No Exclusion, No Recognition of Arms: Functional Legitimacy as the Criterion for Dialogue A readin

00:52 AM October, 13 2026

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Series: "Complementing, Not Confronting"

No Exclusion, No Recognition of Arms: Functional Legitimacy as the Criterion for Dialogue

A reading of the exchange between Mr. Khalid Kodi and Dr. Elwathig Kameir on "Tasis" and the Sudanese dialogue

Dr. Ali Abdullahi Elkhalifa Taha

Introduction

Dr. Elwathig Kameir published an article entitled "'Tasis' and the Sudanese Dialogue: Between the Necessity of Inclusion and the Danger of Legitimizing Division." Mr. Khalid Kodi responded with a critical reading in which he argued that Dr. Kameir's approach makes the continuity of the institutions of Old Sudan the reference point for deciding which parties are eligible, and that the dialogue he calls for risks reproducing the very crisis it seeks to resolve. The exchange between the two writers is among the most useful contributions on this subject, because it puts its finger on the question that will decide the fate of any coming political process: who sits at the dialogue table, in what capacity, and by what criterion؟

In this series we do not write to side with one party against another, but to complete what both writers have begun. We will try to show that the disagreement between them is narrower than it appears, that its real location is not where Mr. Kodi placed it, and that the binary within which both operate — institutional exclusion or institutional recognition — can be transcended by a third criterion that we propose in the "Charter of Salvation and State-Building."

First: Where Mr. Kodi Is Right

Mr. Kodi is right to invert Dr. Kameir's question. Instead of asking about "the danger of legitimizing division," he poses a prior question: how do we prevent the reproduction of the state that made division and war possible in the first place؟ No project for dialogue may bypass this question, because the current war is not an accident that befell a healthy state; it is the most violent manifestation of an old structural crisis.

He is right to distinguish between the New Sudan project and the alliances that carry it today. He writes that the demands of New Sudan "preceded the Tasis alliance and the current war by decades," and that the peoples of the margins did not struggle "merely to obtain additional seats within the institutions of the old state, but to change the foundations that produced discrimination, exclusion, and historical privilege." This is a necessary distinction, because tying the just demands of the margins to a single armed faction ultimately serves those who wish to defeat those demands.

He is right, third, to state clearly that defending the New Sudan project "does not grant the Tasis alliance or anyone else immunity from accountability, nor does it turn military force into a source of democratic legitimacy." And he is right, finally, to conclude that the unity worth defending is "a voluntary unity among equal citizens in a state they recognize because it recognizes them." It is a phrase we adopt in full.

Second: What Dr. Kameir Actually Said

Yet fairness to Mr. Kodi requires fairness to Dr. Kameir as well. A return to the text of his article shows that his criterion of eligibility is not membership in the institutions of the existing state, but the capacity in which a party participates: a civilian and political capacity, not an armed capacity or that of a parallel authority. He begins from an explicit principle:

"In principle, no serious dialogue can rest on total exclusion."

He then applies the same criterion to the other side:

"Political or civilian forces that support the army or the existing government should not participate as representatives of the army or as its spokespeople."

And he adds a principle that can hardly be read as a defence of the old structure: that "control of territory does not confer political legitimacy." Mr. Kodi's claim that this approach grants "the forces linked to the existing structure the right to determine the eligibility of others" therefore does not match the text. Dr. Kameir refuses to let the army enter the political dialogue through its fronts, just as he refuses this to the Rapid Support Forces.

Nor does Dr. Kameir ignore the historical causes of the crisis, as the response suggests. He places on the agenda of the constitutional phase "the major questions concerning the form of the state, the constitution, the relationship between the centre and the regions, justice, citizenship, and identity," alongside the relationship between religion and the state and a single national army. As for his distinction between Tasis and the Juba Agreement movements, it rests on a specific criterion: those movements existed as political actors with declared demands before the current war, and some of them moved toward integrating their forces into state institutions and transitioning to civilian political work. Even so, he demands that they not exploit their remaining weapons to gain additional political weight, and he does not exempt them from accountability.

Third: Where the Real Disagreement Lies

If this is so, the disagreement between the two writers is not between one who defends the old state and one who wants to refound it. Both accept that the questions of centre and margin, citizenship and identity, are unavoidable. The real disagreement lies in two more precise issues.

The first issue: sequencing

Dr. Kameir proposes a phased path: a military and security track to end the war first, then a widening of the political process once the rules of participation are clear, then a constitutional dialogue addressing the major questions. Here lies Mr. Kodi's legitimate concern, even if he does not name it as such. Sudanese experience has taught us that what is deferred to "the final phase" often never reaches it, and that the balance of power formed in the first and second phases decides in advance what may be raised in the third. If post-war arrangements are entrenched on the basis of the existing state, the constitutional dialogue becomes a dialogue about the details of the structure rather than its foundations.

The second issue: the double standard

Mr. Kodi proposes that the criterion be a party's political project and its record, not the date of its founding or its signature on an agreement. This is a sound criterion in itself, but the response applies it unevenly. The institutions of the old state are judged by their historical record of marginalization and war, and rightly so. Tasis, however, is read through "the political project it declares," not through the record of the armed force to which it is linked in the areas under that force's control. If the record is the criterion, it is a criterion for everyone. And if declared principles were sufficient, the old state itself declared fine principles in every one of its constitutions.

Moreover, the response acknowledges that the New Sudan project is broader than Tasis, yet it offers no mechanism to prevent the armed alliance from becoming the exclusive spokesperson for that project at the dialogue table. This is precisely what Dr. Kameir fears: not that the demands of the margins will be heard, but that they will be reduced to whoever carries arms in their name.

Fourth: From Binary to Criterion

The two writers thus move within a binary: Dr. Kameir accepts individuals in their civilian capacity and rejects the entity, while Mr. Kodi refuses to have the entity excluded in advance by a criterion set by the existing structure. In the "Charter of Salvation and State-Building" we propose to move beyond this binary through a set of complementary mechanisms.

Ascending Functional Legitimacy

The criterion we propose is ascending functional legitimacy: that the eligibility of every party be measured by what it actually delivers to citizens — protecting their lives, safeguarding their rights, and providing services — in the areas it administers or influences. Legitimacy does not come from institutional origin; this is what Mr. Kodi rightly rejects. It does not come from arms or control of territory; this is what Dr. Kameir rightly rejects. Nor does it come from declared principles alone; this is what Mr. Kodi's reading of Tasis overlooks. It is a legitimacy that ascends from the base, is earned through performance, and is forfeited through violation. It applies to the Armed Forces and their allies among the Juba signatories exactly as it applies to the Rapid Support Forces and Tasis.

The Institutional Wall

On the question of the capacity in which each party participates, the Charter offers the mechanism of the institutional wall. It is not enough to ask individuals to participate "in their civilian capacity," because a civilian capacity may serve as cover for an existing organizational tie; Dr. Kameir himself warns that "the criterion is not changing a name or denying political affiliation." Nor, on the other hand, is it acceptable for an entity linked to an armed force to enter the dialogue with its entire structure intact. The institutional wall means that the political wing of any alliance participates on condition of a verifiable organizational, leadership, and financial separation from the military command, overseen by an independent body. This opens the door to the political project without letting arms walk through it, and the same condition applies to all forces linked to the army.

The Transitional Bridge Initiative

On the question of sequencing, the Transitional Bridge Initiative proposes accepting the phased approach Dr. Kameir suggests, on condition that the founding principles are fixed from the first phase rather than deferred to the last: equal citizenship, a single national army subordinate to civilian authority, and the impermissibility of converting the outcomes of war into political privileges. The security track must not produce constitutional facts, and the constitutional track must not begin from a page written by the balance of power.

The Fourth Pillar and the Gateway Economy

So that the margins need no armed intermediary to make their voice heard, the Charter proposes the Fourth Pillar: structurally guaranteed regional representation in the institutions of government, not dependent on the military balance of power at any given moment. In this way the demands of the margins move from being a bargaining chip in the hands of whoever carries arms to being a settled constitutional right.

As for the "structure of historical privilege" of which Mr. Kodi speaks, the Charter calls it the gateway economy: the control of narrow elites over the gateways to wealth, power, and services, which they open and close for whomever they choose. The naming is not a linguistic luxury; it turns a general accusation into a structural diagnosis that can be addressed through specific measures. More importantly, this diagnosis reveals that the war economy reproduces gateways among all armed parties — in gold, in border crossings, and in relief. Dismantling the gateways is therefore a task that concerns the old centre and the parallel authorities alike.

Three-Tier Transitional Justice

Finally, three-tier transitional justice gives practical content to what both writers agree upon: the rejection of impunity. It addresses individual criminal responsibility, reparation for victims and communities, and the institutional reform that prevents recurrence. It applies to all parties without exception. Accountability that selects its adversaries becomes one more instrument of war.

Conclusion: A Unity That Recognizes Its Citizens

Dr. Kameir asks: how do we hold a dialogue without legitimizing division؟ Mr. Kodi asks: how do we hold a dialogue without reproducing the state that produced division؟ In our view, the two questions are two faces of a single question, and they share a single answer: one criterion applied to everyone, measuring legitimacy by what is delivered to the citizen, not by what institutions or weapons one possesses.

At the root of all this lies a principle that the Charter calls al-iftiqar — mutual interdependence: that Sudanese, at the centre and on the margins, need one another, and that none of them is made whole by excluding the other. From this principle springs the voluntary unity with which Mr. Kodi concluded his article: a unity imposed neither by the institutions of power nor by the balance of force, but chosen by equal citizens in a state they recognize because it recognizes them. This is common ground on which both writers meet, and on which a dialogue can be built that excludes no one — and recognizes no arms.

References

Elwathig Kameir, "'Tasis' and the Sudanese Dialogue: Between the Necessity of Inclusion and the Danger of Legitimizing Division" (in Arabic), Toronto, 8 October 2026, Sudan Tribune and Sudanile.

Khalid Kodi, "A Reading of Dr. Elwathig Kameir's Article on Tasis and the Sudanese Dialogue" (in Arabic), Sudanese Online, 10 October 2026.

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