The Dams Unit and Instigation of Disturbances In Northern S

The Dams Unit and Instigation of Disturbances In Northern Sudan
An Introduction
The Meroe Dam, or the Hamdab Reservoir as it was called at the start, had been the focus of continuous dialogue even over re-naming it. Many of those affected believe that naming it as a project is the first sign to their grievances. They had been deprived of that great spiritual value embodied on that name. Much dispute had also arisen about the economic feasibility of the project; it was even compared to the feasibility of other major developmental projects. The Meroe Dam is sited in the most marginalized and poverty-stricken regions of River Nile and Northern States. Its reservoir covers a region that extends over about (170) kilometers from the Dam main body in the Hamdab Region in Meroe and northwards to Um Saffaya region in Abu Hamad Commission in the South. The Manaseer, Amri people and Hamdab people represent 68%, 25% and 7% respectively of those affected. This will definitely necessitate their compensation and resettlement.
The main objectives declared for the establishment of the Meroe Dam Project were the production of electric energy, extending the agricultural area and curbing the River Nile floods. It is also believed that the drop of storage capacity for water in the High Dam in Egypt because of the silt deposition might be one of the motives for speeding up the erection of Meroe Dam and other proposed dams in the Greater Northern State such as the Kajbar and Al Shiraik Dams. It is also believed that the necessity for achieving a balanced development, by allocating Northern States part of the major development projects, was one of the motives behind the erection of Meroe Dam.
Studies for the erection of Meroe Dam had started since the forties of last century. They included several sites in the region between AL Shiraik in River Nile State and Al Hamdab in Northern state. Several alternatives were proposed including the erection of three small dams or one large one. It was later on settled that only one dam should be erected at the present site.
Despite the fact that popular folklore in the affected region had always raised suspicions about the erection of AL Hamdab Dam considering it as a mythology in their local poetry and songs, where some had supported it, but others opposed, yet the Hamdab Dam had become a real fact that was blessed by those affected by it. This came in hope that they will gain all their full rights towards compensation.
The obstinacy of the Dam Unit and Federal and River Nile Government laxity in executing their agreements with those affected, beside allowing the Hamdab Dam administration to interfere even after taking the file from it, made the issue waver about. It even made the issue enter every now and then in what resembles a crisis, or pass stages that are more dangerous. This will always happen as long as the Dam Unit keeps on such practices.


Hegemony of the Dam Unit over Decision-making and Marginalizing Those Affected


The Dam Execution Unit refusal to recognize the elected institutions of those affected, since the start in 2004, under open support and investigation by River Nile State Governors and under covert support by the Federal Government, had also prevented arrival at early solutions for the Manaseer issue despite their blessing the establishment of that National Project and despite their being the real affected party.
It was clear right from the start that the Meroe Dam Administration was not happy about dissolution of the previous committee which was backing it. It was also clear that the emergence of the new committee in the area, poses threats against its special agenda which are focused on excluding and marginalizing those affected, and pushing them out of the margin of consultation and decision taking so that the Dam Administration can make whatever decisions it likes as something “de facto”.
The Meroe Dam Unit, assisted by River Nile State, chose Al Hassaya region in Al Dammar as an alternative to Al Mikabrab Valley. This valley was where a Presidential decree was issued to resettle Manaseer. It chose that alternative on account that there was a mistake in the Presidential decree and its results. There is quite a big difference between the two regions in respect of fertility of the land.
The Meroe Dam Administration supervised what was known as Al Mikabrab Scheme in respect of planning and execution, in full exclusion of the committee for those affected, and without taking into account its written advice of stopping work in the scheme until it determines the real number of families which want resettlement in the scheme. This resulted in building large numbers of houses that exceeded what should had really been built.
The Meroe Dam Administration strongly rejected, and with unprecedented insistence, and by all direct or indirect means, the establishment of local alternatives around the reservoir. It related inconsistent technical justifications that were proved faulty through a preliminary study by the Sudanese Expertise House “Yam”, led by International Irrigation Scientist and former Irrigation Minister, Ustaz Yahia Abdel Mageed and a number of scientists and researchers.
About their claims of the high operation cost of those schemes, those affected were not consulted despite the fact that those costs are not real, and modern technological means and irrigation facilities are capable of treating any obstacles facing those schemes.
The Meroe Dam Administration forced Al Fidaa scheme on those affected despite their written rejection, and despite a previous recommendation by a formal committee from the Federal Ministry of Agriculture at the beginning of the nineties of last century. The recommendation showed that the scheme is not suitable for the resettlement of those affected. In addition to that, the Dam Unit neglected its agreement with the River Nile State about stopping execution of Al Fidaa scheme till the actual start of executing local alternatives. All that we mentioned above indicates that the Dams Unit plans to displace Manaseer from around the reservoir and move them forcefully out of it for unknown reasons.
The lack of holding meetings with the Meroe Dam Administration due to its not recognizing the Executive Committee, necessitated the creation of a new channel for those affected to talk and negotiate about their rights towards fair compensation and resettlement in sites that they accept and agree on.


Al Shariqa Hall Agreement of June 2006


The escalation of disturbances in the affected area- the Sani Oasis incidents of December 2005 – and the catastrophe that almost broke out between those affected and police forces surrounding them, speeded up the mediation by Dr. Al Tayeb Ibrahim Mohamed Khair, the Presidential decree no. (70) for 2006 and finally the Shariqa Hall Agreement on the first of June, all those led to the transfer of Al Manaseer issue file from the Meroe Dam Administration to the River Nile State. It was there that the Governor issued his decisions and directions which set the base for establishment of a Commission for those Affected in River Nile State to carry the task of resettlement and relocation in place of the Meroe Dam Administration. Unfortunately River Nile State failed to execute the Shariqa Hall agreement to remind us with the famous saying “much cry, little wool”! Its first failure was that of not being able to stop Al Fidaa Scheme according to the agreement. The failure continued through not passing the law for the Commission of those Affected till now. All this was accompanied by the Dam Unit break through in River Nile State and repeated visits by its chief of Staff to Al Mikabrab and Al Fidda Schemes. They also had repeated meetings with the State Authorities which laxed openly in executing the agreement. All this was accompanied by the lack of enthusiasm by the Governor and his evading meetings with the Executive Committee.
This international delay in executing Al Shariqa agreement was planned by the Dams Unit. It resulted in inflaming fury among people leading to the Abu Hamad demonstrations on March 17th, 2007. It happened after the visit by the Dams Unit Director to Al Fida’a scheme and after his provocative statements. That was followed by Al Karbakan incidents and the detention of police forces by citizens in addition to the arrest of six members of elected institutions of those affected including the Deputy Council Speaker and Deputy Chairmen of the Executive Committee. This took place during the last week of March 2007. It led to congestion in the affected region, but before situations deteriorated National Congress Party Leadership Council formed a committee headed by Professor Ibrahim Ahmed Omar to handle the Manaseer file and to continue dialogue with the Executive Committee for the Affected.

The Friendship Hall Agreement and the Presidential Decree No 70/2006
After several meetings and much push and pull, a new agreement was arrived at, signed by the Federal Minister of Finance as a Guarantor and cosigned by River Nile State Governor and the Head of the Council of those Affected. The First Shariqa Agreement was fully incorporated as a first article in the new agreement.
The Shariqa Agreement stressed the following:
Firstly: Presidential decree no.70/2006 issued by President of the Republic accompanied by interpretation issued by the Presidency for the term "Lands resulting from the Meroe Dam Reservoir", represents the legal referential for the supervision by the commission for those affected in River Nile State over all procedures and stages of the census of those affected in River Nile State, compensating them, transporting them and supervising their settlement in resettlement schemes specified according to the results of the questionnaire executed by the Central Organ for Statistics, under supervision of the commission for there affected in June 2007. This implies that the first article of the Presidential decree assigned River Nile State to allocate the resulting lands for compensating those affected whether for residential or agricultural purposes.
Article ‘5’ of the law for settlement and compensation of those affected by erection of the Meroe Dam for 2002 stipulated authorities of the Commission. These are considered to be original authorities for the Commissioner as stipulated in item 2/B of the same Presidential decree. They are authorities for carrying the necessary Studies and surveys to determine the local alternative schemes for resettlement around the Meroe Dam Reservoir, provided the text of item 2/B should be read together with the interpretation issued by the Presidency for the term ‘Resulting Lands’.
Authorities of the Meroe Dam Executive Manager are stipulated in the text of article ‘4’ of the Meroe Dam Act for 2002. These authorities include appointment of the commissioner. This means that the Presidential decree had assigned River Nile State powers and authorities of the Meroe Dam Executive Manager and the commissioner for Social and Environmental Affairs stipulated in articles ‘4’ and ‘5’. It also assigned the State all authorities of the commissioner which were stipulated in chapter three of the afore-mentioned Act in articles from ‘6’ to ‘15’ which are related to compensation procedures and distribution and classification of Lands. It was also assigned his authorities and specialties stipulated in chapter four about resettlement procedures and determining the sites of resettlement stipulated in articles ’16-17-18’ of the same Act.
Secondly: Presidential Decree no ‘70’ 2006 was issued to achieve two basic purposes.
(A) Creation of a new channel to deal with issues of those Affected to replace the Meroe Dam Administration. This comes due to the fact that there were no means, what-so-ever to deal with that Administration because of its adamant continuous refusal to recognize the elected institutions of these Affected as represented in the Executive Committee and the Council for those Affected.
(B) To respond to the insistence of the majority of citizens on settlement around the Meore Dam Reservoir in River Nile State which is absolutely rejected by that Administration.
According to that, presidential Decree no. 70/2006 was issued on account of the text of article 58/1/M of the Sudan’s Transitional Constitution of 2005, ie President of Republic authorities according to the law of land confiscation of 1930. it was also issued according to President’s authorities stipulated in article ‘1’ of chapter two of the law for settlement and compensation of those affected by Meroe Dam for 2002. In other words, authorities of the Meroe Dam Higher Political Committee which was appointed according Presidential Decree no ‘363’/2001, that is, before the 2002 Meroe Dam Act was issued. It is a well known procedure in interpreting texts that whoever owns the ‘most’ can also own the ‘less’. This implies that the President of the Republic can assign all authorities stipulated in articles ‘2-3’ of the Act or any part of them to any person whom he deems suitable. He can also exclude any group of those affected from being subjected to the provisions of the act. This is supported by the text of article ‘6/1’ of the act of interpretation of general laws and texts for 1974 “Articles of any law are interpreted as to achieve the objectives which it was legislated for. In all cases, the interpretation which achieves this purpose is preferred to any other interpretation.” Similar to this is article ‘6/4’ of the above-mentioned law which supports the right to exclusion from applying the law, bearing in mind that decrees issued according to article ‘58’ of the constitution are considered to be Presidential Decrees that are not subject to judiciary monitorship.
Thirdly: from all that had been mentioned so far, we find that the authorities of the Meroe Dam Higher Political Committee and those of the Executive Manager and Commissioner had all been assigned to the River Nile State Governor, and which had been passed according to decision no ‘35/2006’ by River Nile Governor to the Commission of those Affected in River Nile State. It should also be noted that application of the provisions of the regulations stipulated in Presidential Decree no ‘70/2006’ is restricted to the objective provisions which determine the rules for compensation and not the formal regulations which determine the persons assigned execution of compensation and resettlement procedures. These had been clearly settled in Decree no ‘70/2007’ and were restricted to authorities of River Nile State in an open assignment as stipulated in the text of the Decree.
Fourthly:
The Friendship Hall Agreement recognized, in its first article, decisions of River Nile State Governor of ‘Al Shariqa’ Agreement. These were headed by decision ‘35’ of forming the Commission and its authorities which include authorities of the Higher Political Committee, the Executive Manager and the Commissioner stipulated in articles ‘1-4-5’ of the Meroe Dam Act of 2002. According to that, the authorities of supervision over all procedures of registering those affected together with their fixed assets, plants, their compensation and resettlement are an original authority of the Board of Directors of the Commission for settlement of those Affected by the Meroe Dam in River Nile State. In addition to that the Commissioner should replace the Delegate in the authorities assigned to the Board of Directors.
Again, those Affected were optimistic because the new agreement guaranteed them:
1- Residence and services in the local alternatives.
2- Government commitment as represented by the Federal Minister of Finance to carry the task of technical studies to execute agricultural schemes in the local alternative areas.
3- The formation of the Commission of the Affected Manaseer in River Nile State as a parallel alternative for the Commission of Social and Environmental Affairs in the Meroe Dam Unit and for the tasks it used to carry.
4- New statistics are to be executed for all those affected when they are satisfied about the local alternatives around the reservoir.
5- Guarantee by the Federal Government for the Friendship Hall agreement and its execution.
But, as soon as the new agreement was signed, and as soon as the parties concerned (the Commission for those Affected in River Nile State, and the Committee supervising the agreement, headed by Professor Ibrahim Ahmed Omar), as soon as these started serious steps towards implementing some items of the agreement such as carrying the questionnaire to determine decisions of those Affected in respect of resettlement alternatives, (70%) of the families chose to be resettled around the reservoir. Other items to be determined included determining and planning residential and services sites in Um Sarah and Khor Al Haraz. As soon as these steps were taken the Dams Unit was outraged and tried by all means to abort the agreement.)
It started by an attempt to abort the questionnaire process as a first stage to arrive finally at removing all contents of the agreement. This comes through stopping the formation of the Commission for those affected by delaying approval of the Commission Act within the legislative Council for over a year.
The Dam Unit claims that Presidential Decree no ‘70/2006’ had only assigned River Nile State the job of
The defiance by the Dam Unit to the agreement articles and its publishing lists of 1999 Statistics, as well as its establishing offices for payments and appeals and tempting citizens to receive payments that they do not originally deserve to tempt others was meant to break up the unity of those affected. Its main tool for that was the presence of minority of its elements among those affected imposing what is known as 1999 Statistics, will result in much harm for those affected, such as:
a. All will lose their rights to what they have cultivated during the years following 1999, in respect of date palms.
b. The families formed after the statistics are deprived of their legal rights.
c. Those who built their houses after the Statistics are deprived from their rights to houses in the relocation regions.
d. All will lose their rights towards compensations on cultivation.
To prepare for imposing what is known as 1999 Statistics, the Dam Publicity focused on the alleged submerging of the region in August 2007, especially in the region between Birti and Al Karbakan in north Manaseer region. This was accompanied by an allegation that the whole region from Birti in the north to Um Saffaya in the south might be submerged. It was also alleged that the failure to carry statistics before August 2007 will lead to submerging the properties and cultivations of citizens and consequently to loss of their rights. In the Executive Committee and according to the information available to us, we were sure that submerging the region totally or partially was absolutely improbable in August 2007. After August it was clear that allegation was baseless, and the Dam Unit had started to propagate that there won’t be any statistics after 1999 and any one who does not respond to the 1999 Statistics will lose all his rights. They even went further and announced they will not be responsible towards those affected and towards their rights after May 2008. They asserted that they want the region to be absolutely free from its inhabitants. This was exactly what the Dam Unit Director meant by saying “The water will deal with them and will settle the issue”. In another occasion, he said “We shall get them out of their houses in the same way that water expels rats out of their holes”.
All this had infuriated those affected, leading to the congestion which prevails now over the Manaseer region. It is for this that we hold the Federal Government and River Nile State Government fully responsible. We do this due to the duplicity of the way they dealt with the issue of those affected, being the two parties who signed the Friendship Hall Agreement.
The agreement with those affected on something, and paying a deaf ear to what the Dam Unit Plans, or even giving it green light as a Government organ to do something quite contrary, will blast the agreement with those affected. It will even open the door wide to doubting the Government credibility towards the new agreement it signed. It will also imply that the objective behind this agreement is not at all different from that of the previous one. It is just a dope for citizens to allow the Dam Unit more time to proceed on with what it intends to do to those affected in respect of depriving them of their rights and relocating them forcefully, directly or indirectly to a place which they do not desire to be resettled in. If the Dam Unit succeeded in its objective, then this is what it really wants. Or, let us say, this is what the powerful influential sector that supports the Dam Unit, really wants. On the other hand, if the Dam Unit failed, then, there is an equal and opposite reaction for every action. It does not matter what means will the Dam Unit adopt, or what ways it proceeds through as long as it will reach its final objective: The Manasser Lands.
Sending Police Forces to Manaseer Regions:
The response by the Government to reactions without treating the basic problem and uprooting it will not serve the positive solution to the issue.
On the contrary, it will thus inflame it. Sending hundreds of police troops to the Manaseer region to protect a minority that went against their peoples consensus and became hostile to them will widen the gap in confidence, which the Meroe Dam Administration had been nurturing since the late nineties of last century. It started by breaking up the unity of those affected. Despite the affiliation of this minority to the Dam Unit, and despite their open defiance to those affected by receiving their entitlements according to the so-called 1999 Statistics and including the costs of transports and subsistence and their receiving the keys for the new houses. Despite that, citizens only asked them to move to their new homeland instead of staying in the affected area, within a society that started to reject them. It started to reject them in the same way the living body rejects foreign bodies. They were rejected because they will sow seeds of disturbance and rumors. They belrayed the majority of those affected. They will use the intensive presence of police in the region as a means to provoke people saying “Spite yourselves to death, we have been paid our entitlements, and the Government had sent police to protect us”. What does the Government expect from the majority when they grow impatient, what does it expect especially after the repeated groundless cases filed by that minority, quite haphazardly and without proof alleging that citizens had demolished their houses. While what actually happened did not exceed a small number of incidents, and the demolishing was only symbolic and limited. It was committed by a few enraged youths and was only directed towards the leaderships of this minority who had been quite intent all through the past years in aborting their peoples efforts. Was it not better and more beneficial that police forces should have been used to urge this minority to move to their new regions? They only want to stay as long as possible to spread disturbances and to dispirit people. They are acting as tools for some circles to play such roles.
Is There is A Way Out From This Crisis?
Defusing this crisis is based on two things:
1. To execute the last agreement (the Friendship Hall Agreement) to the letter. This can only be done through excluding the Dam Unit from Manaseer issue and through referring the Mikabrab and Al Fida’a Schemes to River Nile State and the Commission for Those Affected as soon as the Dam Unit completes executing them.
2. Cancellation of the so-called 1999 Statistics and closing offices for payments and appeals, and consequently withdrawing forces deployed in Al Manasser region. It is necessary also to speed up establishment of local alternatives and services to make it possible to carry new statistics which give each citizen his proper and just rights.


It is God we pray for guidance.


N/B: All legal information included in this report are quoted from several memoranda prepared by the legal Advisor for the Council of Those Affected, Advocate Ustaz Ja’afar Abdel Wahid.


Osman Ahmed Hussein Al Magdoum
Member of the Executive Committee

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