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 Re: جنوب السودان بعد 15 عاماً من الاستقلال: الن (Re: Mohamed Omer)
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نُشرت المقالة في موقع "ذا كونفرسيشن دوت كوم"، القسم الأفريقي.
the article was published in the conversation dot com, The African section
South Sudan at 15: how the political elite have found a way to profit from peace as well as war
Published: July 7, 2026 10.16am EDT
https://theconversation.com/south-sudan-at-15-how-the-political-elite-have-found-a-way-to-profit-from-peace-as-well-as-war-285846https://theconversation.com/south-sudan-at-15-how-the-political-elite-have-found-a-way-to-profit-from-peace-as-well-as-war-285846
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https://tinyurl.com/5523b5rehttps://tinyurl.com/5523b5re
https://lnk.ink/Crnmbhttps://lnk.ink/Crnmb
South Sudan’s independence from Sudan in 2011 was meant to close the chapter on one of Africa’s longest civil wars: the north-south war that preceded it. Formally, it did. But independence did not end the deeper struggles over power, revenue and coercion inside the newly independent state.
South Sudan returned to war in 2013, watched a 2015 settlement collapse, and now lives under a 2018 Revitalised Agreement whose promised transition has been postponed repeatedly.
This is usually told as a story of failed peacemaking, with too many spoilers and too little political will. But what if these deals are not failing so much as working؟ What if they stabilise order precisely by preserving the systems that make violence profitable؟
Political settlements theory helps explain why peace agreements often focus on dividing power, offices and resources among elites. The hope is that if rival leaders receive a share of power, offices and resources, they will have less reason to fight. But negotiated transitions can also carry wartime systems into peace. The question, then, is not only who gets a share of the state, but what kinds of war economies, revenue systems and coercive practices are being preserved.
As an economic historian of war and peace, I have spent more than a decade tracing how rulers in South Sudan and Sudan raise money, goods, labour and other resources, and how payment is enforced through soldiers, officials, checkpoints and offices. My recent research paper examined how South Sudan’s peace agreements reshaped the country’s systems of revenue, spending and coercion: who could extract resources, who could allocate them, and who could enforce payment.
My analysis drew on 2020-2024 fieldwork and archival, secondary and peace agreement data. I sought to answer three questions: who collected revenue from monetary and non-monetary sources, such as cash, cattle, grain and labour; who paid; and who benefited.
What emerges is that peace settlements have redistributed access to money, offices and external finance among elites, while leaving intact the coercive revenue system and war economies that preceded them. In some cases, peace has formalised those systems by turning wartime access to extraction into recognised office, revenue authority or security control. Violence changes form rather than ending; it recedes from the battlefield and lodges in the revenue systems, security forces and war economies that continue to extract from civilians – now in the name of order.
This is a pattern I call predatory peace.
The same machinery makes the state itself a prize: controlling it is so lucrative that capture remains worth fighting for, and when the power-sharing breaks down, as it did in 2013, the fighting returns. Peace and war become two settings of one extractive machine rather than true opposites.
Similar dynamics have emerged in other resource-rich, conflict-affected states, such as in oil-rich Angola and the mineral endowed Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). South Sudan is resource-rich too, above all because of oil. But the wider issue is not only natural resources. It is the political control of revenue streams such as oil, customs, aid, loans, contracts, checkpoints, timber, charcoal and other forms of extraction.
It’s all part of a wider pattern in peacemaking that has repeatedly paired political deals with economic reforms that entrenched elite control over revenue and other resources.
None of this is inevitable. A different approach would start by treating the whole revenue complex as the heart of peacemaking itself, not as a technical issue to be postponed until after a peace agreement is signed. It would ask who controls money and other resources, including humanitarian and development assistance; who is allowed to extract resources, payments and labour from civilians; and whether people can see anything in return for what they pay.
Peace as ‘organised robbery’ in South Sudan
South Sudan’s national revenue system includes taxes, customs, fees, oil revenues, international loans, aid and off-budget income. It also includes non-monetary extraction, such as cattle, grain, labour and goods taken from civilians. These flows are enforced through soldiers, security forces, government offices and checkpoints. Together, they form what I call a revenue complex: the machinery through which rulers extract the resources that allow them to govern, reward allies and sustain coercive power.
In much of South Sudan, “peace” has reshuffled who profits from the revenue system, not what it does to those who pay. A businessman in Malakal, a city in Upper Nile State, described the tax system as “organised robbery” in which soldiers were overcharging and pocketing the proceeds. He was told that the system had to be endured to “maintain peace”.
Predation was not a breakdown of order; it was a condition of order.
None of this began with the peace process. My peace agreement analysis starts in the early 1970s, but in separate archival research and an earlier round of just over 200 interviews, I traced the territory’s revenue complex back to at least 1899. Across colonial, rebel and independent rule, I found a similar logic: revenue sources were used to secure rulers’ control more than to fund public goods.
Across more than 120 years, changes in government did not dismantle the underlying machinery of extraction and control. Each major political settlement since the 1970s has been laid over that inheritance, reshuffling who profits from it.
Confusion is integral to the system. Traders described being shuttled from office to office to meet fresh demands; collectors themselves spoke of decrees “passed from nowhere” that shifted revenue to other units. A businesswoman in Wau described fierce competition for tax collection posts because of what could be skimmed from them. This is not administrative failure, but a system that works for those who run it. When revenue authority is spread across overlapping offices, no one can be held to account and everyone can be rewarded for their loyalty.
This performance of state finance runs all the way up. In 2012, the president conceded that some US$4 billion in oil money had simply been “stolen”. In 2026, a UN panel of experts found that South Sudan continued to sell oil months in advance of delivery, and that disputes over undelivered oil cargoes and oil-backed debts had reached UK commercial courts.
State budgets perform reform while the money moves elsewhere.
What people get in return
South Sudanese nevertheless do not reject the idea of contributing to public authority. They contrasted community-level payments and contributions, which they could see returning as boreholes, roads or clinics, with state taxation, which they experienced as extraction without return.
Many insisted that paying tax is good, so long as it is reciprocal, transparent and tied to public goods.
The problem is that peace agreements often leave that link severed, even as they formalise new bargains among elites.
What non-predatory peace would require
A different kind of peacemaking would mean taking the following steps.
rebuilding of a transparent, civilian-controlled revenue complex
linking what people pay to what they receive
making external support conditional on genuine revenue reform.
Lastly, South Sudanese civic actors should be supported to monitor the cross-border flows – oil, arms, timber, charcoal, looted goods and finance – that fund fighting.
This work does not fall solely to donors and mediators. People are already documenting where the money goes.
A serious settlement would treat them as central to any peace worth the name.
the author of the article:
Matthew Benson-Strohmayer
Research Fellow and Sudans Research Director, London School of Economics and Political Science
I am an economic historian and political economist of war and peace. My research examines how states are built and unbuilt through fiscal systems: taxation, debt, oil, aid, illicit finance, and the coercive extraction of labour, grain, cattle and cash. I am a Research Fellow and Sudans Research Director in the Conflict and Civicness Research Group at the London School of Economics, and Affiliate Faculty in LSE’s Department of Economic History.
Africa, particularly Sudan and South Sudan, is my empirical foundation and the analytical centre from which I develop wider arguments about the global economic history and political economy of conflict, governance, intervention and state formation. I work from the premise that the Global South is not an exception to be explained, but a vantage point from which the architecture of the contemporary world economy can be most clearly seen. My work asks how coercive revenue orders make and unmake states across colonial, rebel, authoritarian and internationally mediated political orders.
My research develops concepts such as predatory peace - the reorganisation, rather than resolution, of coercive revenue orders through peace settlements - and civic fiscal resistance, which describes how civic actors contest or redirect extractive governance. My first book, Of Rule Not Revenue: Predation, State-Unbuilding, and Conflict in Sudan and South Sudan, 1821-2023, for Cambridge University Press’s African Studies Series, draws on more than 700 interviews and archival research conducted between 2014 and 2024.
My articles have appeared in Comparative Studies in Society and History and the Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding. I am also developing an invited Cambridge University Press Elements book, A History of the Economic History of the State, and a comparative book project on how coercive revenue orders make and unmake states.
Experience
–presentResearch Fellow and Sudans Research Director, London School of Economics and Political Science
Education
2020 Durham University, History / School of Government and International Affairs
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