Sudan's dilemma Written by Osman Gasm Alsaed

05:27 PM August, 22 2021

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The popular revolution that took place in Sudan in 2019 is unlike any of the Arab uprisings of the last decade; Even the slogan “The people want the fall of the regime or the slogan of freedom, peace and justice” has another Sudanese impact, because in Sudan there is no neutral space between society and the state / regime, or to be precise, between individuals and groups of different political and religious affiliations, or even tribal affiliation and the regime; They are intertwined and feed each other, and they have produced unified Sudanese identity policies that, on the one hand, prevent the separation of society from the state, that is, the formation of a civil society between these two poles, and on the other hand, prevent the building of a real state.

Chad and Libya may be closer to the Sudanese case in terms of societal polarization, but it was found that they lack real and partisan institutions and political heritage available in Sudan.

Even if the Sudanese uprising at the time took an economic turn, as the spark of the uprising was sparked by the intention of the government of the ousted al-Bashir at the time to impose a painful and stifling fait accompli on the citizens in light of the state’s inability to provide the most basic needs of the people, such as water, electricity, treatment, and even housing; This economic trend reflected the corruption of the ruling political class of the regime of ousted al-Bashir in Sudan, without exception, as the protesters and revolutionaries said at the time, which brought the state deficit to more than $100 billion.

And if the problem was economic at the time and its repercussions are still present until writing this article, it is possible to solve it today by austerity government measures, as happened in countries that suffered from economic hardship, such as Lebanon and Greece, for example, or by a reformist technocratic government, for example. However, based on experience, it does not seem that this is the best solution, but rather it may be a pain reliever until the next crisis.

Therefore, it seems that what is happening in Sudan now is a real dilemma, which cannot be resolved by procedures or dismissal of state governors or by appointing a huge number of ministers in the transitional government or with ministers who do not have any qualifications or qualifications, not even just by the slogan “freedom, peace and justice,” because the regime And society in Sudan are identical, or intertwined, mutually reinforcing; The Sudanese politician builds his glory on partisan, tribal, and narrow regional policies. Sudanese society expresses its political aspirations based on party, tribal or regional affiliations (I mean here the geographical area). Despite this, the Sudanese people’s confidence in politicians and parties is not at its best. Rather, the political impotence and the state’s impotence bring the citizen into the corridors of tribal divisions and the fragmentation and division of Sudan into small states, because the state machine operates according to these divisions and quotas.

Most of those who are in the Sudanese political arena now, whether they are politicians or clerics, benefit from these divisions, as well as the one percent of Sudanese society, which accumulates its profits and wealth in parallel with the inflation of the state deficit and the monopoly of hard currency. This means that the overthrow of the former regime or any other regime in Sudan is not a procedural matter that ends with the dismissal of the ousted President Al-Bashir or the dismissal of the government itself or the dissolution of Parliament and the holding of new elections, because it will produce the greedy, the beneficiary and the corrupt themselves, as long as the slogans of the Sudanese revolution are not applied to the ground and in a way An organization through the organs of the transitional government and the removal of all the dirt and ruins of the former regime and those within the transitional government itself and the establishment of a culture of democracy and cultural, religious and ethnic pluralism in the country and within a short period with free and democratic elections and the reversal of political and partisan balances.

Likewise, the Sudanese dilemma cannot be resolved by drafting a transitional document, for example, that did not address the political and economic situation, subject banks to strict state control, and prevent partisan political and economic quotas. In Sudan, there is a price for the dollar and a parallel price in the slippers; As for the media, it is part of the problem, not the solution, even if it appears to be sympathetic to the Sudanese revolution and "ride on the wave." In this way, society, the economy and the state overlap with each other, making this disengagement a difficult task that does not end with the extension of a transitional period for decades, the resignation of a prime minister or the dismissal of governors.

The case of Sudan will be correct if the political elites reach the conviction that “their back is to the wall and is bent on themselves,” and that partisan, religious and personal quotas are no longer a valid machine for financial enrichment and political influence, and that they perform a lofty national service, which is to liberate society from its domination, domination and partisan division. and tribal him. However, this seems unlikely, as the Sudanese elites will not give up their financial and political wealth so easily. On the other hand, the Sudanese citizen has nothing to lose. The ruling junta today, regardless of its affiliations, has brought it to the worst case, or as confirmed by international and local financial reports, that the continuation of the political and economic crisis and the living hardship will bring the Sudanese from extreme poverty to starvation. As if hunger is just craving a morsel, not working 12 hours a day to save the electricity bill.
So far, it does not appear that the Sudanese political elites have understood the extent of the suffering of the Sudanese citizen, and therefore each party is trying to hold the other responsible for the crisis.

Sudan’s dilemma will end with the disengagement between the party and the state through an overabundance of political elites whose goal is to maintain the link through partisan quotas, and this connection is one of the features of totalitarian and partisan regimes. Relying on the revolution is not only by dropping economic corruption and pushing reforms, but by creating a neutral zone between the state, the party and society, which fortifies society from state diseases, and fortifies the state from society’s diseases, which is not an easy task, but it is possible.

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Written by Osman Gasm Alsaed

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