The ongoing war in Sudan reflects two aspects of the chronic socio-economic and political crisis by

04:35 PM August, 06 2023

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Dr. Hafiz Abbas Gasim
On one hand, the war that started in Sudan on 15th April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and what is called the Rapid Support Force (RSF) seems, at first glance, to be no more than a power struggle between the commanders of the army and the paramilitary troop (which has been triggered by the intensification of the main contradictions and antagonism between them and, from behind the scenes, the remnants of the previous regime of the Muslim Brothers) and their tactics to confront the Sudanese revolution of December 2018; but, in reality, it is an outcome of their strategic strive to curb and hamper the still burgeoning revolution and to abort its objectives and slogans - in particular, those demanding the withdrawal of the SAF and RSF from both political and economic life, restructuring the first and dismantling the second, and forming a single and unified army as a necessary precondition to establish a civil and democratic rule, with emphasis on the army's role as protecter of the people and the country, and as guardian of the constitution. Furthermore, a revolution which promotes the establishment of a state of law and constitution that paves the way to formulate and implement a national development project to achieve balanced development and social justice as the only way to ensure peace, human rights, protection of the environment, equality and justice - as well as the fair participation of ethnic minorities, women and disabled in governance and development.
In order to understand the situation in Sudan, it has to be analysed not only bearing in mind the chronic and deep socio-economic and political crisis inflicting the country for more than a half century since its independence in 1956 - from Anglo-Egyptian colonisation - but also through acquainting oneself with different internal and external vested interests and camps involved in this ongoing struggle and the variations of their interests.
The first camp consists of the previous Muslim Brothers�� regime which - although it was ousted - is still fighting for survival, and trying to return back to power. The second camp consists of the main armed forces - in particular the SAF, RSF and groups calling themselves The Forces of the Armed Struggle consisting of the signatories and the non- signatories of peace agreements with the Sudanese government. The third camp consists of the different political parties, trade unions, professional associations, modern and traditional organisations of civil society and, finally, the new player in the political arena known as the resistance committees (grassroots neighbourhood networks). The fourth camp consists of foreign players such as USA, UK, Israel, Russia, China, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar and the neighbouring countries : Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea, South Sudan, Chad and Libya.
Before discussing the triggers of war, consideration must be given to this: that the RSF was created originally by the previous regime - from bandits known as Janjaweed, recruited from some tribes of Arab origin, trained, organised in 2003, and named the Border Guards to fight other tribes of African origin rebelling against the central government of Sudan; in 2017 - due to worldwide condemnation of the Janjaweed - and pressures from the international community - the country’s parliament passed a law legitimising this new body, altering its name to the RSF, and modified its aims, role and tasks, considering it as a paramilitary troop. Some of the RSF brigades were brought to the capital to protect the regime and to safeguard the president against any potential coup or any internal power struggle.

In December 2018, the country saw massive protests and a popular uprising that succeeded in organising peaceful sit-in protests in front of the headquarters of the army, in cities and towns throughout the country and particularly in the capital - posing a challenge to both the regime and the president himself by highlighting both local and international opinion. However, the president’s failure to force the RSF to disband the sit-in by force within 24 hours ended in his arrest by his Security Committee which took over on 11th April (consisting of his deputy, the minister of defence, the RSF and other army, security and police commanders) and what is known as the Military Council was formed.
While the abrupt and spontaneous massive protests swept the streets of a lot of cities and towns, because what had happened was considered to be a palace coup - the refusal of the RSF commander his membership of the council just as a member (because of his lower rank) and not as deputy chairman, led not only to the resignation of all members of the council but also to the formation of a new council, with the RSF leader General Dagalo as deputy to the new chairman, General al-Burhan - after both being promoted to first lieutenant generals. In addition, al-Burhan later installed Dagalo as deputy chairman of the Sovereign Council - formed in late 2019 - according to The Constitutional Document to replace the military council that replaced the former president; from that time - and for many years to come - there was a honeymoon period between the two generals in which they entertained good relations and fully cooperated in countering the revolution by together dismantling the sit-in protest that began on 11th April 2019 - using brutal and disproportionate force on 3rd June 2019. They also made it continually difficult for the civilian government, formed after the famous 30th June rally in protest against that bloody massacre, by also hatching a number of strikes, protests, sit-ins and coups - in particular that of 25th October 2021 (amending The Constitutional Document, arresting the Prime Minister and others, ousting some ministers, replacing the five civilian members of the Sovereign Council with newly appointed members) and declaring many anti- revolutionary laws, decisions and measures.
However, it is very important to mention that the mistrust and fear of the military junta generals - of potential coups against them that could be machinated by elements of the Muslim Brothers that abound in the army, security and their clandestine armed groups - led them to enact changes in the law governing the RSF, entitling it with more powers and authorities not only to expand, equip and employ local experts from the army, security and police - but also recruit foreign experts from the Wagner Group and others to train its troops; this all manifested as another fully fledged and parallel army, having barracks everywhere (like the SAF), entrusted with the task of guarding the presidential palace, the strategic sites like the army headquarters, the bridges, the airport, Sudan radio and tv, and a number of other essential premises.
In addition to government finance, the RSF was regularly receiving millions of foreign currencies through the mining and export of gold, the proceeds of supplying mercenaries to wars in Yemen and Libya, and also from the EU to stop human trafficking and immigration to Europe from Africa via Sudan. Using this accumlated wealth and many gained concessions, privileges and facilities, the RSF leader has built an economic empire and became a tycoon and an important figure in the field of investment, production, exports, imports, internal trade and transport, and built his own information, mass media and service entities. By benefiting from his position as deputy to the head of state and his position as an economic giant, he has also succeeded in nurturing his own relations with a number of foreign countries, kings and heads of states, in addition to large numbers of

local and international dignitaries and politicians - which has enhanced and augmented his ambitions to play politics and to think of becoming head of Sudan either through the ballot box or ammunitions, or both.
As a result of the 25th October 2021 coup and the street slogan of ‘No recognition, no negotiation and legitimacy of the coup��, the African Union, the USA and the European Union did not accept the coup, and the main international and regional financial institutions suspended dealings with the country - demanding the restoration of the civilian government; at this time, an attempt was made - by the USA, Britain, Saudi Arabia and UAE under the auspices of the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the UN envoy to Sudan - to reconcile the generals with those ousted from the goverment by the coup (the political parties), and what is known as The Framework Agreement (FA) was reached, to be implemented in April 2023, followed by constituting a civilian government and a Sovereignty Council. At this juncture, al-Burhan withdrew from the agreement in April, seemingly pressured by the previous regime’s military and civilian elements and some Forces of The Armed Struggle - and the rift widened deeply, with the other camp consisting of the RSF and the political parties endorsing the FA.
Before the complete deterioration of their relations - and for a number of additional subjective reasons to preserve political power and wealth, and also according to the objective and the inevitable laws of the socio-economic struggle - the honeymoon came to its end and the clash between the two generals took place on 15th April 2023. However, the confrontation was ignited specifically by the differences in their opinions about how, when, and the time needed to absorb the paramilitary troops in the professional regular army, as stipulated by the FA signed by both commanders; while al- Burhan proposed a two-year period, and that Dagalo during the transitional period should be under his command, his rival suggested a ten-year period in which he would be under the would-be chairman of the new Sovereign Council, suggested by that agreement.
Sudan, the largest country in Africa till 2011, situated in its centre and neighbouring seven countries in addition to Saudi Arabia and Yemen via the Red Sea, has a population of more than 40 million. The country, with its administrative borders and name at the time of independence, was formed in 1820 by the invasion of the country by Egyptian ruler Mohamed Ali in the name of the Turkish Sultanate, with the aim of ensuring and securing the flow of the Nile water to Egypt, who ruled the country for about 65 years - extensively and intensively exploiting its resources; after that, a Sudanese sophist leader called al- Mahdi succeeded in mobilising his followers from Sudan and West Africa and liberating the country from oppressive Turkish rule, in 1885 - the year in which The Scottish Governor of Sudan, General Charles Gordon was killed and al-Mahdi himself died. But, in 1898, both Britain and Egypt sent troops headed by the Irish Herbert Kitchener to end the 13th years rule of al-Khalifa, the Mahdi successor, and established an Anglo-Egyptian colony up to 1956, when the country gained its political independence through both civil strife and peaceful means.
Since 1956 till now, the country has witnessed many coups - the successful ones being in 1958, 1969, 1989 and 2019 - meaning that for more than 56 years of the 67 years of rule since independence, Sudan has been governed by military rulers. While it is true that the 1958, 1969 and 1989 regimes were toppled by popular uprisings and revolutions in 1964,1985 and 2019 successively - the 2019 uprising has been ongoing for more than four years, striving to finish the job and eliminate the still dominating Islamic military regime.

In fact, the country inherited a lot of social, economic, political and societal problems from colonial rule - and a great many others have been created or complicated by both short- lived civilian rule and the long-lived military rule of after-independence governments. Also, it is worth mentioning that the 34 years of the Muslim Brothers�� coup of 1989, in addition to consolidating and deepening of previous problems has created more, new, complex and intricate ones - and to better understand the country's existing developments it is important to know that the 1989 rule was exceptional, not only because of its tough, autocratic, authoritarian and totalitarian nature, but also because it hijacked the state apparatus, making anything a monopoly for the local Muslim Brothers�� organization - as well as for the international ones - plus being characterised by nepotism and corruption. During this rule, the southern region of Sudan separated and got independence after a bloody civil war, which also spread to embrace Darfur region in the west and both southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile regions because of the limited powers entrusted to these regions, plus the Islamisation and other polices of the regime.
Since its inception in 1989, the regime was met with civilian resistance, disobediences and different forms of peaceful and armed struggle and opposition - which reached its climax in the 2019 revolution and the president being replaced by its Security Committee; and because of the persistence and continuation of the struggle against the remnants of the regime, the original Security Committee used to change its skin from time to time and, accordingly, its name has changed over time from The Military Council to three other successive Sovereign Councils, in an attempt by the Security Committee to adapt and curb the revolution from establishing a true civil and democratic society and constitutional state, and liberate the hijacked state apparatus - to eventually empty its slogans of freedom, peace and justice, and abolish or abort its objectives of formulating a national development project to liberate the country from the shackles of the new colonialism and debt, and fully exploit the country's rich existing and potential resources, to benefit all Sudanese through social justice.
In this context, and while in the wider picture the struggle appears to be mainly between the unfinished and on-going revolution headed by the resistance committees and on the other side the counter-revolution, backed by both internal vested interests and its external backers - in the smaller picture is that the current war between the SAF and the RSF is no more than a power struggle between the two generals, triggered by the accumulated difference of opinions between them - in particular, within the counter-revolution camp in general.
Strategically, in their persistent effort to strangle the revolution, the counter-revolution camp is strongly united; the two generals worked together during the past four years but, when all attempts against the revolution got stuck, the cracks in their camp widened and the two generals fell out - their alliance crumbling. Hence, in the case of one of them winning this war his guns will eventually turn back against the revolutionary camp and its enmity will become more fierce and intensive - not as some naive ones think or try to agitate. And, as proof, we can mention that the 25th October 2021 coup was mainly orchestrated and timed by the two generals - primarily to stop the handing of the chairmanship of the Sovereignty Council to a civilian member as a successor of al- Burhan, according to the Constitutional Document agreed and signed by the military and civilian components.
Viewed from the historical perspective, this struggle between the Sudanese revolution and the counter-revolution is not novel but an extension and a continuation of the liberation

movement started in the early 1920’s by the activities of a clandestine Sudanese society called ‘The White Banner�� that culminated in organising an armed demonstration by the Sudanese officers and soldiers, who were marching the roads of Khartoum, against the British occupation of both Sudan and Egypt in 1924. But this movement eventually subsided, for many years, in the wake of the brutal crushing of the revolt using heavy weaponry together with sentences of executions and imprisionment of participants and organisers, by the martial courts. However, during the 1940’s, the people started organising themselves into some parties and political organisations (the students, workers, employees and farmers gained government recognition of their unions, syndicates and associations - after a prolonged, tough struggle) and succeeded to achieve many of their rights through discussions, debates, rallies, demonstrations, strikes, sit-ins and disobediences - until accomplishing the independence of the country in 1956, by these peaceful means.
After independence, the revolutionary struggle continued mainly between what is known as the ‘Modern Forces�� - consisting of classes and social segments of the future, predominantly in urban areas, and the ‘Traditional Forces�� - consisting of classes and segments of the society, mainly in rural areas, benefiting from existing laws and acquired political rights. During the times of military rule, the struggle used to take different forms - combining both public, legitimate and clandestine activities against military rule, until toppling them through popular revolutions and uprisings.
Concerning the present conundrum of the country - and for any solution to be effective and long lasting - it has to deal with the Sudanese overwhelming, chronic, intricate socio- economic and political crises, bear in mind the persistent and historical revolutionary struggle of the masses - even before independence, ensure the acceptance and endorsement of the classes of the future and the new generations, inhabitants of the urban areas, women and young people, who should be part of any solution or salvation. In this context, the slogans of freedom, peace and justice are still correct and valid and need to be implemented through establishing a civil and democratic society and state of law.
Last but not the least, and for the solution to be sustainable and for the country to avoid a civil war or any sort of foreign military interventions, the revolutionary forces and political leaders have to forget about their differences; they have to try to unite and rally the masses behind a future consensual minimum program to address the urgent short term problems, that has to be based upon a medium term - one for three to five years. In this respect, trade unions, professional associations, civil societies and other grassroots organisations - in particular the resistance committees - need to quickly move from concentrating on provision of necessities, basic needs, providing shelter and protection, and shift from protest organisers to political actors to challenge for power, have the leading political role, and spearhead the elaboration of the country's building-the-future schemes.
Both due to the war’s devastating consequences, impacts and implications, and the absence of a legitimate and internationally recognised government since the 2021 coup, it has been easier for foreign interests to interfere heavily in the country's affairs - thus explaining why a number of external initiatives representing the interests of regions and individual countries are on the table and sale. However, any attempt to isolate the revolutionary forces, transcend the revolution, obstruct or abort the slogans of change, if successful, will only postpone the explosion of the volcano which will flare up sooner or later - this time, more heavily, in its extent and dimension. What characterises the December 2018 revolution compared with both the revolutions of October 1969 and

April 1984 is that, this time, the revolution is still alive and that the revolutionary modern forces are awake - contrary to the past when these forces used to quit the scene, leaving the representatives of the traditional forces and their parties to decide the future of the country, by accrediting the military with constitutional authority so that they themselves could concentrate on organising the ‘one man, one vote�� to take over; in this latter scenario exists the inevitable outcome of neglecting and hampering revolutionary change, ignoring transitional justice and disrespecting the non-impunity principle, thereby deepening the crises and helping facilitate a new tyrannical and corrupt coup and military rule - with a longer timespan than the previous ones.

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