البرهان تحت المجهر الإسرائيلي

Quote: Sudan’s Terror Gatekeeper: Why Israel Must Take Down Iran’s Man in Khartoum The war against Iranian terror isn’t confined to Israelis borders. It’s regional. It’s global. And in Sudan, it has a name: Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. ByNIGER INNIS JULY 1, 2025 14:57 By now, it should be crystal clear: Sudan is no longer just another African civil war zone—it’s an emerging outpost in Iran’s global terror campaign against Israel and the West. The man at the heart of this transformation is General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and every day he remains in power is another day that Tehran gains ground in its effort to surround, weaken, and ultimately destroy the Jewish state. Let’s drop the diplomatic niceties. Al-Burhan is not a “moderate,” not a “pragmatist,” and certainly not a force for stability. He is an enabler of radical Islam, an ally of Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, and most dangerously, a willing tool of Iran’s expanding influence across Africa and the Middle East. This isn’t theoretical. It’s operational. Iranian weapons are flowing through Sudan. Intelligence agents are embedding themselves in Khartoum. Drone technology is being quietly shipped and assembled in the shadows of Sudan’s fractured military. This is no longer a potential problem—it’s a live threat, and Israel ignores it at its peril. We must understand what’s at stake. The Islamic Republic of Iran has long been pursuing its vision of regional domination—stretching from Tehran through Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and now Sudan. Its strategy is simple: surround Israel with firepower, disrupt global shipping routes, and use failed states as bases for terrorism. Al-Burhan has given Iran exactly what it needs: a gateway to the Red Sea, a lawless military structure, and an ideological alignment rooted in Islamism and anti-Western hatred. At the same time, Sudan under al-Burhan has quietly become a sanctuary for Hamas operatives fleeing pressure in Gaza. While Israel dismantles Hamas’s networks at home, they are already rebuilding abroad—with Sudan a key hub. This isn’t coincidental; it’s coordinated. Sudan is now part of the broader Iran-Hamas axis. The October 7th massacre taught us a brutal truth: we can no longer afford to treat distant threats as someone else’s problem. What happens in Sudan today could set the stage for a new wave of terrorist activity against Israel tomorrow. The Jewish state must never again be caught off guard by enemies stockpiling weapons and training militants under the radar. And while the world continues to issue statements and wring its hands over Sudan’s “political crisis,” Israel must remain focused on reality: al-Burhan’s regime is a threat that must be eliminated—through direct or indirect means. This is not only in Israel’s interest, but in the interests of our allies in the region. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates also see the danger. Iran’s foothold in Sudan threatens Red Sea trade, destabilizes their own borders, and undermines the Sunni axis’s attempts to contain Shiite expansionism. But while these countries issue cautious statements and encourage diplomacy, Israel has a different calculus: survival. Israel cannot afford delay. Sudan is no longer isolated from the global jihadist network—it is part of it. Al-Burhan has permitted extremist groups linked to the Muslim Brotherhood and even al-Qaeda to operate with impunity. And as we’ve seen across Africa, these groups are quick to ####stasize, using failed states as breeding grounds for terror and launching pads for attacks far beyond their borders. If this were just an internal Sudanese problem, it would still be serious. But this is something far more dangerous: a weak state becoming a forward operating base for Israel’s most implacable enemies. The international community has proven itself incapable—or unwilling—to stop this trend. Sanctions have done nothing. UN resolutions have been ignored. Diplomatic initiatives have failed. The time for half-measures is over. What’s needed now is a coordinated campaign to remove al-Burhan and replace his regime with one that is anti-terror, anti-Iran, and aligned with the Abraham Accords vision of regional cooperation, economic development, and peace through strength. The campaign should have several fronts: Intelligence coordination between Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE to map out Iran’s presence in Sudan—its agents, supply chains, drone networks, and financial hubs. Targeted economic pressure on al-Burhan’s regime, including sanctions on entities dealing with Iranian arms transfers or harboring Hamas operatives. Support the parallel government announced in Nairobi that oppose both al-Burhan and Islamist extremism—providing them with covert assistance to take back control and shut down Iranian corridors. Cyber and covert operations to disrupt Iranian logistics and disable the terror infrastructure being built on Sudanese soil. Strategic messaging, particularly to the Sudanese people, exposing the regime’s betrayal of national sovereignty by allowing foreign Islamist forces to use Sudan as their playground. There is also a role here for the United States—especially under President Trump's leadership . The Trump Doctrine emphasized clarity, strength, and results—not endless diplomacy. The Abraham Accords changed the region’s trajectory. That same mindset could help reshape Sudan, but only if Washington recognizes that al-Burhan is not a partner—he’s a proxy. Ultimately, this comes down to a fundamental truth: Israel must defend itself, by itself if necessary. And in Sudan, the clock is ticking. Al-Burhan’s removal is not just a Sudanese matter. It is a blow against Hamas. It is a strike at the heart of Iranian expansionism. And it is a necessary step in ensuring that the horrors of October 7th are never repeated—whether from Gaza, from Lebanon, or from a terror nest in Khartoum. The war against Iranian terror isn’t confined to Israelis borders. It’s regional. It’s global. And in Sudan, it has a name: Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. For the sake of Israel's security, for the sake of our future, Israel must help bring him down—before it’s too late. Niger Innis is the chairman of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE). He is the co-founder of the New America organization. He is also a frequent television and radio commentator, having appeared on CNN, CNBC, NPR, Fox News Channel, MSNBC, and BBC.

Quote: فيما ارى عادل الباز حرب الخليج…. سقوط أسطورة الحماية 1 كشفت الحرب الجارية في الخليج الآن عن حقائق لم تكن مخفية تمامًا، لكنها كانت مغطاة بطبقات من الاكاذيب و التطمين الزائف والخطاب المعلّب. ومع أول اختبار حقيقي، سقطت الرواية الكبرى: أن القواعد الأمريكية في الخليج موجودة لحماية دول المنطقة من أي عدوان خارجي. تلك أولى الأكاذيب: “القواعد الأمريكية في الخليج لحماية دول المنطقة من أي عدوان خارجي”. ها هي الحقائق تتكشف مع أول عدوان تتعرض له تلك الدول. ففي الحرب الأولى بين إسرائيل وإيران قبل ستة أشهر، أو ما سُمِّي بحرب الاثني عشر يومًا، وبعد اندلاع المواجهات مباشرة، أُفرغت القواعد من السلاح تقريبًا، وكذلك من الأفراد. وذهب الجنود الذين يُفترض أن مهمتهم الدفاع عن البلاد التي استضافتهم هرعوا جميعًا، إما إلى خارج البلاد، أو إلى غرف فنادق الدوحة الفاخرة، تاركين الدول التي استضافتهم وتكفلت بكل شيء عرضة للهجمات الإيرانية، ثم لاحقًا للهجمات الإسرائيلية التي استباحت سماء الدوحة، بل وقصدت ضرب الوفد الفلسطيني الذي كان يفاوض الإسرائيليين أنفسهم 2. والآن، ما إن بدأت الحرب الجديدة حتى أُفرغت القواعد كلها في الخليج، وهرع الآلاف من الجنود الأمريكيين إلى الخارج، أو إلى القواعد الأمريكية في البحار، أو إلى مواقع أكثر أمانًا. اتضح تمامًا أن مهمة تلك القواعد أبعد ما تكون عن حماية الدول التي تستضيفها، بل لها مهام أخرى لا علاقة لها مطلقًا بأمن دول الخليج 3. عندما اندلعت الحرب الأولى ثم الثانية بين إيران وأمريكا وإسرائيل، لم نرَ دفاعًا مشتركًا، ولا ردعًا فوريًا، ولا مظلة حماية تحمي الأجواء والسيادة. رأينا هروبًا جماعيًا، وإخلاءً للقواعد، وانتقال قوات الحماية إلى البحر أو إلى مواقع أكثر أمانًا. وهذا يعني أن اللحظة التي كان يُفترض أن تُختبر فيها عقيدة “الحماية”، أثبتت أن المهمة الأساسية لتلك القواعد ليست الدفاع عن الدول المضيفة. هنا تنفتح أبواب التساؤلات. أولًا: هل كانت القواعد الأمريكية في الخليج لحماية هذه الدول فعلًا؟ أم لحماية المصالح الأمريكية في الخليج؟ الحقيقة التي يصعب تجاهلها أن وظيفة تلك القواعد تاريخيًا كانت تأمين تدفق الطاقة، وضمان حرية الملاحة، وردع الاعداء عن تهديد المصالح الأمريكية. أما الدفاع المباشر عن العواصم الخليجية، فكان دومًا مشروطًا بحسابات أوسع تتعلق بواشنطن لا بامن المنطقة. بل إن استخدام السلاح الأمريكي والغربي عمومًا مشروط بقيود سياسية وقانونية معقدة، علمًا بأن دول الخليج تنفق نحو 114.5 مليار دولار سنويًا على الدفاع. فإذا كانت مئات المليارات تُنفق على السلاح، فلماذا يبقى جزء كبير منه معطلًا داخل قواعد لا يُسمح باستخدامها إلا ضمن ترتيبات سياسية معقدة؟ 4 السؤال الثاني الذي سيُطرح بقوة بعد انتهاء هذه الحرب: لماذا تُستضاف هذه ويصرف عليها المليارات إذا كانت لا تدافع عن الدول التي تستضيفها؟ بل إنها لم تحمِ حتى نفسها؟ ربما لم يكن هذا السؤال يُطرح سابقًا، لكن بعد ما جرى، سيكون على المسؤولين الخليجيين الاستعداد للإجابة عليه. بل سيكون عليهم طرح السؤال ذاته على الدول التي تمتلك قواعد في بلدانهم: لماذا نستضيفكم، ونصرف كل تلك المليارات، ونشتري كل ذلك السلاح من مصانعكم ، دون أن تتوفر لنا حماية فعلية، ولا حتى فرصة لاستخدام السلاح الذي ندفع ثمنه؟ 5 الحرب الحالية ستنتهي، كما انتهت حروب سابقة. لكن السؤال الذي سيبقى: ماذا كسبت الدول الخليجية من استضافة القواعد الأمريكية؟ هل الحل في طرد تلك القواعد ووقف الإنفاق عليها فورًا؟ أم في إعادة تحديد دورها بوضوح؟ أم أن هناك استراتيجيات جديدة يمكن أن تتخذها دول الخليج لتحفظ أمنها وتخرج من دوامة الاعتماد الكامل على القواعد الأجنبية؟ 6 في اعتقادي أن الانتباهة الأخيرة لمجلس التعاون الخليجي، باتخاذ موقف جماعي ضد الهجمات الايرانية تشي ببداية بناء موقف خليجي موحد تجاه أمن دول الخليج. والأمل أن يتطور هذا الموقف إلى بناء منظومة أمنية خليجية مكتملة، منظومة لا تعتمد اعتمادًا كليًا على قوة خارجية، بل تقوم على تكامل دفاعي إقليمي حقيقي، يُنسَّق ويُضبط ضمن شبكة تحالفات أوسع في المنطقة وخارجها، دون أن يكون مرهونًا بالكامل بإرادة الآخرين 7. إذا خرجت دول الخليج من هذه الحرب بإعادة نظر جذرية في معادلة أمنها، فسيكون ذلك هو الدرس الأكبر. أما إذا استمرت المعادلة كما هي، فستبقى المنطقة أسيرة تصور أمني أثبتت التجربة أنه لا يضمن الحماية التلقائية، ولم يدافع عن دول الخليج، بل عجز حتى عن حماية نفسه.

Quote: سؤالي للاخ ياسر لان هذا التقرير عمره حوالي سنة تقريبا ( ٩ اشهر)

Quote: Burhan is using Sudan-Israel normalization to secure his power - opinion Normalization has become less about peace and more about political survival for Sudan’s leaders. THEN-FOREIGN MINISTER Eli Cohen and Sudan Transitional Sovereignty Council head Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan meet in Khartoum in February 2023. THEN-FOREIGN MINISTER Eli Cohen and Sudan Transitional Sovereignty Council head Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan meet in Khartoum in February 2023. (photo credit: Sudan Sovereignty Council Press Office/Reuters) ByAREIG ELHAG DECEMBER 17, 2025 11:07 Updated: DECEMBER 18, 2025 06:42 In an article recently published in The Wall Street Journal, Lt.-Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Sudan’s leader and head of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) tried to present his vision of the war raging in Sudan since April 2023. One point caught attention – his reference to normalization with Israel: “In 2021, Sudan took a historic step by joining the Abraham Accords. We believe that peace and cooperation are the only path toward a stable Middle East and Horn of Africa.” This reveals that normalization has become a tool used by a military leader seeking international legitimacy amid a war that has caused the world’s worst humanitarian catastrophe in 2025, with more than 12 million people displaced. Sudan witnessed a popular revolution in 2019 that toppled President Omar al-Bashir after 30 years. A transitional government was formed, but Burhan and his partner, Rapid Support Forces (RSF) leader Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo, led a military coup in October 2021. Less than two years later, violent fighting erupted between the army and the RSF, continuing to this moment. But Burhan is not alone in this game. Hemedti has positioned himself, similarly, expressing support for normalization on multiple occasions. Even as he wages a brutal war marked by documented atrocities in Darfur, RSF representatives, including Nasreddin Abdulbari, a leader in the RSF-founded government, have waved normalization as proof of pragmatism and openness to Western partnerships. The message from both sides is identical: “I am your man – I will deliver normalization.” An old trick in new clothing Sudan has taken steps toward normalization since October 2020 as part of the Abraham Accords. In February 2020, Burhan met Netanyahu in Entebbe, Uganda, sparking controversy. Ironically, he staged a coup less than two years later, revealing that normalization was never a national project but a tactical tool to gain Western support and consolidate military power. This dynamic is not new. In January 2016, then-foreign minister Ibrahim Ghandour stated that normalizing relations with Israel could be discussed in exchange for lifting sanctions. Those attempts failed because they lacked popular credibility. Today, both Burhan and Hemedti repeat this approach under worse conditions, each presenting himself as a reliable Western partner while the country collapses. SUDAN’S GENERAL Abdel Fattah al-Burhan salutes for the national anthem after landing in the military airport of Port Sudan on Sunday, on his first trip away from Khartoum since the internal conflict broke out. SUDAN’S GENERAL Abdel Fattah al-Burhan salutes for the national anthem after landing in the military airport of Port Sudan on Sunday, on his first trip away from Khartoum since the internal conflict broke out. (credit: Ibrahim Mohammed Ishak/Reuters) Contradictions that cannot be hidden What makes this moment more confusing is the contradiction between Burhan’s stated path and his actual alliances. While presenting himself as a partner ready to open to Israel, he has simultaneously built a network extending toward Iran and empowering radical Islamist currents within state institutions. Iran has supplied the Sudanese army with Mohajer-6 drones, and intelligence assessments confirm the expansion of Iranian arms smuggling networks into Sudan, despite international restrictions. In parallel, Islamist networks from Bashir’s regime have returned to decision-making positions, framing the war as an ideological confrontation. This scene reproduces a system that represents a long-term threat to the region. The Islamist rise in security and military decision-making creates an environment capable of giving birth to a new hostile front on the Red Sea front that is neither stable nor controllable. Burhan governs through a military system, waging a war that has destroyed major cities and displaced millions, while Burhan rejects mediation initiatives and insists on a military resolution. This alliance – reliance on Islamist networks alongside military cooperation with Tehran – reveals a difficult-to-hide contradiction. Burhan presents normalization as a strategic option, while his actual alliances touch the core of what Israel and the entire region consider structural dangers: direct Iranian support, ideological influence within the military, and the possibility of the Red Sea transforming into an open security competition zone. The legitimate question arises: Can a strategic relationship be built with a military partner who receives weapons from Israel’s primary regional adversary؟ The paradox becomes more complex when we look at Burhan’s main allies: Egypt, his steadfast supporter, and Turkey, which supplies him with Bayraktar TB-2 drones, are going through one of the worst moments in their relations with Israel; Saudi Arabia links any potential normalization to the Palestinian issue. Normalization without legitimacy Israel may have valid incentives for peace, but under these circumstances, it is not in its interest to align with a system moving closer to Islamists and Iran, especially one tied to a figure under US sanctions and accused of war crimes. That’s a connection Israel’s global reputation doesn’t really need now. If Burhan were truly working for his country’s interest, he would realize that any breakthrough in regional relations in this complex climate would be difficult, and he would not pursue it as a personal way out. But he is the only party pursuing this file as a path to political salvation. The truth is that a step of this magnitude cannot be reduced to an individual decision. Normalization is not a card to be raised under pressure, but a sovereign path that needs an elected government and a parliament expressing the will of the Sudanese people. What is happening today is an attempt without support, an initiative without internal acceptance. The result is not peace or stability, but a distorted version of a deficient agreement that does not change Sudan’s position and does not transform war into a stable state; it deepens contradictions and postpones collapse without addressing it. Normalization at this moment becomes a maneuvering margin for a leader repeating an outdated approach at a moment when the approach itself has become part of the crisis, not a way out of it. The writer is a Washington-based journalist, talk show anchor, and researcher with over a decade of experience covering Sudan, the Horn of Africa, and Middle East politics. She currently serves as the Arabic content editor at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.