|
|
 Sudan NCP’s policies: A recipe for secession
|
Sudan NCP’s policies: A recipe for secession
Saturday 21 October 2006.
By Nyuol Justin Yaac
“To have one civil war is an accident, but to have two is carelessness beyond any imagination on the part of the northern political establishment.”— Oscar Wilde
Oct 19, 2006 — It’s slightly less than two years, and almost one year since the CPA and DPA respectively came into effect. The fact that none of them has collapsed makes it hard to omit them as failures; but also, the fact that a lot of the promises that were conceded have not been achieved disqualifies them as success stories.
From the prelude of these major breakthroughs; more often than not, there has been conflicting messages from different blocks in regards to the implementation of the agreements. The NCP claims, “The agreements are being implemented smoothly,” even pledging, they “will continue to work in tandem with the signatories” to realize and resolve the remaining issues.” On the other side, the SPLM completely and bitterly repudiates the assertions, averring the opposite. These conflicting communiqués, though intended to win over public opinion and support, have—if any—served the opposite, even, fostered a certain degree of contempt towards the NCP.
Despite Khartoum’s insistence that the agreements are being implemented smoothly; the dissatisfaction showcased by the Movement, coupled with the stoicism portrayed by Minnawi’s faction make a strong case that, the agreements are not being implemented in spirit. IGADD is aware of it; the international community knows it all, and so does the NCP. Not long ago did UNs Secretary General, Mr. Koffi Anan attest: even warning that, “The CPA is at the brinks of a collapse.” But despite the echo of this alarming bell, the NCP has increasingly become philosophical, endeavoring to ruse the world.
Though the conception and operation of the SPLM and the SLM occurred in distinct regions of the country, their cause and plights are coterminous. When the UN hypothesized entering the country without the consent of the regime a possible solution to the crisis in Darfur: the SPLM, not only sympathetic to the quandary of the Darfurians, but also in search of a logical solution acquiesced to the option; the regimes quid pro quo, abrogation of the CPA. But of greater importance is why the SPLM gets reprimanded for taking alternate sides from the NCP, while the two are distinct and suppose to be respecting of each others opinions? Is there a connection between the SPLM and the SLM, or, is the former the aegis of the latter? Why isn’t the Khartoum regime willing to solve the problem? What is the logic behind the regime’s unilateralist, isolationist doctrine? And what is the future of the country, if these policies do not change?
The NCP formerly known as the NIF rose to power on the platform of Islamicizing and Arabizing the country, ushering to the region if victorious, and ultimately the continent. This seismic ambition meant that those who opposed the reign—the Southerners the target— were classified infidels (“kufr”), and had to be coerced into submission by all means necessary, and the defiant few should be exterminated. Such an ideology is indispensable for the NIF since it legitimizes it to stay in power as long as its goal—which is the formation of a homogeneous Arab/Islamic state—is not achieved.
The implausibility of achieving a homogeneous Sudanese Arab state means, the NIF will be constantly waging an endless war; hence, clinging to power. In other words, the regimes survival is contingent on constant warfare.
Thus, fighting the SPLM/A was the means to an end (goal of Arabization and Islamicization of the country). But, when an agreement (CPA) devoid of proselytization was reached with the South; the NIF, according to its benefactors and religious base, did not only fail, but also, contradicted its own agenda.
Therefore, NCP’s failure to live up to its promises coupled with the unsatisfactory record brought about a barrage of criticisms, as well as, internal pressures and archenemies. The NCP—carefully analyzed the situation—and deciphered it “imminent loss of power.”
More than any other time in their 17 year rule, the NCP was and is still fret by this threat. But with a well organized and firmly rooted intelligence community, they have every reason to believe that, no other force can shake them or even overthrow them, except the military, through a coup de tat.
Therefore, with an establishment like the NCP where “regime survival” is the top priority, and war integral to its sustenance, maintaining power becomes an easy task. Because, all that needs to be done is “constant engagement of the army,” which also means constant warfare. This strategy is worth noting, not only because of its treachery; but also because of its serious implication: the absence of war means, one has to be created.
Inter alia, the employment of such a macrocosm strategy also means, the intermittent interruption of smooth government conducts have to be orchestrated, for example tardiness of the CPA. This queer theory also means the victimization and marginalization of tenuous, vulnerable communities—such as Darfur. For that reason, Magnifying Sudan’s privation from this standpoint is therefore very important, as it allows for the reciprocation of the war formula. For example, from a moral international perspective, the war is gleaned as a humanitarian issue, but for the regime in Khartoum, it’s a war of “necessity.” This is the sort of desperation worth comprehending as it offers and bears open the pretext for the decimation, genocide, incineration of villages, and pogroms inflicted on innocent civilians, as well as the underlying assumptions shaping NCP’s policies.
Totally misguided, the incumbent regime also deems the CPA a bargaining chip; the SPLM utters the catastrophe in Darfur a “needless flagrant foul,” in response, the NCP threatens to subvert the CPA. It seems the NCP is in full embarkation of the dogma “an eye for an eye,” not realizing that this kind of an unwarranted attitude is detrimental to the peace progress, as it can blind the whole nation. With conviction, “We (NCP) will cancel the peace agreement,” says Professor Ibrahim Ahmed Omar, in response to the Movement’s asymmetric stance to that of the NCP Vis`a Vis Darfur issue. The fact that no peace loving citizen from his caucus condemned him is indicative of NCP’s support base is predominantly composed of “fundamentalist, Islamic ideologues,” who believe in strict, rigid Islamic doctrines that tend to exacerbate the subjugation and reproduction of their unilateral, isolationist policies.
If peace is to hold, the regime has to confer with its two distinct wings, alerting them that the peace agreement is a marriage and not a minority/majority rule as deemed. The consultation will obviously be difficult, as it tends to threaten their leadership; but if peace is of paramount importance, then this confessions are necessary as the overriding of a certain clique’s status quo, but if not, then, the notion of “equality,” in the case of Sudan is a mythology.
The tenor of NCPs policy is complex in a myriad of ways; but, the basic principle central to it; is that war has to be fermented, and the warring parties contained—even helped if necessary—so that neither wins or losses so as to keep the war going, of course, this is diametrically opposed to SPLMs role of paternalism, which makes it difficult for the two forces to merge. But, if meticulously analyzed, the failure of both forces reconciling their differences, means the very notion of a peaceful Sudan, one free from war, is an illusory one.
Unfortunately, the incumbent president is less educated than his predecessor, and rarely do his political instincts lead him to make informed decisions. Also equally important, is the fact that the incumbent’s knowledge is mainly derived from his military background. Alas, by training, a military’s regimental ethics prioritizes usurpation over diplomacy; therefore, with this kind of experience, it’s highly unlikely that President, Bashir and his cohorts, implicated in a “vast Islamic conspiracy,” will voluntarily concede to SPLMs demands, or even the international communities’.
Moreover, the regime’s capriciousness is questionable. After signing the peace accord, the NCP broke its trustworthiness by seizing two portfolios, and continuously tarnished that trust by selectively neglecting major CPA provisions; if by choice, they continue violating and antagonizing the SPLM, then, the current incense will be exacerbated, subjecting the latter party to morally and politically suffocate.
But, when that suffocation reaches its apex, the SPLM a distinct entity with a distinct command post will retaliate, resulting to an eruption of violence.
But, if this tragedy in the making is to be averted; or, if the goal of the government is to truly “UNITE” the country, then the NCP has to refrain from adopting unilateral, isolationist views—as this governance is a “secession recipe.” Sudan’s nefarious history must not be allowed to repeat itself. There are a few leaders willing to re-write history to score political points, and maintain a certain status quo. That status quo will have to be over-ridden, if unity is to be achieved.
The current regime can transform the country—if it so chooses— but instead, they prefer sticking to their skewed policies. But, if these exclusionary, discriminatory policies are perpetually and relentlessly pursued by the NCP, then the future of Sudan remains bleak.
* The author of this article is a Sudanese, currently residing in Canada; he can be reached at [email protected]
|
|
 
|
|
|
|
Deng
فيس بوك
تويتر
انستقرام
يوتيوب
بنتيريست