How Can Sudanese Be Saved from Hunger and the Expansion of Famine Prevented؟ By Prof. Hassan Bashi

01:29 AM September, 28 2026

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How Can Sudanese Be Saved from Hunger and the Expansion of Famine Prevented؟

By Prof. Hassan Bashir Mohamed Nour

Introduction: Sudan Is Facing a Rescue Battle That Cannot Wait

Nearly four years after the outbreak of war in Sudan, the food crisis is no longer merely one of the consequences of the conflict. It has become central to the Sudanese crisis itself. Hunger no longer necessarily means that food is unavailable. Increasingly, it means that millions of Sudanese have lost the ability to produce food, access it, purchase it, or transport it from areas of production to centers of consumption.

This is where the gravity of the crisis lies. Wheat, sorghum, and other basic commodities may be available in a market, yet a household may lack sufficient income to purchase them. Agricultural land may remain fertile, but farmers may have no access to fuel, seeds, fertilizers, credit, or other essential inputs. Humanitarian assistance may reach a particular region but fail to reach those most in need because of active fighting, insecurity, destroyed roads and bridges, or administrative restrictions.

Saving Sudanese people from hunger, therefore, cannot be achieved simply by sending more food, important and necessary as that assistance is. It requires restoring the entire food system, including agricultural production, markets and trade, transportation and fuel, household incomes, water and healthcare, and targeted humanitarian delivery.

Hunger Figures Reveal the Scale of the Danger

The figures available in 2026 paint a stark and alarming picture.

According to the latest Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analysis cited in the available data, approximately 19.5 million Sudanese, or around 41 percent of the analyzed population, faced acute levels of food insecurity, classified as IPC Phase 3 or worse, between February and May 2026. Of these, approximately 14 million were in Phase 3, or Crisis; more than 5 million were in Phase 4, or Emergency; and approximately 200,000 were in Phase 5, or Catastrophe.

The risk does not end with these figures. Projections for the lean season between June and September 2026 indicated that the number of people expected to reach Phase 5 could remain extremely high, with approximately 200,000 people projected to face Catastrophe conditions across 15 areas. Fourteen areas in North Darfur, South Darfur, and South Kordofan remained at risk of famine under worst-case scenarios. The available estimates also indicated that the risk of famine could persist in 13 areas until the harvest season in January 2027.

An important technical point must be emphasized. The absence of a declared nationwide famine does not mean that the threat of famine has disappeared. Under the IPC methodology, famine is a classification based on specific technical thresholds. Millions of people can suffer from Crisis, Emergency, or Catastrophe levels of food insecurity long before those thresholds are officially crossed.

The nutritional dimension is even more alarming. International organizations have estimated that approximately 825,000 children under five could suffer from Severe Acute Malnutrition during 2026, a level roughly 7 percent higher than in 2025 and approximately 25 percent above pre-war levels.

The food crisis is therefore gradually becoming a crisis of human capital itself.

Sudan's Hunger Is Not Merely a Food Supply Problem

It may be tempting to view Sudan's crisis simply as a shortage of grain or as a problem that can be solved by importing more food. Such an explanation, however, is inadequate.

Sudan is a large agricultural country with substantial land, water, livestock, and farming expertise. The fundamental problem under current conditions is the collapse and fragmentation of the food supply chain.

The war has displaced millions of people, disrupted agricultural production, destroyed or paralyzed markets, warehouses, and transport networks, eliminated sources of income, increased the cost of agricultural inputs, and fragmented markets across regions controlled by different armed actors.

Humanitarian and physical access to agricultural inputs and humanitarian assistance has consequently become a central component of the food-security equation.

The danger was illustrated on September 2, 2026, when the World Food Programme reported that an airstrike struck two trucks carrying food assistance near Delami/Dilling in South Kordofan. According to WFP, more than 50 metric tons of food intended to feed approximately 5,800 people for a month were destroyed. WFP also reported that it had recorded eight airstrikes during the year that damaged its facilities or disrupted its operations.

Such incidents demonstrate that the challenge is not simply obtaining money and food. It is also maintaining the ability to deliver assistance safely and consistently to the people who need it most.

Funding Alone Is Insufficient, but It Is Essential

Sudan's 2026 Humanitarian Response Plan requires billions of dollars to address the country's enormous humanitarian needs. At the same time, the food, livelihoods, and agriculture sectors require substantial dedicated resources if the country is to move from immediate life-saving assistance toward protecting people's capacity to produce food in the future.

The Food and Agriculture Organization's 2026 appeal reportedly sought approximately US$230.5 million to assist around 2.465 million people through crop, livestock, fisheries, and agricultural production support. The World Food Programme likewise requires substantial resources to maintain its humanitarian operations.

Funding shortages, however, are already translating into reductions in assistance. In September 2026, WFP warned that declining aid was leaving hundreds of thousands of displaced people in Sudan at risk of losing the food assistance on which they depend. Earlier, in June 2026, the agency warned that food stocks allocated to humanitarian operations were approaching depletion.

The immediate first step in saving Sudanese lives, therefore, is to prevent humanitarian funding from collapsing.

Where Can Relief Come From in an Isolated and Divided Country؟

Sudan's political and security conditions have created serious difficulties for donors and humanitarian agencies. Some donor governments and organizations may be reluctant to channel substantial resources through state institutions or other channels perceived to be linked to combatants. However, this reality must not become a justification for leaving civilians without food.

A practical approach requires, as far as possible, separating humanitarian assistance from political and military disputes. It also requires transparent, multi-channel mechanisms that allow direct support for food, healthcare, water, sanitation, and agricultural production, together with independent financial oversight and transparent procurement systems capable of reducing the risk of diversion.

Political isolation and disputes over institutional legitimacy may continue, but they should not be allowed to become humanitarian isolation or collective punishment for the Sudanese population.

Saving Food Begins at the Farm

One of the greatest mistakes would be to allow Sudan to become permanently dependent on external food shipments. Food assistance is indispensable for saving lives, but it cannot resolve a food crisis of this magnitude on its own.

Sudan needs a comprehensive agricultural emergency program implemented before each planting season. Such a program should provide seeds, fertilizers, fuel, pesticides, livestock feed, veterinary services, maintenance of irrigation canals, wells and pumps, and accessible financing for smallholder farmers.

Priority should be given to areas where agricultural production can be restored rapidly, while farmers must be protected from displacement, looting, destruction of crops, and the loss of productive assets.

Wherever conditions permit, part of international assistance should shift from importing food toward purchasing agricultural inputs locally and supporting local production.

A ton of grain produced by a Sudanese farmer provides more than food. It generates income, creates employment, reduces dependence on imports, supports local markets, and strengthens the broader rural economy.

Fuel Provision Is a Counter-Hunger Policy

Fuel is often treated as an energy issue separate from food security. In Sudan, this distinction is misleading.

Diesel is essential for land preparation, irrigation and water pumping, transportation, harvesting, storage, milling, refrigeration, and the operation of hospitals and nutrition centers.

Consequently, increases in fuel prices feed directly into the cost of bread, grains, vegetables, medicines, and transportation. In an economy already suffering from severe currency depreciation, every major decline in the value of the Sudanese pound increases the cost of agricultural inputs and basic commodities.

Fuel policy must therefore be regarded as part of hunger policy. Ensuring affordable fuel for agriculture, food transportation, water systems, health facilities, and other essential services should be an integral component of the emergency response.

Beyond Free Food: Restoring Purchasing Power

Millions of Sudanese people would not necessarily require continuing food assistance if they had reliable sources of income and functioning markets.

For this reason, humanitarian and economic programs should include cash-for-work initiatives, direct cash transfers to vulnerable households where markets are functioning, local procurement of agricultural products, and microfinance and small-business support for farmers, women, young people, and displaced populations.

Cash transfers, however, cannot be used everywhere. In areas where markets have collapsed, prices have become extremely unstable, or commercial access is blocked, in-kind food assistance remains indispensable.

The same applies where financial and digital payment systems are unreliable. Digital banking services such as Bankak have become important channels for financial transactions, but interruptions in connectivity, electricity, or banking services can limit their usefulness in crisis conditions.

The operational question should therefore remain straightforward: which mechanism can deliver the greatest amount of food and real purchasing power to the population at the lowest cost and with the highest degree of transparency؟

Sudanese Markets Need Bridges, Not Further Fragmentation

One of the most damaging economic consequences of the war has been the fragmentation of markets along military and territorial lines.

As barriers between production and consumption areas increase, transport and transaction costs rise sharply, large price differences emerge between regions, and the movement of essential commodities declines.

Protecting civilian commerce requires safe commercial corridors for food, fuel, and agricultural inputs; reducing informal road charges and checkpoints; preventing the seizure of trucks and warehouses; and protecting farmers, traders, and transport operators, particularly during periods of ceasefire or localized truces.

Wheat and sorghum recognize no political borders between Sudan's regions. The war, however, can create dozens of barriers between producers and consumers.

Water and Health Cannot Be Separated from Food

Food alone cannot save a malnourished child if that child is drinking contaminated water, living in unsanitary conditions, or unable to obtain medical treatment.

Addressing severe acute malnutrition therefore requires an integrated package combining specialized therapeutic food, clean drinking water, functioning health facilities, treatment of infections, environmental sanitation, and continuous monitoring and follow-up.

Funding intended to combat famine must consequently treat healthcare, water, sanitation, and nutrition as interconnected pillars of food security rather than as isolated sectors.

Higher Education Is Part of Sudan's Rescue Process

At first glance, universities may appear to be distant from the immediate problem of hunger. In reality, higher education is directly connected to Sudan's capacity to recover from the crisis.

War destroys not only present food supplies but also the country's future capacity to train doctors, engineers, economists, teachers, agricultural specialists, and researchers.

According to UNESCO, 124 universities and higher education institutions have reportedly been looted or destroyed, while approximately 1,880 laboratories have been damaged. The sector has also lost hundreds of libraries and classrooms across Khartoum and at least six other states.

Returning universities to their original campuses cannot therefore be treated merely as an administrative decision. The fundamental question is whether electricity, water, security, housing, laboratories, academic facilities, and qualified academic staff are available.

Without these prerequisites, returning students and staff to physical buildings may become a symbolic measure rather than a genuine restoration of higher education.

During the post-war reconstruction period, higher education should be regarded as an investment in rebuilding Sudan's productive and human capacity rather than as an expenditure that can simply be postponed.

What Can the International Community Do؟

Sudan needs an international approach that goes beyond repeated humanitarian appeals and calls for non-binding ceasefires without concrete implementation mechanisms.

International action should focus on several interconnected priorities.

First, Sudan requires multi-year humanitarian and development funding rather than fragmented short-term donations that make long-term planning extremely difficult.

Second, humanitarian and commercial corridors must be protected so that food, medicine, fuel, and agricultural inputs can move safely. Humanitarian access should not be treated simply as a military bargaining instrument.

Third, agricultural production should be financed alongside emergency food assistance. Saving this year's harvest is as important as feeding people today.

Fourth, transparent funding mechanisms should be established to ensure that assistance reaches affected populations, with independent auditing and monitoring to reduce diversion.

Fifth, child malnutrition must receive the highest urgency because delays in treating severely malnourished children can result in irreversible human and developmental losses.

Sixth, neighboring countries, including Chad, South Sudan, Egypt, Libya, and Ethiopia, require international support to cope with the humanitarian and economic consequences of the Sudanese crisis and to reduce the risk of further regional destabilization.

What Can the Sudanese People Themselves Do؟

Despite the scale of the catastrophe, saving Sudan cannot remain solely an international responsibility.

The Sudanese private sector, civil-society organizations, universities, farmers, traders, professional associations, community organizations, and diaspora communities all have important roles to play.

The Sudanese diaspora, in particular, can support targeted and measurable initiatives, such as financing nutrition centers, providing seeds to farmer cooperatives, supplying water pumps, supporting local health facilities, or financing school-meal programs.

External assistance is most effective when it is linked to local production, nutrition, education, healthcare, and community-level economic activity rather than being limited to emergency food distribution.

Peace Is Not a Mere Afterthought to Food Security

Sustainable protection from famine is impossible without reducing violence.

Every additional day of fighting can mean more displacement, fewer cultivated fields, blocked transport routes, damaged infrastructure, and paralyzed markets.

Political negotiations should therefore incorporate practical humanitarian arrangements from the beginning. These should include ceasefires in areas facing the greatest food-security risks, protection of supply routes, an end to attacks on humanitarian personnel and facilities, and unhindered access for food, medicine, fuel, and other essential supplies.

Saving civilians from hunger is not a substitute for peace. It can instead become one of the bridges through which humanitarian cooperation contributes to creating conditions for peace.

Addressing Political Isolation and the War Economy

Sudan's international political circumstances are complex. Nevertheless, one principle should remain clear: political sanctions and diplomatic pressure should not result in collective punishment of civilians.

Where sanctions are considered necessary, international actors can focus on individuals, entities, and networks directly associated with financing or sustaining the war, while maintaining and expanding humanitarian channels for food, health, water, and agricultural assistance.

A serious strategy for saving Sudan must also address the war economy itself. This includes illicit gold trading and illegal exports, smuggling and informal arms networks, road extortion, and the diversion or misuse of public resources.

At the same time, productive civilian sectors such as agriculture, livestock, internal commerce, and small-scale manufacturing need protection.

The broader objective should be to redirect economic resources away from financing armed conflict and toward food production, employment, essential services, and reconstruction.

Five Urgent Priorities for Saving Sudan from Famine

The rescue strategy can be summarized in five interconnected priorities.

The first is life-saving food assistance. Immediate and sustained funding must be secured for the World Food Programme and its partners, with particular attention to children, pregnant and breastfeeding women, sick people, displaced populations, and other highly vulnerable groups.

The second is the opening and protection of humanitarian corridors. Routes for food, medicine, fuel, and agricultural inputs must be protected, while attacks on humanitarian convoys, warehouses, facilities, and workers must cease.

The third is rescuing agricultural production. Farmers need seeds, fertilizers, fuel, animal feed, water, veterinary services, and appropriate financing to maintain and expand production during the coming agricultural seasons.

The fourth is protecting purchasing power. Direct cash assistance should be used where markets are functioning, while excessive commercial charges and barriers should be reduced and affordable fuel supplied to vital economic sectors.

The fifth is integrating food with health, water, sanitation, and education. Nutrition cannot be treated as an isolated humanitarian sector. Saving lives requires a unified framework that protects food access, healthcare, clean water, sanitation, and the human capacity required for Sudan's future recovery.

Conclusion: Human Life Must Be the Supreme Priority

Sudan does not face a simple shortage of food. It faces a profound crisis in its structural capacity to produce, access, purchase, transport, and distribute food.

The essential question is therefore not simply how many tons of food or grain Sudan needs. The more fundamental question is how to restore the ability of Sudanese families and communities to secure their own food and livelihoods.

The millions of Sudanese facing acute food insecurity are not merely figures in international reports. They are human beings: families, children, farmers, students, women, workers, and elderly people. Every day without effective intervention increases the human and economic cost of saving them.

Food security should not be viewed as a passive outcome that can only follow peace. Protecting food production, opening humanitarian corridors, maintaining markets, and preventing famine can themselves contribute to creating the conditions necessary for peace, stability, and reconstruction.

Sudan's hunger crisis therefore requires an immediate response that combines humanitarian assistance with agricultural recovery, economic protection, functioning markets, healthcare, water and sanitation, and the restoration of productive institutions.

The objective must be clear: not merely to keep Sudanese people alive through another cycle of emergency assistance, but to restore their capacity to produce, earn, purchase, and secure food with dignity.

Data and figures cited in this article are based on IPC, WFP, FAO, and other international humanitarian sources available as of September 27, 2026.

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