06-08-2006, 03:31 PM |
amir jabir
amir jabir
Registered: 01-12-2006
Total Posts: 5550
|
|
Re: We never forget those who died in Mostapha Mahmoud (Re: amir jabir)
|
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY IN CAIRO FORCED MIGRATION AND REFUGEE STUDIES (FMRS) A TRAGEDY OF FAILURES AND FALSE EXPECTATIONS Report on the Events Surrounding the Threemonth Sitin and Forced Removal of Sudanese Refugees in Cairo, September–December 2005 June 2006 The Forced Migration and Refugee Studies program (FMRS) is a program of education, research, and outreach that seeks to improve the understanding, policies, and practices of those who are concerned or work directly with refugees and other forced migrants. While maintaining a global and comparative perspective, FMRS focuses on the particular issues and circumstances of displacement in Africa, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean basin from multiple viewpoints, including those of host societies, policy makers, states, humanitarian organizations, and, in particular, of the forced migrants themselves. FMRS offers a multidisciplinary graduate diploma for that purpose and supports research and service activities that are mutually reenforcing, grounded in the needs of stakeholders, and promote a growing appreciation of the social, psychosocial, economic, cultural, legal and political relevance of forced migration to academics, practitioners, and the general public. * * * Forced Migration and Refugee Studies The American University in Cairo 113 Kasr AlAini Street, P.O. Box 2511 Cairo 11511, Arab Republic of Egypt Telephone: +2027976921, 7976626 Fax: +2027976629 [email protected] http://www.aucegypt.edu/fmrs TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS……………………………………………………………………1 INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………………2 BACKGROUND TO THE CRISIS…………………………………………………………5 THREE MONTHS OF PROTEST………………………………………………………...15 FORCED REMOVAL……………………………………………………………………...31 THE AFTERMATH………………………………………………………………………...36 COMMENTS AND ANALYSIS…………………………………………………………...52 APPENDIX A: Protest demands with explanation………………………………………….59 APPENDIX B: December 17 agreement with UNHCR…………………………………….63 1 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Report Editor Fateh Azzam Editorial Assistance Jasmina Brankovic Nora Danielson Research and First Drafting Introduction: Fateh Azzam Background to the Crisis: Maisaa Youssef, Andrew Woods Three Months of Protest: Nora Danielson, Themba Lewis Forced Removal: Laura Maxwell The Aftermath: James Pearce, Sarah Sadek Comments and Analysis: Fateh Azzam Many thanks to all the refugees and eyewitnesses who gave testimonies and to all who participated in the preparation and factchecking of this report, especially the following, with apologies in advance to all who are not specifically mentioned below: Assad Khalid, Barbara HarrellBond, Chiara R., Courtney Mitchell, Emily Eidenier, Gafar Salim, Karen Zamperini, Leigh Sylvan, Martin Rowe, Maysa Ayoub, Minal Giri, Musafiri Sebbi, Naaz Khan, Omar Idriss, Sara Sevcik, Shadrick King, Stacy Shafer, Viviana Mazza, Yasser Omer Mustafa, and Ahmed AbdelRahman. Thanks are also due to the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and to UNHCR for willingness to meet and share perspectives and for providing information and statistics. Special thanks are due to Africa–Middle East Refugee Assistance (AMERA) and the Association for Human Rights Legal Aid (AHRLA) for their collaboration and sharing of information. 2 INTRODUCTION On September 29, 2005, dozens of Sudanese asylum seekers and refugees initiated a sitin near the offices of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees in Cairo to protest UNHCR’s ongoing suspension of refugee status determination procedures as well as their conditions in Cairo, a situation they considered unbearable. Their number quickly grew to an average of 1,800 to 2,500 and remained at those levels throughout the following three months. Periodic meetings and negotiations among the sitin leadership, UNHCR, and a number of other parties failed to meet the demonstrators’ demands or to result in a satisfactory end to the protest. In the early morning hours of December 30, 2005, thousands of Egyptian security personnel forcibly removed the protestors to various holding centers in and around Cairo. Tragically, 27 refugees and asylum seekers were killed in the removal, at least half being children and women. A 28 th person, a 14yearold boy, died in hospital a month later, and one man committed suicide in detention. Most cardholding refugees and asylum seekers were released within a few days, but more than six hundred remained in detention until their status was clarified between UNHCR and the government of Egypt. The tragedy continued for weeks, with families trying to find loved ones, children being left unaccompanied overnight or held in separate facilities from their parent(s), and people not knowing whether their relatives were in another detention facility, in hospital, or in the morgue. Two months after the event, no one remained in detention, but several children were missing and families still were not allowed to take possession of the bodies of relatives for burial. Calls by national and international human rights organizations for an international inquiry into the deaths were rejected by Egypt, which was rumored to have initiated an internal investigation. The forced removal and its aftermath elicited criticism locally and abroad, strained relations between UNHCR and the government of Egypt, and exacerbated an atmosphere of distrust between UNHCR and Sudanese refugees and asylum seekers. Egyptian and international media coverage of the event was replete with charges of police brutality and racism, and countercharges of abuse of Egyptian hospitality by “drunken” and “diseaseridden” refugees and other xenophobic statements. At the same time, human rights and other civil society organizations worked hard to provide needed assistance by tracing families, identifying the deceased, and raising funds to aid the victims. The Mufti Dr. Ali Gomaa issued a fatwa approving Sadaqah (charitable giving) for all Sudanese refugees during Eid AlAdha. There is little information in the public domain on what happened that day or what led up to it. Many questions surrounding the issue remain unanswered. Who was protesting in the first place, and why? Why did they reject several offers by UNHCR? Could UNHCR and the government of Egypt have offered the protesters more? Why was such excessive force used in the removal, and how did so many people die? Why were autopsy reports not released? Why did it take so long before bodies of victims were released to their relatives for burial, 3 and why were none allowed to be transferred to Sudan for burial? Why was there so little information and care in the immediate aftermath, when dazed asylum seekers and refugees were left wandering the streets of Cairo? Who is responsible and who should be held accountable for which aspect of the problem? Could this tragedy have been avoided and, most important, could it happen again? One week after the tragedy, FMRS initiated an investigative research in an effort to find answers to some of these questions. From the start, the purpose of the investigation was not so much to assign responsibility as it was to promote a thorough understanding of the problem: why it happened, what are the issues, and what could have been done or should be done in the future and by whom in order to prevent such a tragedy. This is not the first effort by FMRS faculty, students, and researchers to shed light on the particular issues and problems facing refugees in Egypt and the region, including the Sudanese. Thus, the report builds on previous FMRS research and on other sources. 1 In order to identify the particular events that occasioned the threemonth sitin, the removal of the protestors, and the aftermath, an FMRS team of more than 10 researchers gathered eyewitness testimonies, met with officials from UNHCR and the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and relied on information from a number of nongovernmental organizations active in providing assistance to the asylum seeker and refugee community in Egypt. FMRS undertook the complicated task of wading through a large amount of sometimes contradictory and confusing bits of information to corroborate testimonies and newspaper accounts, to separate fact from rumor, and to navigate the passions on the different sides of this event and the issues that gave rise to it. This report is the result of more than two months of these efforts. Preliminary findings were presented on February 8, 2006, at an FMRS Wednesday Seminar and the final version—insofar as any analysis of this event can be final—is in your hands. Terminology It is difficult but important to identify correct terminology in clarifying a highly intricate and nuanced situation. On the one hand, not everyone who crosses a border is automatically a “refugee,” and not all those who apply for this legal status are granted it. 2 On the other hand, because of the rigors of the refugee status determination (RSD) process, not everyone who is denied the legal status of refugee should be automatically termed an “economic migrant” or an “illegal migrant.” They may be refugees who simply did not fit the criteria at a particular 1 See www.aucegypt.edu/fmrs, under “Reports.” 2 Article 1 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees defines a refugee as an individual who, “owing to a wellfounded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” Article 1(2) of the 1969 OAU Convention adds that a refugee is an individual who “owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or in whole of his country of origin…is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence.” 4 Asylum Seeker (Yellow Card) Refugee Status Determination (RSD) Process Legal Refugee (Blue Card) Appeal Closed File Internally Displaced Person time or for a particular reason. Individuals in the middle of their RSD process are generally referred to as “asylum seekers,” while those who applied and were rejected are termed “closed files” if no further action is taken or if they appeal and are rejected again. In interviews and general discussions, FMRS researchers were sometimes confronted with confusion concerning these terms. Users of the term refugee are not always cognizant of the distinctions described above, and the word is often used to describe anyone who is in a refugee situation, whether legally recognized as such or not. This report makes an effort to navigate these complications, clarifying the differences as thoroughly as possible. Where it suits the main purpose of the discussion, the report defers to the general usage, referring to refugees in broad terms without distinction. Most of the time, however, the report does make a distinction between asylum seekers, recognized refugees, closed files, and others. The following chart shows various stages and acknowledged categories in an attempt to delineate the differences. The specific situation described by each of those categories is discussed in the report. Process, Status, and Terminology Cross Successful Borders Rejected Resettlement Local Successful Integration Voluntary Unsuccessful Repatriation Return to Move Elsewhere, Country of Origin or Are “Smuggled” Disappear in Country and Wait 5 BACKGROUND TO THE CRISIS Not all Sudanese in Egypt are asylum seekers or refugees. There is a long history of migration between Egypt and Sudan, spanning centuries, facilitated by the geography of the Nile and the populations’ linguistic and cultural affinities. Estimates of the number of Sudanese nationals in Egypt vary widely, ranging from 750,000 to 4 million. 3 The majority has enjoyed longterm residence and successful careers in business or academia. Some intermarry with Egyptians and are fairly well integrated into Egyptian society, but maintain their Sudanese nationality. One expression of neighborly relations between Egypt and Sudan was the 1976 Wadi ElNil (Nile Valley) Treaty, which provided for reciprocal treatment of the nationals of both countries. Under the treaty, Sudanese nationals were granted the right to live in Egypt with near citizenship. They were permitted to enter without a visa and were, in theory, given unrestricted access to employment, education, healthcare, and ownership of property. In 1995, an assassination attempt was made on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Ethiopia that was attributed to Sudanese Islamist extremists, after which the Wadi ElNil Treaty was abrogated. That year, the Egyptian government began requiring Sudanese asylum seekers to carry an entry visa and a residence permit, and their rights reverted to those accorded to any foreign national on Egyptian soil. As we shall see, this cutoff date corresponds roughly with when the question of Sudanese refugees became a significant issue in Egypt. Because of growing political unrest in Sudan, increasing numbers of Sudanese came to Egypt specifically to seek refuge. The first major wave came in 1955 with the start of Sudan’s civil war. This wave extended into the mid1980s, and included opponents of the Nimeiri regime and to the imposition of Islamic law in southern Sudan. The next major wave came in 1983 with another outbreak of civil war in the South. The most recent wave was created by the ongoing conflict in Darfur. These conflicts all but destroyed the country, and millions ended up in camps surrounding Sudan and in camps for the internally displaced within the country. Escapees from political repression in all parts of Sudan continued to come to Egypt, with tens of thousands arriving in Egypt over the past ten years, though even more fled to the south or west of Sudan. As Egypt increasingly became a recipient country for refugees seeking not just immediate asylum but also eventual resettlement to third countries, responsibility for the asylum seekers fell to UNHCR, whose Cairo office eventually developed one of the largest resettlement operations in the world. Interviews conducted with Sudanese asylum seekers show that resettlement to the United States, Canada, Australia, and other Western countries has consistently been the ultimate goal for refugees. Many asylum seekers came to view resettlement almost as a right, but only about a quarter of them have had this expectation met. The rest remain in Egypt, severely disappointed and surviving in an Egyptian urban environment under difficult circumstances. 3 Katarzyna Grabska, “Living on the Margins: Analysis of the Livelihood Strategies of Sudanese Refugees with Closed Files in Egypt,” FMRS Working Paper 6, June 2005, p. 17. 6 Egypt, UNHCR, and International Law Egypt is a signatory to both the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (and its 1967 Protocol) 4 and the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. The conventions grant recognized refugees a set of basic rights, starting with the specific prohibition in Article 33 of the 1951 Convention of refoulement, the forcible return of an asylum seeker to the country of origin where his or her life may be threatened. Other rights provided to various degrees by the two conventions include free practice of religion, continuity of residence, access to courts, employment, welfare, healthcare, education, and freedom of movement and documentation. Egypt has no single guiding policy for the treatment of refugees, however, and it has not taken steps to fully implement the principles of the conventions through its national legislation. At the same time, as discussed above, Egypt has parallel policies that relate entirely to its special relationship with Sudan, and these policies often conflict with or confuse the information regarding services and rights available to Sudanese asylum seekers and refugees. Importantly, the government of Egypt has deferred responsibility for those who seek asylum and refugee status in Egypt to UNHCR, including the conduct of refugee status determination (RSD) and the provision of assistance in its various forms. UNHCR has often called upon the Egyptian government to take on the responsibility for RSD in meeting its legal commitments under the conventions, which the latter has consistently refused to do. 5 Moreover, Egypt sent UNHCR a letter entering a number of significant reservations to the conventions, limiting access to education, healthcare, and employment. 6 In practice, however, Egypt has ameliorated these reservations by softening the restrictions on access to some of these basic services (see discussion below). UNHCR continues to be responsible for determining who qualifies for refugee legal status and its practices in this regard have received some criticism. 7 After initial registration with UNHCR, an asylum seeker is given a yellow card, granting him or her temporary residence in Egypt until status is determined. The agency has been criticized by researchers as well as refugees for having lengthy and unfair procedures, including cursory interviews by insufficiently trained staff, lack of transparency, lack of adequate and clear information, and 4 Ratified by Egypt in 1981. UN Country Report available at < http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/ittmig2002/locations/818.htm> (last accessed 15 January 2006). 5 Interview with Damtew Dessalegne, Deputy Regional Representative, UNHCR Regional Office in Cairo, 16 February 2006. This position was also held by the government of Egypt during an interview with Nasser Hamzawy, Refugee Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 January 2006. 6 These include: Article 12(1) (personal status); Article 20 (rationing); Article 22(1) (access to primary education); Article 23 (public relief and assistance); and Article 24 (labor legislation and social security). These reservations were not mentioned in the official Egyptian Gazette and thus may not have the force of law in Egypt. 7 See Michael Kagan, “Assessment of Refugee Status Determination Procedure at UNHCR’s Cairo Office, 2001–2002,” FMRS Working Paper 1, December 2002. 7 at times even arbitrary and unreasonable determinations. Diminishing UNHCR resources have been straining the agency’s capacity to deal with increasing numbers of applicants in the past 12 years, which has elicited more complaints of inadequate assistance to the most needy. 8 Suspension of RSD Interviews for Sudanese Asylum Seekers In June 2004, as a result of the ceasefire declared earlier in the year between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, UNHCR suspended RSD procedures for all Sudanese asylum seekers, regardless of whether they originated from the South, Darfur, or elsewhere. Instead, UNHCR automatically provided all applicants with yellow asylum seeker cards, which offer temporary protection against refoulement (forced repatriation). The agency’s rationale was that, given the potential for peace in Sudan, this move offered better protection than the rejection of a large number of applicants on the basis of a fundamental change of circumstances in the country of origin, which would undermine the reasons for granting refugee status. The decision was subsequently reviewed and renewed every six months. Sudanese asylum seekers were deeply disappointed and worried by UNHCR’s decision, especially as it put a heavy damper on their hopes for resettlement and relegated them to a longer waiting period under difficult conditions in Egypt. Not long before, in May 2004, the Four Freedoms Agreement between Egypt and Sudan was signed. The agreement, ratified in September of that year, promised a partial return to the Wadi ElNil Treaty of 1976, guaranteeing reciprocal rights of residence, work, movement, and ownership of property. It was unclear how this agreement would be implemented and whether it would have any impact on asylum seekers and refugees from Sudan; clearly, many worried that its effect on them would be negative. In August 2004, a number of refugees were prompted by an Egyptian organization to gather in front of UNHCR’s offices to present a memorandum protesting the agency’s change in 8 Ibid., pp. 4041. In September I was beaten up by some Egyptians in Maadi who took all my documents. I tried to file a report at the police station, but they wouldn’t let me. Finally after several tries they agreed and I got a police report. Then I went to take the police report to UNHCR so I could get a new yellow card. I went there eight times, but they refused to let me enter. One night [before the sitin] I slept in Mustafa Mahmoud Park so I could get there early, because I heard that they only let in a limited number of people a day. On that eighth day, I saw that there was a group of people in the park, including two women with their children. I asked them what they were doing there, and they told me they were protesting. I was already having problems with my flat, so that night I came back with my eight children and husband and mother, and went and joined the protest and stayed at the park. FMRS interview with demonstrator, 28 January 2006. 8 policy and the announced reduction in some of UNHCR’s assistance to refugees. 9 Confusion about who would meet with UNHCR staff and misinformation about UNHCR “refusing” such a meeting led to an open riot and some damage to UNHCR premises. Police were called in and dozens of protestors as well as 10 police officers were injured. Twentytwo protestors were detained but eventually released. In the end, the concerns of the 2004 protestors were not addressed. 10 One result of the 2004 protest was the decision by UNHCR to move its first meetings with asylum seekers and refugees to the nearby Mustapha Mahmoud Park, about one block from the agency’s offices in Mohandeseen, a Cairo neighborhood. For the following year, initial interviews were conducted at the park and appointments made there for applicants to come to the office for more extensive meetings and followup. UNHCR’s holding of asylum seekers and refugees “at arm’s length” in this fashion can be seen as a physical representation of the increasing distance between UNHCR and the population it purported to protect. Justified or not, Sudanese refugees’ longstanding frustration with UNHCR’s lengthy procedures, diminishing resources for assistance, and perceived low rate of acceptance (let alone resettlement), as well as their dissatisfaction with the interview process and their treatment by some UNHCR staff and security personnel, combined to fuel loss of trust in the agency. At the same time, asylum seekers could turn to no other agency. Statistics on Sudanese “of Concern” Statistics released by the UNHCR Cairo office show that between 1994 and the end of 2005, 58,535 Sudanese nationals sought asylum and registered with the agency. By December 2005, 31,990 of these asylum seekers had been accorded refugee legal status and 16,675 had been resettled in third countries. An additional 15,000 of the recognized refugees did not meet the resettlement countries’ criteria and most, if not all, remained in Egypt under “local integration” status. This leaves just over 315 individuals who, according to UNHCR, were referred for resettlement but whose procedures for travel have not yet been completed. Of those who sought refugee status with UNHCR, 16,000 were rejected and eventually became “closed files,” and another 10,200 were given temporary asylum seeker protection. As of the end of 2005, 13,327 recognized refugees remained in Egypt. 11 These numbers undergo monthly revision by UNHCR as decisions are made and individuals shift between categories. Importantly, the numbers only include those Sudanese who approached UNHCR and received interviews. Many more may have arrived in Egypt for similar or other purposes; if they have not approached UNHCR, there is no way to accurately count them. 9 The South Center for Human Rights called for a “demonstration” in front of UNHCR offices but failed to be present in the morning when dozens of refugees and asylum seekers appeared. See Sudan Human Rights Organization, Cairo Branch, at org/pressreleases/04/august/26august04.htm>. 10 Leben Nelson Moro and Gamal Abdel Rahman Adam, “The Slow Death of Darfurians Out of Sight in Egypt,” Damanga Coalition for Freedom and Democracy, 28 July 2005, available at < http://www.damanga.org/slow_death_in_egypt.html>. 11 Dessalegne, op. cit. 9 UNHCR Statistics on Sudanese of Concern to UNHCR, 19942005 1. Total seeking asylum/registered 58,535 100% 2. Total recognized refugees 31,990 54.6% of applicants 3. Resettled refugees – no longer in Egypt 16,675 28.48% of applicants 52.1% of those recognized 4. Pending resettlement +/315 5. Recognized but not referred for resettlement – ‘local integration’ 15,000 25.62% of applicants 46.9% of those recognized 6. Asylum seekers with suspended interviews since 2004 10,200 17.4% of applicants 7. Closed files 16,000 27.3% of applicants 8. Other (for integration, or suspended interviews) +/345 Total not resettled (categories 58) 41,545 71% The statistics above show that approximately 71 percent of all Sudanese who have come to Egypt seeking asylum (and eventual resettlement) did not get resettled. A number of them have left, either returning voluntarily to Sudan on their own or trying to make another journey through smuggling networks or by other means to where their hopes may be met. A significant majority of the people in categories 5 through 8 remains in Egypt, however, although exactly how many cannot be ascertained. It is this group of Sudanese refugees, asylum seekers, and closed files who decided to protest their living conditions and uncertain future. Life as a Sudanese Refugee in 2005: Themes and Livelihood Issues Sudanese refugees in Egypt cite difficult or inadequate access to education, healthcare, housing, and employment as pressing concerns. Each of these livelihood issues is colored by the larger themes of racist attitudes and misinformation, as well as increasing frustration with an ambiguous, suspended existence for an indefinite amount of time. 12 Work Recognized refugees in Egypt are given the opportunity to work, provided they obtain a work permit in accordance with Egyptian law. To do so, they must meet strict criteria, including sponsorship by an employer, legal residence and travel documents, proof of specialized skills that do not put them in competition with Egyptian workers, HIV tests, and the payment of processing fees. Few employers choose this route, so few Sudanese refugees are able to get such work permits. In 2004, the Egyptian government changed its visa stamp format and added “not permitted to work” to the residency stamps of recognized Sudanese refugees. After more than a year of effort, UNHCR succeeded in having that addition removed in May 2005. 13 12 For a detailed discussion of livelihood issues among Sudanese with closed files, see Grabska, op. cit. 13 Dessalegne, op. cit. 10 Asylum seekers who do not yet have legal status as refugees, along with closed files, are not guaranteed the right to work in Egypt. Consequently, they, as well as recognized refugees without work permits, can only get temporary employment in the informal and unregulated sector, along with many poor Egyptians and illegal aliens. The refugees’ special vulnerability makes them subject to exploitation by employers. Many start their own enterprises, buying and selling handmade crafts and other merchandise on the streets. All have to keep a watchful eye out for police raids and are often subject to roundups, fines, and detention. Many Sudanese women find work as cooks and maids in private homes, but there, too, the risk of harassment and abuse is high. Thus, most Sudanese refugees, regardless of their official status, are only able to work sporadically, for little money, with no job security, and often under exploitative conditions. The lack of sufficient employment opportunities causes many refugees to become impoverished. While UNHCR gives minimal financial support to recognized refugees, it does so only to specific vulnerable or destitute families. Indeed, UNHCR reports that while the cost of living in Cairo has increased substantially in the last few years, the subsistence allowance allocated to vulnerable refugees has dropped by an average of 72 percent from US$55 in 1998 to US$15.5 in 2002 per person each month, leaving many refugee families well below Egypt’s poverty line. 14 Without a steady income, refugees have difficulty paying rent, educational fees, and costs of healthcare, the quality of which depends on one’s ability to pay. While several NGOs, churches, and community groups have developed education and healthcare initiatives, many services are only available to holders of blue and yellow cards, with yellow cardholders only allowed access to emergency healthcare. Education Prior to 1995, all Sudanese, including refugees and asylum seekers, could access Egyptian public schools. This arrangement was separate from Egypt’s obligation to provide primary education under the 1951 Convention, a commitment to which it entered a reservation. 15 Regardless, Egypt is bound to provide basic educational services by treaties such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the African Charter of Human and People’s Rights. In 1992, the Ministry of Education issued a decree allowing recognized refugee children to attend Egyptian schools, thus meeting these commitments and bypassing the reservation. 14 UN news story, “Hard Times for Cairo’s Refugees,” 25 November 2002, available at < http://www.unhcr.ch/cgibin/ texis/vtx/news/opendoc.htm?tbl=NEWS&id=3de201595&page=newsR>. 15 See footnote 5. I know this Sudanese woman who worked for an Egyptian family in the North coast. She died. Her employer claimed that she died in an accident in the swimming pool, but the autopsy showed that she was hit in the head. I ask the UNHCR to give us protection and to address the problems of refugees. We are not migrants. We are refugees. FMRS interviews with demonstrators, 14 January 2006 11 Attempts by Sudanese refugees to enroll their children in Egyptian public schools are often unsuccessful because of the current overpopulation of classrooms and the unwillingness of many school headmasters to accommodate new students. In addition, school fees must be paid. UNHCR provided a fund for educational grants managed by Catholic Relief Services and made them available for asylum seekers and recognized refugees, but many were either unaware of the grants or chose not to apply for them. Because of a preoccupation with and desire for resettlement, many refugees prefer to educate their children in English rather than in Arabic, which is possible only at more expensive private schools. Those who cannot afford a private education must depend on charitable community or churchbased schooling, and the largest such program uses an Egyptian curriculum. This type of schooling is unaccredited and may not be recognized by other schools. Health Services The Egyptian Health Ministry issued a directive in 2005 making primary health services at governmental health institutions available to everyone. This subsidized healthcare does not include complicated or longterm medical treatment, surgeries, and costly medicines. Recognized refugees have access to subsidized medical services through UNHCR via its partnership with CARITAS. Many refugees expressed serious concern with and a deep distrust of the public healthcare system in Egypt, complaining of poor quality, disrespect, and lack of proper attention to medical problems. 16 Despite assurances to the contrary, many cite fears of organ theft or even intentional malpractice as reasons for not going to public institutions and for preferring churchbased clinics for basic medical treatment. A number of mosques offer free healthcare assistance, but few refugees are aware of these unadvertised services. Religious sensitivities are often transmuted into a firm belief on refugees’ part that some churches only offer their services to Christians or that Christians cannot approach mosques for medical treatment. Housing Refugees and asylum seekers do not have access to the rentcontrolled housing available to Egyptians and have to find housing on the private rental market. With no standardized estimates of property values, the prices of apartments in Egypt are often arbitrary and increase exponentially for foreign renters, including refugees. Because most refugees do not have a stable income, they are forced into overcrowded living quarters, which results in poor sanitation, minimal personal security, and a stressful home environment. Without regulation, 16 Alexandria is an exception in terms of the services available to Sudanese refugees in Egypt. Cooperation between the city, the refugee community, and a number of churches has resulted in better living conditions for refugees, including easier access to health services. In some cases, however, health services provided in cooperation with churches is limited to refugees from southern Sudan. Grabska, op. cit., pp. 4142. Refugees need to be provided with medical care and with shelter. A huge problem is malnutrition. For example, for three months the protesters were eating terribly. There is a lack of food and many people died from malnutrition. There should be a special group of the UN who deal with nutrition. FMRS interview with demonstrator, 3 January 2006 12 Sudanese refugees are subjected to arbitrary increases in monthly payments and may be evicted without just cause. Although they have a right to do so in theory, refugees do not easily access Egypt’s justice system when this happens or when they are cheated out of rental deposits. Under these conditions, refugees often have no permanent home address, and many are vulnerable to exploitation by landlords and by other refugees in seeking to secure a place to sleep at night. Closed files and, significantly, new arrivals have even more limited means of providing for health, housing, and education. Racist Attitudes Although most Egyptian Cairenes would deny that their society is racist, 17 racism presents a significant, if not welldocumented, obstacle for Sudanese and other refugees in Egypt. Sudanese refugees widely report discrimination—which they attribute to racist attitudes—in the realms of employment, access to housing, healthcare, and everyday interactions with civil society. 18 Southern Sudanese, who often have a darker complexion than the average Egyptian, bear the bulk of this abuse. They report being verbally harassed by Egyptians, who shout names such as “oonga boonga” or samara (meaning “black”) at Sudanese and other African migrants. Stories of attacks by both the police and street thugs circulate widely. One doctor has reported seeing an average of one violent attack on African refugees per month. 19 Police occasionally round up people on the streets who “look” African and subject them to verbal and physical abuse until UNHCR intervenes to have them released, if they are listed with the agency as an asylum seeker or a refugee. 20 Such roundups have occurred with far less frequency in the past two years. In some cases, negative relationships between refugees and locals are perpetuated by the resentment felt by Egyptians, who may be just as povertystricken but are unable to access the services available to refugees. In addition, refugees are often blamed for taking jobs away from locals, an especially sensitive issue in a country with an estimated 30 percent rate of unemployment. The already negative experience of becoming a refugee is magnified in Cairo by the absence of sufficient services and the poverty experienced by many refugees. Refugees in Cairo are 17 See Anita Fábos, abstract from “Cosmopolitan Racism? Nationalism, Refugees, and Integration in Cairo,” unpublished presentation at the University of Ghent, 17 December 2001, available at < http://www.evensfoundation.be/PDF%20documents/Intcul_Conf_Fabos.pdf>. 18 See Cynthia Johnston, “Feature: Egypt’s African Migrants Dodge Rocks, Fight Racism,” Reuters, 24 June 2005, available at . 19 Ibid. 20 See Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: Mass Arrests of Foreigners, African Refugees Targeted in Cairo,” 10 February 2003, available at . A group of Egyptians beat me and broke my leg and stole my money when I was on my way home from work. When I complained to UNHCR, they told me to bring the abusers. How am I to bring them? This kind of treatment is intolerable. FMRS interview with demonstrator, 12 January 2006 13 subjected to both racial and class discrimination, the overall effect being one of extreme frustration, marginalization, and loss of dignity. Many refugees feel so marginalized in Egypt that they complain of “not being treated like a human being.” 21 Some Egyptians’ racist attitudes shock incoming asylum seekers into negative assumptions about Egyptian society, producing counterracist attitudes that lead to selfmarginalization, which compounds difficulties. Because of widespread high expectations for resettlement, Sudanese refugees often refuse to engage with Egyptian society except at the most necessary levels, viewing their sojourn in the country as temporary. Attitudes such as preference for English over Arabic and for foreign services over Egyptian ones sometimes produce what may be characterized as racist attitudes among refugees, which exacerbate selfmarginalization. Misinformation Experiences and attitudes of racism are closely linked to the information vacuum. Most Egyptians are misinformed about refugees’ role in Egypt, with many ascribing the responsibility for the country’s poor job market and even a perceived decline in moral values to refugees. In addition, few Egyptians become friendly enough with refugees to appreciate the reality of their situation or their positive contribution, especially economic, to Egypt. Refugees suffer even worse information failure than Egyptians. They face a glaring absence of reliable and trusted sources of information, and they often do not know what assistance is available. This is partly due to the size and density of Cairo, but it also points to the failure of UNHCR, the government of Egypt, and service NGOs to provide clear and accessible information on what is available, how it can be accessed, and who qualifies. What the law provides is often not available in practice, and what is available is at times more than the law allows for and more than refugees and asylum seekers know about. 22 In the absence of credible information, refugees rely on rumors that spread quickly through the community. 23 These rumors often relate to resettlement promises or programs that do not exist. The community is victimized by rumors about churches and mosques only “serving 21 Stacy Schafer, “Sudanese Demonstrators in Mohandeseen: Who They Are and Why They’re Here,” unpublished paper on file with FMRS, p. 15. 22 UNHCR publishes a booklet in English that describes RSD procedures and some of the assistance available for asylum seekers and refugees. FMRS has a list on its Web site of organizations that provide services for refugees, available at . Little information is available in Arabic, however. 23 See Shafer, op. cit., p. 14. I’m from Darfur, from the war, where I had very hard troubles. There I witnessed my father being killed and my mother’s legs being broken. Then I fled from my town to a camp in Darfur, and then to Khartoum, where I was beaten by police and other people, who said, “You make the capitol’s face ugly,” because we were refugees. And then I came to Cairo and went to UNHCR because I heard that they offered protection, but I found that the situation here is just as bad: there are also beatings and killings and persecution. FMRS interview with demonstrator, 28 January 2006 14 their own,” about gangs of Egyptian youths attacking Africans, assumptions about the disappearance of young Sudanese men and women, poor explanations of deaths, and invasive surgeries on the part of Egyptian medical personnel, including organ theft. Many refugees are convinced to refuse interaction with Egyptian society, often confining themselves to their homes and minimal social networks. 24 Growing Frustration These factors have combined over the past two years to create growing frustration within the Sudanese refugee community in Egypt. Frustration is not only the result of the community’s disappointment about the lack of resettlement opportunities. Refugees have had to contend with staying in Egypt for an indeterminate amount of time under difficult living conditions, with only patchy access to basic rights. They are buffeted and confused by rumors, and few receive the minimal assistance available from UNHCR and NGOs working on their behalf. They feel marginalized by the lack of understanding and, at times, outright hostility displayed by Egyptian society, and react by further marginalizing themselves. A great many refugees are convinced that a longterm stay in Egypt is untenable. This opinion is held by recognized refugees, asylum seekers who were told that their RSD interviews would not occur in the foreseeable future, and closed files not willing to return to Sudan. Their decision to sit in at Mustafa Mahmoud Park and to demand fundamental changes in their circumstances should have come as no surprise. 24 See Pasquale Ghazaleh, “In ‘Closed File’ Limbo: Displaced Sudanese in a Cairo Slum,” Forced Migration Review, January 2003, available at . I was in the park for 91 days. I went there because, 1) I went to get resettled to a secure country. There is no security here. The Sudanese and Egyptian governments have a relationship. I could be deported at any time. 2) I had no where to live at that time. 3) The UN doesn’t give money, shelter, education. 4) The protesters were demanding the same things as me. FMRS interview with demonstrator, 2 February 2006 15 THREE MONTHS OF PROTEST The sitin began on September 29, 2005, with several dozen participants. Refugee Voices, a group of Sudanese in Cairo who had been gathering information about refugee rights and international refugee law since January 2005, organized the protest. 25 According to Refugee Voices, the purpose of the demonstration was to draw the “attention of the international community to find solutions to [their] problems.” 26 Mustafa Mahmoud Park was an obvious choice for the sitin: it is close to the offices of UNHCR and large enough to accommodate many people, it allowed for the demonstrators to access water and bathrooms at the adjacent mosque, and, being next to a busy intersection, it provided public visibility. The start date roughly coincided with the beginning of Ramadan and the end of seasonal employment for some demonstrators. In only a few days, the park’s population grew into the hundreds. Within the first month, between 800 and 2,000 people were living in the park full time. An average of 1,500 to 2,000 were present for the duration of the sitin. Many would leave during the day for work and return to sleep in the park at night. 27 The demonstrators moved onto the surrounding sidewalks when the park became full, and some estimates show that there were 3,000 to 4,000 people at the park by the end of December. 28 Evidence suggests that initial mobilization was spontaneous, and that the majority of those who joined the protest heard about it through word of mouth. The demonstrators were a mix of men, women, children, and the elderly, though about half were single men between 20 and 35 years old. The numbers of Christians and Muslims were roughly equal. At least 16 tribes from all parts of Sudan were represented, and the three largest ethnic groups—Dinka, Nuba, and Nuer—comprised only 30 percent of the total. 29 25 UNHCR reports that the sitin began with 20 demonstrators (see “Sudanese Demonstrations in Cairo,” UNHCR Cairo, 30 October 2005, on file with FMRS). Protest representatives report that it began with 70; see statement by members of Refugees Voice in Egypt, “Appeal for Group Protection and Humanitarian Assistance to the Members of ‘Refugees Voice in Egypt,’” 23 February 2006, on file with FMRS. The organizers referred to themselves in written publications in English alternately as Refugees Voice in Egypt, Refugee Voice in Egypt, Refugee’s Voice, and The Voice of Sudanese Refugees in Cairo. 26 See statement by members of Refugees Voice in Egypt, op. cit. 27 One demonstrator said, “Most of us stayed in the park all the time. Very few left and came back.” FMRS interview, 14 January 2006. 28 Estimates include: 20 on 29 September, 300 on 3 October, and 1,500 during peak hours on 9 October in “Sudanese Demonstrations in Cairo,” UNHCR Cairo, op. cit.; 3,000 in Abeer Allam and Michael Slackman, “23 Sudanese Die in Raid in Egypt,” New York Times, 31 December 2005, p. A.1; and 4,000 in Ranyah Sabry, “Harsh Life in Egypt Protest Camp,” BBC News, 30 December 2005. One demonstrator stated that some Sudanese from outlying areas, including Nasser City, Arba wa Nus, and Heliopolis, were prevented from coming to the demonstration by Egyptian police. FMRS interview, 17 October 2005. 29 See Schafer, op. cit. Egypt Today reported that “a visit to the square reveals that refugees hail from all parts of Sudan….Some are from southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains, others from Darfur and eastern Sudan.” Viviana Mazza, “Enemy Camps?”, Egypt Today, December 2005. 16 Media and Civil Society Response The demonstration quickly received attention from the public and the media. Because Mustafa Mahmoud Park is bordered on all sides by streets, one of which is a primary commuter thoroughfare, as well as by small businesses, restaurants, and residential buildings, the park’s fence was used to display banners with slogans in Arabic and English, such as “We are the victims of mismanagement,” “We reject local integration,” “Where is the international media?” and “Attention please: Who will restore our rights?” They included tributes to Sudanese killed or missing in Egypt. Some of the park’s neighbors complained about the demonstration, 30 while others gave the protesters words of support and donations of food, blankets, and clothing. One neighbor said: I was not bothered by [the demonstrators]. Most of the people in the area were complaining saying that they should go back to their homes or even their country because we as Egyptians have lots of problems. Some people also complained that they were drinking alcoholic drinks; this is true but not all of them so I don’t see it as the general behavior of the park….Since they came to the park, the park was freed from those youth who were hanging around at night till early hours in the morning running around with cars and loud music; honestly, I was bothered by such behavior, not by the peaceful protest by the Sudanese. 31 In the first two weeks, Egyptian authorities blocked some news agencies, journalists, photographers, and human rights advocates from accessing the demonstrators, 32 but as the protest wore on, they usually allowed visitors to enter the park at will. Visitors were asked for identification by the sitin’s internal security, often identifiable by red badges and vests, and were usually introduced to a media spokesman. 30 See Jamal Al Keshkie, “Radical Refugees,” AlAhram Weekly Online, 1723 November 2005, available at . 31 FMRS interview, 8 January 2006. 32 One report said, “News agencies have not been given access to the participants. Journalists reported being turned away and having their film confiscated. In addition, attorneys for the AMERA Center, an organization of Egyptian human rights lawyers, attempted to reach the refugees but were kept away by Egyptian authorities.” See “Darfur Refugees Protest UN Policies in Cairo, Egypt,” Damanga Coalition for Freedom and Democracy, 13 October 2005, p. 1, available at < http://www.damanga.org/refugee_protest.html>. I don’t believe this thing will happen again, because all the people stayed like one person, if you are from South, West, East, if you are Muslim or Christian, no difference because you can meet five Christians and two Muslims and they stay together and cook together. FMRS interview with demonstrator, 13 January 2006 17 Both Englishand Arabiclanguage Egyptian media covered the demonstration from its start. Statements by journalists and demonstrators attest to a certain amount of distrust between those in the park and the Egyptian media. 33 Most print stories included the views of both demonstrators and UNHCR representatives, and several publications wrote features that presented multiple perspectives, including those of UNHCR representatives, protesters, university professors, Egyptian security personnel, and the park’s neighbors. The demonstration was also covered in several African refugee and Sudanrelated publications, as well as at least nine online Web logs. 34 No major international newspapers picked up the story until the week before the forced removal. Cairo NGOs and churches continued to provide services to Sudanese asylum seekers and refugees. Some met with UNHCR to discuss how to resolve the demonstration, and many were present at an October 26 meeting between demonstration and UNHCR representatives. 35 On October 26, FMRS hosted a standingroom– only seminar about the demonstration. 36 33 One report stated, “It seems like that most of the people there don’t want to give or show us a lot of information, especially to Egyptian journalists and press, because they think it’s not their business and they don’t care about their problem. On the other hand, they are so helpful and grateful with the foreign and international press and channels.” Mehana Nour and Mohammed Rabie, “They Transformed Mustafa Mahmoud Garden into a Refugee Camp,” October Magazine, 29 October 2005, p. 79, translated by Omar Idriss. 34 For sample blog entries, see “Rebelman,” So Much Things, 9 October 2005, < http://somuchthings.blogspot.com/2005/10/blogpost. html>; Sarah Sevcik, “Massive Sudanese Demonstration/Protest!”, A year in Cairo Egypt, 27 October 2005, < http://smsevcik.blogspot.com/2005/10/massivesudanesedemonstrationprotest. html>; “Refugee tragedy Unfolds Amid Eid Celebrations,” Darfur Daily News, 4 November 2005, < http://darfurdaily.blogspot.com/2005/11/refugeetragedyunfoldsamideid. html>; “Madmonk,” “Sudanese Refugees Protest in Cairo,” 11 November 2005, N01>; “Scott,” “The Sudanese Regional Government…,” 12 November 2005, < http://scottymac.blogspot.com/2005/11/sudaneseregionalgovernmentcommander. html>; “Sudanese refugees in Cairo Start Hunger Strike…,” Blogging Web, 15 November 2005, 2005/11/sudaneserefugeesincairostart. html>; Youssef M. Assad, “Photos of the Sudanese Protests in Cairo,” Youssef, or Perhaps Not, 27 November 2005, < http://youssefassad.blogspot.com/2005/11/photosofsudaneseprotestsincairo. html>; and “Sudanese Refugees,” Brian’s Study Breaks, 28 November 2005, < http://bjulrich.blogspot.com/2005_11_01_bjulrich_archive.html>. 35 Refugee Egypt, Catholic Relief Services, the Association for Human Rights Legal Aid, Heliopolis Community Church, and Musa’adeen were present at the meeting. See “Meeting with demonstrators and NGOs; Date: Thursday 26 October,” on file with FMRS. 36 Demonstration representatives were invited to present their demands and express their points of view, with discussion from the audience. UNHCR had been invited to do a separate presentation on its perspective on the sitin, but declined the invitation. On the fourth day, as we became more and we were almost 800, so we realized that we had to be organized. So there were committees, one for the press, one who collected money and gave donations, and there was one for security. The members in this committee searched anybody who came into the camp. They did not want anyone to enter with alcohol. When some came drunk to the camp, the security committee held them for some hours, until they became sober. FMRS interview with demonstrator, 14 January 2006 18 Requests, Demands, and Responses Participants distributed a list of requests early in the demonstration. The list was handed out at the park to visitors and the media, sent around on email lists, and distributed and explained at meetings with UNHCR and NGOs. Several versions of the list, with different titles, authors, emphases, and demands, eventually circulated. An early list, given to a visitor to the park on October 10, was entitled “Requests” and contained a list of 13 points in English. Another early, slightly different version of the list, with 20 points written in Arabic, was given to the Damanga Coalition for Freedom and Democracy; this list was translated and published by Damanga on October 13. A third list was distributed at the FMRS seminar on October 26. It was entitled “Statement” and contained a list of 12 points, written in better English than the first and with each point explained more fully. A UNHCR statement on October 30 under the heading “What are the demands of the Sudanese demonstrators?” contained a list of 19 points, rewritten, reordered, and rephrased again. The specific names of the authors and editors of each list are unknown. At the FMRS seminar, demonstration representatives on the panel used their time to go through the list and explain each point in detail. Common to all versions of the list were calls for the resumption of the individual refugee status determination interviews suspended in 2004, a clearer and more transparent RSD process, the opening of closed files by UNHCR, protection from the Sudanese government, extra protection for the vulnerable, registration of asylum seekers upon arrival, and investigations of arbitrary detentions and missing persons cases. The lists also called attention to the problem of pressuring refugees to return to Sudan—what they called “compulsory voluntary repatriation.” The lists also described the difficulties of local integration due to discrimination and lack of basic rights, the geographical and ethnic distinctions made in RSD interviews, and negative reactions to the Four Freedoms Agreement, which the demonstrators worried would adversely affect their protected status. The lists ended with a demand for a “radical solution” to the problems facing Sudanese refugees in Egypt, and for resettlement if another viable solution is not found. An explanation of each of the points on the lists can be found in Appendix A. On October 3, five protest representatives began a series of meetings with UNHCR protection officers and others to discuss a solution. UNHCR also held a meeting with several NGOs on the same topic. At around this same time, UNHCR temporarily closed its offices, citing security considerations. On October 26, three UNHCR representatives, five demonstration representatives, and parties from five Cairo NGOs and churches held a second meeting. Little progress was made in these early discussions. UNHCR’s early public reactions had a clearly adversarial tone toward the protestors. For example, the first known list distributed by the protestors, titled “Requests,” stated, “The Sudanese refugees object the UNHCR programme of compulsory voluntary repartition.” The list distributed at the FMRS seminar, entitled “Statements,” explained, “We, the Sudanese refugees in Cairo, fear that UNHCR or the Egyptian government will impose compulsory involuntary repatriation to the South because we read in UNHCR’s newsletters about repatriation how things have improved there. We have contrary information and are afraid to return.” On October 30, UNHCR released a statement that outlined the agency’s views of the 19 demonstrators’ requests. The press release called the demonstrators’ requests “demands” and stated simply that “Sudanese refugees reject any notion of voluntary repatriation.” The demands mentioned by UNHCR also contained several surprising points that had not appeared before, including “UNHCR should stop holding meetings with Sudanese community leaders and communitybased organizations to discuss about voluntary repatriation or local integration” and “There should be no police officers guarding UNHCR premises.” These points may have been based on discussions between UNHCR and demonstration representatives on October 3 and 26, but they were not published in any demonstrator statement before or after the sitin. The tone of UNHCR’s October 30 press release was surprisingly combative. It addressed the “demands of the Sudanese demonstrators” alternately as “priority areas of concern to UNHCR,” “selfserving,” and “allegations unsupported by any piece of evidence.” In the same document, UNHCR attempted to distance itself from the demonstrators by stating as “clear fact” that the protesters were primarily economic migrants who fell outside the agency’s mandate and that they were almost all from southern Sudan, undermining their claim to refugee status and protection: Firstly, the vast majority of the Sudanese demonstrators are southern Sudanese….Secondly, a great many of them are unsuccessful asylumseekers (the socalled “closed files”) who are not of concern to UNHCR and new arrivals who have registered themselves as refugee applicants with the hope of immigration to America or Australia….The situation of the demonstrating Sudanese nationals, many of whom are not refugees as defined by the 1951 Convention or the 1969 OAU Convention, demands national legislation and/or policy measures outside the frame of refugee protection and indeed of UNHCR’s mandate….Objective factors in south Sudan indicate that these people are generally not fleeing persecution or even generalized violence, but economic deprivation….It is this often deliberate blurring of the distinction between refugees fleeing persecution and migrants in search of economic opportunities that for the most part characterizes the Sudanese “protest” against UNHCR office in Cairo….In addition, the signing of the peace agreement in southern Sudan increased nexus requirements for status recognition and created new opportunities for protection in Sudan, so that UNHCR’s responsibility to refugees from that area changed. 37 The italicized segments above are a series of subjective and judgmental determinations by UNHCR that display a negative if not hostile attitude toward the protestors. It is important to note that UNHCR’s insistence that the protestors were not really refugees was echoed in much of the media. 38 37 Emphasis added. See “Sudanese Demonstrations in Cairo,” UNHCR Cairo, op. cit. 38 For example, “These people see themselves as refugees, fleeing a country that offered little hope for a better life, and yet the law does not consider them refugees,” in Allam and Slackman, New York Times, op. cit. 20 The facts eventually spoke otherwise. As noted earlier in this report, the demonstrators were from all parts of Sudan, including Darfur, the East, and the North. More importantly, a December 16 study of the park population showed that 43 percent had yellow asylum seeker cards and 24 percent had blue recognized refugee cards, which made a total of 67 percent of the protesters of immediate concern to UNHCR. Of the remainder, 13 percent were closed files cases and only 15 percent had neither a card nor a closed file. 39 These estimates were later confirmed by the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which showed that of the 2,174 people removed from the park at the end of December, around 70 percent were almost immediately released as registered asylum seekers or refugees. UNHCR staff advocated for and obtained the release of those from Darfur and of the vulnerable women and children population. Only 169 individuals were left who may have been considered “of no concern to UNHCR,” and even they were eventually released. 40 The October 30 UNHCR press release pointed out that the demonstration was illegal and would have to end, praising the Egyptian government’s restraint in dealing with the protesters. The document concluded with the suggestion that obstinacy on the part of the “selfappointed organizers” was the root of the failure to reach a compromise and that “this is regrettable, and many innocent men, women and children who joined the demonstration, misled by rumors, are paying the price.” On the same day, UNHCR released another document titled “Rumours, Myths and Speculations Behind the Sudanese Demonstrations.” This statement charged that “persons have been spreading false and misleading information in order to induce many into joining the sitin.” 41 Since knowledge of the protest was primarily spread through word of mouth, it is difficult to confirm the validity of this charge. Demonstrator testimonies reveal that a large majority of the participants held strong convictions about why they were demonstrating and that few, if any, needed to be induced to move out of their flats and into the park. In fact, several demonstrators said that they learned about and joined the protest after discovering it during independent visits to UNHCR’s offices. 39 See Schafer, op. cit. The study included a survey of 150 demonstrators and 15 group interviews. Shafer witnessed an Egyptian television news crew ask everyone at the demonstration to hold up their blue or yellow cards, if they had them, and found that “an overwhelming majority of the refugees immediately produced UNHCR cards, with yellow cards dominating.” Schafer photographed the event; photos are on file with FMRS. 40 See “The Aftermath” in this report, which provides more detail on these efforts. 41 UNHCR, “Rumours, Myths and Speculations Behind the Sudanese Demonstrations,” 30 October 2005, on file with FMRS. I went to UNHCR office weekly to inquire with them about my status, and three days of the start of the demonstration, I went to the office and saw all the people there in the park. I asked what everyone was doing there and they said they all have a lot of problems, and so I went there and joined the protest. I was upset with UNHCR and decided to stay. I stayed until it was broken up. I was disappointed in the office, because I had gone repeatedly for the year, putting in inquiries into my situation, and they never helped me. FMRS interview with demonstrator, 29 January 2006 21 The Response of Egyptian, Sudanese, and Resettlement Country Governments The Egyptian government’s role during the demonstration’s first month was primarily protective. Police maintained a constant presence around the park, with some officers in plain clothes and most in uniform. They had a peaceful relationship with the demonstrators. As one demonstrator said, The relationship with the police was very good; we respected them and they respected us and they were guarding us. That’s why we brought our bags and clothes and money to the park; we knew the police were around the park and it was a safe place. If they found children wandering outside they would direct them back in the park, with no problem. 42 Many expected that the park would be cleared in time for Eid AlAdha celebrations at the beginning of November, but it was not. Instead, the police continued to play what seemed a protective role throughout the threemonth period. One article quoted a brigadier, Mohamed Ibrahim, as saying, “Security is there to protect them there around the garden twentyfour hours a day.” The article went on to claim that the security staff’s orders to treat the protesters well came directly from Interior Minister Habib AlAdly. 43 In a speech in the park in late December, one protestor said, “We thank the Egyptian government…since we came here in this park, we find there is police around us protecting our lives. I am quite sure—250 percent—if not this Egyptian government protecting us, we shouldn’t stay here in this park for three months. I give many, many, many thanks to the Egyptian government.” 44 Unfortunately, this protection and its appreciation were not to last beyond December 29. According to a UNHCR representative, the Egyptian government’s patience with the protest was not due to prompting from UNHCR. 45 Egyptian government representatives charge that they faced continual pressure and even threats from UNHCR to end the protest, although UNHCR has denied these allegations. In a statement made several days after the forced eviction of the demonstrators, Egypt’s Foreign Ministry said that “throughout the three months…the Egyptian authorities faced continued pressure from the regional office of the UNHCR [which] demanded in writing [three times] and verbally the need for the authorities to intervene and end the protest and held [Egypt] responsible for any possible harm on its staff and offices.” 46 42 FMRS interview, 29 January 2006. 43 October Magazine, 29 October 2005, op. cit., p. 79. 44 Speech given 21 December 2005. Transcript on file with FMRS. 45 The UNHCR representative said the police “have shown remarkable restraint and should be commended. They have had no prompting from UNHCR.” See Alex Gomez, Themba Lewis, Martin Rowe, Assad Khalid Salih, Leslie Sander, Stacy Schafer, and Helen Smith, “UNHCR Responds to the Cairo Refugee Sitin: An Official Response,” Pambazuka News, 27 October 2005. 46 “Egypt Deflects Blame for Deadly Sudanese Protest Breakup,” Agence France Presse, 4 January 2006, available at . This charge was repeated in an FMRS interview with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (see Hamzawy, op. cit.), but has been denied as “nonsense” by UNHCR (see Dessalegne, op. cit.). 22 It remains unclear, and subject to much speculation, why the government of Egypt was uncharacteristically lenient toward the protesters for such a long period. Some believe this patience should be seen in the context of the government’s historical disagreements with UNHCR over who ought to be responsible for refugees, and even that Egypt may have allowed the protest to last so long in order to pressure UNHCR to deal with the mounting problems of Sudanese asylum seekers. In an article in AlNaba newspaper, a UNHCR representative was quoted as saying that “Egypt since President Gamal Abd El Nasser has refused to handle the responsibility of refugees in their land, placing the responsibility on UNHCR. With the large number of problems for refugees inside Egypt and the small amount of funding UNHCR receives, discussions with the Egyptian government about who will be responsible for the refugees will occur. In the next two years, the government will take responsibility for those refugees.” 47 Statements by the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also emphasize that the government was particularly conscious of Egypt’s special relationship with Sudan in its handling of the demonstration. 48 The Sudanese government, meanwhile, took an interest in the sitin in its early months, a matter of grave concern for many asylum seekers and refugees, who were worried that the government might target them for having fled Sudan. Demonstrators reported that representatives of the Sudanese government often circled the park at night in embassy vehicles. In the early hours of the morning on October 15, a few Sudanese men in a jeep with diplomatic license plates arrived and allegedly infiltrated the camp, distributed alcohol, and attempted to start a fight. The intruders were stopped by demonstrators and handed over to Egyptian police. The rear license plate was removed from the intruders’ vehicle to keep as evidence and was photographed. Later, the same vehicle was photographed on a street adjacent to the Sudanese embassy, with its rear license plate missing and a replacement paper license in the window. Sudanese officials indicated that the men using the vehicle that night were friends of embassy employees but that they were not affiliated with the Sudanese government in any official capacity. 49 47 Ahmed Baraka, “The Secrets of the Sudanese Demonstration in Front of Mustafa Mahmoud Mosque and Their Demands to Create Camps for Them in Egypt,” AlNaba, date unknown, translated by Omar Idriss. Statement made by an Assistant Protection Officer at UNHCR. 48 For example, “The evacuation could have been done easy and without any loss if we had intervened from the beginning, but we did not want to interfere because of the sensitive relationship between Egypt and Sudan.” Hamzawy, op. cit. 49 “For the Seventh Week: The Sudanese Refugees Keep Going in Front of UNHCR Office,” AlWafd, 14 November 2005. The photos are on file with FMRS. It’s a conspiracy between the Sudanese government and the Egyptian government since they both want us sent to Sudan. The Egyptian government wants refugees out of their country and the Sudanese government doesn’t want to look bad by the people who fled their regime. FMRS interview with demonstrator, 12 January 2006 23 Representatives of resettlement countries chose not to get involved in the protest and supported UNHCR’s negotiation efforts. When asked about the protest in October, representatives from the Australian and the United States governments, which are among the handful of large donors to UNHCR and hosts to resettled refugees, affirmed their support for UNHCR’s efforts and gave no indication of any change of policy regarding resettlement programs. 50 Daily Life During the Sitin Although uncomfortable, the park became a refuge for the protesters and many noted that they felt safe there. Their voices were being heard and recognized on a global scale; UNHCR was in dialogue with them about their futures; they did not have to pay rent and thus worry so much about money; and, more than anything, they were together, surrounded by security, in the public eye, and enjoying a strong sense of community and solidarity. Many moved all their belongings and family out of their previous dwellings and into the park. As the demonstration gained participants and longevity, more comfortable arrangements and structures were created in the park. The ground was covered with a layer of mats and blankets. Luggage and other items formed partitions with narrow walkways between living spaces. Separate sections were built for men and for women and children. Media reports describe how, at first, sheets were hung as shelter from the sun. As the weather turned colder, the sheets were replaced with tarps. Meals were prepared in a communal kitchen area on gas stoves, with food bought with money pooled from those in the park and shared. Clothes, food, and blankets were donated by community members, neighborhood residents, and Egyptian and international organizations. 51 Makeshift shops inside the park offered snacks. In addition to the mosque’s toilets, some people used the nearby houses of friends. Still, living conditions were difficult. Demonstrators reported having too little food: “We only had one sandwich to eat everyday, and milk was given only to the children and the elderly.” 50 United States Regional Refugee Coordinator for North Africa and the Middle East Gerard Cheyne said, “We will work with UNHCR in Cairo and elsewhere in the region to encourage the Sudanese to return to Sudan. At the same time we will continue to consider for resettlement any Sudanese for whom repatriation is not possible and for whom resettlement is believed to be the best durable solution—as determined by the UNHCR.” The Principal Migration Officer for the Australian Embassy in Cairo, Ross Wilkie, stated that “any decision by UNHCR is one for them to comment on. Our large refugee resettlement program in Africa, which includes significant numbers of Sudanese from Cairo…is continuing.” Pambazuka News, 27 October 2005, op. cit. 51 For a report on donations, see AlAhram Weekly Online, 1723 November 2005, op. cit. I felt very safe and very relaxed in the park, except for the final day when it was broken up. We received no alarm or warnings. FMRS interview with demonstrator, 28 January 2006 24 Showing the level of distrust in the community, protesters accepted food contributions from some Egyptians, but several said, “We were afraid that it may have been poisonous.” 52 The park had a makeshift hospital with equipment for administering intravenous medication and a small supply of oral medications. A Sudanese refugee doctor regularly visited the park. 53 An Egyptian NGO reported that four babies were born in the park during the protest’s three months. There were seven confirmed deaths prior to the forced eviction, including a toddler, twin infants, and an adolescent female, although the number is disputed. One protester reported as many as 11 deaths. 54 Many visitors and members of the media remarked on the orderliness of the sitin, despite the presence of a large number of people in a small space: They maintained a level of cleanliness in proportion with their numbers— 3,000 persons in a park without a lot of services. I saw them more than once collecting their garbage and putting it away. It is not their problem that it was never collected by the garbage collector. I think they were organized and they had a great sense of community. Every one of them was responsible for a particular job, and there were always group meetings. They were also proactive—they prepared for the rain before the rain started. 55 Demonstrators themselves highlighted the respectfulness and organization of the sitin. Protesters organized English, Arabic, and art lessons for children. On one occasion, demonstrators made puppets from disposable items and performed a puppet show for the children in the park. Daily speeches were given in which speakers reminded those present to “respect this place, it is your community,” to “respect the police,” and to ignore the insults of passersby, stay in the park, “stay orderly, and avoid violence and rowdy behavior.” Demonstrators entering the park were checked, and alcohol and potential weapons were confiscated. Inside, the park was very organized. It became an independent life….The people tried to reflect civilized behavior, especially because we were portrayed in the Egyptian media as being uncivilized, drinking, etc. We had a time to sleep, a time to wake up. We wanted to deal well with the media coming, with the police outside the park. Even the guards inside the park searched anyone coming into the park to make sure that they didn’t have any alcohol with them, and if they did, they would be handed to Egyptian security….The internal environment was very respectful, and everyone respected the other, Muslim or Christian, living together in peace. FMRS interview with demonstrator, 29 January 2006 52 FMRS interview, 3 January 2006. 53 Shafer, op. cit. 54 See AlAhram Weekly Online, 1723 November 2005, op. cit.; email from protest leader to Nora Danielson, 17 May 2006; transcript of speech, 21 December 2005, op. cit. 55 FMRS interview, 8 January 2006. 25 Some accused the demonstration’s internal discipline of going too far. A number of firsthand accounts describe how those who came to the park drunk or who misbehaved were punished. A tree in the middle of the park apparently served as a makeshift prison, where individuals were sometimes tied up, covered by blankets, and doused with water if they cried for help. 56 Even visitors, including suspected security personnel from the Sudanese embassy, were on occasion “disciplined” in such a manner. Personality and political conflicts seemed to mesh, and one interviewee accused the security detail in the park of making up its own law and of stealing mobile phones and money. He said he tried to report the perpetrators but that the police did nothing. 57 Several demonstrators vehemently denied these allegations. Ongoing Negotiations with UNHCR Soon after the demonstration began, participants held elections to choose representatives for public relations work and to negotiate with UNHCR. Committees were created to oversee donations and security. With few exceptions, the Sudanese interviewed by FMRS, especially those who participated in the sitin, spoke at length and with pride of the level of organization and decisionmaking within the park. The dynamics of leadership changed as the park’s population grew. From the outset of the demonstration until the fateful December 17 agreement, five male organizers maintained a visible public presence. These five leaders, although initially referred to as “selfappointed” in UNHCR documents, 58 were nonetheless viewed by UNHCR, possibly for lack of alternatives or out of convenience, as representing the demonstration as a whole. They were present at multiple meetings and were authorized to negotiate on behalf of the protestors. The five were routinely interviewed by local and international media, met and hosted visitors to the park, and were the main negotiators in meetings with UNHCR and others. In addition, these leaders were responsible for supervising the high level of internal organization in the park. In the beginning of December, the five began backing away from the term “leaders” and began referring to the demonstration as a spontaneous and selforganized event. 59 Media attention also shifted away from individuals who previously had prominent media and public relations roles. 56 Leigh Sylvan, “Revised News Article,” unpublished, January 2006, on file with FMRS. 57 FMRS interview, 3 January 2006. 58 See UNHCR documents, “Rumours, Myths and Speculations Behind the Sudanese Demonstrations” and “Sudanese Demonstrations in Cairo,” op. cit. 59 FMRS interview, 13 January 2006. We wrote our requests on a list and gave the leaders the list and said please talk to the office about them. The leaders were chosen through election….The first five leaders, they were very strict and frank and we trusted in them. If they said, “Go to the moon,” we’d go to the moon, because they were trying to give us our rights. FMRS interview with demonstrator, 28 January 2006 26 On November 17, demonstration representatives met with UNHCR representatives, Goodwill Ambassador Adel Imam, senior Egyptian government officials, and several Sudanese community leaders. The meeting resulted in an offer of onetime housing assistance for demonstrators who had lost their homes while at the sitin, as well as help with the costs of elementary education and assisted return to southern Sudan for those refugees and asylum seekers who chose to repatriate. During the meeting, the demonstrators were told that residency permit fees had been lifted and that the Four Freedoms Agreement would not be applicable to Sudanese asylum seekers. Finally, UNHCR said it would investigate detentions and missing persons if names were provided. After the meeting, UNHCR issued a press release that announced the involvement of Goodwill Ambassador Adel Imam and of the government of Egypt in working to resolve the Sudanese sitin. The release is the first official document to recognize direct cooperation between the Egyptian government and UNHCR in relation to the demonstration, and it is the only public statement by UNHCR that addressed the demonstrators directly, with the term “you.” Demonstration representatives, in turn, released a statement entitled “In Response to UNHCR’s Statement Dated 17 November 2005,” which acknowledged that since “most of the demands do not fall within the mandate of UNHCR, it is therefore logical to omit some of the 20 demands despite their legitimacy and importance so that we can reach a point of understanding and a meeting point through which UNHCR can respond to the demands of the Sudanese refugees based on the rules and regulations of asylum.” This statement demonstrates that the protesters understood the nonapplicability of the Four Freedoms Agreement to Sudanese asylum seekers and refugees, accepted the offers of assistance, and acknowledged that UNHCR was not compelling them to repatriate. The statement reiterated the view that assistance should not be used as indirect pressure to convince refugees to repatriate. It also repeated demands for an honest and transparent RSD process with individual interviews as well as for the opening of closed files. These specific points remained obstacles to fruitful negotiation. 60 On November 24, a “highlevel delegation from UNHCR headquarters in Geneva,” held a meeting with “the five leaders of the demonstration,” Adel Imam, Sudanese community leaders, and Egyptian government representatives. Showing an increasingly conciliatory attitude, UNHCR addressed the demonstrators directly in the park, apparently in an effort to reach the demonstrators through channels other than their leaders. Radhouane Nouicer, Deputy Director of UNHCR’s Genevabased Bureau for Central Asia, Southwest Asia, Northern Africa, and the Middle East, declared to the crowd: We can talk about assistance for the most vulnerable or the reopening of files if there are new and valid arguments, something UNHCR always does. Some other demands, however, are based on false information— 60 Voice of Sudanese Refugees public statement, “In Response to UNHCR’s Statement Dated 17 November 2005,” November 2005, on file with FMRS. 27 such as forced repatriation, which does not occur—or not realistically feasible, such as massive resettlement to third countries. 61 A UNHCR press release that followed expressed “extreme concern” on the part of the agency and the Egyptian government about the “deteriorating humanitarian situation” in the park. 62 On November 27, a meeting was held between the organizers of the demonstration and UNHCR in the presence of Farouk Abu Issa, the former Sudanese Minister for Education, former SecretaryGeneral of the Arab Lawyers’ Union, and current spokesperson for the National Democratic Alliance. On November 29, UNHCR released a public statement entitled “Sudanese Demonstration at UNHCR Cairo,” which described the progress of negotiations. According to the statement, “Although the meeting reached a positive conclusion, it now seems that the leaders of the demonstration have once again changed their mind about ending the sitin unless all their original demands are met immediately.” 63 The December 17 Agreement On December 17, UNHCR announced that an agreement had been signed by the five leaders of the demonstration, which set forth the responsibilities of UNHCR and the demonstrators in ending the sitin amicably (see Appendix B). The agreement would apply only to demonstrators whose names were included in a definitive list submitted to UNHCR by the protest leaders. While much of the agreement offered little new, it did contain several significant offers. 64 For the first time, UNHCR offered a conditional opportunity for the opening of closed files through a written request submitted by the individual seeking review. Additionally, any person on the list from Darfur with a closed file could approach UNHCR to obtain a yellow card. Under the agreement, all yellow cardholders could have their files reviewed for valid status claims. After an initial interview, if individuals insisted on RSD, it would be undertaken. The offer, however, included an implied threat that, if rejected, individuals would automatically become of no concern to UNHCR and would “no longer be eligible for ongoing assistance.” While appointments for RSD interviews would be provided by the agreement, there was no mention of when or under what circumstances the interviews would take place. The agreement authorized eligibility for those on the sitin list for oneoff 61 As quoted in “UNHCR and Adel Imam Address Sudanese in the Park and Appeal for the End of the Sitin,” UNHCR Media Relations and Public Information Service, Geneva, 24 November 2005, on file with FMRS. 62 See “Sudanese Demonstration at UNHCR Cairo,” UNHCR Cairo, 29 November 2005, on file with FMRS. 63 Ibid. 64 See UNHCR, “Cairo, 17 December 2005,” 17 December 2005, on file with FMRS. They brought the agreement to us and told us that this is our limit after three months; this is all we can get from UNHCR office, the office can’t offer more than this from us. We, the refugees, replied, “Okay, but let them write us a guarantee, a document, promising that this will happen,” but the leaders said, “This is the UN, they won’t give a written guarantee to refugees, we are just refugees.” FMRS interview with demonstrator, 28 January 2006 28 financial assistance for housing. It also provided for monthly meetings between UNHCR Cairo senior management and the demonstration leaders. The other major focus of the December 17 agreement was on how to clear the park logistically. The document outlined that park residents could approach UNHCR for processing in groups of 20 at a time, with priority given to those in need of special assistance and those who came directly from Darfur to Egypt. The demonstrators would be interviewed, their situation decided, and then they would be sent home or to new accommodations with offers of assistance. They were not to return to the park. The entire process was given four days to be completed. The agreement precluded a mechanism for feedback to those remaining in the park, a problem that would prove to be its undoing. Mixed Reactions among Protesters On the morning of December 19, UNHCR representatives went to the park to explain the agreement. Although demonstration representatives had signed the agreement, protesters were not in agreement and did not reach a consensus about whether to accept or reject the solution. Confusion and uncertainty reigned, and a few protesters publicly stated their intention to remain until UNHCR finished all interviews. Evidently, the protesters were afraid that by not getting feedback on the initial interviews and by being dispersed, they would lose the momentum and collective strength they had gained over the previous months. Again and again, protesters interviewed for this report emphasized that they had wanted guarantees in writing or from embassy officials. UNCHR tried to reassure them that public and international media attention to the agreement was sufficient guarantee of UNHCR’s intentions to honor it. However, no evidence was found to suggest that UNHCR had requested the presence of embassy representatives in the park in order to lend credence to the agreement. 65 A UNHCR representative acknowledged this concern in a December 19 address to the demonstrators, saying, “I know this is the reason why you will not leave the park, because of the guarantees.” Agency representatives noted the empowerment experienced by the demonstrators and understood that this perceived power was connected directly to the protesters’ presence in the park. Most demonstrators seem to have consented to the agreement but wanted to stay in the park until all cases were processed. On December 19, one protester declared to the large crowd and in front of UNHCR personnel: “The refugees, they did not refuse a solution. All of us, we did agree to basically all the demands [but] we agree to remain here until all the process is 65 One representative said, “This is the first time we hear of this request.” See FMRS interview with Eric Audet, 23 March 2006, on file with FMRS. After the agreement between the leaders and UNHCR, most of us waited for UNHCR to call us to come for interviews/processing. We were waiting for normal procedures from the office to start, like getting tickets for interviews, or, for people with blue cards, for RSD interviews. However, we doubted that there would be enough time to process everyone, because they had allocated three days only and there were more than 2,000 refugees. FMRS interview with demonstrator, 29 January 2006 29 finished. I’m trying to give you the information….So, we agree that we have to go to the office and meet them.” 66 In response, a UNHCR representative said: I do not want to participate in this political rally. I am only here to clarify some issues for you. Okay, you know the process takes long. To remain here for two, three, four, five, possibly six months will also mean that you will have casualties, not only in terms of physical suffering but also in terms of the legal implications [in the Egyptian system]. And we cannot be held responsible for the casualties or the failure to meet the legal requirements. And the reason I say this is because UNHCR has…done everything that is required of us, but you are not willing to vacate this park. Then it is your responsibility and the international community will view it as such. 67 The discussion continued until the crowd was eventually asked whether it would accept the agreement as is or with the condition of continuing to occupy the park until all cases were processed. Loud cheering confirmed the protesters’ preference for the second option, and the speaker finished his statement by saying, “If each and every individual, refugee, woman, and child, if you want to go there, that you can solve the problem, then they can go. We don’t stop anybody. If each anybody want to go there, let him go. We don’t stop him.” 68 The most visible division in the leadership and among the protesters came as a result of the December 17 agreement. Some suggest that the tragedies that occurred during the forced eviction are the result of an overlong stay in the park and of repeated refusals of solutions proposed by UNHCR. As mentioned above, a UNHCR representative warned of possible casualties and “legal ramifications” in the December 19 speech. A November 17 UNHCR press release maintained that the offer the agency made “represents a final opportunity to resolve the sitin peacefully and quickly.” 69 66 “UNHCR Speech to Sudanese Refugee Demonstrators,” transcribed by FMRS researcher,19 December 2005, on file with FMRS. 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid. 69 UNHCR, “Goodwill Ambassador Adel Imam Works with UNHCR and the Government of Egypt to Resolve the Sudanese Sitin,” 17 November 2005, on file with FMRS. The UN agreed to take a look at yellow cards cases. Eighty percent of the refugees at the sitin approved of this agreement. They were made up of mostly Northerners, Westerners, and Easterners. The remaining 20 percent were made up of South Sudanese who would probably be deported since the war is over in their area. All the refugees of the park remained there for this 20 percent. They felt that it would split up the Sudanese community if not everyone got what they wanted. FMRS interview with demonstrator, 3 January 2006 30 Communication between UNHCR and the demonstrators ceased. On December 22, UNHCR sent an official letter to the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, saying, once again, that it could do no more and paving the way for the forced removal. Despite growing rumors that security forces would break up the protest, demonstrators continued to settle in for winter, reinforcing their makeshift homes with plastic tarp roofs and expanding out onto the pavement surrounding the park. We demanded that representatives from the embassies guarantee us that the resettlement of Sudanese was open as an option. But the UNHCR said that it would be unable to do that. On the 17 of December, after the meeting with the UNHCR, there was a press conference in the park. Sadiq El Mahdi came. In fact, personnel from the Australian, American, and Canadian embassies were also supposed to attend, but they did not show up. We were told by Sadiq that this was due to security problems. Sadiq said that the agreement between the UNHCR and the refugees would be fulfilled. But these are only empty words. If any representative of the embassies would have turned up, I am sure that the demonstrators would have left the park. FMRS interview with demonstrator, date unavailable. 31 FORCED REMOVAL The forced removal of the Sudanese protesters was an emotionally and politically charged event. Although it is difficult to determine a precise chronology, the following timeline is based on accounts by protesters, the Egyptian authorities, journalists, human rights activists, local residents, and other eyewitnesses and bystanders who were present on the night of the forced removal. Afternoon and evening, December 29 · Witnesses notice an increased police presence in the area of the park. · Police tell a number of protesters that the officers are there to protect them from a Muslim Brotherhood demonstration. Many protesters accept this explanation when they see a group of 20 to 40 bearded men dressed in traditional gellabiyas gather outside the Mustapha Mahmoud mosque. The police gave protesters no warning that they would be removed from the park, with force if necessary. Throughout the day, the authorities seemed to be deliberately avoiding telling the protesters their intentions. One protester commented: In the afternoon, many police vehicles began arriving close to the park. We could see how cars from the parking lot in front of the park had been removed. I heard two different answers from the police. One officer said that this was in preparation for a speech by a Sudanese minister about our rights. Another policeman said that Egyptians wanted to demonstrate against our sitin ; therefore, they had to remove the cars fearing that they might be damaged. 70 Around 1:00 a.m. · Approximately 4,000 riot police surround the park. An Egyptian bystander counts “60 state security wagons, 10 armored cars, [and] six ambulances.” 71 · A group of highranking
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|