The Addis Ababa Agreement and National Unity

Summarry for : The Addis Ababa Agreement and National Unity

By Raphael Koba Badal


Explanations and Analysis

It remains to pose the obvious question: what has gone wrong? How can one account for the demise of the agreement? How does one account for the fact that the two most important personalities that ratified the agreement either vigorously campaigned for or decreed the splitting of the south? Indeed, what are the social and political forces that necessitated this U-turn in policy? The primary concern of this section of the paper is therefore diagnostic, a kind of stock-taking. Engaging in stock-taking can and does lead to apportioning blame to the one or other side involved in the abrogation of the peace-treaty, although this is not the primary intention here. The task of the social scientist is not just to castigate but also to account for the occurrence or non-occurrence of a social phenomenon; it is to offer a rational, plausible or scientific explanation, supported by reliable evidence.

It is a cardinal thesis of this study that three major variables, forces or contributing factors have operated jointly to unsettle the hard-won agreement. The first consists of the style of politics adopted by the regime since its inception in May 1969; the second may be described as the role of Northern Sudanese politicians; and, finally, Southern Sudanese factionalism. The regime's style of politics consisted in its ability to forge a governing coalition regardless of changes in policy that the regime was required to make. The end justifies the means seemed to be the guiding principle. It was dictated by the regimes need for solvency or survival. In practical terms, this meant that today's foes would be tomorrow's friends and the other way round. Employing this Machiavellian principle, the regime was able to make and un-make coalitions and allies at will, not only in the North but also in the South.

The record of the May regime provides abundant testimony to this hypo-thesis. When it came to power in May 1969, the regime pledged itself to liquidate the hold of northern political notables and technocrats who had monopolized policy-making in the country since independence. The style of Sudanese politics whether in the North or South was characterized by elite factions. The regimes efforts were directed to terminate this state of affairs, with partial success.

However, it was unable to generate enough support for the single, secular political organization, the S.S.U., it had created. Nevertheless, the orientation of the regime was secular, combining a radical perspective with some form of Arab socialism. In this first phase, the regime further alienated the popular Islamic leaders by mounting an armed attack on the "Ansars" strong holds on the Abba Island and by confiscating the assets of the wealthy families that controlled the popular Islamic movements. This was followed shortly afterwards by the coup of July 1971. During this phase the Southerners were rather suspicious of the regime's radical intentions.

Bereft of political allies in the period immediately after the July 1971 coup Nimeiri turned to non-political technocrats, who introduced reformist policies and turned the S.S.U. from a vanguard party to a mass organization. They may be termed the Mayoists and had had little or no identification with any of the Sudanese sectarian parties who had hitherto dominated political life. Thus time was ripe for Nimeiri to clinch a deal with the Southerners and thereby earn himself until June 83, a solid Southern Constituency. The point has been made that it is doubtful if a settlement with the South could have been reached at any other time during the entire life of the regime.

Things began to turn sour for the South after the national reconciliation of 1977. A third phase of the regime had been inaugurated by another almost successful attempt to overthrow the government in July1976. The policy of national reconciliation was quite ominous for the Southerners. It brought back into the government, the S.S.U. and other leadership positions elite politicians who were known proponents of Islam. This bold reversal of policy brought into the country leading notables such as Mr. Sadiq Al-Mahdi, a leading notable in the Ansar movement and Hassan al-Turabi, leader of the legitimate faction of the Muslim Brotherhood, a group advocating Islamic fundamentalism. These two leading politicians were not only prominent members of the exile National Front that had organized the abortive 1976 coup, but were individually known for their militant opposition to the Addis Ababa Agreement. The return of both was seen as threatening by Southern politicians.

Although national reconciliation brought back proponents of Islamization into the political arena, for several years afterwards Nimeiri merely paid them lip service. It is possible, however that after the 1976 coup attempt Nimeiri himself underwent a spiritual renewal or rebirth. At any rate, there is a limit to the policy of balancing the political factions in coalition formation. If the style had been for the leadership constantly to change the membership of the inner circle, to seek out and accommodate opponents but to drop them when expedient the Southern politicians had little political weight and the interest of the South was liable to sacrificing with impunity. That is what happened in June 1983; that is what may explain the fate of the agreement.

Many Northern political notables, particularly the then influential Attorney-General Dr. Hassan al-Turabi were urging Nimeiri to abandon the agreement. He was also a prominent public advocate of re-division of the South. As the Chief Law Officer of the land, he might have been responsible for finally convincing Nimeiri to issue the re-division decree.

But the factor most accountable for the destruction of the agreement was Southern Sudanese factionalism. In simple terms, the growth of political competition among Southern factions created opportunities not only for intervention of the national government in Southern affairs but had enabled Nimeiri to decree the re-division of the South. Southern factionist or ethnicity is not something new. It had been a prominent feature of Southern politics and organization since the 1950s during the first party elections that were held. Since that time the same pattern has emerged under multi-party regimes, single-party-regimes and even in the organization of the liberation movement. These factions, however, were never more than loosely organized coalitions of politicians with undefined mass support. Education and high office were more important than mass following though membership in an ethnic group and winning a parliamentary seat were just as crucial. The poverty of the South ensured that the educated Southern elite remained tiny and far removed from the rest of the masses in wealth, outlook and objectives. The result has been that politics in the South has been shallow; the preserve of the few highly-educated, whose primary pre-occupation has been to secure salaried positions for themselves and for their protégé's. Patronage for ones fellow tribesmen, friends and protégés helped in the creation and maintenance of these factions. As one Southern leader remarked, the problem of the South is inherent in the position of the Southern intellectuals, who ask the government for more than is within its capabilities. Every intellectual wants to hold an important post.

This is precisely the sort of fertile ground conducive to the style of politics described in the preceding pages. By exploiting this Southern weakness the central government was able to maintain its way over Southern affairs. Southern politicians were accordingly classified into the *good guys* and the *bad guys*. The strategy required for their good cooperation is simple: put the *good guys* in positions of power and authority in the South and prop them up with continuous flow of financial remittances for the smooth running of the regional government there as well as the civil service. In return, they were expected to toe the line of the central government and avoid making what the latter regarded as unacceptable demand such as increased Southern representation in the central cabinet and the like.

This is the only plausible model that explains why from about 1978 onwards, Southern politicians began competing with each other to be in the good books of the central government. By the very logic of this strategy, and as wee have already seen in the case of Northern factions, no alliances forged are ever permanent. As one group or faction becomes increasingly out of favor the regime simply switches its support to back another group of horses. As a result, the urge to maintain or please the Northern Constituency, became even stronger for the Southern politician of any importance. Thus, not to have a *Northern Constituency* was liability just as to qualify for a high political position, status as a notable in a local community was a valuable asset. This drives politicians to strengthen their ethnic and sectional connections.

Of course, being appointed to a high office also makes one a notable and reinforces local support through the expectation of patronage.

For the stability of these factions other social identities were necessary to provide rather more enduring informal links than financial inducements. Prominent among these were the *insider-outsider * cleavage, the traditional rivalries between SANU and the Southern Front parties and, above all, the clash of personalities. It is an important insight to note that, in the post-Addis Ababa period at least, all these other cleavages clustered around two prominent personalities; Abel Alier and Joseph Lagu. The insider-outsider dichotomy tells us whether a politician represented Southern interests in the national government, or the liberation movement during the civil war or SANU-outsider. As for the political parties inside the country, Abel Alier and Clement Mboro were Secretary General and President of the SF, respectively while SANU-inside was headed by, first, the late William Deng and later Mr. Samuel Aru Bol, whereas the informalities of the former SSLM was led by Mr. Lagu. However, this paper takes the view that for our purposes the crucial cleavage has been that between Lagu and Abel Alier. Except for a brief period in February 1978 when Clement Mboro joined Lagu in a *wind of change * campaign, by and large, outer-sides and politicians from the former SANU party often entered into coalitions with the Lagu group which included a good number of Equatorians. By contrast, insiders and former politicians of the defunct S.F. and only a sprinkling of Equatoria politicians found it easy to coalesce around Alier. This is a rough and gross over-simplification; nevertheless, it serves the function of analysis.

Throughout the 1970s Southern politicians labored under the assumption that an attack on the agreement would be sufficient to unite all Southerners. The Southern Sudanese oppositions to the National Assembly's attempt to change the borders with the South in 1980 and the demonstrations and protests against the choice of Kosti, not Bentiu, as the site of Sudan s second refinery clearly supported this assumption. However, in so vehemently opposing the decision of the central Minister of Mining in reference to the site of oil refinery and later indignantly opposing and suppressing any free discussion of the re-division proposal of Joseph Lagu, Abel Alier and his group fell out of favor with the regime. He had offended his constituency in the North, consequently suffered the indignity of being stripped of his two posts as president of the High Executive Council in October, 1981 and vice presidency of the Republic in June 1982. At the same time Lagu was elevated to fill the Vice Presidency post vacated by Abel. Thus not only had factionalism in Southern politics allowed Nimeriri to dissolve the regional assembly in 1978 and 1981 and to re-divide the South, but it had permitted him to argue that he had merely helped Southerners reach decisions that many of them, particularly in Equatoria, already publicly advocated.

Conclusion
Increasing pressure by Northern Sudanese nationalists, particularly, Muslim fundamentalists forced president Nimeiri to abandon the Addis Ababa Agreement. However, he could not have done so without the support of a substantial group of Southerners, particularly from Equatoria. As the regime depended more on the support of Northern political notables than the Southerners, this vital constituency could not easily be alienated. It was much easier to sacrifice Southern interest.

Southern Sudanese politics has always been elitist and the Addis Ababa Agreement, an elitist accommodation. Because it rested upon no popular support, the agreement could be abrogated without provoking open, mass revolt in the South. Under the agreement the South was unified, but without adequate provision or prior arrangement for smooth cooperation among Southerners. In its excessive concentration on North-South relations it totally ignored or downplayed the importance of intra-communal conflict i.e. south- South relations. The Bari, Dinka and other ethnic group in the South were for the first time brought into direct contact and hence confrontation with each other in stiff competition over the tangible benefits of modernization.

The leadership of the South must also take its full share of the blame. The roots of the present crisis in the South are embedded in the experiment of one decade of autonomous self-government. Although the pace of socio-economic development was slow, at times in adept, insensitive, corrupt and arrogant leadership was not only far from inspiring but itself lacked inspiration and a vision. Factionalism, the desire to keep a safe Northern Constituency and to maintain one's ruin of the agreement. Of all Southern politicians active in the post-Addis Ababa era, Abel Alier alone had a unique opportunity to unite the South. However, this task was impossible of realization given these political imperatives.

But what of national unity?
There can be little doubt that the Addis Ababa Agreement had been a boost to national unity. By the terms of the Agreement accommodation had been reached with the small but vocal group of southern intelligentsia, who with the southern masses had accepted the basic premise of national unity. However, this modus vivendi acted for only slightly over ten years when the precipitous action of splitting the South into three regions set the clock back to the pre-Addis era. Mutual fear, suspicion and mistrust between the central government and the southerners were resurrected as a result not only of the abrogation of the treaty but also by the imposition of Sharia Law in September 1983.

Finally, to promote the cause of national unity it is imperative upon Sudanese leaders to work for restoration of the special status of the South, devise an agreeable formula for power-sharing at the central government level, tackle the pressing issue of balanced economic development in an effective manner and abolish the Sharia laws of September 1983.

Arabic Forum