An Islamistsí failed attempt at slaughtering the CPA on Christmas!
By: Dr. Justin Ambago Ramba, MD.
The year 2009 will be remembered in the Sudan for the myriads of the political developments that evolved as a result of an accumulated political oppression under a suppressive regime as represented in the NIF/NCPís grip to all pillars of powers in defiance of all the different peace agreements it has so far signed with the various regional and national Sudanese political groups in the name of the so-called national reconciliation.
To make this particular year a very exceptional landmark in the modern history of the
, all the hidden evils unexpectedly, and in the most an unprecedented sequence completely emerged and dominated the entirety of our socioeconomic and political scenes.
These are nothing new but the previously unattended to problems that collectively pose a significant threat to the very existence of the
not only as a united country, but even one that can never be accepted into the international community without in fact first having to worry about its human rights records and quality of governance.
Since it all started in March by the issuance of the ICC arrest warrant to the incumbent president Omer al Bashir for his role in the crimes committed in Darfur, an event that the NIF/NCP reacted to by reserving to itself the monopoly to organise any mass demonstrations in the country, and indeed it did carry one in condemnation of the warrant, suddenly the country went back into an unofficially declared state of emergency.
The events in May 2009 when the Darfuri Justice and Equality Movement attacked the town of
in the heart of the united Sudanese capital city, has its shadow as well on the political environment that followed. If human rights were already in the abuse, however following the JEMís attack, it virtually became non existent, specifically so of course for our brothers and sisters who happen to come from the same ethnic groups as the rebels i.e. the ďwestern zurghaĒ.
On the CPA side, the partners to this historical document were surprised by the fact that an agreement that they so wisely intended to use for perusing their undeclared agents turned to have a price attached to it.. The NIF/NCP was however quick to realize though much more earlier than its partner how the timely and fully implementation of the agreement that beside the two benchmarks of the general elections and the referenda, is indeed centred around an overall
democratic transformation of the political system in its totality. And in other wards a complete overhaul to the Sudanese politics that could leave them (NIF/NCP) exposed and vulnerable to changes from the other Sudanese political opposition forces as well as the traditional enemies in the West.
The southern SPLM on the other hand trusted much in the goodwill of the IGAD, the troika, the
government and the international community. There was and still is this strong believe amongst the people of south Sudan, who in no way have any trust in the dominant NIC/NCP and to some extend the northerners in general, that the international community would
always abide by its promises in seeing that the peace agreement is fully implement to both the letter and the spirit. The south Sudanese also expected and continue to expect that the US, UK, France, EU, AU and the IGAD would intervene and put pressure on the NIF/NCP to abide by the timely framework of the agreement given the well documented records of the NIF/NCP repeated failures to live up to the expectations in all its political agreements be it locally or internationally.
The real fears of the people of south
, lies in the fact that the President Obamaís administration has chosen a means too soft for dealing with this basically rogue regime in
. If there is a one-word handle that fits the conduct of foreign relations in Barack Obama's first year as the American president, it is "engagement." The Obama administration has engaged with
. "Engagement" sounds harmless--something any sensible administration would do (though the Bush administration apparently did far less of it).
However though, this so-called policy of engagement might have earned the US President what is perceived worldwide as a premature Noble Prize, to some conservatives, engagement thus sounds like a euphemism for "appeasement." Max Boot, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, argues, "There is a perception around the world that Obama is proceeding on bended knee to our enemies, and they're rebuffing us contemptuously."
Obviously with just a quick look at the CPA, we can see that there still exist disagreements in everything that the two signatories have so far engaged to bring about. The so-called government of National Unity (GoNU) without any biasness is nothing but a big failure. Why? Well events are all over the place to tell you why.
Take it in any order as you please, but the truth remains that the following key benchmarks remain to be areas of gross disagreement: the 5th Census Results, the Abyei Protocol (even after the Hague arbitrations),
the distribution of the Oil Revenue( as exposed by some quarters that the south is in fact receiving less than its share), the Security bill (as opposed to the CPA, which restricts the role of the security to only gathering information), the elections (geographical constituencies drawn on grossly disputed Census results), the north/south border demarcation (too much intentionally delayed because of the northís greed over the southís Oil fields that lie along the borders), the votersí registration (reported frauds both in the north and the south).
And now finally the referendum bill which was intentionally passed by a mechanical majority in the absence of the SPLM and the other south Sudanese MPs, despite
declared opposition to the controversial and unilateral sinister inclusion of paragraphs that would allow any Sudanese who resides
in the north to claim an unverified southern origins and be allowed to vote in the referendum, as opposed to the initial agreement reached between NCP and SPLM at both the Presidency and the Council of Ministers.
Following what happened in the parliament in Omdurman on Tuesday, 22nd December, the reactions that came from the different camps clearly shows to an outsider how distanced the Sudanese people remain to be,
far from ever finding the right solutions to their chronic ailments. SPLM Deputy Chairman, Riek Machar, said by endorsing the bill in the absence of Southern Sudan parties, the National Legislature appears to be representing northern Sudan'.
Meanwhile, Deputy Head of SPLM bloc in the National Assembly, Thomas Wani Igga, said that his party will not recognize the Southern Sudan Referendum Bill endorsed on Tuesday. Speaking to Miraya FM, Wani said that SPLM will now completely boycott parliamentary sessions and will not participate in any activity.
The above are unfortunately the latest position of the SPLM, a party whose Secretary General Ustaz Paígan Amum, who can still be
quoted as less than two weeks ago and in a personal style and
a mood loaded with emotions and euphoria declared that,Ē we have got what we want and as such our problems with the NCP is over.Ē ďAnd now our MPs can return to the Parliament within 24 hours,Ē he added.
Comparing the above SPLM position to the one of the NIF/NCP, one can clearly see the opposing directions as to which our so-called peace partners are set to function whereas
in practice they are none but real-life antagonists. Dating some months back, the Speaker of the Sudanese National Assembly Ibrahim Attahir and the chairperson of the referendum sub-committee Ms Bedriya Suleiman, both of the NCP have more than once declared their partyís intension of not only complicating matters ahead of the south Sudaneseís referendum, but their readiness to bring out laws that would make it difficult if not impossible for south Sudan to secede through a referendum.
Based on the negative stance declared by the NCP towards the referendum, the party wasted no time or opportunity at different levels including the Presidency in frustrating the efforts of the south Sudanese to get a consensus on the simple majority needed to decide the outcome of the referendum. This was to be followed by the marathon negotiations between the two camps and eventually the
Monday 7th December 2009
With the new dimensions added to an already volatile situation, the NCP found itself battling with the SPLM and the Sudanese opposition forces on one hand and the international community on the other as it ruthless moved in and disrupted the intended peaceful march while detaining some prominent political figures including the SPLMís Secretary General himself and his deputy.
But in a very suspicious U-turn the NCP agreed to accept the simple majority vote to declare the independence of south
should that be the
choice come 2011. However it tactfully isolated the SPLM from the main opposition block by falsely declaring that a committee would be formed to review the other bills, including the much contested security bill.
Yet to prove the sceptics right, the NIF/NCP never lived up to its promises as usually is the case. They went ahead and endorsed the security bill in its worse form without the involvement of the northern oppositionís parties, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), and SPLM MPs. Though the opposing block maintained their rejections to the bill and vowed to fight it at all fronts, the NCP never wasted time in striking again the following day when it for the second time in a row resorted to its mechanical majority in the Parliament and yet passed another secretly amended version of the referendum bill.
Putting all the above aside, yet to all those who closely followed this unfolding melodrama, it is the much delayed jubilations of the NCP MPs that immediately followed