ليس الصادق المهدي ولكنها الحركة الشعبية من انتهكت الحقوق /بقلم محمد حسن العمدة

Quote: أول صحيفة سودانية تصدر عبر الإنترنت من الخرطوم - أسسها خالد عز الدين و محمد علي عبد الحليم -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- رئيس التحرير: طارق الجزولي تلفون: 0912201125 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [email protected] Last Update 01 ديسمبر, 2005 10:19:00 AM -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ردا على الأخ قبريال شول ميرور: ليس الصادق المهدي ولكنها الحركة الشعبية من انتهكت الحقوق محمد حسن العمدة [email protected] الأخ قبريال شول وأخي القاري الكريم لا احب الاطالة في كتابة الانشاء خاصة في مجالات انتهاكات حقوق الانسان السوداني ولكني سادع التقارير الدولية تتحدث عن الانتهاكات فهذه منظمات لا تنتمي لحزب الامة ولا هيئة شئون الانصار ولنحتكم الى المحاكم العدلية الدولية بوثائقنا وليس بخطبنا الرنانة التي لا تغني عن الحق شيئا ولتستعد الحركة الشعبية للمثول امام محكمة العدل الدولية المختصة بجرائم الحرب , وخوفا من هذا المصير الحتمي لم تؤيد الحركة الشعبية القرار خمستاشر ثلاثة وتسعون والخاص باحالة المنتهكين لحقوق الانسان بدارفور للمحكمة الدولية وشريكك كان زينو يا قبريال عقب بل راسك كما يقول المثل هذه بعض من تقارير والبقية تاتي من تقرير لمنظمة العفو الدولية - امنستي انترناشيونال- The SPLA, the SSIA and human rights On 30 July 1995 SPLA soldiers and armed Dinka, Agar and Atuot civilians from the Akot and Aluakluak areas combined to attack Nuer villages and cattle camps around the small centre of Ganyliel in southern Upper Nile. Ganyliel is a relatively densely populated area. Its villages are scattered collections of homesteads, each with its own cattle byre known as a luak, and each surrounded by its own fields. By late July 1995 most of the cattle had been brought back to the cattle byres from more distant camps where they had been pastured during the dry season. The attack is reported to have begun in the early hours of the morning. First the raiders attacked villages northwest of Ganyliel. They then split into three parties and over the hours that followed, both before and after dawn, they looted and burned villages around Dhuolmanyang, Gualaguk and Laidit. Over 200 civilians, the majority of them women and children, were reportedly killed. Thousands of cattle, sheep and goats were driven away. Some standing crops were slashed and destroyed. Many of those killed were indiscriminately shot as they fled. Others were captured and then deliberately killed. An eye-witness to the attack on Bongkhal, which took place shortly after first light, has described seeing three women with their babies being caught by SPLA soldiers. Two of the women were shot dead. One woman and the babies were killed with large knives. A woman who survived the attack on the village of Manyal had one child shot and two others hacked to death. Nearby an elderly women was cut to death. An infant was killed by being thrown in the air and left to hit the ground. Another eye-witness described seeing SPLA soldiers capturing Nuer civilians and then handing them over to Dinka civilians to be speared to death. The attack on Ganyliel was in retaliation for an earlier assault by SSIA soldiers and Nuer civilians on Akot and the nearby Tharagep cattle camp. Akot is an important regional centre for both the SPLA and for relief and development assistance. The villages around it are similar to those around Ganyliel, except that cattle are kept all year round in camps containing thousands of animals. In the raid on Akot and Tharagep, on 22 October 1994, more than 100 civilians are reported to have been killed and as many as 2,000 cattle stolen. Civilians were shot indiscriminately as they tried to escape. Adith Malok, a midwife in Akot medical centre, was shot dead minutes after she had delivered a baby when she ran outside. Others were captured and then beaten and speared to death. A survivor of the attack on Tharagep, Macol Mayang, was beaten about the head with an iron bar. He survived because he fell unconscious. SSIA soldiers and Nuer civilians looted Akot during the attack; after the asault SPLA soldiers and local people looted stores belonging to foreign relief and development organizations. These attacks follow the pattern of fighting between the SPLA and SSIA involving deliberate attacks on civilians detailed in previous Amnesty International reports. In the past, the SPLM/A has remained silent on the issue of responsibility for human rights abuses. Recently, however, there have been indications that some senior members of the SPLM/A have recognized the need to take responsibility for human rights abuses committed by SPLA members. These developments stem from a decision by the First National Convention in April 1994 to strengthen civilian involvement in the organization. In 1995 both the SPLM/A and the SSIM/A signed agreements with UN Operation Lifeline Sudan establishing ground rules for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. These include a commitment to respecting basic principles laid down in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions. While the ground rules are primarily about humanitarian issues, the international treaties to which the SPLM/A and SSIM/A have committed themselves contain important human rights provisions. The ground rules represent a statement by these organizations about the standards to which they aspire (and which are also expected of UN agencies and non-governmental organizations). Amnesty International welcomed the SPLM/As signature of the agreement as an important act in a report entitled Monitoring human rights published in October 1995. ( In January 1995 Amnesty International called on the SPLM/A to make a public commitment to the humanitarian principles enshrined in the Geneva Conventions.) At that time Amnesty International was not aware that SSIM/A had also signed it. Amnesty International pointed out that the SPLM/A was already bound as a minimum to apply Common Article Three of the Geneva Conventions, and went on to say that whether or not these steps are meaningful will be determined by the SPLAs conduct. Since the ground rules were signed the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA), the humanitarian wing of the SPLM/A, and the Relief Association for the Southern Sudan (RASS), the equivalent wing of the SSIM/A, have cooperated with UN Operation Lifeline Sudan in holding a series of meetings to explain the ground rules. In October Amnesty International representatives attended such a meeting in Chukudum, an SPLM/A-controlled village in southern Sudan. It was attended by over 100 civilians and SPLA officers, as well as by representatives of Sudanese and foreign non-governmental organizations working in Chukudum. The SRRA team explored the links between the principles underlying the ground rules and southern Sudanese socio-cultural traditions. However, the human rights implications of the ground rules agreement were not made clear. The agreement therefore currently represents an opportunity to build human rights awareness rather than a decisive intervention for human rights protection. This was underlined to Amnesty International in a meeting in October 1995 with SSIM/A leader Dr Riek Machar Teny Dhurgon. He and his advisers insisted that the agreement did not commit the SSIM/A to respecting international standards for the protection of human rights. In September 1995 the SPLM/A held a large meeting of its officers, part of which was attended by civilians and Sudanese and foreign non-governmental organizations. Public criticism was encouraged. The opinions that were voiced from within the SPLM/A included criticism of human rights abuse by the SPLA. At the meeting the SPLM/A committed itself to setting up a verification committee to investigate alleged violations of childrens rights and the ground rules. Again, this is a welcome development -- but it is not yet clear that it has been put into practice. In October 1995 Amnesty International representatives met Salva Kiir Mayardit, Chief of Staff of the SPLA and Deputy Chairman of the SPLM, and four Regional Governors and senior commanders. The officers were critical of Amnesty Internationals reporting of alleged abuses by the SPLA. They argued that there had been mistakes in the past, but that, since the First National Convention in 1994, the human rights situation had changed. They questioned Amnesty Internationals objectives in repeatedly raising incidents which had taken place several years before, suggesting that the organization was politically motivated. The Amnesty International representatives raised the killings in Ganyliel. Salva Kiir Mayardit said that the killings had been carried out by cattle raiders, and described cattle raiding as an endemic problem between the Dinka and the Nuer. Although he conceded that SPLA personnel may have taken part in the raid, he denied that the attack was authorized. Cattle raids are part of life in this area of Sudan and civilians in the Akot area undoubtedly wanted revenge for the October 1994 attack. However, information received by Amnesty International indicates that SPLA officers in command in Karic and Akot organized the raid. About half the attacking force was made up of SPLA troops, most from Karic and Akot, some from Mvolo, an SPLA post in Western Equatoria south of Akot, and some, reportedly, from around Tonj. Even if SPLA officers did not organize the attack, the large scale involvement of SPLA personnel makes the organization accountable for their actions. (SPLA detachments in the Yirol area, east of Akot, are reported to have refused to take part. The chiefs of Dinka sections from Yirol were actually in the Ganyliel area holding peace talks with their Nuer counterparts when the raid took place.) The Amnesty International representatives asked what steps the SPLA had taken to investigate the incident. The procedure described involved the Regional Governor contacting the Divisional Commander, who in turn contacted local commanders and local chiefs. The officers pointed out that Ganyliel is in SSIA territory and that therefore an on-the-spot investigation was not possible. It is true that the SPLA could not mount an investigation in Ganyliel itself. However, the inquiry outlined in no way constituted a thorough, systematic investigation. It was not independent and contained no safeguards against the only people being asked for information being the very people responsible for the abuses. It does not appear to have been pursued with any vigour nor to have led to any action against alleged human rights abusers. The killings at Ganyliel were committed within days of the signing of the agreement on ground rules. The SPLM/As failure to take action shows that the pattern of inadequate SPLM/A responses to abuses by its troops has not yet been broken. The inadequacy of the SPLM/A reaction underlines how much work remains to be done if it is to establish genuine human rights protection. Amnesty International representatives also raised the Akot incident with Dr Riek Machar Teny Dhurgon of the SSIM/A. His response was similar to that of the SPLM/A. He said that he had tried to find out the facts of what had happened in Akot but that this had proved difficult. He indicated that he had not transferred the commander from the area, but acknowledged that the incident raised important issues about the control and training of troops. By the time this report is published, the SPLM/A will have held a conference on Civil Society and the Organization of Civil Authority in the New Sudan, currently scheduled for late April 1996. Its aims include developing policies for establishing effective, efficient and accountable structures of civil administration; developing an independent, effective and efficient system for the administration of justice; and developing mechanisms to nurture the growth and effective functioning of civil institutions. Amnesty International urges the SPLM/A to address human rights issues directly. A strong civil administration is no guarantee of respect for human rights. A functioning judicial system is vital, but will not protect human rights if laws are inconsistent with international human rights standards or if procedures do not allow, for example, the right of appeal to an independent body. Strengthening the institutions of civil society (including non-governmental human rights organizations) is a fundamental long-term step towards holding those with power accountable. However, its success depends upon creating the freedom for such institutions to operate without interference. Amnesty Internationals message is simple. The resource constraints and logistical problems which hinder both the SPLM/A and the SSIM/A cannot justify continued failure to take practical measures to improve respect for human rights. It is easy to hide behind such constraints to avoid taking difficult action, but generalizations about the importance of human rights are useless if not backed by action. The SPLM/A and the SSIM/A have to take action on human rights which addresses the real seat of power. For both organizations this remains the military. Soldiers who commit abuses must answer for their actions. Strict control should be kept over all military units and clear orders should be given prohibiting the deliberate and arbitrary killing of civilians. To be effective, action has to be based on a proper assessment of the facts. Mechanisms to establish the facts in cases of human rights abuse are therefore a top priority. Allegations of abuse should be promptly investigated by impartial systems of inquiry which have sufficient independence to be credible and which issue public reports. The leadership should respond publicly to such reports, indicating what steps they are taking in the light of the report's recommendations. Both the SPLM/A and the SSIM/A should explore mechanisms of investigation which can work across the borders of territory controlled by each without hindrance. This would require the politically difficult step of agreeing that human rights issues transcend narrow interests. It could involve the creation of an institution independent of each group but respected by both. المرجع: ِمنظمة العفو الدولية SUDAN Progress or public relations? 29 May 1996 AI INDEX: AFR 54/06/96 DISTR: SC/CC/CO/GR/OUT http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGAFR540061996 SPLA On February 18, 1999, the SPLA captured three government employees said to be "spies" and a Red Crescent tracing officer, and two ICRC expatriates with them, who strayed into SPLA territory. Although the ICRC personnel were released, the SPLA later claimed that all four Sudanese captives were killed during an unsuccessful rescue attempt. It refused to release the bodies, making it likely that the four had been murdered. The Didinga of Chukudum in the Eastern Equatoria region of southern Sudan were deeply dissatisfied for years with the SPLA garrison in their town, claiming mistreatment by the Bor Dinka who dominated the garrison and whose families lived in nearby displaced persons camps. There was a history of summary executions and retaliations by both sides. On January 10, 1999, a personal clash between a Dinka SPLA officer and a Didinga SPLA officer resulted in the death of the Dinka officer. The next day, Didinga fled for the mountains, fearing retaliation. On January 13, fighting broke out, and the SPLA took the town. A peace-making delegation appointed by the SPLA was not heeded; the SPLA claimed the Didinga were in league with a government militia. In April, fighting started again. A cease-fire was finally declared in August and the SPLA agreed to remove landmines it planted in the area. SPLM leaders admitted SPLA responsibility for food diversion at a U.N.-convened May meeting on the 1998 famine. They also sharply criticized international blunders. In Ajiep, a major relief distribution center during the famine, some 800 bags of food (fifty kilos/bag) were stolen from the airstrip, the work of warlord Kerubino's soldiers, police from Wau, and SPLA deserters. The SPLA was blamed for not restoring order after it was notified of this problem. In Ajiep only 41 percent of the food was left for the community after the chiefs, commissioners, and SPLA had taken their cut, and that lay undistributed for weeks. The SPLA took 30 percent, more than they needed to feed their troops, those at the meeting said. This was the area in which the diversion problem was the largest magnitude: Ajiep had the highest mortality rate during the famine. Visitors to SPLA areas continued to see armed SPLA youth who looked younger than eighteen. Although UNICEF had a program for demobilization of child soldiers, the SPLA was not known to have demobilized any of the child soldiers in its ranks. Marial Nuor, an SPLA major in military intelligence, was investigated by the SPLA after he detained elderly foreign nuns and a priest for two weeks in 1996, causing an international uproar. Marial, in charge of SPLA recruitment in Yirol, had allegedly also killed two soldiers, three recruits, and tortured an old man to death. He was convicted by a court martial-for mutiny when he evaded arrest. He was imprisoned briefly, and then was under "open arrest." At the request of the old man's family, Marial was sent back toYirol in 1999 and tried in a civilian court. He was convicted and sentenced to five years in jail and fined. Several months later, however, he was freed when the SPLA ordered him to conduct more recruitment in Yirol. After he threatened his fellow officers and bragged of his untouchability, he was again punished: with a transfer from Yirol. المرجع: راصد حقوق الانسان SUDAN Human Rights Developments http://www.hrw.org/wr2k/Africa-11.htm وهذا جزء من تقرير منظمة هيومان رايتس ووتش ؛ لعام 2000-2001؛ انتهاكات الحركة الشعبية لحقوق الانسان الجنوبي ؛ بما تشمل النهب من المواطنيين ؛ التجنيد الاجباري ؛ تجنيد الاطفال المصدر http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/africa/sudan.html ---------- SPLA and Other Rebel Groups Despite church peacemaking efforts between the Didinga of Chukudum in Eastern Equatoria, and the Bor Dinka who dominated the SPLA garrison in Chukudum, hostilities continued. Sometime after the August 1999 cease-fire, the SPLA assigned commanders of local origin to the garrison, but the local population remained reluctant to return to their homes and fields because of the landmines that the SPLA promised to remove but did not. Even though SPLA leaders promised to stop their troops' #####ng, the confiscation of relief food from civilians by SPLA soldiers and officers continued. In March 2000, an SPLA commander in Bahr El Ghazal took the entire contents of a relief warehouse, valued at $500,000, according to an investigation carried out by the SPLA's relief arm and international relief agencies. Several #####ng incidents, at or after relief food distributions, occurred in Eastern Equatoria. When angry civilians on one occasion tried to prevent the SPLA from taking the food, the soldiers fired into the crowd, killing several. In 2000, negotiations on a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the SPLA's Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA) and the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating in SPLA territory-in which the SPLA sought to impose new demands and operating conditions on relief organizations-foundered. Some eleven of forty NGOs operating in SPLA territory refused to sign for fear of compromising their neutrality and safety. They had to withdraw from that territory by the SPLA deadline of March 1, 2000. The SRRA's executive director claimed he did not care if 50,000 or 100,000 southerners died as a result of the NGO pullout. In later months, several nonsignatories signed the MoU or restarted operations in SPLA territory. Some NGOs did not return. Meanwhile the E.U. withheld funding from NGOs who signed the MoU. Visitors to rebel areas continued to see armed youth who looked younger than eighteen. Cooperation with UNICEF's program for demobilization of child soldiers was uneven. One SPLA commander remobilized several hundred boys when UNICEF failed to provide promised school books and other supplies for the boys. On the eastern front, visitors received credible complaints from military and civilian victims that the Sudan Alliance Forces (SAF), an NDA member, committed abuses against its soldiers accused of spying or defecting to another rebel group, including summary executions, torture, and detention of prisoners in a pit in the ground. The allegations were denied by the SAF وهذا عن دور الحركة الشعبية في تسبيب المجاعة في بحر الغزال في عام 1998؛ والتي قتلت ربع مليون مواطن ..كما عبر عنها تقرير: المجاعة في السودان ؛ وانتهاكات حقوق الانسان التي سببتها .. المصدر تقرير The Famine In Sudan, And The Human Rights Abuses That Caused It http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/sudan98/testim/house-03.htm ------- The SPLA also has played a role in the famine. Its policy of putting garrison towns under siege has led to the successful interdiction of almost all overland and river transport, through land mines and ambushes. This means that most relief goods must be delivered by air, which makes this a very costly operation, although there are other reasons the air bridge has been resorted to, such as the absence of all-weather roads. The SPLA has been responsible for #####ng and diversion of relief food from civilians, as mentioned, although the government has been guilty of this as well. For instance, in the garrison town of Wau, Bahr El Ghazal, assorted government forces looted the property of the Dinka who had fled for their lives in January 1998, and of the U.N. and NGOs who evacuated the town before the SPLA attack on it. The government has done its best to encourage south-south fighting, by arming any southern group that will fight against the SPLA as in the case of Kerubino. Southerners are not absolved from all blame, however. There are divisions among them because the SPLA has treated some ethnic groups roughly, forcibly conscripting their youth, raping women, and stealing food وهذا من احد التقارير لمنظمة العفو الدولية (امنستي انترناشيونال ) يتحدث عن آلية الحركة الشعبية ورؤيتها في تحرير الطفل الجنوبي والمراة الجنوبية المصدر تقرير منظمةالعفو عن عام 2001 http://web.amnesty.org/web/ar2001.nsf/webafrcountries/SUDAN?OpenDocument ------ Children continued to be forcibly recruited by the SPLA, despite the fact that the SPLA had informed UNICEF that it would demobilize all child soldiers in its forces and end the recruitment of children. ----- Rape and other violence against women Violence against women by combatants on all sides, long a feature of the conflict in Sudan, intensified during the year. There were widespread reports of sexual abuse, including sexual slavery, rape and forced pregnancies. Rape was used as a tactic of war by both government and opposition forces to dehumanize and humiliate civilians in the conflict zone. However, because of the taboos and stigma attached to rape, reports were rare and impunity for the rapist was the rule. There were frequent reports of women being abducted while collecting firewood or water and being forced to carry heavy loads of goods looted from ransacked villages. They were also used as bonded labour and forced to clean, cook and provide domestic services to soldiers in barracks and camps. هذه شهادة نساء كن مقاتلات في الحركة الشعبية ؛ حيث ظنن انها جائت لتحريرهن ؛ وهربن منها نتيجة لانتهاك حقوقهن فيها ؛ وقد رصد الخبر نهيال بول ؛ وهو صحفي من جنوب السودان المصدر موقع العالم الواحد http://www.oneworld.org/ips2/apr/sudan.html ========= SUDAN-HUMAN RIGHTS: Women Ex-Rebels Speak of Neglect and Abuse By Nhial Bol KHARTOUM, Apr 3 (IPS) -- Until recently, Aroghu Radolfa was a lieutenant in Sudan's main rebel group, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), but she was unable to move further. The reason, she said, was that she was a woman. Aroghu was one of five female ex-rebels who recounted their experiences to the press here last week after defecting from the rebel movement. They are part of a group of 27 women who have decided to leave the main faction of the SPLA and one of its splinter groups, the Southern Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM). The five women recounted their life in the bush which was characterised by discrimination and abuse. ''During fighting, we fight side by side, on equal footing with men, but when it comes to promotions, women are less considered. We really faced difficulties to get promotions,'' Aroghu said. ''Some of my (male) colleagues have little education, but still they become commanders.'' The SPLA main faction is estimated at 800,000, and according to Aroghu there are some 354 women officers below the rank of commander. But lack of promotion was not the only problem faced by women rebels, said Aroghu. They were also forced to put up with human rights abuses. ''I remember during our training in 1986 in the bushes of the Equatoria region (in the south), some of us were sexually abused not only by Sudanese trainers, but also by Ugandan soldiers who were training us,'' recalled Aroghu who has come home to help her family, find work and go back to school. She joined the SPLA in 1986. Some women were married to male rebels without prior knowledge, she charged, adding that compulsory marriages were common in rebel territory. ''You were told to sleep with a man you had never talked to and if you disobeyed, you violated the orders of the movement and you were punished for it,'' she added. ''(SPLA leader John) Garang himself told us during (one of) his lectures near Chukudum in Equatoria State that he favoured marriages among fighters, because the movement needs children for this war,'' Aroghu said. ''Garang wants us to produce more children in order to support his forces in the future.'' According to Aroghu, the international community has made no effort to investigate the serious human rights violations perpetrated against women behind rebel lines. Women and young boys were also given the most distasteful tasks, such as burying people who died in fights between the SPLA and the regular army, the former rebel complained. On one occasion, she said, ''I was given some women and young boys to bury people killed on both sides. The dead bodies were allowed to remain in the open air for some days so the birds had been consuming them and later we were told to bury them. That particular job was very unsanitary and made us sick.'' Another former fighter, who gave only her first name as Aliza, said she too had been a lieutenant, but her rank meant little to her male fighters. Aliza, who has lost her hair and carries the scars of war on her legs and in the face, said she had been detained and tortured in the town of Wau (Southern Sudan), when she refused to go to bed with her local commander. ''I tell you, women in the eyes of the rebels, are nothing...,'' she said. According to Aliza, because women fighters were poorly trained, they often constituted a high number of the fatalities on the battlefield. More than 200 women and girls died last year in factional fighting between the SPLA and the SSIM's army in the Southern Sudanese towns of Watt, Aiod and Bor, and some 25 women died during the siege of Jekau in the Upper Nile region this year, she added. Aliza said that women must begin to fight their oppressor on all fronts. ''Women should prepare the ground for demanding equality and justice even through the use of armed struggle,'' she said. ''For how long are we going to face this oppression?'' (end/ips/nb/pm97

Quote: Gurtong Discussion Board -> El-mahadi Vs Garang (war Of Letters) Logged in as: charlesdeng ( Log Out )My Controls | 0 new messages | View New Posts | My Assistant Gurtong Discussion Board ->Gurtong Discussion Boards - Active ->General Help | Search | Members | Calendar El-mahadi Vs Garang (war Of Letters), (2000) « Next Oldest | Next Newest »Track this topic | Email this topic | Print this topic TuraleiPosted: Jul 31 2004, 06:46 AM Advanced Member Group: Members Posts: 82 Member No.: 51 Joined: 8-June 03 Dr. John Garang De Mabior, Chairman SPLM and C-in-C SPLA 22 December 1999 Dear brother As far back as 1964, the Umma Party leadership recognised the politico-cultural and economic aspect of Sudan's national crisis as reflected in the civil war. It was an uphill task to convert Northern political opinion on the matter. Since then, you are ware, I am sure, Umma had, within Northern opinion pioneered all the new ideas which formed the nexus of understanding between the old and the new thinking, namely, the recognition of cultural plurality, the founding of constitutional rights upon citizenship, the endorsement of universal Human Rights to form an integral part of the country's future constitution, the move to make peace agreements between the borderline tribes to deprive the NIF regime from lining them up in their Holy War, the initiative to secure SPLM membership of NDA, and the introduction of SPLM to Arab opinion in the face of mutual suspicions. Right from the inception of our decision to co-operate in the interests of peace, democracy and a restructured Sudan, we have had an honourable relationship in terms of the agreements we have reached, and the means to realise our resolutions in the satisfaction of the legitimate aspirations of the Peoples of Sudan. Recently, we have failed to see eye to eye on certain matters: Ã 1 We insisted on an IGAD update to broaden it to involve uncatered for aspects. You were not equally enthusiastic for this revision. Ã 2 We encouraged the Joint Egyptian-Libyan initiative as a necessary means to rectify the IGAD drawbacks and to compliment it. Initially you have welcomed the joint initiative and then had second thoughts about it. The IGAD revision, which you suggested as a substitute, was so unfair that our rejection of it should have caused no surprise. Ã 3 Towards the end of 1998 we became increasingly anxious about the possibility of international resolutions being implemented over the ######### of the Sudanese peoples, and the creeping Balkanisation of the Sudan. You may not have similar anxieties. However, our discussions with important players in the international community left us in no doubt that the SPLM/A is regarded along with the government as responsible for Human Rights abuses, and perpetuation of the war. The feared Balkanisation of Sudan is not viewed in North/South terms but would be a pervasive retrogressive phenomenon. You are not the cause of these anxieties but one of its expected victims. However, the most important two causes of disparity in our views are the Pace of search for a Comprehensive Political Agreement in Sudan, and the margin of party activity within the NDA umbrella. 1. Starting from May 1998 and the events, which led to the Horn of Africa war and the Great Lakes war, we in Umma have seen our geopolitical region in for a new political map with all kinds of unexpected alliances. That heralded as far as we analysed, the diminishing of our hitherto considerable, military and logistical space. 2. Beginning with 1997, we detected a change of political language in Khartoum which manifested itself in the regime's belated acceptance of the DOP of IGAD, the acceptance of citizenship as the basis of constitutional rights, the endorsement of some Asmara 1995 resolutions, particularly the principle of self-determination for the South, and the appointment of a "National" constitutional commission charged with drafting a constitution guaranteeing political plurality. Widening margins for internal dissident political activity, diminishing military spring boards, anxiety about misguided internationalist agendas, and the possibility of creeping Balkanisation, have persuaded us to move very fast indeed in the search for a Comprehensive Political Agreement made possible by new circumstances. The internal and external events which we saw coming and so expected were a complete surprise to most of our NDA allies. This accounts for the different speeds and explains some of the consequent suspicions. 3. You were in the NDA, but not of the NDA. You maintained a relative organisational and political distance. We tried to lift the NDA from its No body Does Anything lethargy. In March 1997 we suggested a ten-point crash program to accompany the military accomplishments, and suggested a task force to implement it. The crash program was accepted, but the task force rejected. Consequently Nobody Did Anything. In February 1998 the Umma party's fourth external conference criticised the NDA structures and total inactivity. We wrote an elaborate memorandum outlining past achievements and present disabilities. We suggested a reform program to rehabilitate its structures, to broaden the organisation and to activate it. To no avail. After several unsuccessful attempts to reform and activate the NDA, we decided to free ourselves from the NDA deadwood, to pursue our party activity abiding by the reference resolutions. After this practice became a well-known NDA tradition, we sought to legalise it by proposing a resolution in June 1999 to that effect. We declared that we shall meet anyone in pursuit of the Comprehensive Political Agreement. The last NDA Leadership Council in Cairo called for the formulation of a position paper. The Umma party presented a position paper based on all previous reference resolutions. Our Djibouti meeting with Albashir was expected to be an ordinary meeting exchanging views about how to activate the Egyptian Libyan initiative, and balancing the Geneva meeting with Alturabi, and providing an opportunity for us to explain the necessity for the confidence building measures. Instead of such a simple exchange we found that Albashir was ready for a further deal. He was prepared to sign on a summary of our position paper. Small wonder we accepted. Those who considered the accord on its merits appreciated it. We were not surprised by the negative reaction of the Cairo rally because we know exactly how "staged" it was. Although we noticed that after your last Washington visit your views about IGAD update and the Joint Initiative rallied to the USA position on the matter, we were shocked by the vehemence of your negative reaction to Djibouti. Your Kampala 8th December 1999 speech was a scathing, unfair, and distorted attack on a party which represents majority opinion in the Sudan, and in terms of our direct experience had the greatest input, amongst Northern parties, in the making of new policies towards the causes of the marginalized Sudanese groups. It contained a political language, which represents a complete adoption of the political rhetoric of some Northern "lost cause" elites who would dearly like to recruit SPLA to fight for their lost causes for which they have neither the will to fight, nor the masses to struggle. You know how much for the sake of larger considerations we have tolerated your digressions. Ã 1 On more than one occasion you presented the Government of Sudan (GOS) with a plan to establish two Confederate States, to divide central power between SPLM/SPLA and the NIF regime. You mapped new boundaries for the two states. A position in direct contravention of the Asmara resolutions and all previous NDA agreements. Ã 2 You were party to an NDA resolution in March 1998 to represent the NDA In the IGAD process and to enlarge it in other ways. It was always assumed that it was the Khartoum regime, which disapproved of IGAD update. It emerged that the SPLM/A disapproves of NDA participation in IGAD and when you suggested NDA involvement you simply repeated the unacceptable non-paper of Mr. Johntson's delegation. Ã 3 You publicly endorsed the Egyptian-Libyan Initiative and the SPLM/A signed the Tripoli Declaration of August 1999. Later in the year you revised your position and came close to rejecting the Joint Initiative all together. So by the standards of abiding by the reference resolutions of NDA, the SPLM/A track record is very poor. A similar scrutiny of Umma activities, particularly the Djibouti accord will vindicate Umma's position as consistent with NDA reference resolutions. Ã 4 The SPLA's record on Human Rights, in the eyes of many neutral observers has blunted if not altogether arrested the opposition campaign against the Human Rights record of the NIF regime. The 55th session of the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1999, the US state Department report of Human Rights abuses in 1998, the NGO's operating in Sudan particularly the big four who addressed their observations to the UN Secretary General in November 1998, the American based Human Rights Watch in December 1999, and numerous articles in the US press have equated SPLA abuse of Human Rights to that of the NIF. However, much we resent the unfairness and vehemence of your attack on Umma, and uphold the correctness of our position, we will not allow reaction to derail our strategic drive for Just Peace, Democratisation, Regional Stability and the restoration of Sudan's status in the Community of the Nations. 1. The NIF Islamicist Agenda has failed to vitalise the economy. Failed to win the civil war failed to uproot the opposition, failed to expand regionally, and failed to establish a viable state and society, which could be presented as an Islamic model. 2. On the other hand, the armed resistance, the political opposition, the regional response, and the reaction of the international community have isolated, and all but besieged the Khartoum regime. 3. Under pressure from the steadfastness of the resistance, the regime's own failures, and the pressure of its internal schism it changed direction allowing a greater margin of freedom inside the country. It changed its regional address towards good neighbourliness. It changed its international agenda. Small wonder that our NIF "intransigence dividend" receded. Our room for military pressure and diplomatic isolation contracted. However, the opportunity for political action multiplied, and the possibility of that action leading to a political resolution of Sudan's conflicts or failing that providing a springboard for a greater political pressure has become very real. 4. In the circumstances, to expect our regional neighbours to maintain their previous position towards the Sudanese opposition unchanged is wishful thinking. Apart from their positive response to the regime's changed diplomatic language, their own national agendas have drastically been altered by internal security priorities, and the requirements of the Horn of Africa, and the Great Lakes regional wars. They are honourable neighbours who know that we have a just cause. Therefore it is reasonable to expect them to link their normalisation with Sudan with the resolution of Sudan's internal conflicts. 5. Our monitor of the internal political situation, the regional position, and the developments within the regime indicates that it is possible to clinch a Peace Agreement, a program for Democratic Transformation, and all the items in our Asmara agenda. All that remains is to decide upon the mechanism to reach it, the measures to ensure compliance and the transition arrangements. This is a viable scenario, which could clinch a political agreement to realise the legitimate aspirations of the peoples of Sudan, and if the regime fails to deliver, create the political dynamic for an irresistible political pressure. There are two possible alternative scenarios to this: A. An eradicationalist scenario to mount a successful challenge to the regime and uproot it. Although this fulfils the dreams of many who have suffered so much at the hands of this regime, the means to do so are not available. All that can be realised is to create a continuous condition of instability in Sudan, which could disintegrate state, and society and "Somalize" the country. B. Perpetuate the war related Humanitarian tragedy in Sudan and so create conditions for possible international Intervention. Intervention, if and when it comes, will not aim at a comprehensive resolution of conflicts in Sudan. It will simply apply a Kosovo or an East Timor pattern. It is a recipe for a very dangerous national and international polarisation. Such polarisation could very well act as a conduit for a revitalised Islmicist come back in league with Islamicist protest and reaction world-wide. High handed foreign initiatives are counter productive. They simply allow the regime to portray its position as an anti-Neocolonial struggle as well as a defence of Islam and National Sovereignty. Both scenarios are enigmatic and totally abhorrent form a patriotic point of views. 6- The developments inside the Sudan especially after 12 December 1999 could lead to one of the four following developments: a. Alturabi succeeds in restoring the status quo ante. b. Albashir's success tempts him to develop a full-blown military dictatorship. c. The two sides resort to force in a massive way, and in the circumstances, expediting the deterioration towards Somalization. d. Further tragedies making foreign intervention inevitable. The four possibilities are catastrophic to the Sudan and can only be averted by an opposition strategy that is viable, realistic, and relevant. Umma's own reading of the situation, plus National consultations and discussions with our neighbours, and with members of the International Community argues for the following program: 1st To convene a national All Party Conference to discuss and resolve all national conflicts and usher into a Comprehensive Political Agreement. 2nd The National Conference to be guided by a Declaration of Principles for a Comprehensive Political Agreement (DOPCA). 3rd The mediation mechanism for the conference should decide its time, place, membership, agenda, and through consultations with the parties to conflict issue the DOPCA. It should consist of a two plus five representing our North African and Horn of Africa neighbours, backed up by an extended IPF. 4th Until the conference reaches agreement, the country should be governed by a Transition Constitution. The Transition Constitution should be drafted by a technical committee from the following sources: a) The Constitution drafted by the National Commission. The IGAD DOP. c) The Asmara 1995 resolutions. d) The Nation's Call. 1st The Transition Constitution to be enacted by a summit of the country's political leadership acting as a Constituent body. 2nd The appointment of a National Transition Government to govern the country until it holds the plebiscite and the general National Elections as required by the Comprehensive Political Agreement by the All party National Conference. Finally, please accept our best regards. Al-Sadig Al-Mahdi, Umma Party President TuraleiPosted: Jul 31 2004, 06:48 AM Advanced Member Group: Members Posts: 82 Member No.: 51 Joined: 8-June 03 Responding to Sadik El Mahdi opened letter Mr. Sadek Al-Mahdi, President of the Umma Party, and Former Prime Minster of Sudan. Dear Mr. Sadek al-Mahdi; I had to suspend my disbelief when I read your letter dated 22nd December, 1999 which you distributed to the public before I even received it. Evidently, the letter is also meant for the gallery, and since that was really what you wanted, then so be it. Your letter is as bewildering as it suffers from grave economy of truth. Equally, it includes uncalled for remarks and propagandist allegations. I assume that you expected me to reply; for otherwise that would be taking me for granted, to let such a letter go unanswered. You therefore called for and deserve this reply. At the outset your letter starts with a blatant inveracity about the role of your party, that: “As far back as 1964, the Umma Party leadership recognised the politico-cultural and economic aspect of Sudan’s crisis as reflected in the civil war”. You have been Prime Minister twice since 1964, and no other Sudanese politician or political party in our history has had, and squandered, two opportunities to correct things in the Sudan. Indeed, if your claim were true, the Sudan would not have been cursed with two bitter wars. The Sudanese people are not suffering from amnesia and know the facts. Since you chose to start with 1964, let us examine the facts from then. 1964 is recognised in the history of Sudan’s tumultuous civil war, as the year of the October revolution, the Round-Table Conference on the so-called “Problem of Southern Sudan” and the sequels of that Conference. And if there is one government that should shoulder the responsibility and blame for the failure and non-implementation of the decisions that ensued from that conference, for whatever they were worth, it is the Umma Party. Your share of the blame, Mr Former Prime Minister, is colossal since it was you who teamed up with Dr. Hassen al-Turabi to initiate for the first time in the modern history of Sudan, the monstrous idea of an Islamic Constitution in a multi-religious and multi-cultural country like the Sudan. Since then the politics of Sudan have retrograded and gone downhill until we reached the bottom in 1989 with the present NIF fascism. The people expect from you apology and atonement for contributing to the present Sudanese debacle, not the unfounded claims that came in your letter, that your party has always recognised the religious and cultural diversity of Sudan. Your further claim that your party, obviously under your leadership, has pioneered, in an “uphill battle" all the new ideas that informed the new thinking about the issues of diversity is as false as it is nettling. Who then, one is forced to wonder, are responsible for the old ideas? Pioneering new thinking is hardly the description to be given to the man and party whose battle cry has always been the forcible Arabization and Islamization of Southern Sudan. In this regard let me remind you of the lecture you gave in the Gulf not long ago in which you unashamedly and quite openly talked of how Southern Sudan should be Arabized and Islamized. Those ideas came in your treatise: The Future of Islam and Arabism in Sudan (Mustgbal al Islam wa al Urouba) of which I quoted pages 114 and 115 in my address at Koka Dam on 20 March, 1986. I prefaced that statement by urging the Umma Party representatives not to be disappointed. We neither mince our words then, nor do we now. Let us also not forget that those who espoused the ideas of the New Sudan, whose parentage you now want to ascribe to yourself, were persecuted in Khartoum as fifth columnists by your government, when you were Prime Minister. Whereas the Sudanese people may forgive, they should not be expected to forget. The archives of your two periods as Prime Minister are available to history, as is the period of the Mahdiya, and many Sudanese, especially Southerners, would not want to be reminded of these periods. What is more exasperating is your reference to your role in mediating differences between Southern and Northern borderline tribes. Let me recall, Mr Former Prime Minister, that in no time in the history of Sudan's civil war, were borderline tribal conflicts escalated beyond control, than during your term in office; tribal pogroms were unleashed since then. The tribal militias, bitterly referred to as “the Marahiliin” in the South by their victims, were a creation of your government. What the NIF government did later was simply a continuation of the policy of “government tribal militias”, which your government had initiated and scandalously called “friendly forces”. In your type of Sudan, citizens are thus divided into “friendly and unfriendly tribes”. Tribal feuds over water and pastures were not unknown to the borderline areas of Bahr el Ghazal, Darfur and Kordofan, but they were always apolitical and settled by tribal elders. Our people on both sides of the divide have never been driven by the psychopathological politics of ethnic cleansing. It was also your government that transformed the Anyanya-2 guerrillas into a government tribal militia. Indeed, the NIF must have studied the archives of your regime when they negotiated the so-called Khartoum Peace Agreement. The record of atrocities committed by your government in this regard also included brazen insensitivity towards the plight of those Dinka people who fell victims to those dastardly policies. When two patriotic university professors (Dr. Ushari Mahmud and Suleiman Baldo) raised the alarm bells about the massacre of the Dinka in Dhaein, rather than investigating the horrendous accusations, your government opted to shoot at the messengers, describing them as fifth columnists. Indeed, the resurgence of slavery in the border areas of Northern Bahr el Ghazal is traceable to your period in office, a fact ably documented by the two professors and other independent witnesses. But then should we be surprised since this is in line with your own line! You also alluded to your co-operation with us in the interest of peace, democracy and a estructured Sudan, as well as to your respect of agreements to that effect. Regrettably, this is not borne by the facts. Our cooperation did not start with the NDA; it has a long and tortuous history. In 1986, we met in Koka-Dam, Ethiopia, and your party was among the first to sign the Koka-Dam Declaration emanating from that meeting, only to be disowned by you later when you became Prime Minister. Two years on, we reached an agreement with al-Mirghani, the 1988 SPLM-DUP Sudan Peace Initiative. That agreement, despite the wide public support it received, as evidenced by the reception accorded to al-Mirghani at Khartoum airport on his return from Addis Ababa, was not considered by the official media under your government control as an event worth reporting. The dilly-dallying of your government in implementing the agreement provided the NIF with the time they needed to prepare for their coup. In fact their inclusion in your government, and your foot dragging on peace, gave the NIF the wherewithal to carry out their plans with impunity. Nevertheless, giving due to where it belongs, the Umma Party played an important role, together with others, in bringing about the watershed agreement of Asmara in June 1995. However, imputing to your good self and your Party that you were behind the inclusion of the SPLM in the NDA, as claimed in your letter, is simply a gross mutilation of history. All those who attended the 1995 Asmara NDA Conference know that the SPLM was officially designated as the “Convener” of that Conference. All know the role played by the SPLM to make the conference a success. It is mind boggling to read in your letter that it was by your favour and that of your party that the SPLM was included in the NDA! This is an inexplicable absurdity. You also claimed credit for allegedly “introducing the SPLM to Arab opinion in the face of mutual suspicions”. The three Arab countries that I have visited in the course of the struggle are Egypt, Libya and Yemen, and neither you nor your Party played any role in these visits. Actually you played a negative role in the Arab World against the SPLM/SPLA. Technology has made the world very porous. Our information indicates that you have done the exact opposite of your claim. Whenever you had the opportunity you are reported to have actually de-campaigned the SPLM/SPLA in the Arab world. In point of fact sympathetic elements in the Arab World have sometimes asked us such embarrassing questions as: “What is the problem between the Former Prime Minister and the Movement?” Mr. Former Prime Minister, since the Asmara Conference of 1995, the SPLM and Umma Party have had good working relations, both within and outside the NDA. However, since your emergence out of Sudan, there was a weather change within the NDA. We could sense a desire by you to re-do every single agreement or institution of the NDA. On many occasions you have attempted to create conditions for the NDA to rubber stamp your reconciliation with the NIF regime. These attempts were of course successfully resisted by the NDA. Indeed, let me borrow a leaf from your own lexicon, many Sudanese had claimed and warned us that you came to the NDA as a “fifth columnist” for the NIF. The Geneva and Djibouti agreements and your continued warming up with the NIF regime point to some truth in these claims. Your letter then came to points on which you claimed that we do not see eye to eye. On my part I can enumerate many others. Your first point, however, was the IGAD peace process, which you claim you wanted broadened to involve the "uncatered for aspect". What is indeed uncatered for in the IGAD is not an aspect; but a party, the NDA within the IGAD negotiations, and Egypt as a state with legitimate interests in, and concerns about, the Sudan. As regards the first "aspect", the NDA Leadership Council (NDALC) came out with a clear decision on the matter requesting inclusion of the NDA in the IGAD process (March 199. The SPLM signed up to that resolution while reminding all and sundry that the decision to include NDA in the IGAD process belongs to three parties, namely, the mediators and the two negotiating parties, which hitherto have been the SPLM and the NIF regime. So, it is unfair to accuse the SPLM with lack of enthusiasm for inclusion of the NDA in the IGAD process, indeed it is belied by the decision of the NDALC in Kampala in which it has acclaimed the SPLM position in this regard. We are sure of the position of the IGAD mediators on inclusion of the NDA in the IGAD process; but not so with that of your new allies in Khartoum as they are up till this moment silent on the issue. This being said, there were indeed lingering and genuine fears within our ranks that the inclusion of certain elements of the NDA in the IGAD process might be a harbinger to the undoing of the IGAD DOP, particularly on the issue of religion and state. Those fears were not off the mark as proven later by the Djibouti farce which, for all intents and purposes, amounts to watering down the IGAD DOP. This is a matter the NIF fought strenuously to achieve. The Djibouti agreement is otherwise a ####### amalgam of the IGAD DOP, the Asmara Resolutions and familiar NIF double talk. Concerning Egypt’s participation in the IGAD process, the SPLM since 1997 and in direct consultations with that country, strove to include Egypt on the IPF. You also claimed that we had second thoughts about the Joint Egyptian-Libyan Initiative. This is not just a misreading, but a total misrepresentation of our position. That position was made, in no uncertain terms, in Tripoli when we espoused the initiative. Briefly the SPLM position is summarised in the following three points: * There must not be two parallel initiatives at the same time. The Joint Egyptian-Libyan Initiative should therefore be co-ordinated with, or related to, the IGAD peace process to deny the NIF regime their reckless habit of forum shopping. * The NIF regime should respond favourably to the NDA requirements for creating a conducive environment for dialogue, including scrapping the so-called “Ganun al-Tawali” and unbanning of political parties. * The NDA must have one negotiating position before it negotiates with the NIF regime, and related to this requirement is that a comprehensive cease-fire should be negotiated as part of a comprehensive political settlement. Both Egypt and Libya, with whom we have close contacts and open channels of communication, are very aware of this position. I had to travel personally to Cairo and Tripoli to present the position of the SPLM, and I held a press conference in Cairo, thus leaving nobody in doubt about our position. We therefore do not see in your misrepresentation anything other than an attempt to muddy waters between the SPLM and the two countries. Fortunately those countries have long histories and look at issues much more critically than Sudanese politicians who assume otherwise. Your letter then delves into another misrepresentation; this time of realities within the international scene; the spectre of an international resolution of the Sudan conflict forced on us, and alleged human rights abuses. You referred to discussions you have had with “important players” in the international community that left you in no doubt that the SPLM together with the NIF are accused of perpetuation of the war and human rights abuses. Mr. Former Prime Minister, we live in a porous world and shall, therefore, not be taken by statements like this. We too have contacts with international players. I do not believe that there is any danger of international military intervention in the Sudan. Your thesis on the possibility of imposed solutions is eyewash meant to bamboozle the unwary, and an unscrupulous attempt to mobilise the North, and beyond, along racial and religious lines. Perhaps that is why you managed to smuggle the issue of alleged internationalization of the Sudan conflict into the Tripoli Declaration, a matter I raised with you in Cairo as unfounded and unnecessarily divisive of the NDA, and for which you apologised. Nevertheless, I wish to assure all and sundry that the SPLM is a grown-up organization that is guided by principles and consistency, which are known to the Sudanese people. For a number of years we have been steadfast in rejecting calls, coming from those “important players”, for a comprehensive cease-fire prior to a political settlement. We equally have never appealed to others to fight our wars for us. It is mind boggling for such an accusation, of internationalization of the war, to come from the same man who sought UN intervention to restore power to him as they did with Arstide in Haiti. Your lamentations on the duration of the war are also suspect to say the least. The Sudan could have been wallowing in peace since 1986 were it not for your prevarications on implementation of the Koka-Dam Declaration of 1986 and the Sudan Peace Initiative of 1988, not to mention the wasted nine hours of meeting that I had with you in 1986. I now come to your surprising accusations and questioning of the human rights record of the SPLM/A, worse still comparing it to the structured policy of the NIF government. I said surprising because you are the least qualified to lecture us on human rights abuses. Those who live in glass houses should not throw stones. Despite the inconsequences of your human rights remarks, indeed their inappropriateness to the main tenor of your letter, we shall address them head long, if only to put the record straight. Again, you solicited for our response on this issue, and so you shall have it. The SPLM/SPLA, as you should know, is not a government restrained by internationally recognised covenants, norms and obligations. It is a liberation movement waging a war for justice, but nonetheless curbed by internationally recognised laws of war and good behaviour towards innocent civilians, as well as towards captured Prisoners of War (POW’s). As such, our record is an open book for all to see, particularly by those living and working in our midst. There are more than forty international NGO's working in the liberated areas, and it is they, not those judging us from distant capitals of the world, who can attest to our human rights record. Your accusations of us are based on hearsay, newspaper reports and reports of international human rights groups, most of which are based on second-hand and dubious sources. Moreover, you should know that the SPLM/A is a movement supported voluntarily by the civil population. We could not have survived without the ready and willing support we receive from our grassroots. That being said and human nature being what it is, excesses by zealous warriors may sometimes lead to overstepping the bounds of propriety. When that happens and it is detected, it is always checked and those responsible for it are brought to book according to law. On the conduct in the war, you more than anybody else, know that we have been holding thousands of Prisoners of War (POW’s) despite the onerous task that attends their upkeep. You would agree that in war human emotions are at their peak, and so it is in war that respect for human rights can best be judged. We have instilled in our soldiers, the SPLA principle that “the object of war is not to kill the enemy soldier, but to render him non-combative”, and that “if an enemy soldier is disarmed or unarmed, killing him would amount to murder”. Many POW’s were captured by the SPLA in battles with forces under your supreme command, when you were Prime Minister. May I ask, how many POW's of the SPLA did the army under your command capture and keep? History has it that to your army the only good Southern fighter, even when he was rendered inoffensive, was a dead one. When you were Prime Minister, your then Army Chief of Staff, General Abdalazim Sadik Mohammed, announced that your army had captured 27 SPLA POW’s, but that all of them had to be killed to relieve them of their pain! This pattern of behaviour reminds Southerners of the period of the Mahdiya, when whole tribes were wiped out in the South. Least you forget and have the temerity to want to become an authority and advocate of human rights, perhaps we should remind you of the Juba, Wau and Bor massacres of the 1960’s, all committed when you were Prime Minister. This painfully brings back to memory other sad episodes. The remorseless pattern of insensitivity towards fellow citizens did not spare even your closest friends and allies among Southern politicians. The saga of William Deng shall remain indelibly etched both in our memory and psyche. William Deng, who was presumed to be your closest ally, was brutally killed by the army when your party was in power, and what did you do? However, your energetic efforts to bring to task those who were accused of murdering your great uncle, Imam al Hadi, during Numeiri's rule, 18 years after the event, tells us a different story; that in your scheme of things there are two classes of citizens in your vision of the Sudan. Up to this day, the killers of William Deng have not been brought to book, despite your having been Sudan’s Chief Executive twice, and you know who these murderers are, Mr. Former Prime Minister. I cannot end this paragraph on the subject of human rights, which you chose to bring up, without reminding you of the Bor “incident”, which occurred in the 1960’s when you were Prime Minister. You went to Bor then and wept profusely at the grave of a certain Captain of your army that had been killed in battle by the Anyanya guerrillas of that time. You are reported to have, in one way or other, ordered the army to avenge the death of this Captain. And not surprisingly, shortly after your return to Khartoum, more than 30 prominent chiefs, including the Paramount Chief, Ajang Duot, were murdered in cold blood by your army. Some of the sons of those murdered chiefs are now commanders in the SPLA. They may forgive, but they cannot forget, and it also adds insult to injury for you to lecture them on human rights. Mr. Former Prime Minister, during the 1994 Pan African Congress in Kampala, Africans in diaspora from the Americas tabled a motion demanding reparations for the Atlantic slave trade. There was a very spirited debate on the subject, but finally a resolution was passed demanding reparations from the sons and daughters of those slave traders. In the case of the Sudan, Mohamed Ibrahim Nugud has recently published a very authoritative book on the saga of slavery in the Sudan during the Mahdiya. Nobody should be surprised if some Southerners demand reparations for the Sudanese slave trade from the Mahdi family. Perhaps you should be reminded that the present wealth of the Mahdi family includes income from the period of the slave trade, as can easily be verified in Ustaz Nugud’s book. We expect remorse and atonement from you for any meaningful national reconciliation, not the kind of lecture about human rights that came in your letter. Such a lecture evokes bad memories. Your inadequacy in the human rights sphere was not only limited to the periods of war, whether in the 1960’s or 1980’s, your democratic record left a lot to be desired. So let us revisit the 1960’s when you were Prime Minister. Were it not your party and you yourself who expelled elected members of parliament, banned a political party and introduced into the draft constitution the charge of apostasy, the same charge with which the 74 year old man, Mahmud Mohammed Taha, was indicted and executed by Numeiri? So, what right do you have to lecture us on democracy and human rights, when both your past and present are littered with a flagrant display of allousness spiced with arrogance? The problem, as I could detect from your letter, is that you think the past is irrelevant, the present is all that counts, and the future shall take care of itself. You claimed that, within the NDA, the SPLM/SPLA "maintained a relative organizational and political distance", that we (SPLM/SPLA) are “in the NDA but not of the NDA". This is another of your several misrepresentations of reality. Those who were present in the 1995 Congress of the NDA will attest to the sacrifices that the SPLM/SPLA had to make in order to be accommodative, so as to have the NDA moving. This explains the meagre representation of the Movement in both the NDA Leadership Council and in the Executive Bureau. You should really have commended the SPLM/A leadership rather than condemned us for the magnanimity we showed at Asmara in 1995. You also referred to your suggestions for reforming the NDA, which were largely rejected by the Alliance. I want to assure all and sundry that the SPLM/A's commitment to the NDA is unswerving, in the battlefield as in the political arena. In the former, you know that we have the largest force; that is the ultimate sacrifice. This was not done through a vacuous appeal for Hijra, which eemingly fell on deaf ears; but through sustained professional planning, commitment and leadership. You would probably counter that it is the political arena that matters, and you would further assert that your party is the biggest in the country, as came in your letter. But I challenge this; is it really the case that you are the largest party in the Sudan? The SPLM has never contested elections with the Umma Party, and so there is no objective basis for comparison, since largeness is a relative concept. However, your claimed large size was never reflected in the NDA. Before you left Khartoum in 1996 to join us in the NDA, the story I heard was that the poor recruitment showing of the Umma party was due to your being held hostage by the NIF. However, when you finally came out and called for Hijra for your faithful to join you, there was no significant increase in your recruitment. I am the Chairman of the NDA Unified Military Command (UMC), and the reality is that the New Sudan Brigade (NSB) has more Northern Sudanese in it than the whole army of the Umma Party, not to mention Southerners, whom I presume to be Sudanese. I therefore fail to see the objective meaning of the claim that your party is the largest in the country. If the Northerners who are in the NSB could voluntarily give their blood to fight for the SPLA, why would they not give their votes to the SPLM in a free and fair general election? Indeed, based on our common experience with you in the NDA and in the war, one has justifiable cause to conclude that the SPLM would come out ahead of the Umma Party in a free and fair general election. The claim that your party is the largest party in the Sudan is therefore just another of the many misrepresentations or elusions in your letter. Mr. Former Prime Minister, calling your colleagues in the NDA “dead wood”, as came in your letter, has more to it than meets the eye. This "dead wood" are the same forces with which we want to carry Sudan through the interim period, unless if you believe that Sudan is destined to be ruled by one party; indeed one man. This is of course untenable and that is why we have all along accepted to cohabit with all manner of politician and live with the dead weights of history. Failure to accommodate each other’s views, however divergent, does not bode well for the New Sudan. As a man who prides himself of being Sudan’s apostle of democracy, perhaps you may need to appreciate that democracy is the most humbling, because it reduces men to natural proportions. As for those of us who were born natural, we naturally have no problem with this. However, for those who believe that they are divinely ordained with super human faculties or abilities that would put them above everybody else, they shall perpetually fail in a multi-faceted democratic environment, especially ours which is characterised by multiple diversities. I was tickled to read in your letter that your meeting with al-Beshir in Djibouti was supposed to be "ordinary" but turned into something else. Equally revealing was your apparent ability to chieve in three hours what we failed to achieve in ten years of negotiations with the NIF. Alas, your joy with Djibouti is neither shared by your colleagues in the NDA (Kampala meeting) nor with the NDA inside Northern Sudan. Obviously, you were not overjoyed by their reaction; hence you referred to a staged Cairo rally. For all that I know the Cairo rally was attended by all the NDA parties. Moreover, the position taken by the NDA in Cairo was affirmed by the full NDA meeting in Kampala in which the Umma Party was censured for the Djibouti mishap. Surely, the Kampala meeting was not by any stretch of the imagination staged. Perhaps nobody has told you that one of the reasons the Sudanese people give for their reluctance to remove the NIF regime in an Intifadha is that they shudder at the prospects of some “dead weight” of history returning to power. Ironically, the Sudanese people blame us for giving shelter in the NDA to known historical liabilities. You also veered in your letter to my Washington visit and drew your own propagandist conclusions. The insinuation carried in your reference to this visit is that the SPLM/SPLA are working with or for Washington. This is of course a false and malicious allegation intended to malign the Movement in circles known to you. Surprisingly, you saw it expedient to give a copy of the letter you wrote to me to the same Washington, from which you tried to distance yourself in your accusations of us. Mr. Former Prime Minister, the Sudanese people know our track record over the years, as an independent and patriotic Movement that has stood against all odds. The SPLM has been consistent in its political stances on the main issues; conditions for unity, religion and state, and respect of Sudan's multiple diversity. It has never been we, who changed their positions on those issues. So, whether in Washington, Cairo, or Tripoli, or in Ruritania, we always stood firm by our principled positions. However, if Washington, or any other Capital, shares our positions on those issues that is the more reassuring. You further accuse the SPLM/SPLA of disapproving of NDA participation in IGAD and of repeating what you called “the unacceptable non-paper of Mr. Johnston’s delegation”. Both accusations are unfounded and unfair. The SPLM/SPLA supported the March 1998 NDA resolution to this effect, and in Kampala we came out openly to welcome NDA participation in IGAD. What was not resolved was the mode of that participation, pending endorsement of NDA participation in IGAD by the mediators and the NIF Government. As to the arrangement I proposed for including the NDA within the technical committees of the SPLM, that was meant as an interim arrangement till the parties concerned agree to the inclusion of the NDA in its own right as peace negotiator. For our hurry to find ways and means to include the NDA in the process, we expect to be thanked not reproached. Since the Kampala meeting there was one session of negotiations with the NIF government under the auspices of IGAD. If our call was heeded we could have not only assured NDA’s participation in the process, but also tested the seriousness of your new friends in Khartoum in accepting that participation. As to the divergence of views between Washington and other capitals on peace initiatives, that is of no concern to us; our position is clear on the Joint Libyan-Egyptian Initiative, but on which you tried to score points to mobilise those countries against us. We accept whole-heartedly the Joint Egyptian Libyan Initiative on the basis of the principles enunciated above, which are consistent with the letter and spirit of the Tripoli Declaration, and in the interests of the unity of our country (the New Sudan). On the mode of participation of the Joint Egyptian-Libyan initiative, we uggested formation of an “African IGAD Partners Forum (AIPF)”, which would include Egypt and Libya and seven other African countries. Now in heaven’s name what is the relation between this SPLM/SPLA position and the non-paper of Mr. Johnston’s delegation, which you alleged we repeated in Kampala? Strangely, it is your good self who borrowed from our position of the AIPF, when you said that your so-called “All Party Conference” will have for its mediation mechanism what you called “a two plus five representing our North African and Horn of African neighbours, backed up by an extended IPF” (emphasis mine). You referred to my Kampala speech as "scathing, unfair and distorted". Indeed, it was scathing in its objectivity, but neither unfair nor distorted. I commenced that statement by quoting Dr. Francis Deng that "in the Sudan what divides is what is unsaid". I believe that it is time to stop burying our ######### in the sand, or our differences under the rug. We owe it to the Sudanese people to tell the truth, enough for the white wash of smudge. Your letter proved us right, when you insinuated that you and your party are beyond reproach since you "represent majority opinion" in the Sudan. You also made a bizarre claim that in the leadership of the country the Umma Party had “made the greatest input, among Northern Parties, in the making of new policies towards the causes of the marginalized Sudanese groups”. Those are indeed very mighty claims. They expose all that is rotten in the old Sudan; the belief by some that they historically and perpetually own the Sudan, if not have a divine right to it. But thanks anyway for the admission. Indeed, if there are “marginalized groups”, there must be “marginalizers”, i.e., those who marginalize these groups. And one of the “marginalizers”, your good self, has finally identified himself, via your claim that you have made the greatest “output towards the causes of marginalized groups”. Need I say more? Your letter describes the language I used in my Kampala speech as containing “a political language, which represents a complete adoption of the political rhetoric of some Northern ‘lost causes’ elites who would dearly like to recruit the SPLA to fight for their lost causes". The SPLM/SPLA, Mr. Former Prime Minister, is not in the cattle or slave market, and you should be the first to realize this. How many times have we resisted your calls for a bilateral alignment that would exclude others? Though I do not know who are those "lost cause elites", I very well know that nobody can use the SPLM/SPLA to fight their causes, lost or otherwise. This is actually part of the problem, that some political forces have the audacity to think that they can broker their way into power using others. Moreover, there is an even more sinister insinuation in your accusation, which is the allegation that Northerners in the SPLM/SPLA are the ones who think for and therefore misdirect the Movement. This fallacy is not new nor confined to you, as it is entertained by those Northern political forces that become frustrated in their attempts to use the SPLM/A to broker their way to power. But what are the facts on this issue. The SPLM/A articulated its vision of the New Sudan in its Manifesto, published in July 1983. At that time there was not a single Northern Sudanese in the SPLM/A. It is therefore the vision of the Movement (initially articulated without Northern input) that brought Northerners into the SPLM/A. It is a gross misinterpretation of history, if not biased chauvinism, for anybody to think that it is Northerners in the SPLM/A who do the thinking for the Movement. Finally, I make reference to your alleged strategic drive for a just peace, democratisation, regional stability and the restoration of Sudan's status in the community of nations. This is meaningless rhetoric in the light of the dismal history we have just enumerated. A new, peaceful, democratic and internationally respected Sudan cannot be midwifed by those whose main concern is to repackage the same old stale wine in a new bottle, however beautiful that bottle may look. However, all evidence points to that your so-called Comprehensive Political Settlement is a euphemism for reconciliation with the NIF regime, and from the position in which you are in today, reconciliation with the NIF regime, unlike your reconciliation with Numeiri’s Socialist Union in 1977, would be tantamount to surrender. I warned you of this dismal prospect last June 1999 in my address to the meeting of the NDA Leadership Council in Asmara, Eritrea. Take my advice for what it is worth, you and the Umma Party are better off in the NDA than in the sinking ship of the NIF. In Kampala the Movement was satisfied with the censure, and as you know we did not press for the expulsion of the Umma Party from the NDA, and that still remains our position. In closing, reference is made to your anxieties about the changing international and regional environments. In our search for peace, justice and equality we have never, since 1983, lost sight of our main objectives despite the shifting sands of regional and international politics. We struggle for justice, equality of all nationalities and cultures, fair play, an even political ground, and equality of opportunity for all irrespective of religion, race or gender. It is only in such an environment that unity and the New Sudan are possible. It is only in the context of the New Sudan that democracy can ever be meaningful in the Sudan. Those are basic values that are invariable, and are not conditional to regional or international changes. However, your gleeful remarks about these changes in favour of the NIF were very revealing. In our view, the dividend of being principled is much more valuable than what you called in your letter the “NIF-Intransigence dividend”. Our record on the search for peace is unblemished. Since the days of Numeiri, we have talked with all governments that have come and gone in Khartoum, including yours and the NIF’s. So no one can accuse us of being “eradicationalist”, a buzzword that keeps, together with internationalization of the conflict”, emerging in all your utterances of late. With the present NIF regime alone we have had more than 10 different negotiating sessions; so we know more than anybody else, the nature of the beast. Certainly we are not going to accept your belaboured speculations, particularly when they are based on an image of a reformed NIF seen through the distorting prism of those in a hurry to recapture an illusory power. Mr. Former Prime Minister, please accept the highest of my regards. Dr. John Garang de Mabior SPLM/SPLA, Chairman and Commander-in-Chief, SPLM/SPLA. January 21, 2000: Yei and New Cush New Sudan. jakolPosted: Jul 31 2004, 11:19 AM Editor and Moderator Group: Admin Posts: 810 Member No.: 3 Joined: 11-May 03 Dear Turalei, Many thanks for posting these documents. They should enlighten our past and help us see the future. Sincerely, Jacob. TuraleiPosted: Jul 31 2004, 04:09 PM Advanced Member Group: Members Posts: 82 Member No.: 51 Joined: 8-June 03 Dear Jakol, Accept my greetings. Hey, I was meaning to catch up with you after you presented gurtong project at Abyei Conference last month in Phoenix, but a friend of mind whom I did not see in many years suddenly came and pulled me aside for some private inquiries. By the time he let go of me, you were out of sight and nowhere to be found. Anyway, it wasn’t a big deal but to simply introduce myself, and if time permits us, chitchat with you for few minutes. As for these documents, It is not very often one came across letters such as these. I couldn’t think of anything better to do with them than share it with my follow netters of both gurtong.net and SDB. I was elated when I trembled across these exchanged letters between two prominent and powerful political heavyweights of our era. These letters, especially the one written by Garang really rekindled and embarked on the harmful deeds Sadiq El Mahdi and his family inflicted on people of Southern Sudan in particular. It was rather nice to see Garang summing up the ugly sides of the El-Mahdi family as well as many other northern elites in chronicle summary. By all means, I could at least say this is one of the mind-blowing pieces of well-put together letter I ever read in months. Garang without a doubt has enlightened us on political diseases that seemed to have paralyzed the country called Sudan. These letters are two long, but worth reading for they answered some of the questions that are coiled up and constraints on our minds. jakolPosted: Aug 2 2004, 11:31 AM Editor and Moderator Group: Admin Posts: 810 Member No.: 3 Joined: 11-May 03 Dear Turalei and All, No danger then, it seems from the above exchange of letters, that Garang will ever marry Sadig? In the wooing of Garang by Northerners, here is a reminder of what I said about this fellow, Sadig, in a humorous article published last year by Sudan Mirror and posted on the "Editor's Page" on this website under the title: "This Daughter of South Will not Come Cheap!" "The leading contender for the hand of the Daughter of the South (John Garang) has long been the Oxford-educated Mandukuru, a seemingly civilized and gentle fellow, yet an extremely dangerous and unreliable individual in his historically recorded dealings with the South. This atrocity-ridden character is called Mr. Sadiq el Mahadi, a grandson of the Sudanese Mahadi, at one time an ineffectual, twice-failed, Prime Minister of the Sudan. He is the long-time leader of the Umma Party and he thinks himself the natural suitor for our warrior daughter. But when he was Prime Minister in the late 80s, Sadiq made half-hearted attempts to capture the heart of the Black Daughter of the Soil; but She of the capital S had an honest agenda that Sadiq saw as undermining his own barely concealed blurred vision for the Sudan that sees Islam as having "a holy mission in Africa and the Southern Sudan is the beginning of that mission" (SM Oct. 6-19 2003, Sudan's Media War of Visions). "The failure of Islam in Southern Sudan," he said, "would be the failure of the Sudanese Muslims to the international Islamic cause." He then went on to arm a hoard of ill educated, genocide-minded, Arab tribes of Southern Kordofan and Darfur to accomplish this mission. Their repeated and devastating raids into Bhar el Gazal and Upper Nile, even long after Sadiq was deposed, accomplished nothing but a lasting bitterness in those regions. Ask any surviving child or mother of these regions about the Marahaliin and you will hear all about Sadiq's bloody handiwork. When during the Koka Dam peace talks in 1986, and later in other marriage talks, Sadiq pretended to be working for a fair and peaceful Sudan, the Daughter of the Soil kept remarking that "Others," meaning the 61% of non-Sudanese Arabs, "get frustrated as they fail to see how they could become Arabs when their Creator thought otherwise." If there is anything Sadiq fears and detests most, it is a Southerner who appears to outwit him; so he abandoned the idea of marrying our daughter. Good riddance!" Have a Gurtong Day or Night. Sincerely, Jacob. 1 User(s) are reading this topic (0 Guests and 0 Anonymous Users) 1 Members: charlesdeng 4 replies since Jul 31 2004, 06:46 AMTrack this topic | Email this topic | Print this topic << Back to General Track this topic Receive email notification when a reply has been made to this topic and you are not active on the board. Subscribe to this forum Receive email notification when a new topic is posted in this forum and you are not active on the board. Download / Print this Topic Download this topic in different formats or view a printer friendly version. Forum Jump------------Welcome - Discussion Board - Terms Of Use - Guest Book Gurtong Discussion Boards - Active - Governance - General - Voice of Youth - Peace Debate - South-South Dialogue - House of Nationalities Imported Topics And Closed Discussions - Read Only - Governance - Closed Discussions - General - Closed Discussions - Voice of Youth - Closed Discussions - Peace Debate - Closed Discussions - South-South Dialogue - Closed Discussions - House of Nationalities - Closed Discussions [ Script Execution time: 0.2367 ] [ 12 queries used ] [ GZIP Enabled ] Powered by Invision Power Board v1.1.1 © 2003 IPS, Inc. Hosted by Gurtong Diaspora Peace Project

Quote: لنا والعمدة. انتو حزب الامة بتاعكم ده بينتقد في تقارير المنظمات الدولية ويتهرب منها, اليوم الجدة شنو?