combined force, with logistical support from the international community. This combined force would be robust enough to provide security, stabilize Darfur and enhance prospects for a fair and just political settlement as well as forestall foreign interventions.

5. On the political tract, the SPLM is ready to contribute ideas towards achieving a fair and just political settlement in Darfur And Eastern Sudan on the basis of the solution modalities outlined in the CPA. The details of such a settlement will of course have to be worked out by the parties to the conflict themselves, i.e., the GOS and the resistance movements in Darfur and Eastern Sudan. This will involve a large degree of autonomy for Darfur and Eastern Sudan as well as power sharing, wealth sharing and security arrangements.

6. Finally, we want to emphasize that the situation in Darfur and UNSC 1593 should not be seen as adversely affecting the implementation of the CPA; instead the CPA and its implementation offers the best opportunity for the resolution of the conflicts in Darfur and eastern Sudan. Linking implementation of the CPA or the peace dividend to resolution of the conflict in Darfur would have very serious consequences and eventually result in the spread of armed conflict all over the Sudan. Indeed, the route to the Somaliacization of Sudan, which many analysts fear, would surely come through linkage of Darfur with the implementation of the CPA. As an illustration, in battle if Company ALPHA is doing well, while BRAVO is getting a bloody nose, the Battallion commander uses his reserve, company CHARLIE, to reinforce the successful ALPHA to make a break though so that both ALPHA and CHARLIE come to the rescue of BRAVO, and the battle is won. Using CHARLIE to reinforce the failing BRAVO would likely lead to loss of the battle and the war.