Can we compare?!! What happened during this decade?!

Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement / Army SPLM/SPLA
Office of the Representative to the United States and Canada
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LAST STEPS IN THE SUDAN PEACE PROCESS

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
September 3, 2003

Steven Wöndu


1.0 Background

The current impasse in the Sudan peace process is consistent with Khartoum’s past malpractice of avoiding decision making. In 1993, they terminated the Abuja talks when everyone thought a breakthrough was at hand. In 1994, they walked out of the nascent IGAD process protesting the Declaration of Principles which they signed three years later. In July this year, they stormed out of the ‘final’ IGAD session protesting the draft peace framework. Whenever a peace process approaches it’s ‘last steps’, Khartoum would shut it down. They would have invented an excuse to frustrate IGAD if the draft framework did not exist.

Khartoum clearly favors processes that drag on forever while they build their military capability in preparation for a decisive victory on the ground. Omer Beshir says this loudly enough for the deaf to hear. Alternatively, the regime intends to pressure the SPLM to an agreement which they can either ignore like their charade Khartoum Agreement of 1997 or one they can scrape at will like the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1983. The regime has proved over and over again, that it has no intention to peacefully end the Sudanese conflict in a manner that truly redresses the injustices they have inflicted on the South.

2.0 The Draft IGAD Framework

In the last seven years or so, the parties to the Sudan conflict have presented themselves, the IGAD mediators and the international community all their views and perceptions on the history of the conflict. We have had all the time and opportunity to identify and agree that the causes of the conflict include:
(a) Jihad-destruction of the African identity in Sudan.
(b) Apartheid - economic neglect and exploitation of the south.
(c) Racism - monopoly of power by one racial/religious group.
(d) Terrorism - destruction of life and property in the South.
That is why the peace agenda crystallized to the issues of power sharing, wealth redistribution, military reorganization, and democracy. The parties have made exhaustive representations on how these things could be done. IGAD and the international community have heard us out. They have noted the areas of convergence. They have isolated the points of disagreement. They have sought the opinions of a wide range of Sudanese personalities and groups not directly participating in the negotiations. The observers have also provided counsel, not only to the mediators but to the parties as well. Technical advice has been ably provided by teams of experts to the mediators as well as the parties. By April everyone felt that all that could be said had been said and that the time had come to wrap things up. Nobody objected to the mediators’ decision to prepare a draft agreement in light of the information and data in their possession. The result was the Framework unveiled in Nakuru in July.
Khartoum’s insistence that the Draft Framework be shredded is completely unacceptable as it amounts to the killing of the IGAD process itself.

3.0 SPLM Position on the Draft Framework

3.1 The Draft Framework represents the best effort of the mediators in codifying the points of agreement and reconciling the differences that remained. The SPLM deplores Omer Beshir’s demand that General Lazarus Sumbeiywo should dissolve the draft in water, drink the ‘porridge’, and go to hell. We cannot be a party to the vitriol, much less the scheme behind it. The document that deserves trashing is the regime’s sixty page disparaging critique of the mediators and the Draft framework.

3.2 The SPLM accepts the Draft Framework as the basis for negotiating the fine details of an agreement. We believe that the hour for making the difficult decisions has come. Both parties may have objections to certain aspects of the Draft Framework. Fortunately, the parties are not being asked to sign on the dotted line. The Draft is a guide for negotiating the last corner on the path to peace.

4.0 SPLM Position on the Issues.

4.1 The Presidency and Cabinet
The ideal arrangement would have been a rotational sharing of the presidency on the Burundi model. The Draft suggests that the regime retains the presidency until elections are conducted while the Vice Presidency goes to the SPLM. It specifies some of the functions of the Vice Presidency. We are ready to discuss this matter and the decisions that must be made will be made at the table. From our perspective, this has nothing to do with the short term accommodation of individuals but a principled imperative to protect the agreement and the rights of the South.
On the cabinet, the SPLM is of the opinion that the tradition of preserving certain portfolios for Northerners and Muslims must end. The regime has not offered any explanation as to why the status quo should be sustained. The regime ran away from Nanyuki and Nakuru because they had not invented a plausible lie to justify limiting the South to an ornamental role in the central government.


4.2 Capital Territory
The need for a legally unique national capital should be obvious to those who would like to lay a new foundation for national unity. All Sudanese political parties, except the regime, are unanimous on this matter. Omer Beshir’s belated admission that his junta shot its way to power to impose an Islamic order on the Sudanese people is not a useful contribution to the peace process. He has vowed to fight to death to retain Khartoum as an exclusive Arab/Muslim city. With that he has made his point emphatically enough. All we now ask of him is to present his preferred alternative arrangement at the IGAD table; not treat everyone to a circus.

4.3 Security Arrangements
The integrity of the SPLA during the interim period is the life or death issue to the SPLM. What can be negotiated is a command coordinating mechanism. Other outstanding matters include redeployment, disengagement, and monitoring. These are the issue on the table, not integration.
Integration or no integration is a post referendum issue. The parties have agreed that the people of the South will decide, through an internationally supervised referendum, whether to remain part of the Sudan or establish an independent state of their own. Premature military integration would amount to a fraudulent perversion of democracy. Integration of forces would preempt and hijack the sovereign mandate of the people of the South.
The role of the government is to redress the grievances of the South during the interim period and demonstrate that unity is in their personal and collective interest. The decision itself is reserved for the people.

4.4 Economic Arrangements
In the short and medium term, the peace agreement has to be translated into tangible improvement in the lives of the people. Much has been said about the urgency of rehabilitation, ‘reconstruction’ and development. Any meaningful programs have to be owned and implemented by the beneficiaries. The peace agreement must therefore include a wealth sharing scheme that empowers the local institutions. Decentralization of government without fiscal devolution centralizes power. Our experience with similar arrangements in the past informs us to make appropriate improvements.

We had expected the regime to readily agree to a significant transfer of financial resources to the South as a gesture of goodwill, a demonstration of remorse, and beginning of healing and reconciliation. The SPLM is not begging for charity. We are demanding equitable allocation of our nation’s wealth.

We welcome international support in the reconstruction and development effort. But this must be supplemental to our own resources. We must not continue stockpiling lethal arsenal while expecting the international community to bankroll our social and development budgets. I think the donor governments owe it to their tax payers to link aid to the use of domestic resources.

The long term economic issue is the question of land ownership. Who owns the lands of Southern Sudan, the people or the government? What rights and responsibilities do different levels of government have in land use? How should a government apply revenue accruing from mineral extraction contracts?
The Machakos Protocol stipulates that the constitution of a future government of the South will be based, where appropriate, on customary values. One such area is property rights. Land is by far the most important property we have. According to our customs, land is communally owned. This is the principle that we must base the negotiations. After all, South Sudan is 100% a traditional rural society. A peace agreement that does not restore the peoples’ rights to their land cannot stand.

5.0 Way Forward

1. The SPLM has taken the decision to reach a negotiated settlement with the regime if that is possible. We have consulted with our constituents everywhere and secured the mandate to conclude such an agreement. It must be a just agreement that is acceptable to our people and can stand the test of time. We cannot agree to terms which our people will not tolerate.

The regime needs help in reaching the decision to negotiate seriously. On its own, Khartoum will take one step forward and ten steps back to catastrophe.


(a) The international community should continue to support for the IGAD process and its leadership. I am encouraged by the remarks of Mr. Alan Goulty, the British envoy, that “there is no alternative to the present peace process for putting and end to the suffering of the Sudanese people”.

(b) The ‘troika’ and other observers should endorse the Nakuru Draft Framework as the basis for negotiating the ‘end game’ to the conflict.

(c) Khartoum flouted United Nations Resolutions 1044, 1054 and 1070 with impunity in the 1990s and got away with it. They should be convinced that this time there would be real ‘serious consequences’ if they continued to frustrate the peace process.

I must end by reminding ourselves that the content of a Sudan peace settlement will have profound long term impact on the politics, economics and the security of the Nile Basin and the Horn of Africa. It is in the interest of all that we get it right from the very beginning.

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