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01:51 AM Feb, 12 2016 Sudanese Online
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November, 18th, 2001 – Cairo
Concerning Comprehensive Peace Settlement
1. Composition of the NDA:
Tile NDA initially incorporated all Sudan’s historical political forces form the South, North, East and West, in addition to representatives of democratically ‑ elected social groups (trades unions) and the Sudan Army's High Command ie pre‑NIF coup. Left out of that conglomeration of political and social groups was the NIF. Early last year the Umma Party opted out of the Alliance, but continued to affirm its adherence to its political agenda as expounded in the Asmara Resolutions of June, 1995.
2- Pre‑Bashir Peace Initiatives
The Objectives of The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) objective from the plan of the comprehensive political solutions to open the passage for confronting the roots of the Sudanese crisis that has extended since the independence, stressing that the solution should not be partial or bilateral, new mean reconciliation with the regime, division of power or sharing it, but the realization of a comprehensive political solution in accordance with the following objective:
(l) stopping the civil war, establishing the basis of a comprehensive just peace and opening the way for the establishment of a stable, united and democratic Sudan by the voluntary will of its people.
(2) Removing the dictatorship and its organs and institutions restoring liberal democracy, freedoms and basic rights, and guaranteeing the removal and replacement of one party state by a multi party system, just free regime.
(3) Punishment of everyone who committed a crime against the country or citizens, restoration of the looted public or individual’s properties and investigating in all the corruption activities that took place during the rule of the regime through the judicial system.
References of the comprehensive political solution:
1/ Resolutions of the fundamental Issues Conference of Asmara in
June 1995, as a basic reference.
2/ IGAD Declaration of Principles of 1994.
3/ Resolution of the Leadership Council related to the political solution,
March 1998 and June l999.
4/ The two memorandums of the NDA inside, June 1996 and December 1999
5/ Tripoli Declaration, 1999.
6/ Massawa Declaration Sept. 2000.
7/ Cairo Declaration June 2001.
Basic Demands:
To test the seriousness of the regime, and to enable the plan of the political solution reach its goals, the NDA is .stuck to the fulfillment of the following basic procedures by the regime:
l/ Recognition of the National Democratic Alliance as an organizational body and an opposing political vessel that expresses for the member groups.
2/The regime should determine the official body authorized to negotiate with the NDA since it is concerned by negotiation with the government only, because it possesses the machineries for implementing what comes out of the negotiation will also be questionable by the governments of states concerned with the Sudanese question, especially those states with initiatives.
3/ The regime should implement the following arrangements to create an atmosphere suitable for the comprehensive political solution:
(a) Cancellation of the articles in the regime's constitution of 1998 that restrict public freedoms or allow such a thing.
(b) Cancellation of all the exceptional procedures, including that permit detention, searching and calling to report to the National Security organs.
(c) Lifting up the restrictions on the political parties and trade union activities by cancellation of the 1992 Act and Tawali law of 1998.
(d) Abolishing the public order courts and police.
(e) Guaranteeing the freedom of movement, expression and organization, and every law that restricts such freedoms.
(f) Releasing all political prisoners.
(g) Returning to jops all those dismissed for what they called (public interest).
(h) Returning of the confiscated properties, and determining the body authorized to return these properties in their original condition
(when confiscated) or compensate for the harm caused.
The NDA confirms its commitment to the following basic principles related to the arrangements for the suitable atmosphere:
(1) The arrangements for creating the suitable atmosphere should be treated as one package .. no way to choose from them.
(2) The regime is held responsible for determining a machinery to implement the arrangements in accordance with a fixed time‑table.
(3) The NDA is not obliged to go into the process of political solution unless the regime carries out the arrangements in a way satisfactory to the all.
All the parties of the NDA are obliged, literally, by the charters and resolutions signed before.
The NDA has consistently called for a comprehensive political settlement of Sudan's crisis. The basis for that settlement was laid in November 1988 following Al Mirghani ‑ Garang peace initiative signed in Addis Ababa. That agreement was the corner stone for the All – Party agreement signed in Khartouun in April 1988 and was due to be adopted by the Council of Ministers on June 30 of that year. Precisely, at that date disaster struck. The NIF staged a military coup to frustrate the implementation of that agreement; indeed to frustrate the Sudanese people's yearnings for peace and stability. The NIF could not live with a political regime that bars the exploitation of religion for political ends, an affliction that has marred Sudan's body politic since September 1983 when Nimeiri introduced his so-called Shari’a laws.
Given the above there was no way in the world for the NDA to reach any reconciliation with the NIF usurpers, so long as they maintained their divisive ideological agenda. Indeed the NIF dared the NDA to carry arms, were they to recover power. The NDA appropriately picked up the gauntlets.
3- NDA’s Mission Scope:
Though the NDA comprises parties from whom power was wrested unlawfully by the NIF in June 1989, its declared mission from the start was not to regain power, but to lay the foundation for a New Sudan where peace With justice is established, historical inequities are removed and sustainable peace and democracy are instituted. Its, was thus not a struggle for power inasmuch as a grand design to restructure governance In the Sudan.
4. Post‑Bashir Peace Initiatives
There were several peace initiatives since the late eighties and in some of which the US was directly involved (Carter, Cohen, Melissa Wells and David Shinn together with ambassadors Timothy Carney and Don Peterson). You are surely aware why those initiatives were doomed' from the start. For one, the focus of all those initiatives was very narrow (stopping war and concluding an agreement between the NIF regime and the SPLM). Much as the NDA wishes for the war to end, it still believes that Sudan's problems are comprehensive in nature. No permanent peace can be achieved by disaggregating those problems. On its side, the NIF would have wished to reach an agreement with the SPLM, not for the sake of universal peace and tranquility, but only to remove the imminent and present danger of the SPLA, so that it would continue unperturbed with its ideologically ‑ motivated agenda in the North. If that were to happen, there would have neither been stability in Sudan, nor peace in the region. This is as true today as it was yesterday.
That was why the NDA, though not party to the IGAD process, has solemnly declared its support to the IGAD DOP since it approached Sudan's problems in a comprehensive manner particularly by highlighting the issues of multiparty democracy, decentralization, voluntary unity, respect for all human rights declarations and covenants etc. Nevertheless, the NDA called for its inclusion in that initiative, only to be told by the IGAD Secretariat that the Sudan Govermnent did not look favorably to that proposition. In reality, it threatened to withdraw from the IGAD process, if the Alliance was brought into it.
In September last year (2000) the President of Eritrea launched an attempt to bring Elbashir to Asmara in an effort to bring peace to Sudan and still the process has remained inconclusive.
Another peace initiative was jointly launched by Egypt and Libya which was accepted by the NDA and the government. But since it smelt a rat in the govermnent's willingness to engage it in negotiations within the joint initiative, while denying its participation in the IGAD process, the NDA called for the coordination of on‑going peace initiatives. The NDA is of the belief that the government is only playing one peace initiative against the other so as to have a breathing space. For that reason the NDA made it clear to the mediators that the viability of their mediation would hinge on the coordination of peace initiatives.It was also made clear to all mediators that comprehensive
cease-fire shah be a function of a political settlement and not a prelude to it. Comprehensive cease‑fires also are not a matter of declarations by the warring parties. They are to be subject to serious negotiations, agreements and outside guarantees and monitoring. Besides, for the cease‑fire be comprehensive it should include all fronts: South, East, South East and central Sudan (Nuba Mountains).
5. What to Do؟ NDA
By relinquishing its position that the NIF regime should be removed root and branch (Asmara Resolutions), the NDA has now accepted a political settlement in which there shall be a place for the NIF. Obviously, the NIF deserves a treatment no less than that meted on the Bosnian abusers in Dayton, Ohio (depriving all those who were involved in crimes against humanity from political rights). In effect, unlike in Bosnia, the horrors committed by Sudanese human rights abusers were catalogued in reports by UN human rights monitors. Nevertheless, for the seek of peace the NDA stands committed to: ;
· Negotiations in good faith with the government.
· Coordination of all peace initiatives in which the parties are engaged.
· Agreement on a transitional government in which the NIF shall take part, but not dominate in any manner or means.
· Discussion with the regime with a view to reaching agreement on the constitution, laws and institutions of state so as to end partisan hegemony over those institutions and put paid to ideologicallyinspired formulations of the constitution and laws.
· Working towards voluntary unity.
· Cease‑fire on the basis of the above‑mentioned parameters.
6. What to Do؟ Government of Sudan (GOS)
The government should also negotiate in good faith. The first thing it would have to do is to agree to the coordination of peace initiatives and stop playing one against the other, or shopping around for more initiatives. In addition, the GOS should stop its reckless policy against civilians in the war zones and harassment of opponents in the North and South. It should also discontinue behaving as if it would write the last page in Sudan's history while the world stands watching. To that end the government should be called upon to:
· Immediately cease bombardment of civilian targets and relief distribution centers.
· Put an end to the use of tribal militias and the forcible abduction of women and children ensuing from militia activities.
· Accept that nothing is unnegotiable, particularly as regards conditions conducive to the emergence of an interim government. This includes prior agreement by all parties on the constitution laws and state institutions.
· Stop posturing about their thawabit (fundamentals) that can neither be abandoned or relativized. Those thawabit are untenable. Insistence on them by the regime is what made the NDA initially call for its eradication. They also made agreement well ‑ nigh impossible with the SPLM through the IGAI:) process. Truly, it would be the height of hypocrisy for a regime that has shed the last fig leaf by handing over terrorists who were presented, all through the decade of the nineties؟ as Allall's warriors carrying His message to South Sudan7 Eritrea, Egypt and Addis Ababa, to still maintain the inconvertibility of its so‑called thawabit. The regime has no longer any political, moral or religious leg to stand on as regards that issue.. Aligned to the above the regime should be prevailed upon to cease its vociferous campaign in the name of Shad which permeates the media. The govermnent's shunning of its bad old habits is not a matter of promises made behind closed, doors or press statements meant to hoodwink international public opinion. What matters is what goes on in the official radio and TV, school rallies and militia graduations. Manifestly, the regime may go on recruiting fighters as long as the war is on, but it should not be permitted to continue with the war cries of shad. The regime is also free to make‑believe in its discredited ideological agenda7 but it has no right to impose it on others.
· Lastly, for any interim arrangement to be viable, the use of oil revenues must be placed tu1der strict supervision by the two parties. There is abundant evidence substantiated by credible international observers that oil revenues have only one use to the government: enhancing the war effort.
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