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 Re: مطار شرق العوينات | الأقمار الصناعية تكشف (Re: Biraima M Adam)
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تقدمت للذكاء الاصطناعي بهذا السؤال:
Quote: كيف نفسر التناقض في موقف مصر من الإمارات التي تدعم الدعم السريع الذي يحارب النظام السوداني؟
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فكانت الإجابة التالية:
Quote: يُفسر التناقض الظاهري في الموقف المصري تجاه الإمارات والسودان من خلال صراع المصالح بين "الأمن القومي الاستراتيجي" و"الاحتياجات الاقتصادية الحيوية". فبينما تدعم مصر الجيش السوداني (SAF) وترفض قوات الدعم السريع (RSF)، فإنها تظل مرتبطة بعلاقات مالية واستثمارية عميقة مع الإمارات، الداعم الرئيسي للأخيرة.
إليك أهم الأبعاد التي تفسر هذا التناقض بناءً على تحديثات عام 2026:
1. الموازنة بين "الأرض" و"المال"
الموقف من الجيش السوداني: تنظر مصر للجيش السوداني كعمود فقري للدولة السودانية، وتخشى أن يؤدي انهياره إلى فوضى عارمة على حدودها الجنوبية أو تقسيم السودان، وهو ما تعتبره القاهرة "خطاً أحمر".
التبعية الاقتصادية للإمارات: تعتمد مصر بشكل كبير على المساعدات المالية والاستثمارات الإماراتية الضخمة (مثل صفقة رأس الحكمة) لدعم اقتصادها، مما يحد من قدرتها على الدخول في مواجهة دبلوماسية علنية وشاملة مع أبوظبي بشأن ملف السودان.
2. التحول من الدبلوماسية إلى "التطويق الاستراتيجي" (تطورات 2026)
بحلول مطلع عام 2026، انتقلت مصر من حالة "الغموض" إلى إجراءات أكثر حزماً لتقليل تأثير الدعم الإماراتي للدعم السريع:
العمليات العسكرية السرية: كشفت تقارير في فبراير 2026 أن مصر تستخدم قاعدة مسيرات سرية في صحرائها الغربية لشن ضربات ضد قوات الدعم السريع، خاصة بعد سقوط مدينة "الفاشر"، مما يشير إلى تدخل مباشر لدعم الجيش السوداني ميدانياً.
إغلاق المجال الجوي: أشارت تقارير في يناير 2026 إلى أن مصر بدأت فعلياً بمنع طائرات الشحن الإماراتية المرتبطة بعمليات الدعم السريع من عبور مجالها الجوي.
الضغط على الحلفاء المشتركين: مارست مصر والسعودية ضغوطاً مكثفة في يناير 2025 و2026 على خليفة حفتر في ليبيا لوقف تسهيل الإمدادات العسكرية الإماراتية للدعم السريع عبر الأراضي الليبية.
3. تقارب "مصري-سعودي" لتحجيم النفوذ الإماراتي
تشهد بداية عام 2026 اصطفافاً مصرياً سعودياً قوياً (انضمت إليه تركيا أحياناً) يهدف إلى:
حماية وحدة الدولة السودانية ومنع تفككها، وهو موقف يتعارض مع الرؤية الإماراتية التي يراها المحللون أكثر تركيزاً على تأمين الموارد والوصول الاستراتيجي عبر قوات الدعم السريع.
تقليل المخاطر الأمنية في البحر الأحمر، حيث تخشى القاهرة أن تؤدي سياسات الإمارات إلى زعزعة الاستقرار وتضرر عوائد قناة السويس.
4. التناقض الأيديولوجي
تجد مصر نفسها في موقف فريد؛ فهي تدعم تحالفاً سودانياً يضم عناصر إسلامية (الكيزان) لأنها تعتبر بقاء الدولة السودانية أولوية قصوى تفوق خصومتها الأيديولوجية مع الإخوان المسلمين، في حين تبرر الإمارات دعمها للدعم السريع بمحاربة "الجماعات المتطرفة" المرتبطة بالإسلاميين في السودان.
الخلاصة: مصر لم تعد تصمت عن الدور الإماراتي، لكنها تديره عبر "صراع خفي" وأدوات ضغط ميدانية (مسيرات، إغلاق مجال جوي) مع الحفاظ على القنوات الدبلوماسية والاقتصادية مفتوحة لتجنب انهيار اقتصادي داخلي. |
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Re: مطار شرق العوينات | الأقمار الصناعية تكشف (Re: Yasir Elsharif)
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https://shorturl.at/ZoGms
Quote: Egypt: Partnering with Saudi Arabia on Security in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden
Jan 27, 2026 Gregory Aftandilian
Despite its extensive economic relations with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt appears to be hitching its wagon to Saudi Arabia in the kingdom’s dispute with Abu Dhabi over Yemen and other regional issues. Egypt shares Saudi Arabia’s perception that the UAE is attempting to undermine territorial integrity and sovereignty in Yemen, in Sudan, and elsewhere. From Cairo’s perspective, the UAE’s approach risks fostering instability in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden region, which can disrupt international shipping through the Suez Canal. Egypt depends upon canal transit fees for vital foreign exchange. Some reports suggest that Egypt is also uncomfortable with the UAE’s close relationship with Israel and with some of its other regional stances.
Protecting an Important Lifeline
In Yemen, Egypt provided Saudi Arabia only minimal military support for the Riyadh-led coalition of Arab states organized in 2015 to defeat the Houthi rebels (also known as Ansar Allah) who had taken over Sanaa. Cairo wanted to avoid a repeat of its unhappy experience in Yemen in the 1960s, when it became bogged down in that decade’s civil war. Yet Egypt shared Saudi desires to beat back the Houthi offensive. Egypt did not want the Yemeni conflict to disrupt international shipping from the strategic Bab al-Mandab strait at the mouth of the Red Sea that connects to the Suez Canal. Nor did Egypt want to see Iran’s military assistance to the Houthis allow Tehran to develop a foothold in Yemen.
Yemen’s current civil war has lasted much longer than Saudi Arabia anticipated, and the kingdom eventually realized that its military intervention against the Houthis had bogged down and began to seek a political solution to the conflict. Egypt also wanted the Yemeni conflict to end. The UAE’s support for the separatist Southern Transitional Council forces and its attempt to control several ports in southern Yemen worked against Egypt’s goals of a diplomatic resolution and the preservation of a unified Yemeni state. The UAE’s wish to control the sea lanes in this area raised concerns for Egypt about instability in those vital waters.
Instability in Yemen worries Cairo for economic and geostrategic reasons. The month after Israel launched its war on Gaza in October 2023, the Houthis started to attack Red Sea shipping to show their solidarity with the Palestinians. Although the Houthis claimed that they were only targeting vessels that were Israeli-owned or were headed to the Israeli port of Eilat, the group hit other ships as well. The attacks prompted several major international carriers to reroute their cargo ships from the Red Sea and the Suez Canal route to the longer, more expensive route around Southern Africa’s Cape of Good Hope. Egypt reported that in 2024, the state lost some $7 billion in revenue due to ships’ rerouting from the Suez Canal, a drop from the $9.4 billion from canal tolls that Egypt earned in 2022-23.
Since the October 2025 Israel-Hamas ceasefire, the Houthis have ended their shipping attacks, and Cairo has begun to recoup some of its losses by enticing shipping companies to return to the Suez Canal route, even offering them financial incentives to do so. For logistical reasons, rerouting will take some time. The last thing Cairo wants in the meantime is for violence and instability to return to the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
On the Same Page with Riyadh on Sudan
Egypt and Saudi Arabia are not only on the same page in Yemen. In the civil war in Sudan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt have sided with the government headed by Sudanese Armed Forces chief General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan against Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (also known as Hemedti) and the UAE-backed Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Islamists cooperate with al-Burhan’s coalition. Although Egypt’s regime strongly opposes Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated organizations, Cairo considers a potential breakup of the Sudanese state to be a more ominous threat. Egypt has had a long relationship with the regular Sudanese military and wants to keep those relations friendly. It also needs the Sudanese government on its side in its long-running dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which has begun to adversely affect the flow of Nile water that is crucial to meet Egypt’s needs.
While Egypt and Saudi Arabia’s support for one side in the Sudanese civil war has prolonged the country’s agony, in recent months they seem to have changed heart. In November 2025, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) visited Washington at the same time as news broke of fresh atrocities committed by RSF units in al-Fasher in the Darfur region. Perhaps with Egyptian support, MBS called for an end to the Sudan crisis and asked President Donald Trump to help. The UAE—which has long denied any involvement with the RSF—has seemed uninterested in a negotiated solution.
Opposition to Israeli-UAE Efforts in Somaliland
Another Saudi-Egyptian divergence with the UAE is over Somaliland: the two countries opposed Israel’s December 2025 recognition of the breakaway state, where the UAE has built a presence. From Egypt’s and Saudi Arabia’s perspective, the Israelis have no business interfering in the internal affairs of a Muslim country, especially one that buttresses the strategic Gulf of Aden. The UAE has provided Somaliland with investments and military training while establishing its own military presence in the port of Berbera. This strategy seems to echo Abu Dhabi’s approach in southern Yemen. When Israel recognized Somaliland, it appeared as if the UAE and Israel were coordinating to make the breakaway state viable. The President of Somalia, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, severed all agreements with the UAE and said that he would enhance strategic cooperation on Red Sea security and deepen military cooperation with Riyadh and Cairo.
Seeing the UAE as an Outlier on Israel/Palestine
Egypt, the first Arab state to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, has in recent years increased its economic cooperation with Tel Aviv through large natural gas deals. But Cairo has a cold political relationship with the Netanyahu government over Gaza and the broader Palestinian issue, even after the Gaza ceasefire. Israel has still not opened the Rafah crossing in the southern Gaza Strip, as per the ceasefire agreement of October 2025, thus continuing to hinder the flow of humanitarian supplies into the Gaza Strip, nor has it stopped its military attacks in Gaza, causing hundreds of casualties since the ceasefire began. Egypt likely sees the Netanyahu government as unwilling to allow a Palestinian technocratic administration to run Gaza under US tutelage, as Trump’s peace plan calls for. Saudi Arabia, despite past behind-the-scenes cooperation with Israel on issues such as Iran, also is concerned about the policies of the Netanyahu government toward the Palestinians. For this and other reasons Riyadh has not joined the so-called Abraham Accords, despite Trump’s entreaties.
By contrast, the UAE has established close relations with Israel. It appears to be the Arab state that has been the least critical of Israeli policies in Gaza and the West Bank since the Gaza war began. Although Emirati diplomats occasionally have criticized Israel at the United Nations, the widespread perception in the region is that the UAE has been too indulgent of Netanyahu and his far-right government and have developed a strategic alliance that has enabled Israel to bolster its position as the regional hegemon. While both Cairo and Riyadh are realistic about Israel’s power, they do not see the need for Abu Dhabi to cater to Israel’s designs.
An Important Meeting in Cairo…
For these and other reasons, relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia have been improving, as evidenced by Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs Faisal bin Farhan’s January 5, 2026, visit to Cairo, where he met with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. According to the Egyptian readout, the two countries hold “identical” positions on reaching peaceful solutions to the region’s crises, emphasizing that the solutions must “preserve the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of states” and specifically mentioning Somaliland, Sudan, and Yemen. Although the statement did not name the UAE, it is quite possible that Egypt and Saudi Arabia intended to convey criticism for Abu Dhabi’s support of rebel movements and breakaway states.
Cairo maintains important economic links to the UAE. Recent data have shown that trade between the two countries increased by 77 percent, to $4.8 billion, in the first half of 2025 and that remittances from Egyptians working in the UAE were $1.8 billion in Fiscal Year 2023/2024. Nevertheless, Egypt seems willing to risk Emirati ire by siding with Saudi Arabia in these regional disputes. Part of Egypt’s calculations may be that while UAE trade and investment in Egypt is substantial, its economic ties with Saudi Arabia are even more important. In 2024, trade between Egypt and Saudi Arabia reached almost $16 billion, representing a 29 percent increase over the previous year. In addition, Saudi investments in Egypt grew to some $35 billion in 2025. Egypt perhaps hopes that this amount will continue to increase as it becomes even closer to Saudi Arabia. Reports in September 2025 indicated that Egypt and Saudi Arabia agreed to form a joint naval force to protect the Red Sea, in order to avoid being tied to Western security actions in the area. Whether such a joint force will come to fruition is uncertain, but the announcement does signal growing ties between the two countries.
… and Another Important Meeting in Davos
On January 21, 2026, Trump and el-Sisi held a bilateral meeting at the World Economic Forum in Davos. El-Sisi said that he valued Trump’s offer to help mediate in Egypt’s dispute with Ethiopia over the GERD. El-Sisi may hope that MBS will weigh in alongside Trump on Egypt’s behalf, which would represent an added benefit of Cairo’s enhanced security cooperation with Riyadh. Although bolstering revenues from increased shipping on the Suez Canal is a priority for Cairo, ensuring that the GERD does not adversely affect water flows may be even more important considering Egypt’s growing population and water needs.
The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors. |
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Re: مطار شرق العوينات | الأقمار الصناعية تكشف (Re: Yasir Elsharif)
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Quote: Some reports suggest that Egypt is also uncomfortable with the UAE’s close relationship with Israel and with some of its other regional stances.
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https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/dependency-politics-in-the-egypt-uae-relationship/
Quote:
Dependency Politics in the Egypt–UAE Relationship
Nov 26, 2025, 8:18 PM
Egypt and the United Arab Emirates still perform unity with polished ease. Joint statements evoke shared visions of stability, counter-extremism and modernization. Ceremonial optics suggest two states moving in parallel. Yet behind the choreography lies a shift more fundamental than the polite language can conceal. What began a decade ago as ideological convergence has matured into structural asymmetry. Egypt speaks the language of partnership; the UAE acts from a position of leverage. The transition has unfolded quietly, without rupture or rhetoric, but it now reshapes the balance of power in the Arab world.
From Counter-Islamism to Strategic Imbalance
The hinge year was 2013. Sisi’s ascent after the ouster of Morsi aligned perfectly with Abu Dhabi’s strategic worldview. Both leaderships regarded the Muslim Brotherhood not as a political competitor but as an existential threat. The UAE supplied cash injections, supportive lobbying in Western capitals and a media environment that delegitimized Islamist currents. Egypt supplied symbolism: the return of the region’s historic centre of gravity as the anchor of counterrevolution.
Even then, the benefits were uneven. Egypt needed liquidity to defend its currency, protect subsidies and reassure a wary military establishment. The UAE needed a large state to give regional weight to its ambitions. The more Egypt leaned on Emirati funds, the less room it retained to shape the agenda it claimed to lead. Dependency began not as humiliation, but as convenience.
Libya: Shared Goals, Diverging Priorities
Libya reveals how convergence hardened into constraint. Both states initially backed Haftar, but after the failure of the 2019 Tripoli offensive, Egyptian officials reassessed his utility. Cairo cultivated ties with Aguila Saleh and other eastern actors, prioritizing border stability and predictability. Western diplomatic reporting and UN monitoring indicated growing Egyptian irritation with Haftar’s refusal to compromise. The UAE, by contrast, doubled down, extending drone and armored support long after Cairo’s enthusiasm cooled.
For Egypt, Libya policy is defensive: prevent militant spillover, weapons flows and uncontrolled migration. For the UAE, Libya is a proving ground for a strongman-centric model of post-revolutionary order. Continued Emirati arms supplies prolonged the conflict and contributed to the insecurity Egypt must absorb. Cairo-aligned commentators now hint at unease, though without naming Abu Dhabi. The beneficiary dictates tempo; the dependent manages consequences.
Sudan: A Fault Line in Plain Sight
Sudan exposes the limits of alignment even more starkly. Egypt maintains deep ties to the Sudanese Armed Forces and views the RSF’s rise as destabilizing to Nile negotiations, border management and internal cohesion. The UAE, however, cultivated relations with the RSF and supplied material support that strengthened a faction Cairo considers hazardous. Emirati officials framed their role as mediation and humanitarian facilitation. Egyptian policymakers privately expressed frustration that their supposed partner was empowering a force hostile to Egyptian preferences.
The point is not that the UAE controls Sudan or that Egypt has lost all influence. Rather, the divergence fits a recurring pattern: Cairo seeks institutional continuity, while Abu Dhabi often backs adaptable power brokers. Instability burdens Egypt; opportunity benefits the UAE.
The Horn of Africa and the Water Constraint
In the Horn, the dynamics are subtler but no less consequential. The UAE has secured port access, logistics hubs and security partnerships across the Red Sea corridor, granting it maritime reach and proximity to Ethiopia. Egypt’s overriding concern remains the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which threatens its water security. Emirati diplomacy occasionally offers mediation, but influence in the Horn increasingly flows through Abu Dhabi rather than Cairo’s historic African ties. Nothing here is explicitly anti-Egypt, yet the strategic environment shifts in ways that complicate Egypt’s negotiating leverage.
Israel and the Erosion of Symbolic Primacy
For decades, Egypt alone held the legitimacy to mediate with Israel. The UAE’s normalization agreements rewrote that hierarchy. Economic cooperation, technological exchange and regional security coordination now run through Abu Dhabi. Egypt still matters in Gaza management and security channels, but it no longer defines the terms of Arab-Israeli engagement. Symbolic capital has migrated.
Debt, Demographics and the Silent Constraint
Under ordinary conditions, such foreign-policy frictions would prompt recalibration. But Egypt lacks the economic sovereignty required for recalibration. The UAE is among its largest external creditors, provides central bank deposits that stabilize the pound and facilitates investment inflows that prevent fiscal collapse. Egypt’s population size – once an asset – has become a structural burden requiring perpetual external financing. The state cannot sustain subsidies, upgrade infrastructure or maintain military dominance without Gulf capital. This is not alignment; it is enforced acquiescence.
Egyptian analysts increasingly acknowledge the dependency, though cautiously. The official narrative remains partnership. The lived reality is constraint.
The Emirati Logic and Egypt’s Narrowing Horizon
Abu Dhabi’s strategy is consistent: secure ports and supply chains, acquire financial leverage, develop technological capacity, and cultivate transactional relationships with major powers. It favors stability without mass politics and influence without ideological exposure. In this framework, Egypt is most useful when dependent and non-competitive. A resurgent Egypt would dilute Emirati centrality; a constrained Egypt reinforces it. Through debt, assets and investment conditionality, the UAE not only shapes Egypt’s environment – it shapes Egypt itself.
A Quiet Reordering of the Arab System
This leads to an uncomfortable conclusion. The traditional hierarchy of the Arab world, in which demographics and military weight determined influence, no longer applies. Egypt retains the symbols of leadership. The UAE exercises the functions. Cairo still speaks the language of historic centrality, but it does so from a position where independence is increasingly theoretical.
The only path to reversing this trajectory would require Egypt to restructure its economy, reduce the military’s dominance in civilian sectors, foster innovation and rebuild legitimacy through performance rather than narrative. Nothing in the current system suggests such transformation is imminent.
The question, then, is no longer whether the UAE undermines Egyptian influence. It is whether Egypt retains the capacity for strategic agency at all. If it does not, the Arab centre of gravity has already moved – and it moved while Cairo still talked as though history guaranteed relevance.
About the AuthorLeo Benderski is a university student from Germany with a passion for exploring Israeli national security, Middle Eastern geopolitics, and strategic affairs. Currently pursuing his studies at the University of Mannheim, Leo combines rigorous academic inquiry with active engagement in regional developments. Through his writing, he seeks to provide thoughtful, balanced perspectives on complex geopolitical issues, aiming to inform and encourage meaningful dialogue among readers. When he's not analyzing policy or international relations, Leo enjoys connecting with fellow enthusiasts, expanding his knowledge, and staying curious about the evolving dynamics of global politics. |
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احدث المقالات بسودانيزاونلاين اليوم
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Yasir Elsharif
Biraima M Adam
فيس بوك
تويتر
انستقرام
يوتيوب
بنتيريست