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Re: الحكـومـة تقصف أقصى شمـال دارفـور (Re: Abureesh)
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>Subject: New Attacks on Civilians Far to the North in Darfur; >Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2004 19:52:00 -0500 > > > > >New Attacks on Civilians Far to the North in Darfur; >More Than 1,000 Human Beings Now Dying Weekly in Darfur: >What is the Threshold for an Emergency Humanitarian Intervention? > >Eric Reeves >February 8, 2004 > >A number of credible eyewitnesses from within far northern Darfur (near >al-Atrun) are reporting a significant increase in fighting this past >week, in a region far from any humanitarian or news presence of the sort >that has begun to be established in the Tine area (on the Chad-Sudan >border, over 300 kilometers to the south) and the al-Geneina >(Darfur)/Adre (Chad) areas further south yet. Khartoum's clear >strategy, having begun to consolidate its brutal grip in western Darfur, >is to shift the military effort to the far north. There the Berti and >Midop tribal groups (related to the Fur and Zaghawa tribal groups) have >begun to experience the same genocidal tactics already widely reported >by Amnesty International, the UN, and news wires. > >First the villages of these African tribal groups are bombed by >Antonovs or helicopter gunships, and then they are attacked on the >ground by Khartoum's regular and Arab militia forces. Confident that >there is no humanitarian or news presence that might expand our scope of >understanding, Khartoum is further exploiting the international >community's unwillingness to do anything but talk about the urgency of >the catastrophe in Darfur. One series of detailed accounts, coming to >this writer and an Arabic-speaking human rights worker from Darfur, >originates in the area of al-Malha, some 50 miles southeast of al-Atrun, >far to the north in Darfur and almost 300 kilometers from the border >with Chad (thus likely far beyond walking distance for most). > >Of the twenty villages in this area, seven have been burned and >destroyed. 48 people, all civilians, are reported dead, including four >blind women and two disabled civilians who were burned to death by >militia ground forces after a bombing attack on a heavily-used water >well (this is an increasingly common and vicious military tactic on >Khartoum's part). The attacks were confirmed by means of telephone >communications from multiple sources, several of whom are unknown to one >another. > >The absence of humanitarian access in Darfur, as well as the extremely >limited range of news reporting from the region, makes verification of >such reports impossible, even as their great number and similarity is >all too telling. Similar difficulties, of course, attend efforts to >establish accurate numbers for the Darfur catastrophe as a whole. Even >so, all available evidence suggests steep increases in the numbers of >internally displaced persons and those war-affected. Internally, UN >staff are now using the figure of over 1 million displaced and 3.5 >million war-affected (it would be useful for the UN to publicize these >numbers, as well as explain precisely their meaning of "war-affected"). >The number of refugees in Chad has quickly grown to over 135,000 >according to the most recent UN public estimate (see UN Integrated >Regional Information Networks, February 4, 2004). > >But for some time now, the total civilian casualty figure has remained >at an implausibly low 3,000. In the absence of an alternative estimate, >or an actual body count, UN organizations and other humanitarian and >human rights groups have been obliged to continue with this figure. > >So it is especially important to note the figure of more than 30,000 >dead that was cited in the very recently distributed monthly report from >the highly authoritative and experienced Sudan Focal Point/South Africa >(late January 2004). This figure is based on very significant and >recent field research, and has powerful implications if it is correct >(it is likely already an estimate too low, given the continuing >deterioration in food security and the cumulative effects of disease and >exposure). For the time-frame of the current conflict in Darfur, and >the humanitarian crisis it has precipitated, make it reasonable to >assume that this total figure implies a present civilian casualty rate >of over 1,000 civilians a week. > >The conflict in Darfur, which began in February 2003 as a response to >years of marginalization and abuse at the hands of various governments >in Khartoum, gradually accelerated through most of last year, with a >brief (and partial) respite following a cease-fire accord in September >2003. Since the collapse of the cease-fire, fighting and destruction >has greatly intensified, with a very rapid deterioration in the >humanitarian situation. If we correlate the Sudan Focal Point figure of >30,000+ with the course of events over the last 50 weeks, and the very >marked acceleration of human destruction reported since December 2003, >it appears highly likely that casualties over the last three months >likely reach toward 20,000. Certainly we are witnessing a crisis that >has not been defined by an evenly distributed loss of life over these >roughly 50 weeks. Rather, there has almost certainly been a dramatic >increase that is coincident with the huge upsurge in refugees pouring >into Chad: 30,000 in December alone and 20,000 in a ten-day period in >January---over one third the total number. > >In short, not only do chronology, refugee numbers, and all available >reports on humanitarian conditions and military attacks suggest that >more than 1,000 civilians are dying every week: this number is almost >certainly on the rise. > >For how could it be otherwise? Humanitarian access within Darfur >remains denied by Khartoum or insecure because of the fighting that >Khartoum has directed primarily against civilians. Food production in >Darfur as a whole has fallen off precipitously with the war, and most of >the African tribal groups that are the targets of Khartoum's genocidal >campaign are now too fearful to plant or harvest crops. Cattle #####ng >by Khartoum's Arab militias has been rampant, thus stripping people of >their essential food reserve and insurance against famine. Those within >Chad, along the border with Sudan, have made great efforts to assist >refugees, who are often of the same ethnic group. But they, too, are >largely subsistence farmers and their ability to assist is rapidly >coming to a halt. International humanitarian efforts and >resources---and indeed funding---for the crisis in Darfur haven't begun >to keep pace with the accelerating catastrophe. > >As a consequence, the future (near- and longer-term) will inevitably be >much worse than the past, even as what we are seeing now in the way of >threats to the civilian population are far greater than what could have >been seen or predicted even half a year ago. It is not impossible, >given the terrible food insecurity throughout the area, and the lack of >shelter and medical relief, that people will soon die in numbers closer >to 10,000 per week. There is nothing in the evidence available that >allows for any discounting of the possibility that such vast human >destruction and suffering is in the offing. > >Khartoum---because it has yet to pay any real price for its >unrestrained military efforts to crush the insurgency groups in Darfur, >and to destroy the civilian base of support for these groups---has been >emboldened to attempt a final solution. The suspension of the Naivasha >(Kenya) peace talks between the Khartoum regime and the Sudan People's >Liberation Movement (SPLM) offers the perfect moment of military >opportunity. The brutal attacks reported to this writer from far >northern Darfur, in the area southeast of al-Atrun, are almost certainly >being replicated throughout Darfur, especially the exceedingly remote >northern Darfur. What Amnesty International has so thoroughly >chronicled of Khartoum's conduct of the war (see >http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR540082004) shows no sign of >abating, nor does Khartoum give any evidence of being willing to begin >serious peace negotiations under meaningful international auspices. > >The ghastly impotence of the international community in the face of >such stark evidence of genocidal destruction is at once appalling and a >guarantee that such destruction will continue so long as Khartoum feels >it will not be held accountable and will confront no meaningful >response. > >If this is to change, the international community---chiefly the UN, the >US, the UK, Norway, Italy, and France---must accept the urgent need to >plan for a cross-border humanitarian intervention of the sort intimated >last week by Andrew Natsios, Administrator for the US Agency for >International Development, and by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry. Since >Chad is the only site that is truly practicable for such a humanitarian >intervention, France should immediately use its immense diplomatic >leverage with Chad to secure from President Idris Deby permission for >such an urgent mission. French Foreign Minister Dominique De Villepin >is due in Sudan shortly (Al-Anbaa newspaper [Khartoum], February 7, >2004), and this trip should focus sharply on Darfur, as well as making >clear French willingness to assist in the immediate future with a >humanitarian intervention through Chad. > >Just as important is the urgent need for a clear and unambiguous signal >to Khartoum: "war crimes from this time forward will be prosecuted, >either (and preferably) in the International Criminal Court or by means >of an ad hoc tribunal on the model of that presently convened for the >Rwandan genocide of 1994." Khartoum must be put on notice that Naivasha >will not be the occasion for any negotiated immunity from war crimes >committed by the regime in Darfur. > >A blunt statement to this effect from Western governments most involved >in the peace talks at Naivasha---the US, the British, the Norwegians, >the Italians---would go a great distance toward forcing an end to a war >effort that is nothing more than serial violations of international law, >the Geneva Conventions, and a host of international treaties to which >Sudan is nominally party (see Section 5 of the Amnesty International >report: "International human rights and humanitarian law"). If the >senior members of the National Islamic Front truly believed that they >would be held accountable for all future war crimes, violations of >international law, and crimes against humanity, the nature of war in >Darfur could change precipitously. > >As it stands, the regime understands from negotiations in Naivasha how >unlikely it is that there will be a criminal tribunal for its all too >similar conduct of the war in southern Sudan over the past fifteen >years. The simple assumption, all too well warranted, is that the same >will be true of Darfur. But we catch a glimpse of some telling anxiety >on the part of the National Islamic Front with President Omar Bashir's >recent duplicitous effort to encourage Darfur refugees in Chad to return >to Sudan (Agence France-Presse, February 5, 2004), this even as the UN >is moving many refugees further into Chad for safety, this at the >request of the refugees themselves, who continue to feel unsafe near the >border (UN News Centre, February 6, 2004). As Bashir realizes, these >refugees have seen too much, and have far too much to tell organizations >such as Amnesty International and other human rights and humanitarian >organizations, as well as news reporters (e.g., the BBC filed a dispatch >from the Chad/Sudan border today). > >But if the present conduct of the war is to change from its primary >military effort of genocidal civilian destruction, there must be a clear >articulation of consequences by those countries with the power to insure >that war crimes will be prosecuted. To date, not a single country has >declared as much, even though such a declaration has no diplomatic costs >and would have future implications only if war crimes were indeed being >committed. Since all evidence available suggests not only that war >crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide are being committed, but >that they will continue until pressure is brought to halt them, the >reason for this international silence is unfathomable---like the >suffering of the people of Darfur. > >Eric Reeves >Smith College >Northampton, MA 01063 > >413-585-3326 >[email protected]
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