التجمع الوطني الديمقراطي.. بيان حول الأوضاع في دارفور

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
التجمع الوطني الديمقراطي

بيان حول الأوضاع في دارفور

ظللنا في التجمع الوطني الديمقراطي نتابع بقلق تطورات الأحداث المتفجرة في دارفور والمأساة الإنسانية المروعة الناتجة عنها، وننظر باستنكار لمنهج النظام في مواجهة الأزمة والذي يعتمد الحل العسكري وحرق القرى والتطهير العرقي والتهجير القسري للمواطنين، وفي نفس الوقت نستنكر التشويه الذي ظل يمارسه نظام الخرطوم بتصوير الصراع الدائر في دارفور تارة بأنه نهب مسلح يمارسه قطاع الطرق وتارة أخرى بأنه تمرد محدود لا هدف له، وطوراً آخر بأنه أدوات للآخرين.
إن ما يجري في دارفور في حقيقته ثورة شعبية لها أسبابها وجذورها التاريخية التي تفاقمت بسبب سياسات نظام الخرطوم لتنفجر هكذا ثورةً مسلحةً في وجهه، تناضل من أجل أهل دارفور وحقهم العادل في الحياة الكريمة وفرص التنمية والاستقرار والمشاركة في القرار والمصير، وبالتالي هي مظهر من مظاهر الأزمة الوطنية الشاملة والممتدة منذ الاستقلال، وتعبير جزئي عنها في بقعة واحدة من مختلف بقاع السودان التي تنوء جميعها تحت وطأة تلك الأزمة، وتأكيد واضح لصحة ما ظللنا نطالب به من أن الأزمة الوطنية في بلادنا، وبمظاهرها وتعبيراتها المختلفة في الشرق والغرب والجنوب والشمال الكامنة منها والمتفجرة، لا حل لها إلا بمنهج سياسي شامل يعترف بالأزمة ويخاطب جذورها.
وإننا إذ نشيد باهتمام المجتمع الدولي بأزمة دارفور واهتمام المؤسسة الدولية الذي عبر عنه الأمين العام للأمم المتحدة؛ نطالب كل الأطراف الدولية والإقليمية بمزيد من الضغوط على النظام للكف عن نهج الحلول العسكرية الرعناء، كما نناشدهم لنجدة وإغاثة أهلنا النازحين والهائمين على وجوههم في صحارى دارفور وشرق تشاد.
وإننا نناشد أهلنا في دارفور بتوحيد صفوفهم واتخاذ الحيطة والحذ لتفويت الفرصة على النظام بعدم الانجرار وراء سياساته المدمرة التي يمارسها معهم بتأليب القبائل ضد بعضها بالتسليح والإثارة، لأن الانجرار وراءها لا يؤدي إلا إلى تخريب نسيجهم الاجتماعي ونمط تعايشهم السلمي الذي مارسوه طوال القرنين الماضيين.

أسمرا في يوم الإثنين 16 فبراير 2004م

NAIROBI,2/16/2004 (IRIN) - //This is the second of five reports on
prospects for peace in the Sudan. The reports are being published over two
months//

A year-old conflict pitting rebels against government forces and militia
groups in the Darfur states of western Sudan has created a humanitarian
crisis that has spilled over into neighbouring Chad, as well as concerns
among some observers about the region’s stability.

These concerns are rooted in the fact that cross-border ethnic solidarity
in the region is a more powerful force than nationality. Since July, more
than 110,000 Sudanese refugees have crossed the largely unguarded 1,350-km
border separating the two countries.

Also see: href="http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=39284&SelectRegion=East_
Africa&SelectCountry=CHAD-SUDAN">Darfur's invisible refugees living rough
in eastern Chad

But Chad is much more than a passive host to the fleeing victims of one of
Africa’s newest wars, which began in February 2003 when two rebel groups,
the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement
(JEM), rose up to push their political and economic agendas.

Also see: href="http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=38666&SelectRegion=East_
Africa&SelectCountry=SUDAN">The escalating crisis in Darfur

At the same time as playing mediator between Khartoum and the rebels, Chad
has openly supplied troops to the Sudanese army in Darfur. But, covertly,
it also serves as a conduit for arms that are fuelling the war, as an
arena for Sudanese militias pursuing the refugees across the border, and
as a refuge or assembly point for rebels and their families, say
observers.

Different ethnic groups in Chad may also be supplying both the SLA and
JEM, as well as the militias aligned to the Sudanese government, with
manpower.

These murky and often conflicting roles threaten not only to destabilise
the current relative peace in Chad but may also lead to a regional war
fought along ethnic lines, say observers. "It's a tribal war that has
become a problem between the two countries," commented a former army
officer and Zaghawah business man in the Chadian capital, N'Djamena.

MEDIATING ROLE

Chad mediated talks between the government of Sudan and the SLA, resulting
in a nominal ceasefire from September to December.

Chadian President Idriss Deby, himself a Zaghawah, was thought to be a
good choice as mediator because of his shared ethnicity with many of the
rebels, his deep-rooted connections with and knowledge of Darfur, and his
support base there which allowed him - with Khartoum's knowledge - to
launch a coup from the region in 1990. (His predecessor, Hissene Habre,
also launched his takeover from Darfur in 1982).

But a chorus of voices has long questioned his impartiality.

After the SLA and JEM emerged in February 2003 demanding political and
economic rights, Deby committed himself to cooperating militarily with
Sudanese President Umar al-Bashir to crush them. He officially sent 500
troops to take part in joint army operations in Sudan, but commentators
later suggested that the real figure was close to 2,000, according to the
International Crisis Group (ICG) think-tank.

Sudanese Interior Minister Gen Abd al-Rahim Muhammad Husayn announced to
parliament in May that Chad had also contributed three helicopters and 17
vehicles to the same campaign.

When the time came to extend the 45-day September ceasefire agreement with
the SLA, the Chadian government deported 35 Darfurian intellectuals who
had arrived in N'Djamena, to advise the politically inexperienced rebels,
ICG reported.

Deby then signed an agreement with Khartoum in November to establish a
joint task force to curb cross-border attacks and smuggling, a deal which
also allowed for the extradition of armed groups from Chad.

In fact, the remoteness of the 1,350-km border with Sudan allows not only
the militias to regularly attack refugees on Chadian territory but also
the rebels to freely cross between the two countries. JEM rebels, whose
wives and families are among the refugees, reportedly often cross the
border into the Chadian half of the border town of Tine (Tine Chad) to
assemble. One local humanitarian source told IRIN he saw a convoy of them
leave the town for Sudan in about 20 lorries at the end of January.

But Deby's perceived bias has led both rebel groups to demand the presence
of "international" observers as a precondition to any peace negotiations.

"They [Chadians] don't have the authority to compel the Sudanese
government to act," JEM spokesman Abu Bakr Hamid al-Nur, told IRIN in Tine
Chad, adding that observers from the UK, US, France or neighbouring
African countries should be involved in future talks.

"Even the Sudanese don't believe in the Chadian mediating role," said
Dobian Assingar, the vice-president of the International Federation for
Human Rights in Chad and president of the Chadian League for Human Rights.
"Sudan doesn't believe in the mediation efforts started by Chad. Chad
knows that Sudan doesn't believe in it, but is trying to continue to give
itself a good image."

ETHNIC TIES ON BOTH SIDES OF BORDER

According to the last Chadian census in 1993, of the 16 ethnic groups that
straddle the border, 78,000 Zaghawah, 50,000 Masalit and over 760,000
members of nomadic Arab tribes live in Chad. The Sudanese counterparts of
all these groups are prime movers in the Darfur conflict.

The groups share common resources, history, culture, family ties, and
remain close, with a great degree of toing and froing across the dividing
line. In Tine, just a dry river bed separates the Chadian and Sudanese
Zaghawah, allowing them to share both water points and marriage ties.

"Even we can't distinguish between them. A man can have two wives, one in
Chad, one in Sudan," a local official with the Chadian Red Cross, Abu Bakr
Muhammad Sha'ib, told IRIN.

The ethnic nature of the devastating attacks in Darfur, in which mainly
the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawah - from which the rebels emerged - are
systematically being attacked, killed, forced off their land, abducted and
raped by Arab militias and the Sudanese army, means that emotions are
running high among their Chadian neighbours.

In both Darfur and Chad, numerous people told IRIN that kin on the Chadian
side of the border were helping their "brothers" in Sudan, with Chadian
Arabs - travelling from as far away as Biltine and Ati - helping the
militias, and the Zaghawah helping the rebels.

(Many of the Zaghawah refugees who have fled from Darfur are actually
Chadians who fled to Sudan to escape Chad's incessant civil wars and
insurrections since independence in 1960.)

The vice-chairman of the exiled political and military movement, the Sudan
Federal Democratic Alliance, Dr Sharif Harir, who is from Darfur, told
IRIN that social systems in the region were built on "kinship and blood"
and that there was an obligation to help one other.

"The Arabs come from Chad and join their brothers in Sudan. Their goal is
to form Arab unity," said Abd al-Karim Abbakar Anaw, a Sudanese chief, now
a refugee in Kourbileke on the Chadian side of the border. "When the
rebels catch the Arabs, they tell them they're from Chad."

A local aid worker in Tine Chad told IRIN there was no doubt that some
Zaghawah from Chad were also helping their neighbours. "The locals are
more than angry, because they are relatives. They have relatives in
Sudan - fathers, brothers, uncles and they are all coming back wounded."

"It's a tribal problem. Black with black, Arab with Arab. We are
neighbours, one brother is here, one brother is there. Without doubt if
the brother is a victim of aggression, the other will come to help," said
a Sudanese teacher in Kourbileke, Muhammad Husayn Ali. He said up to 2,000
Zaghawah from Chad were currently helping the rebels in Darfur.

A local source from the Chadian town of Guereda told IRIN that of 180
Zaghawah from the area had gone to Darfur to fight last December, only 15
had returned alive.

Proof is hard to come by, rumours are rife, and the various groups
involved in the fighting are quick to accuse their enemies of receiving
outside help. "It's an open question to what degree the Chadian Zaghawah
are helping. Also whether the Arabs are doing the same. The Arabs in Chad
don't necessarily want to be used by Khartoum," commented a regional
analyst. He warned that significant involvement of Chadian counterparts in
Darfur would "lead to a parallel face-off and more cross-border attacks".

Whether or not they are supplying manpower, at the very least the
influential Zaghawah business community in Sudan, Chad and elsewhere is
supporting the rebels financially, say observers.

"There were contributions here [N'Djamena] to help our brothers in
Darfur," a Zaghawah businessman who was formerly an army officer told
IRIN. "Some of them [the rebels] came here to N'Djamena to procure arms. I
don't know how much we collected, but it's true that Chad is supporting
Darfur."

There are also suggestions that the Darfur rebels may enjoy significant
support from the Zaghawah - many of them Sudanese - who dominate Chad’s
top army brass and upper ranks of the presidential guard.

"Certain elements of the presidential guard of President Deby may be
participating in the conflict, because the rebels are their cousins," said
a senior army officer. "You have to understand that the Zaghawah officers
are the biggest group in the army with arms and men under them," he added.

DEBY'S PRECARIOUS BALANCING ACT

According to observers, Deby is caught between his ethic affinity with his
minority Zaghawah support base in Sudan and Chad - which put him into
power - and his relationship with militarily powerful Khartoum.

In recent months, his position has become increasingly precarious, not
least following the judicial executions in November of four men convicted
of the murder in Chad of a Sudanese member of parliament and head of the
Chad Petroleum Company, who was also reportedly close to Bashir.

The man found guilty of masterminding the killing, a prominent Zaghawah,
had expected impunity and appealed for a presidential pardon. But Deby,
who was involved in mediating in Darfur at the time, decided his interests
lay more with Sudan, a regional analyst told IRIN. So the execution was
carried out within weeks of the verdict, and for the first time since
1991.

In a country rife with cronyism among the Zaghawah elite, "it is very rare
for a Zaghawah to be prosecuted and punished for anything", said the
analyst. "The Zaghawah have come to expect impunity."

The ruling against his kin alienated many of Deby's supporters, who
believe their backing of his 1990 coup obliges him to help them in their
struggle against Khartoum.

But maintaining good relations with Sudan, at least on the surface, has
taken precedence, say observers.

When Sudanese bombs were dropped on the border town of Tine Chad, killing
three and injuring 15 Chadian civilians on 29 January, the Chadian
government was at pains to play down the "incident". Chad's foreign
minister, Nagoum Yamassoum, reportedly said it was "in no way a deliberate
act". "We do not want to speak of a deliberate act of provocation to bring
the war towards Chad."

Speaking about Darfur a day later on national radio, Deby placed the blame
for Darfur's woes on the rebels. "The rebels have to accept the rule of
law in order for Darfur to become peaceful," he said.

"He [Deby] can't afford a falling-out with Sudan," said a regional
analyst. "If he supports his clansmen openly, Sudan will come down on him
like a tonne of bricks. If he does it covertly, he risks taking the war
home with him."

If a regional war broke out, it is not clear whether Deby - whose health
is increasingly bad - would survive politically, he continued.

Deby is also mindful, according to some analysts, that if he upsets
Khartoum, Chadian rebels based in Sudan might enjoy increased support from
their hosts. According to Africa Confidential, Sudan is already backing
several hundred Chadian fighters based in the Darfur region.

So the "balancing act" continues.

"Both countries deal hypocritically with each other. They refuse to say it
officially, but each is using rebels [the Darfur rebels and the militias]
to attack the other," said Assingar, the Chadian human rights activist.

"I am scared that the conflict will destabilise the relative peace we have
in Chad now, and I call on both countries to stop their hypocrisy and to
avoid a war that will cause thousands of deaths for nothing."

عزيزتى رجاء،

لم أجد كلمات تعبر عن حال قادة التجمع المبارِكة اتفاق جدة والمصدِرة لهذا البيان، أصدق وأبلغ من امضائك:

ليك درب ولا دربين.. مساك الدروب ضهًاب
ليك قلب ولا بالين.. سواي القلوب كضًاب
ليك ظهر ولا سرجين.. ركًاب السروج وقًاع

شكراَ مرة أخرى.

الأعزاء الأفاضل
رودا
عدلان احمد عبدالعزيز
شكرا للمداخلة..

شكرا يا رجاء
ندى

الاستاذة رجاء
شكرا على هذه الملومات القيمة لمستجدات الاوضاع فى دارفور عبر بيان التجمع الوطنى الديمقراطى .
ولكن هل يعنى هذا ان التجمع الوطنى ومن خلال قراءة

Quote: وبالتالي هي مظهر من مظاهر الأزمة الوطنية الشاملة والممتدة منذ الاستقلال، وتعبير جزئي عنها في بقعة واحدة من مختلف بقاع السودان التي تنوء جميعها تحت وطأة تلك الأزمة، وتأكيد واضح لصحة ما ظللنا نطالب به من أن الأزمة الوطنية في بلادنا، وبمظاهرها وتعبيراتها المختلفة في الشرق والغرب والجنوب والشمال الكامنة منها والمتفجرة، لا حل لها إلا بمنهج سياسي شامل يعترف بالأزمة ويخاطب جذورها

انه لا يعترف بما يجرى فى نيفاشا ويعتبره امر يخص النظام والحركة ولا شأن له بما يخرج من وثيقة تهائية للسلام
مع تحياتى

من اجل اهلنا فى دارفور

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