From Karbala to the Tamil Tigers — What History Teaches About the Likely Fate of Hemedti Part 1

03:50 PM October, 24 2026

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From Karbala to the Tamil Tigers — What History Teaches About the Likely Fate of Hemedti

Part 1

By Dr El-Tahir El-Faki

Introduction

From the early Islamic period to the modern era, rebellions against established governments have ended in markedly different ways. Some rebel leaders have been killed in battle or executed after capture. Others have escaped into exile, negotiated settlements, or survived defeat to establish new political orders. In some cases, the leader has disappeared, but the movement or the grievances that sustained it have endured.

These historical experiences offer a useful framework for examining the possible fate of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, the leader of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

History cannot predict an individual’s future with certainty. It can, however, identify recurring patterns and explain why military victory, political legitimacy, alliances and organisational cohesion often determine whether a rebel leader survives, surrenders, negotiates or loses power.

The experiences of six figures from Islamic history, together with three modern armed movements, illustrate these patterns.

I. Rebellion and Its Consequences in Islamic History

1. Husayn ibn Ali: Death and Enduring Historical Memory

In 680 CE, Husayn ibn Ali, the grandson of Prophet Muhammad, refused to recognise the authority of the Umayyad caliph Yazid. He and a small group of family members and supporters were killed at Karbala, in present-day Iraq.

Although Husayn’s immediate political challenge ended in defeat, his death acquired an enduring religious and moral significance, particularly in Shi’a Islam.

His experience demonstrates that the death of a rebel leader does not necessarily destroy the meaning of his struggle. A movement may lose militarily while its leader becomes a lasting symbol of resistance.

The distinction between political defeat and historical legacy is therefore essential when assessing the consequences of rebellion.

2. Abdullah ibn al-Zubayr: The Collapse of a Rival Authority

Abdullah ibn al-Zubayr challenged Umayyad rule and established a rival caliphate centred on Mecca. His political authority attracted support in several regions and survived for years.

The Umayyad caliph Abd al-Malik eventually sent al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf to suppress the rebellion. After the siege of Mecca, Ibn al-Zubayr was killed in 692 CE.

His fate illustrates the vulnerability of a rebel leader who establishes a competing political authority but cannot ultimately defend it against a better-positioned adversary.

Territorial control and the ability to challenge a government do not necessarily translate into sustainable political legitimacy or long-term survival.

3. Abu Muslim al-Khurasani: The Revolutionary Who Fell Out with His Allies

Abu Muslim played a crucial role in the Abbasid revolution that overthrew the Umayyad dynasty in 750 CE. His military influence and following in Khurasan made him a powerful figure in the new political order.

Nevertheless, the Abbasid caliph al-Mansur considered his independent power a threat and arranged his killing in 755 CE.

This case illustrates a recurring danger in revolutionary politics: a leader who helps defeat a common enemy may subsequently become unacceptable to the allies who benefited from his victory.

The interests of a rebel leader and those of his supporters are not always identical. An alliance built around a shared adversary can weaken or collapse once political power is redistributed.

4. Babak Khorramdin: Prolonged Resistance and Final Defeat

Babak led a prolonged rebellion against the Abbasid Caliphate in north-western Iran. His movement resisted government forces for approximately two decades before he was captured and executed in 838 CE.

His experience demonstrates that a rebellion can survive for many years without achieving a lasting political victory. Local support, difficult terrain and the weaknesses of central authority may sustain armed resistance, but these advantages can disappear when the military balance changes.

The duration of a conflict is not, by itself, evidence that its outcome will favour the insurgents.

5. The Zanj Revolt: Defeating an Organisation Without Erasing Its Grievances

The Zanj revolt, which lasted from 869 to 883 CE, mobilised enslaved people and other marginalised groups in southern Iraq under the leadership of Ali ibn Muhammad.

The rebels established a substantial territorial base and resisted Abbasid forces for years. Eventually, the Abbasids captured the rebel stronghold and crushed the movement.

The revolt caused extensive destruction and demonstrated the state’s eventual capacity to defeat a major uprising.

Yet its broader historical significance also raises a question that remains relevant to modern conflicts: does the defeat of an armed movement resolve the grievances that contributed to its emergence؟

Military victory may remove an organisation without necessarily eliminating the underlying social, political or economic tensions.

6. Abd al-Rahman I: Escape, Exile and Political Renewal

When the Abbasids overthrew the Umayyads in 750 CE, Abd al-Rahman I escaped the destruction of his family. He eventually reached al-Andalus, in present-day Spain, where he established an independent Umayyad emirate in Córdoba in 756 CE.

His experience represents a different outcome from death or execution. Escape enabled him to rebuild political alliances and establish a new centre of power far from the territory in which his family had lost control.

However, his achievement depended on exceptional historical circumstances and his ability to build a viable political coalition. Exile alone does not guarantee renewed power.

II. Modern Parallels: Three Different Outcomes

7. The Tamil Tigers: The Leader Falls with the Military Organisation

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), commonly known as the Tamil Tigers, fought for an independent Tamil state in Sri Lanka.

In May 2009, the Sri Lankan military defeated the organisation’s remaining forces, and its leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, was killed.

The LTTE’s defeat illustrates how the destruction of an organisation’s territorial base and military leadership can bring a prolonged insurgency to an end.

The comparison is relevant to the question of whether a movement can survive the collapse of its military position. Nevertheless, the LTTE and the RSF differ in their origins, political structures, social composition and conflict environments. Their outcomes should not be treated as interchangeable.

8. The Taliban: Defeat Followed by a Return to Power

The Taliban were removed from power in Afghanistan in 2001 but survived as an insurgent movement. After years of conflict, they returned to Kabul in August 2021.

Their trajectory demonstrates that losing government control does not necessarily mean the end of a movement. Organisational continuity, recruitment, territorial influence, external relationships and changes in the international environment can create opportunities for a return.

However, this outcome was not inevitable, and it should not be used to predict a similar future for the RSF. The political and military circumstances in Sudan are different.

9. The FARC: Negotiating an Exit from Armed Conflict

Colombia’s Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) signed a peace agreement with the government in 2016. The agreement provided for disarmament and the reintegration of former combatants into civilian and political life.

The process demonstrated that an armed movement can negotiate a transition away from war rather than face the complete destruction of its membership.

Nevertheless, the agreement did not end all violence. Some former combatants rejected it, dissident groups remained active, and serious challenges to peace continued.

The lesson is that a negotiated settlement requires more than signatures. Its durability depends on security guarantees, political inclusion, implementation and credible mechanisms for addressing victims’ rights and accountability.

III. Five Historical Patterns

Taken together, these cases reveal five recurring outcomes:

1. Death in battle: A leader is killed when the movement loses its military position.
2. Execution after capture: A victorious authority eliminates a rival it regards as dangerous.
3. Negotiated settlement: A leader or movement accepts an agreement that ends or reduces armed confrontation.
4. Exile and political renewal: A leader escapes defeat and attempts to rebuild power elsewhere.
5. The survival of the movement: The organisation, its political cause or its underlying grievances persist after defeat or leadership change.

These patterns are not mutually exclusive. A leader may be killed while his movement survives in a different form. A movement may disarm while some of its members return to violence. A leader may survive in exile without regaining political influence.

Conclusion: History Offers Lessons, Not Certainties

The experiences of Husayn ibn Ali, Abdullah ibn al-Zubayr, Abu Muslim, Babak Khorramdin and Abd al-Rahman I demonstrate that rebel leaders have faced very different outcomes. Modern examples, from the Tamil Tigers to the Taliban and the FARC, reinforce the same point.

No single historical analogy can determine Hemedti’s future. The relevant question is not simply whether he will win or lose, but whether the RSF can sustain its organisation, whether its alliances endure, whether negotiations become possible and whether a political settlement can address Sudan’s wider crisis.

Part Two examines these questions directly, assessing the possible trajectories for Hemedti and the RSF, the factors that could shape their future, and the implications for Sudan’s peace, accountability and political reconstruction.

Arabic Forum