Will Abu Dhabi reconsider its calculations if the mortal Hemedti loses the war؟ by عثمان قسم السيد

03:01 PM December, 17 2023

Sudanese Online
عثمان قسم السيد-السودان
My Library
Short URL



Written by Osman Gasm Alsaed

How did a war criminal, whose militia terrorized the Darfur scene, killing men by ramming pickup trucks and raping women in the name of jihad and suppressing rebellion, turn into one of the heroes of the Sudanese revolution؟

Well, of course...you need money for that.

The British public relations agency announced that it charges each of its clients between 100 thousand pounds (125 thousand dollars) and 125 thousand pounds ($156 thousand) in monthly fees. Of course, this is not considered a significant amount for the dead General Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti.

The Sudanese politician Mubarak Al-Fadil, in a conversation with whom Hemedti tried to gain the support of his party, estimates that Hemedti’s wealth amounts to... $7 billion worth of raw gold trade he manages between Sudan, the United Arab Emirates and Russia. Al-Fadil even went so far as to mention the name of the Emirati bank in which Hemedti allegedly deposited his money.
It also needs deniability. The PR agency coyly describes itself as a “shop”.

This means “we work discreetly and in a confidential manner. We do not reveal the identity of those who deal with us. If you search for us on Google, you will find it very difficult to identify our clients. We are not a joint stock company, so we are not exposed to pressures resulting from fluctuations in stock prices or from activity carried out by stockholders.”

The public relations agency goes on to say that the military in Sudan is greatly misunderstood here in the West.

The public relations agency goes on to say that the military in Sudan is greatly misunderstood here in the West.

She says: “The general impression of the military is that they range between neutral and negative, while in reality, it was the military who helped overthrow former President Omar Al-Bashir, and Sudan would not have started again if it were not for the role it played.” The military in this regard.”

She goes on to say that the biggest victim of misunderstanding is the role played by their client, Hemedti. She says: “The media tends to focus on the past, while its role in what is happening now and what is expected for it in the future is much more important. Therefore, we seek to rebalance the impression of the military so that it ranges between neutral and positive.”

This text was written three years ago when Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Hemedti were leading the military members within the Sovereignty Council, which was formed in August. From 2019, a year before Al-Burhan led the military coup that took place in October 2021.

#A carefully prepared attack

At that time, the deceased Hemedti was busy planning his move. Coming. While the incident of the Rapid Support militias shooting pro-democracy activists in the Khartoum massacre in June 2019 was burned in Sudan’s memory, Hemedti was busy remaking himself in front of the naive Western media as a freedom fighter.

What the British Public Relations Agency reported was written seven months after the massacre. But in doing so, they were following the model set for them by diplomatic agencies in the West. In April 2019, the ambassadors of the United States, Britain, and the European Union rushed to shake Hemedti’s hand, preferring him over Al-Burhan, a military man about whom he did not know much.

The fighting that broke out on April 15, 2023 was not a spontaneous quarrel that broke out between two military commanders who failed to agree on who would hold the reins. If the data available to Middle East Eye are proven correct, this was an attack prepared with great care.

Hemedti had set up anti-aircraft guns inside Khartoum, which prompted his colleagues in the Sudanese Armed Forces to ask: Why and against whom؟

The Rapid Support militia attack was launched in many areas. Locations simultaneously: in the vicinity of Al-Burhan’s residence, at the main intelligence headquarters, and at the army headquarters, all of which are a stone’s throw from Khartoum airport, at Merowe and Al-Ubaidiya airports, at the army’s main headquarters in Nyala in South Darfur, in Al-Fasher in North Darfur, and in the city of Port Sudan. In Red Sea State.

At least 35 people died during the attempt to kill or capture Al-Burhan, according to what was stated by Sudanese Armed Forces sources. At the time of writing this report, Rapid Support militias were still holding civilians hostage inside the intelligence headquarters building, Middle East Eye was told. Al-Fadil agrees with this assessment, writing: “This whole attack was not just a reaction to the dispute between Hemedti and Burhan over the integration of the Rapid Support Forces into the armed forces. Rather, it was part of a large plan by three people whose goal was to seize power in Sudan with the encouragement of foreign powers.#Foreign powersSo who are these foreign powers؟ a>Mansour bin Zayed, Vice President, has so many tools to control and pressure Hemedti, that it is unreasonable for him to be safe if he displeases them. Mohammed bin Zayed may have bet that he could benefit from the chaos occurring in Sudan, whether Hemedti succeeded in removing Burhan or not.His money is deposited there, his bank is there. And his Facebook account runs from there. The eleven gold refineries in the United Arab Emirates are the focus of Hemedti's trade, from smelting stolen gold from Sudanese mines to laundering the precious metal on international markets via the gold market. I had doubts about The idea that the UAE has decided to irrevocably abandon hard power in favor of its softer alternative. Sudan has proven that it is no exception to the rule. It is not plausible that Hemedti launched his coup attempt against Al-Burhan without obtaining the green light from Abu Dhabi. The UAE claimed that from now on it would seek to extend its influence through trade rather than coups. But did the tiger really change its skin؟ I asked this question to an official in the Middle East who has good knowledge about how the three brothers Mohammed, Tahnoun and Mansour, sons of Zayed, work, and he replied: “No, but they may change their working methods.”The United Arab Emirates began what it claimed was a "strategic assessment" Due to its previous policy of financing and organizing military coups or coup attempts in Yemen, Syria, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. What was the return she was making on her investment؟ Certainly none of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi or Khalifa Haftar and the like, who have caused huge losses to their financiers in the Gulf. In September 2021, the United Arab Emirates began to retreat and move in a completely opposite direction, as Mohammed bin Zayed pursued a policy of rapprochement with the Emirati president’s fiercest rivals in the region: Turkey and Qatar.


















Or perhaps he was convinced, as was true in the case of Haftar at one point, that this would be a quick and clean coup that would be completed within hours. Where have we heard these words before؟ But Hemedti and Haftar, both of them, were close to success.

There is no doubt that the UAE's apparent support for Hemedti has put Egypt, Sudan's closest neighbor and which just over a century ago was a vassal of it, in a dilemma. The army of Egypt and the army of Sudan are carved from the same trunk, and the institutional relations between them closely link them together.

#The deafening silence of Cairo

When Hemedti launched his attack, approximately 250 Egyptian military personnel, including pilots and aircraft, were present at the air base in Merowe and at sites Others inside Sudan. The purpose of their presence was to send a message to Ethiopia that Egypt and Sudan are united in their joint opposition to the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which threatens the course of the Nile.

These did not participate in the fighting, some were taken hostage by the Rapid Support Force, and their planes were destroyed.
Egypt remained silent about the number of its soldiers who were released and then returned. The Sudanese Armed Forces said in a statement that 177 Egyptian prisoners were returned to their homeland on three planes. Then, she later retracted the use of the word “prisoner.” Sudanese army sources say that the Rapid Support Forces are still holding foreign hostages, but they did not go into details.

There was vague talk that some Egyptian soldiers took refuge in the Egyptian embassy seeking protection. This means that dozens of Egyptian military personnel are still in Sudan, according to what was stated by Egyptian sources familiar with the details of the crisis.

According to two external sources, Egypt initially sided with the Sudanese Armed Forces.
But Sudanese sources close to the Sudanese Armed Forces denied that Egyptian aircraft had participated in the air strikes launched on the Rapid Support Forces. One source said: “Why would we need them؟” We have our planes and our pilots.”

However, the Middle East Eye website has two independent, highly credible sources who say that there were air strikes launched by Egyptian aircraft on convoys of the Rapid Support Forces that attempted to reinforce positions inside Khartoum. It came from Port Sudan during the first four days following the coup.

However, Egypt has remained silent since then, in contrast to what was the case in Libya.
When ISIS killed 29 Coptic Christians in an attack launched by the group on a convoy heading towards the monastery in Minya in 2017, Egyptian warplanes did not hesitate to bomb what they claimed were ISIS camps in Derna. Inside Libya. At that time, Sisi said: “Egypt will never hesitate to strike terrorist camps wherever they are... if it plans to attack Egypt, whether inside or outside the country.”
As for today, Cairo’s silence in comparison is deafening.
All there is is that it called on both sides to adhere to the utmost levels of restraint in order to “respect the lives and capabilities of the brotherly Sudanese people and preserve the supreme interests of the nation.” According to a statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which meekly added that it was “following developments.”

#Why self-control؟

Three days before Hemedti moved against Al-Burhan, Mohammed bin Zayed arrived on an unannounced visit to Cairo, and was received by Sisi at the airport.

The Egyptian economy is still in a state of deterioration despite the efforts made by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Emirates and Kuwait to save it and despite four loans granted to Egypt by the International Monetary Fund. Rather, the value of the Egyptian pound has fallen by half since March 2022.

What is interesting is that while Egypt is striving to sell state assets in order to put an end to the deterioration in the value of its currency, The Financial Times newspaper said that the Abu Dhabi Sovereign Fund, which... The main Emirati entity entrusted with the task of investing in Egypt announced the cessation of its projects in the country.

It is not known what the two men discussed, but it is clear that Mohammed bin Zayed had enough pressure tools to get the bankrupt Sisi to prevent the Egyptian army from coming to the aid of his cousins ​​in the Sudanese Armed Forces.

Then the Egyptian army was soon subjected to further humiliation when Haftar, the general whom Sisi had always been keen to support in Libya, rushed to send weapons, ammunition and soldiers across the Sudanese-Libyan border.

#Concern in Riyadh

The UAE’s bet on Hemedti sparked reactions in capitals other than Cairo, including from Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

In a statement to Middle East Eye, Aziz Al-Ghasyan, a Saudi researcher in foreign relations based in Riyadh, said: “The last thing Saudi Arabia needs now is another Syria on the Red Sea coast.” a>All of this is happening at the same time, and one can almost find it difficult to believe that it is happening. At the same time, you find it flirting with China and seeking to turn the dirham into a reserve currency that competes with the dollar. In defiance of the US boycott decisions, Abu Dhabi gave Wagner a way to smuggle gold, and by financing coups in large, influential countries such as Sudan, very far from its coast, it contributes to destabilizing neighboring countries. Abu Dhabi has reached the peak of the financial boom, and has now become a headquarters and crossing point for Russian oligarchs and exiles alike. But this time, the problems may have approached the heart of the UAE state, which has begun to extend its arms in the region and across the African continent. Once again, the last three weeks in Sudan have revealed the catastrophe that results from supporting and financing military tyrants, a catastrophe that millions of innocent Sudanese are currently suffering from. Mohammed bin Salman has learned that an aggressive foreign policy has limits, and this was a lesson he learned hard, through the hole in his pocket caused by the Yemen war. Not only were his forces unable to expel the Houthis from Sanaa and stop the rain of their missiles on airports and other targets throughout the kingdom, but this war was costing him a lot, a lot. Indeed, as happened in Yemen, the gap is widening between the ruler of Abu Dhabi and his disciple. Previously, the Crown Prince in Riyadh.
He added: “Saudi Arabia actually wants Sudan to be stable. If stability is absent from Sudan, the Red Sea projects will not be able to achieve their goals, and that is the source of concern that concerns Riyadh now.”
















This level of independent action raises concern in Washington, and antagonizes Riyadh, which took a decision at least once this year to prevent trucks coming from the Emirates from crossing the Saudi border, which resulted in the destruction of the goods they were carrying.

Mohamed bin Zayed and Mohammed bin Salman both believe that they should now be president of the other. As for the first, it is because he was the one who, without the slightest doubt, made a valuable ruler out of an unknown prince when he introduced him to the Trump clan and introduced them to him in exchange for rapprochement with Israel. The second is because he is now the de facto ruler of the largest and richest country in the Gulf, and therefore he expects other countries to owe him loyalty. It is an equation that does not bode well.

Commercial stability in Abu Dhabi has become vulnerable to dangers due to the inconsistent methods that the UAE is confidently adopting to destabilize regimes in other places.

If Hemedti loses the civil war he sparked, I expect another prudent retreat by Mohammed bin Zayed away from military adventures abroad.

And the rest of the story


Osman Gasm Alsaed
[email protected]

Arabic Forum