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 Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ (Re: Deng)
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The Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement:
A Framework for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Transformation of Sudan
Statement of:
Luka Biong Deng
Minister for Presidential Affairs
Government of Southern Sudan.
Before:
The United States Congress Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health
The House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Washington, 24th January, 2007
Summary:
The Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) is one of the rare achievements not only in the Sudan but indeed in Africa as it offers a unique resolution of one of the most complicated and protracted civil wars in Africa. It also offers a unique mechanism to resolving issue of religious and cultural diversity, rural marginalization, a new framework for democratic transformation and good governance and a basis for national unity based on the free will of the people. The organic and external mechanisms provided for its implementation clearly show that it would be extremely difficult for any party to the CPA to dishonour or abrogate it and if it happens it will tantamount to constitutional disorder with far repercussions on the unity and peace in the Sudan and regional stability. The extremist and anti-CPA members of the National Congress Party are deliberately working against the full implementation of the CPA. Exposing the atrocities and gross human rights committed by these elements against the people of Sudan as well as bringing them to justice and rule of law will ensure stability and expedite the full implementation of the CPA. Implementation of Abyei Protocol is litmus test to the NCP political commitment to peace in Sudan and necessary measures are needed to be exerted on NCP to accept the immediate and full implementation of Abyei Protocol. Support to political, democratic and security transformation in the Sudan as per the CPA with Southern Sudan as its life support will provide basis for realizing the vision of the New Sudan and making the unity of Sudan a possible outcome. Support of the people of Southern Sudan, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile and their governments including the Sudan People’s Liberation Army will not only deter any attempt to abrogate the CPA but will also provide a basis to transform Sudan through the vision of the New Sudan.
1. Introduction:
For the duration of its post-independent history, Sudan has been plagued by persistent, endemic internal conflict; since the declaration of independence from Anglo-Egyptian Condominium rule in 1956, violence – not peace – has been the country’s norm. Increasingly known as a country that does not honour any peace agreements but always opts instead to fight a violent internal war.
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed on 9th January 2005 by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Government of Sudan offered a unique and unprecedented rare opportunity to break this cycle of violence and make peace not only a reality, but the new and lasting norm for future generations of Sudanese children. This peace, however, remains deeply fragile. The CPA represents a critical moment in Sudan’s history, and its success – or failure – has far-reaching implications not only for the Sudanese, but throughout a volatile region. For this reason, sustaining and ensuring the eventual success of the CPA is our shared objective.
My principal reason for being here today, and the core purpose of my statement, is to renew and reinvigorate U.S. policy interest in the CPA by assessing its implementation on the occasion of its second birthday. First, however, I will attempt to summarize the complex root causes of Sudan’s recurrent internal conflict. Second, I will pose to you whether the CPA addresses these root causes and meet the aspirations of the rural Sudanese. I will discuss the internal and organic mechanisms for ensuring effective implementation of the CPA, while suggesting external measures in support of the same. I will also attempt to lay out for you some of the many challenges and impediments yet facing the CPA and its implementation. Finally, I will share my conclusions and lay forth several urgent steps and actions that can – in my view – be taken on the part of the United States to help guarantee the success of Sudan’s hopeful peace.
2. Causes of the Recurrent Civil Wars: The Rural Marginalization
Civil war in the Sudan has long been a rampant, intractable and a recurrent phenomenon, affecting virtually every region of rural Sudan and having now reached across international borders (Johnson, 2003). Since independence in 1956, Sudan has been in a near-constant state of war with itself, wasting more than 40 years in two major civil wars (1955-1972, 1982-2005) that resulted in a death toll of more than 2 million and untold internal displacement.
Having a solid understanding of the causes and origins of Sudan’s persistent internal conflicts is naturally crucial; ultimately achieving a sustainable solution to them will depend avoiding repeating the mistakes of the past. Despite the fact that Sudan has been at war with itself since its independence in 1956, the debate on the genesis and causes of the recurrent civil wars is rather divisive and far from settled. The absence of a clear understanding about those root causes largely explains why several would-be peace agreements ended up dishonoured or discarded. Generally most northern Sudanese, particularly the ruling elite, perceive civil war as a ‘southern problem,’ caused by sinister international interference (Ahmed, 1988, Ali and Elbadawi, 2002). The majority of southern Sudanese, including their elite, perceive the causes of the civil war to be rooted in ethnicity and religion (Deng, 1995).
Since independence in 1956, governance and development in Sudan have been largely characterized by an urban bias and highly centralized regimes that have generally favoured the populations living around the capital city and in the rive rain areas. As such, the fundamental root cause of the conflicts between the Sudan’s centre and its hinterland lie in the decades of structural marginalization, and the exclusion and neglect of rural Sudanese in the country’s public affairs and decision-making. Additional proximate causes included increased centralization of power with few elites, failure to implement and honour previous peace agreements (Alier, 1995), and the use of religion and ethnicity to monopolize power and divide the communities.
The rural marginalization in the Sudan is well rooted directly or indirectly in the colonial legacies and the early formation of Sudan as a sovereign state. Winston Churchill (1940:2) described the first historical contacts of the indigenous communities of the Sudan with the outside world - Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and Britain - as brutal invasion by outsiders ‘destitute of wealth’ in search of resources such as gold, ivory, water and slaves. In particular the proportion of per capita gross domestic product of other parts of northern Sudan and Southern Sudan in relation to that of Khartoum was respectively 19 percent and 10 percent at the end of the colonial administration, while that of Gezira was about 60 percent. It is no surprise that the marginalization of Southern Sudan was well rooted in the colonial development policy towards Southern Sudan. While the British colonial rule exerted considerable efforts to modernise the economy and infrastructures in the north, it entrusted Christian missionaries to provide moral guidance that was perceived to be more needed in the south than economic development (Lesch, 1998).
Not to the surprise of most rural communities, successive post-independence central governments pursued policies that deliberately aimed at marginalizing them socially, politically and economically. The socio-economic disparity that was scandalously created by lack of development in the rural Sudan during colonial rule had naturally widened sharply between the rural and urban during the years of independence. These profound socio-economic disparity and horizontal inequalities generated the sense of frustration and feeling of helplessness, injustice and marginalization that eventually led people in the South to resort again to armed struggle (Yongo-Bure, 1993). Garang (1987:21) argues, using his words, that ‘under these circumstances the marginal cost of rebellion in the Sudan became very small, zero or negative; that is, it pays to rebel’.
Even with increased oil production in the late 1990s and coupled with high overall growth in the Sudan, the pattern of growth has been unbalanced and evidently failed to mitigate regional disparity and neglect. This pattern of growth has been geographically concentrated in central states around Khartoum, boosting their tax base thus allowing them to have much higher expenditure on services than the rest of the country, and further boosting regional disparities (World Bank and UNDP, 2004).
Subsequently, the recurrent civil wars in Sudan since its independence in 1956 represent a nationwide and rural quest for a New Sudan of equality and freedom of choice, where there will be no discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, culture or gender. The chain of rural rebellion can be summarized as follows:
· began in the Southern Sudan in 1955
· erupted again in 1982 in Southern Sudan including Abyei.
· extended to the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile in the mid 1980s,
· and further into the Eastern Sudan in the early 1990s,
· and most recently exploded in the devastating crisis in Darfur in 2003, now widely acknowledged as the worst humanitarian tragedy in the world today.
Behind all of these rebellions is one legitimate struggle: it is the struggle for human rights, freedom, equality and dignity. This is the same motivation that led the people of America to launch their revolutionary war and seed the democracy which they now enjoy. By recognizing the popular call for a New Sudan and accepting principles of democracy and human rights, there is a chance that the people of the Sudan may one day choose consensual unity.
3. The CPA: A Framework for Transformation of Sudan:
Generally peace agreement in most cases comes as a result of failure of each side of the conflict to defeat the other side and became sub-optimal solution to each side but provides a second best solution with a win-win outcome. Indeed the CPA provides a win-win outcome to both parties of the conflict in the Sudan. However the real test for sustaining the CPA depends primarily on how to address the aspirations of the rural Sudan. The SPLM in particular heralded the liberation struggle of the rural Sudan against the central and urban-biased governance in the Sudan. The real question is whether the SPLM has negotiated well in the CPA to meet the aspirations of the people of rural Sudan? This question can only be answered by assessing the perspectives of the people about the CPA, issues of governance and basic rights and how far the political aspirations of people of Southern Sudan and transitional areas have been addressed by the CPA.
Perspectives from the People:
In order to assess the perspectives of the people of New Sudan (Southern Sudan, Abyei, Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile) about the CPA, a series of focus group interviews[1] were conducted towards the end of 2004 by National Democratic Institute and the New Sudan Centre for Statistics and Evaluation. A set of 32 focus groups across a wide range of communities in Southern Sudan, Abyei, Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile clearly shows that the CPA garners broad and overwhelming support (Cook and Deng, 2004). While there are several key hesitations about some aspects of the CPA, there is a broad confidence that John Garang and the SPLM have negotiated a largely fair deal for the people of New Sudan (Cook and Deng, 2004). With peace and the imminent conclusion to decades of war, people see the future as bright, and expectations are high for what it will bring: freedom, education, an end to hunger, better health care facilities, clean water and road access to local markets.
Despite the overwhelming optimism about the CPA, people are equally concerned about the future of the peace as SPLM has not decisively won the war and are equally aware that the peace agreements signed in the past were not honored. Some have an understanding that the war will not really be over until the CPA is implemented. This genuine concern and precariousness of peace in the Sudan is well summarized by a war widow during a focus group discussion by saying that:
“This peace of ours is like a sick man in the hospital. You don’t want to say for sure that he is going to be coming home because as long as he is in the hospital and sick, he still might die.”
Basic Rights and Devolution of Powers
The main achievement of the CPA is its attempt to realize peace, security and development in the Sudan and which are the same objectives embodied in the Millennium Declaration adopted by Members States of the United Nations and ascribed to by the entire international community in 2000. One of the salient features of the CPA is that it has laid down a new basis for the relationship between all levels of government in the Sudan and their people through new constitutions at the national, Southern Sudan and states levels. The sovereign authority in the Sudan has been recognized to be vested in the people with all levels of government deriving their authority from the people. Among the basic principles adopted in the CPA is the devolution of governmental functions and powers to the people at appropriate levels where they can best manage and direct their own affairs.
Besides the recognition of sovereign authority of the people and devolution of powers, the Bill of Rights has also been recognized in the CPA and enshrined in the new Interim National Constitution and subsequently making it obligatory on all levels of government to respect, uphold and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Bill of Rights is a covenant between the people and their government at every level and the cornerstone of social justice, equality and democracy. By adopting principle of devolution of powers and the Bill of Rights, the CPA has laid a basis for good governance, respect of rule of law and basic rights and freedoms which are the concerns of the rural Sudan. Two years after the signing the CPA, Sudan has witnessed a constitutional transformation with all states and Southern Sudan having their own constitutions, functioning legislative assemblies, governments and judiciary. As rightly stated by Dr. John, the icon of peace, that “Sudan will not be the same again with the signing of the CPA” Sudan is indeed changing everyday with the implementation of the CPA.
Southern Sudan: Own Government and the Right of Self-Determination:
It is a common fact that the process of state creation and nation building in the Sudan came as a result of geographical units arbitrarily created by colonists without any regard to views of the concerned communities, particularly the people of Southern Sudan. The way the northern ruling elite hurriedly achieved the independence of the Sudan through unilateral declaration of independence without national consensus may explain the fragility of nation building in the Sudan. Since its independence, Sudan has been searching for its common identity and nationhood that would recognize diversity as a virtue rather than a curse.
During the first civil war (1955-1972), the leaders of the Southern rebels fought for secession and only achieved self-government through Addis Ababa Peace Agreement in 1972 that was later abrogated and dishonoured by the central government in Khartoum. The CPA has achieved not only the establishment of an autonomous Government of Southern Sudan but also the right of self-determination to the people of Southern Sudan to determine their future status. The performance, in terms of achievements, challenges and future plans, of the Government of Southern Sudan since its establishment in October 2005 is summarized in separate document that is attached with this statement. So far, the GOSS has established an active legislature that is now enacting laws that will frame the New Sudan; a Council of Ministers that is setting development policies for a New Sudan; a judiciary that is committed to the rule of law, transparent and accountable government; and paid army (SPLA) that is rapidly professionalizing. But the GoSS faces enormous challenges related to institutional capacity, insecurity driven by external elements interested in undermining the CPA and slow implementation of the CPA.
In fact the right of self-determination is the only thing that people of Southern Sudan value most as it would allow them to express their views for the first time about the future of the Sudan. Most Southerners even did not entertain what they viewed as an unnecessary lengthy six-year period it would take to cast their votes, for they feared many a slip along the road. The inclusion of the right of self-determination in the CPA is not only just and fair but it provides a solid framework for making the unity of the Sudan to be based on the free will of its people. The series of Focus Group Discussion conducted by NDI and Southern Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and Evaluation to gauge the views of Southerners if they were to be given now a chance to vote in the referendum on the right of self-determination and overwhelming majority of Southerners consistently see separation as the only solution. Depending on how various levels of government in Sudan will make the unity of the Sudan an attractive option for people of Southern Sudan, the current conditions clearly indicate that separation is increasingly made attractive by the extremist and anti-CPA elements in the National Congress Party.
Transitional Areas: Self-Rule and Popular Consultation
The sustainable peace in the Sudan will primarily hinge on the stability in the transitional areas of Abyei, Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile, Eastern Sudan and Darfur as these areas represent the majority of the marginalized rural Sudan. While the people of Nuba Mountains, Eastern Sudan, Abyei and Blue Nile initially joined the agenda of the SPLM to fight for freedom and rights symbolized in the New Sudan vision, the people of Darfur were later on dragged into civil war with similar underlying causes of marginalization, suppression and neglect from the central government.
As the conflict in Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile is a microcosm of other conflicts in the rural areas of northern Sudan, the CPA has provided a resolution for such conflict and a model framework for addressing the issues of governance, neglect and marginalization not only in the two states but also for the entire rural Sudan. The resolution of conflict in Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile in the CPA has accorded an autonomous and decentralized self-rule with independent executive, legislative and judicial organs subject to popular consultation by the people of the two states through their respective democratically elected legislatures. The implementation of the protocols for Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile will be a litmus test for the CPA as a framework for resolving other conflicts in other areas of the Sudan such as Darfur and Eastern Sudan.
In fact the decentralized self-rule did not adequately meet the aspirations of the people of Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile as they were aspiring for the right of self-determination. In case the implementation of the CPA fails to provide a meaningful self-rule in Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile, then the chance that war will erupt again is most likely in these transitional areas. Despite their dissatisfaction, most people in these areas appreciated what has been achieved in the CPA as first step in their long search for ultimate self-determination (Cook and Deng, 2005).
The problem of Abyei Area is one of the main causes that sparked the conflict again between the north and south after the conclusion of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement in 1972. Since the British colonial authority arbitrary decided to annex Abyei area to Northern Sudan in 1905 without the consent of the Ngok people, the area has been gravely devastated by policies of ethnic cleansing and counterinsurgency. Despite the conflict in Abyei area was resolved in the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement; the provisions concerning Abyei Area were deliberately ignored until the entire Addis Ababa Agreement was later abrogated. The CPA has recognized this thorny conflict by according the people of Abyei dual citizenship in the South and North, special administrative status under the Presidency and a referendum to determine their future administrative status. The people of Abyei area overwhelmingly supported the CPA as their aspirations have been adequately met (Cook and Deng, 2005). Lack of implementation of Abyei Protocol makes it now the most contentious flashpoint and litmus test to stability and peace in the Sudan. This poses a direct challenge to the USG’s unique and special contribution to the CPA as the current Abyei Protocol is based on the suggested draft text prepared by USG and it subsequently makes USG to have major stake in the implementation of this Protocol.
Cultural, Ethnic and Religious Diversity as Virtue:
The cultural, ethnic and religious diversity is central to understanding the aetiology of civil war and violent conflict in Sudan, sustaining peace and laying down pillars for good governance. The ruling northern elite in Sudan opted to see such diversity as a curse and a threat to unity and strove to eliminate it by adopting Arab-Islamic paradigm as a framework for ensuring national unity and stability in the Sudan. This paradigm instead of unifying the country it has haunted Sudan and created division and deep sense of marginalization and exclusion that forced the rural Sudan to wage violent conflict against the centre.
The Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement has provided a golden opportunity for ending the violent conflict and a new basis for defining national identity and recognition of cultural and religious diversity as a virtue and a basis for peace building, citizenship and legal pluralism. Specifically the CPA has redefined the nature of state in Sudan away from Arab-Islam paradigm and recognized the cultural, religious and ethnic diversity as a virtue and the foundation for national cohesion in the new post-conflict Sudan. Specifically, the new Sudan has been defined as multi-cultural, multi-lingual, multi-racial, multi-ethnic, and multi-religious country where such diversities co-exist and are sources of strength, harmony and inspiration for the Sudanese people and shall not be used for causing division.
Also the CPA has provided for legal pluralism with the nationally enacted legislation having as its sources of legislation Islamic Sharia and the consensus of the people in Northern Sudan, while its sources in Southern Sudan include popular consensus, the values and customs including traditions and religious beliefs of the people. The CPA equally allows each state in northern Sudan to introduce new legislations that are consistent with religion and customs of the majority of its people and repeal those national legislations that are inconsistent with the will and customs of its people. Although the Islamic Sharia is recognized as one of sources of legislation in northern Sudan, the religious rights are generally guaranteed and protected by the CPA with religion or religious beliefs not to be used for patronization, hatred and division among the communities. In particular there shall be freedom of belief, worship and conscience for followers of all religions or beliefs or customs and no one shall be discriminated against on such grounds. The Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan has clearly separated religion from state affairs and guaranteed equal treatment of all religions with no any religion to be declared the official religion of Southern Sudan.
The CPA has supplanted the long-asserted Arab-Islamic paradigm of promoting Arabic as the only official national language by recognized all indigenous languages of the Sudan as national languages to be respected, developed and promoted with the legislature of any state of Sudan having a right to adopt any other national language besides English and Arabic as an additional official working language or medium of instruction in schools at its level. The Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan has even gone further and provided for the promotion and development of a sign language for the benefit of people with special needs.
4. The CPA: A Framework for Sustaining Peace and Stability
It took almost ten years and about half of the war period to conclude the CPA and that makes it one of the longest and meticulously negotiated peace agreements. Unlike other previous peace agreement in the Sudan, the CPA was signed by the National Congress Party and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement after they were clearly convinced that neither party was able to defeat the other party militarily. As such the parties to the conflict concluded the CPA on parity basis with each side recognizing the political and military strength of the other side. Despite the unpopularity of the National Congress Party in the Sudan, it was; unlike other northern political parties, bold enough to vehemently take courageous political decision such as acceptance of the right of self-determination to the people of Southern Sudan. The SPLM on the other hand with its overwhelming popularity and charismatic leadership conceded to Islamic agenda for the Muslim majority in the North with secular system in Southern Sudan and thus provides a framework of “one country two systems”. The parity nature of the CPA is one of the inherent mechanisms that will undoubtedly contribute to the full implementation of the CPA.
The level of successful implementation of any peace agreement depends not only on its content but more importantly on the detailed mechanisms of its implementation. Unlike other previous peace agreements, the CPA has a detailed implementation modalities mechanism that charts out for each of its implementable clauses the timing, executing body, funding and process of implementation. The implementation modalities known in the CPA as “Global Matrix” are integral part of the CPA and their provisions are authoritative and supersede the original provisions in the main protocols in case of interpretations. In fact the Global Matrix has deadened any future conflicts that might arise during implementation and it has provided a solid basis for effective monitoring of the implementation of the CPA.
There are genuine concerns that the CPA may reach similar fate of other previous peace agreements (Addis Ababa, 1972 and Khartoum, 1992) that had been unilaterally abrogated and thrown into dustbin by the central government in Khartoum. The real question is what makes the CPA different from other previous agreements? Such genuine question can only be answered by assessing the organic and external mechanisms provided for ensuring the full implementation of the CPA.
4.1 Organic Mechanisms
The organic mechanisms that have been provided in the CPA to ensure its implementation include constitutional and democratic transformation, security transformation and economic transformation and detailed implementation modalities.
Constitutional and Democratic Transformation
The CPA has adequately provided for the constitutional institutions that will ensure its full implementation. At the national level, the new Interim National Constitution has been agreed upon and it derives most of its authority from the CPA. The provisions of the CPA are all deemed to have been duly incorporated into the Interim National Constitution. In fact the Interim National Constitution is nothing but the main provisions of the CPA redrafted in a constitutional and legal language. The National Legislature consisting of the National Assembly and Council of States have been specifically mandated to oversee and ensure the full implementation of the CPA.
At the level of Southern Sudan, new and the first Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan has been adopted and provides for the establishment of an autonomous Government of Southern Sudan, independent Judiciary of Southern Sudan and Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly with primary responsibility of ensuring as well the full implementation of the CPA. Also all states of the Sudan have adopted for the first time in Sudan history their own interim constitutions that allow them to establish their own state governments, legislature and judiciary to guarantee the implementation of the CPA and provide them as well the check and balance mechanisms for good governance. This constitutional transformation has reshaped Sudan into a new country that upholds and respects the rule of law, bill of rights and fundamental freedoms and sovereign authority of people.
Besides this constitutional transformation, the CPA has vested sovereignty of the Sudan in the free will and choice of people of Sudan, particularly through fair general elections to be held by the end of 2009. The current power sharing arrangements are interim mechanisms till general elections that will mark a real democratic transformation. The necessary legislations (elections law and political parties act) are now underway and will certainly require wide consultation with all stakeholders so as to ensure transparent general elections. These general elections will give the people of Sudan an opportunity to freely choose the government and representatives of their choice and this will truly ensure the CPA to be people’s peace as rightly stated by our late leader Dr. John Garang that “this peace (CPA) is your peace and it is not that of Bashir nor Ali Osman nor Dr. John…it is your peace”. With general elections, the elected institutions of governance (assembly and executive) at all levels will not only provide check and balance for good and accountable governance but will also ensure the effective implementation of the CPA.
Security Transformation:
One of the important aspects of the CPA is the detailed security arrangements and the agreement on having a new National Armed Forces consisting of Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) as separate, regular and non-partisan armed forces with a mission to defend the country and constitutional order, respect the rule of law, the civilian government and the will of the people. Besides SAF and SPLA forces, the CPA provides the formation of Joint/ Integrated Forces consisting of equal numbers from SAF and the SPLA as symbol of national unity and sovereignty during the interim period and to constitute a nucleus of a post referendum army of Sudan, should the result of the referendum confirm unity, otherwise they would be dissolved and the component parts integrated into their respective forces. These forces will be guided, as provided for in the CPA, by a new military doctrine that will promote a culture of peace, respect the rule of law, respect the basic rights and fundamental freedoms of all people, and the will and sovereign authority of people and to reflect as well the new political transformation as per the CPA.
Unlike other previous peace agreements, the fighting armed forces of the SPLM have not been absorbed but become an integral component of the Sudan National Armed Forces. The SPLA, consisting of all armed forces (Southern Sudan, Abyei, Nuba Mountains and Southern Sudan) that participated in liberation struggle, have a separate command and funding from the Government of Southern Sudan and external support as agreed upon in the CPA. Given its composition and nature of its funding, the SPLA will definitely act as a deterrent force against any disruption of constitutional order, rule of law or implementation of the CPA not only in Southern Sudan but also in Abyei, Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile.
The Government of Southern Sudan has allocated about 40 percent of its total revenue in 2006 and slightly below 40 percent for its 2007 to the SPLA. With the SPLA gradually organizing itself into professional army, the security situation has improved considerably in Southern Sudan except when incidents, such as the violence in Juba and Malakal, are externally instigated. Despite the allocation of resources, the SPLA faces challenges in terms of increasing numbers of its forces as a result of absorption of former militias supported by the NCP for counterinsurgency warfare against SPLA, the arduous task of transforming the SPLA into a professional army, the limited capacity in management and procurement and limited access to and knowledge of military equipment markets.
Besides transforming the national armed forces, the CPA has made provisions to transform the Sudan National Security Service to a professional and representative national service mandated to define the new national security strategy based on analysis of new security threats and with its primary role to be advisory and to focus on information gathering and analysis. This transformation in the national security service is to be reflected in a new National Security Act and doctrine that will reflect this new mandate and the relevant provisions of the CPA. Although a new National Intelligence and Security Service has be reconstituted and restructured, the new act and doctrine are to be finalized as there are outstanding and contentious issues that need to be resolved and agreed upon by the Parties to the CPA.
Economic Transformation:
The economic guarantees are rarely considered in most peace agreements and failure in the implementation of such peace agreements is attributed in most cases to economic factors or absence of economic guarantees. One of the reasons that led to eruption of the second civil war in the Sudan after the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement was the limited revenue transfers from the central government to Southern Sudan reaching less than 4 percent of the total government annual revenue. For example the realized budget of Southern Sudan was hardly covering 20 per cent of the planned budget except in the first year of the peace agreement in 1972 when the realised budget reached about 40 per cent of the planned budget (Deng, 2003a). Even with increased oil production and rapid economic growth in the Sudan, the fiscal revenue transfer from the central government to the sub-national levels of government is less than 12 percent of the total government revenues (World Bank and UNDP, 2004).
The CPA has provided detailed and well defined fiscal revenue decentralization mechanism that will ensure availability of resources to all levels of government to discharge their functions, particularly the provision and delivery of basic social services to the communities. Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission has be provided for in the CPA to monitor and ensure prompt transfer of equalization grants from the central government to sub-national levels as well as guaranteeing appropriate utilization and sharing of financial resources. The framework for the management of the oil and gas sector has been elaborately and adequately addressed in the CPA by providing for the establishment of an all inclusive National Petroleum Commission. Any oil producing state has been allocated, for the first time, at least 2 percent of the net oil revenue generated from within the state while the Government of Southern Sudan has been allocated 50 percent of net oil revenues generated from oil-field in Southern Sudan and 42 percent of the net oil revenues generated from oil-field in Abyei area. These fiscal and financial mechanisms will definitely provide the necessary economic guarantees for effective implementation of the CPA.
With implementation of the Wealth Sharing Agreement, the revenue transfers to Southern Sudan, northern Sudan states and three areas (except Abyei) have increased considerably as recently reported by the World Bank Report on Public Expenditure Review. Prior to the signing of the CPA, the revenue transfers to the three areas increased from zero in 2004 to 16 billion Sudanese Dinnars in 2006, while that of northern states increased from 12 percent of total revenues to about 28 percent in 2006. The transfers to Southern Sudan increased from 21 billion Sudanese Dinnars (2% of the total revenue) in 2004 to about 319.4 billion Sudanese Dinnars (18 % of total revenue) in 2006.
Despite such impressive transfers after the signing of the CPA, transfers to three areas are sluggishly behind the average transfer to northern states and their realized transfers are far less than the targets. Abyei area did not receive any revenue transfers since the signing of the CPA. For Southern Sudan, the relative revenue transfers after the signing of the CPA have been consistently far less than its share of the total population (about 33 percent) in the Sudan. Although FFAMC has been established, it did not pick up as it was under-funded and it took sometimes for its internal regulations to be agreed upon. The functioning of the FFAMC will greatly assist in transforming the fiscal transfers so as to achieve the objectives and commitment provided for in the CPA and INC.
Besides the considerable revenue transfers after the signing of the CPA, the commitment in the CPA and Interim National Constitution to combat poverty and attain the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is far from being reflected in the effective public spending towards poverty reducing programme. According to the World Bank Report on Public Expenditure Review (2006), the pro-poor spending in a year before the signing of the CPA was only 14.5 percent of the total public expenditure and it slightly increased to 17.5 percent and 19.3 percent in 2005 and 2006 respectively.
The National Petroleum Commission (NPC) has been established but it has not been effectively functioning till its internal regulations have been recently approved. With new internal regulations as agreed upon by the Government of National Unity and Government of Southern Sudan, the process of transforming petroleum sector will commence as the NPC will start working soon. Efforts are now on the way to resolve the outstanding issues related to the oil contracts entered into by the SPLM prior to the establishment of the NPC. Even with agreement on internal regulations of the NPC, the National Ministry of Energy and Power continues to unilaterally sign new oil contracts without approval by the NPC in accordance with the new regulations.
The major economic transformation after the signing of the CPA is the successful restructuring of the Central Bank of Sudan including the opening of the Bank of Southern Sudan and issuance of the new Sudanese Pound that reflects the cultural diversity of the Sudan. The new currency will certainly facilitate the smooth integration and harmonization of the Sudanese economy as well as facilitating the effective implementation of macroeconomic and monetary policies in the entire country. Despite such success, the conventional banking system in Southern Sudan is not yet effective as and Islamic banks are still operational in Southern Sudan contrary to the provisions of the CPA.
Foreign Policy Transformation:
The major transformation agreed upon in the CPA is the new Sudan’s Foreign Policy to promote culture of peace, regional and international cooperation and good neighbourliness and mutual cooperation among our neighbours as well as commitment to non-interference in the affairs of other states and combat all forms of terrorism. Despite these noble principles as basis for transforming our foreign policy so as to ensure internal and regional stability, the foreign policy after the signing of the CPA did not live up to these principles and values. Instead our foreign policy continues with old mentality of aggression, antagonism and confrontation not only with some of our neighbours but even the entire international community, particularly on Darfur crisis. Such aggressive foreign policy adopted by anti-CPA members of the NCP has contributed not only to internal and regional instability and tension but it has slowed down the effective implementation of the CPA.
4.2 External Mechanisms:
Besides organic mechanisms that are critical for the implementation of the CPA, there are external mechanisms that would complement the organic mechanisms. It needs to be highlighted that experiences have consistently shown that external mechanisms are not by themselves enough to ensure the effective implementation of any peace agreement. The the CPA is one of the few peace agreements that attracted immense international attention because of prolonged human suffering resulting from the recurrent and protracted civil war and conflict in the Sudan. The most important external factors that will help in the implementation of the CPA include the witnesses of the CPA, international monitoring mechanisms and international assistance.
In order to solidify their commitment to the CPA, the Parties to the CPA requested about 14 international and regional Organizations and States to witness the signing of the CPA as affirmation to their unwavering support to the implementation of the peace agreement. Among the international and organizations that are witnesses to the CPA are Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, African Union, European Union, the League of Arab States and the United Nations. The States that witnessed the CPA include Kenya, Uganda, Italy, the Netherlands, United Kingdom and Northern Ireland and United States of America. Such pronounced and outstanding witnesses will make the CPA as international commitment to making peace a reality in the Sudan.
International Monitoring Mechanism:
In addition to witnessing, the CPA has provided for establishment of an independent Assessment and Evaluation Commission, as an international monitoring mechanism of the CPA, consisting mainly of the representatives of the Parties to the CPA, international and regional organizations and states that are witnesses to the CPA. The main function of the Commission is to monitor and conduct a mid-term evaluation of the implementation of the CPA. Although this Commission has been established and is functioning, it has not been effective enough in resolving the outstanding issues in the implementation of the CPA, particularly because of poor representation of other states and its limited mandate beyond monitoring and evaluation. Besides this Commission, the CPA has also provided for the establishment of a Ceasefire Political Commission and Ceasefire Joint Military Committee to supervise, monitor and oversee the implementation of the Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements. While the Ceasefire Political Commission is co-chaired by the Parties to the CPA, its members are predominantly from international and regional organizations and States that are witnesses to the CPA. This Commission besides its monitoring role it is the only Commission that is mandated to recommend changes or amendments in the CPA, particularly the provisions related to ceasefire and security arrangements. The Ceasefire Joint Military Committee is chaired by the UN with membership from the SPLA and SAF and other countries acceptable to the Parties to the CPA. Although this commission and various ceasefire committees have been established a lot is desired to making them operational and effective. Again this internationally monitoring mechanism of the CPA will again add a considerable weight to ensuring the full implementation of the CPA.
International Assistance:
The international community through Operation Life-line Sudan (OLS), NGOs and community-based organizations has been generously active in addressing humanitarian needs since 1989. It is worth mentioning that the humanitarian assistance during civil war has, paradoxically, increased access to social services in Southern Sudan and even better than the level of access before the eruption of the civil war (Deng, 2003). With peace now in the Sudan, it is expected that the evolution of external assistance to increasingly shift away from the humanitarian and recovery toward development and long term capacity building as assessed by the Sudan Joint Assessment Mission. The CPA has provided for establishment of National Multi-Donors Trust Funds and Southern Sudan Multi-Donors Trust Fund (MDTF) to support urgent and investment budget costs and development priorities. It is estimated by the Sudan Joint Assessment Mission that the financing gap for the humanitarian (USD1 billion), reconstruction and development (USD 2.6 million) to be about USD 4.6 billion for the first three years (2005 – 2007). For year between 2008-2011, it is estimated that the overall external financing needs will be at about $1.5 billion per year between 2008 and 2011, falling sharply afterwards. It is expected that by 2011, Sudan’s external assistance needs would have fallen to African averages, and that by 2015, Sudan would no longer require major amounts of external assistance.
During the donor’s conference held in Oslo, Norway in April 2005 for mobilizing international assistance for the recovery, reconstruction and development of the post-conflict Sudan, the international community generously reaffirmed their support and solidarity with the people of the Sudan to making peace a reality by pledging a total amount of USD 4.53. This amount exceeds the humanitarian, recovery and development needs assessed by the Sudan Joint Assessment Mission but is slightly less if other needs such as Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) programme and UN peace-keeping operations (USD 6 billion) are taken into account.
With the signing of the CPA, the total pledges for humanitarian assistance remains considerably high and it amounted to about USD 2.8 billion while development assistance amounted to about USD 1.7 billion over three year from which about USD 600 to be channelled through Multi-Donor Trust Funds (National and Southern Sudan). About USD344.1 million is firmly committed to Southern Sudan MDTF and USD 166.4 million has been paid in. The actual disbursements to date are USD 54.8 mm with USD 38.2 mm (about 69.7%) as contribution from the GoSS. There six major grant agreements (rapid impact emergency programme, core fiduciary procurement, infrastructure, health, education and population census) have been signed and effective with a total amount of 270.6 million with GoSS contribution of USD 165.9 million (61.3%). Also public works programme (USD 12 million with GoSS contributing USD 3.6 mm) for 9 state capitals of Southern Sudan has been approved for funding from the Southern Sudan MDTF. Although substantial development assistance is been channelled outside the MDTF and poses a real coordination and prioritization challenge to the GoSS, sector budget working groups have been initiated to harmonize and coordinate all development assistance within the overall budget planning and prioritization process in Southern Sudan. It is not surprise that the international and regional organizations and states that are witnesses to the CPA are up to their commitments and pledges. Such pledges if they are fully realized will undoubtedly contribute to sustaining peace, development, eradication of extreme poverty and hunger as well as attainment of other Millennium Development Goals.
5. The CPA Implementation Challenges:
Despite the elaborate and detailed organic and external mechanisms for ensuring the implementation of the CPA, the implementation of the CPA faces the following challenges:
a. NCP Extremists, Sudan Armed Forces and their Sponsored Militias:
The most likely spoilers of the CPA are the Muslim and Arab extremists in the Sudan, the same people who are committing the atrocities in Darfur. They are dissatisfied by the CPA, which limits their Islamic and Arab expansion agenda into Southern Sudan and beyond. After the signing of the CPA, a group of fanatic Muslims clerics, who called themselves the Legal Association of Muslims Scholars, issued a fatwa (Islamic religious verdict) labelling the SPLM and those cooperating with infidels against whom a declaration of Holy War is justified to halt their “devilish” doctrine and secularist ideology
The extremist and anti-CPA members of NCP are gradually asserting their rein in Sudan Armed Forces, Government of National Unity and NCP leadership and pursue a deliberate strategy of undermining the implementation of the CPA and destabilizing the SPLM-led government in Southern Sudan. This is well reflected in their defiance of the provisions of the CPA and public commitment by the President of Republic to abolish all former counterinsurgency militias but instead continue providing them with military support to commit atrocities and violations in most states of Southern Sudan (Upper Nile, Unity, Eastern Equatoria State, Jonglei, Central Equatoria and Western Bahr el Ghazal). Although President Bashir in his speech in Juba on 9th January 2007 admitted of initially supporting 40,000 militias with only 10,000 militias remaining now to be incorporated in SAF or paid off, our estimates suggest that there are still nearly 20,000 militias being supported and maintained by the SAF in Southern Sudan
b. Lords Resistance Army:
Given its brutal atrocities against the people of Southern Sudan and Uganda, the people and Government of Southern Sudan stand firmly with international community to wage counter-terrorism warfare against the LRA. As LRA had been sponsored and supported by the SAF as part of their counterinsurgency warfare against SPLA and to destabilize the Government of Uganda, the LRA continued committing such atrocities even after the signing of the CPA and formation of the GoSS. Coming out of war and having multiple challenges and pressing priorities, the GoSS offered to LRA three options: talk peace with the Ugandan Government or reallocate their forces outside Southern Sudan or face military confrontation with the SPLA. With acceptance of the Ugandan Government to talk peace with LRA, the GoSS found it necessary and logical to facilitate peace talks between the Ugandan Government and LRA with the aim of bringing peace and stability to Southern Sudan and Uganda. Even during peace negotiations which are at the final stage, the LRA is not only using the peace talks as platform to access media and press but it is seen not serious in concluding the peace talks as well as continuing to commit atrocities in Southern Sudan. Despite the denial of President Bashir on 9th January 2007 for not supporting LRA activities, the LRA continues committing atrocities in Southern Sudan and that made President Salva Kiir to ask SAF forces in Southern Sudan to stop supporting LRA and to convince them to conclude peace with the Ugandan Government. GoSS has equally sent a clear message to LRA to conclude peace talks with the Ugandan Government within a specified time otherwise its forces shall be expelled out of Southern Sudan.
c. Abyei Protocol: A Litmus Test to a Commitment to Peace in Sudan
The Abyei conflict was one of last issues resolved in the CPA with a firmed stand of the SPLM and considerable pressure from the international community, particularly the US Government. The Abyei Protocol is simple, clear and straight forward with special administrative status under the Presidency and a referendum to determine whether the area will be part of the South or North. The area of Abyei is to be defined and demarcated by Abyei Boundaries Commission as mandated by the CPA:
Mandate of the Commission:
“……...Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) to define and demarcate the Area of the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905, referred to herein as Abyei Area” (CPA: Abyei Appendix: Understanding of ABC paragraph 1 age 235).
Rules of Procedures of the Commission:
Besides this clear mandate, the CPA also provides for experts (US, UK and IGAD) in the Commission to determine the rules and procedures of the Commission:
“The experts shall determine the rules of procedure of the Commission” (The CPA: Abyei Appendix: Understanding of ABC paragraph 4: page 235)
Report and Decision of the Commission:
With clear mandate and rules of procedure of the Commission, the CPA also provides for the presentation of the final report and the decision making power in the Commission.
“The report of the experts, arrived at as prescribed in the ABC rules of procedure, shall be final and binding on the Parties to the CPA” (The CPA: Abyei Appendix: Understanding of ABC paragraph 5: page 235)
NCP Position on the Report of the Commission:
With the submission of the report by the Commission to the Presidency immediately after its formation in June 2005, the NCP has consistently rejected the report on the basis that the Commission has exceeded its mandate. This position became clear on the 9th January 2007, when President Bashir in his official speech during the celebrations in Juba of the Second Anniversary of the Signing of the CPA by stating the following:
“The experts of the Commission have exceeded their mandate and have failed to find a map describing the area of the Ngok Dinka transferred to Kordofan in 1905...and instead the experts produced a map that describes the Ngok Dinka areas of settlement in 1965…as the experts have failed to find 1905 map, they did not have the right to decide as such right rests with the Parties to the CPA”
SPLM/GoSS Position on the Report of the Commission:
The SPLM has consistently made its position clear that it shall abide by the outcome of the report of the Commission as per the provisions of the CPA. The SPLM initial stand on the settlement of Abyei conflict during peace talks was an outright annexation of Abyei area to Southern Sudan as the area was wrongly annexed by the British colonial authorities to Northern Sudan for their administrative convenience and against the will of the people of Abyei area. The Council of Ministers of the Government of Southern Sudan and Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly unanimously (including members of the National Congress Party) resolved in 2006 to accept the report of the Abyei Boundaries Commission and urged the Presidency to fully implement Abyei Protocol as part and parcel of the CPA. In his official speech on 9th January 2007 during the celebrations of the Second Anniversary of the Signing of the CPA, President Salva clearly echoed the stand of the SPLM and GoSS on the Abyei Protocol and the stated the following:
“On the Abyei Protocol, the SPLM and the GOSS stand firm in full support of the Abyei Border Commission (ABC) Experts’ decision. The decision of the experts is final and binding as per the CPA, on Abyei Protocol and neither party has no right to change it. The Experts never exceeded their mandate, but did what they were mandated to do. The people of Abyei must have a functioning Administration, so that they also enjoy the fruits of peace, they had struggled for. In the light of the deadlock reached by the parties in the CPA, I hereby take this opportunity to call upon IGAD, the friends of IGAD who helped in the peace process and the international community to help our partners to implement the Abyei Protocol without any further delays”
Assessment and Evaluation Commission on Abyei Protocol:
As it is mandated to monitor and assess the implementation of the CPA, the Assessment and Evaluation Commission sought for an independent legal opinion on the implementation of Abyei Protocol. AEC independent legal opinion clearly confirms that the experts in the Commission did not exceed their mandate but acted within the mandate agreed upon by the Parties to the CPA and finds that the Presidency has no any constitutional right to delay the implementation of Abyei Protocol, particularly the establishment of Abyei administration with its special status under the Presidency.
It is clear from various arguments and evidence that the anti-CPA members of the NCP are using the Abyei issue to delay the implementation of the CPA and to ignite tribal tension between the Ngok Dinka of Abyei area and their Arab Missiryia neighbours who have not only been marginalized but they were excessively used by the NCP to cheaply fight the SPLM through counterinsurgency warfare and to destroy assets base and livelihoods of Dinka communities in Northern Bahr el Ghazal. Instead of implementing Abyei Protocol, setting up Abyei administration and to start the process of reconciliation and healing for enormous atrocities and gross human rights abuses committed by NCP during war against the Ngok Dinka of Abyei, the anti-CPA members of NCP are simply delaying the implementation Abyei Protocol to expedite the excessive extraction of oil in Abyei area (it is estimated that Abyei area produces not less than 65 percent of oil produced in Northern Sudan) with far reaching negative impact on rural livelihoods and environment in the area.
d. North-South Border Committee:
The North-South Border Committee is mandated per the CPA to demarcate the North-South borderline as of 1st January 1956. This demarcation is essential for effective implementation of Wealth Sharing Protocol, redeployment and withdrawals of forces as per Security Arrangements and conduct of the next population census. Based on the regular reports that we having been receiving from GoSS members on the Border Committee, the work of the Committee is dysfunctional because of deliberate intention by the anti-CPA members of NCP not to avail resources and budget for its effective functioning. The recent report by Assessment and Evaluation Commission also confirmed that lack of budget and resources is the main challenge for the functioning of the Committees and most activities have been delayed simply because of lack of resources.
As consequence of delay in the work of the Committee, most oil producing areas within the territory of Southern Sudan have now being wrongly considered as part of Northern Sudan and affected the share of GoSS in the oil revenue. Also the conduct of population census that is planned to be conducted by the end of this year or early next year may be affected and that will affect the timing of the general elections to be held by the end of 2009. Such delay will have a profound impact on the democratic transformation as provided for in the CPA. Other consequence of delay of the work of the Committee is the deployment of excess forces of SAF to Northern Sudan. SAF by now should have withdrawn 83% of its forces and the remaining 17% to be withdrawn by 9th July 2007. So far the SAF have withdrawn only 68% in greater Bahr el Ghazal and Equatoria regions and only 48% of its excess forces in greater Upper Nile region. Alarmingly most of the excess forces withdrawn from other parts of Southern Sudan are either redeployed in Upper Nile region (as border between North-South is not known) or in the areas adjacent to Southern Border, particularly in Southern Kordofan, Abyei Area and Blue Nile. This is a clear violation of the provisions of the CPA and sends a clear signal of the military intentions of the anti-CPA members of the NCP.
f. The Death of Dr. John Garang:
The death of the SPLM Leader, Dr. John Garang, was a big shock to the peace in the Sudan and threatenend not only the implementation of the CPA but indeed the future of the Sudan as a united country. Garang was one of the few leaders in Africa who strongly believed in and championed African renaissance and civilization, diversity and commonality as virtue and empowerment of the marginalized people. Sudan was the right place to start his revolution and to make such values, ideas and ideals a reality that would change the current daunting image of the Sudan. For many rural marginalized Sudan, Garang was seen not only as their saviour and liberator but a redeemer and beacon of their struggle and aspirations and vision of the New Sudan. During focus group interviews conducted towards the end of 2004, the people describe Late Garang as follows (Cook and Deng, 2004):
“He is like Jesus Chris”.
“We consider Garang to be like Moses, who took his people away from Egypt”.
The smooth transition of leadership to Salva Kiir Mayardiit as the only credible, competent and legible successor of Dr. John Garang affirms to the world and people of Sudan the organizational maturity within the SPLM. President Salva Kiir in the eyes of most Southerners is seen as Joshua and the only person who could unite all Southerners and members of the SPLM and without him we would have seen disintegration and fragmentation within the South and the SPLM and fading away of the New Sudan Vision. Although the final report of investigation team, that was set up to look into the causes of the crashed helicopter that claimed the life of late Dr. John Garang, did not provide conclusive and convincing finding, the people of Southern Sudan and Sudan are not prepare to loose their leader again in such a deadly accident. This poses a real challenge to the provision of security and protection to President Salva Kiir and leadership of Southern Sudan and SPLM. This will require specialized support in areas of protection and security, particularly in areas related to transport, personal security and communication.
g. Darfur Conflict:
The increased atrocities and suffering of the people of Darfur are not only unacceptable but they equally challenge the credibility of political commitment of our political partner (NCP) to peace and stability in the Sudan as per CPA. The situation in Darfur underscores the political marginalization of rural Sudan and validates the SPLM agenda of the New Sudan and transformation of Sudan as the basis for peace and stability in the Sudan. The link between people of Darfur and SPLM goes back to 1991 when SPLM sent its forces to mobilize the people of Darfur to join rural Sudan in their liberation struggle and fight against the centre for their rights, dignity and freedom. Even after the signing of the CPA, the late Dr. John Garang expressed his concerns of the huge UN forces to be deployed in Southern Sudan and three areas instead of Darfur where such forces were most needed to stop atrocities committed against the people of Darfur. Late Dr. John Garang and later on President Salva Kiir initiated the deployment of JIUs (SPLA and SAF) to provide security and protection to the civilian population in Darfur. Because of such long stand with the people of Darfur, the SPLM and GoSS do not only denounce the atrocities committed in Darfur but resolved to support the UN Security Council Resolution No. 1706 as the basis to protect lives and livelihoods in Darfur and ensure humanitarian access to the people of Darfur. The people of Southern Sudan sympathize with the beleaguered people of Darfur and President Salva has not spared any effort to help bring peace to Darfur on the basis of the framework laid in the CPA. The SPLM made a recognizable contribution to the talks that produced the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) signed in Abuja, Nigeria. President Salva has also been personally involved in exhorting and encouraging the other Darfurian armed movements that are still holding back to sign the DPA so that their concerns are considered to enrich DPA and to make it more acceptable to all Darfurians. President Salva is even exploring the possibility of involving the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) as part of the national armed forces to assist the UN peace keeping forces in Darfur.
6. Conclusion: Urgent Steps and Actions
(a) Anti-CPA members of the NCP: As it is becoming clear that some elements of NCP are derailing the implementation of the CPA, the anti-CPA members of the NCP are be to exposed and their atrocities including misappropriation of oil revenue, public resources and abuses of public positions and gross human rights abuses committed against the people of Sudan are to be made public and to be brought to justice. Despite their defiance to UN Security Council resolution and USG sanctions as well continuing committing atrocities in Darfur, the anti-Peace members of NCP are paradoxically getting stronger militarily, politically and economically. Simply there is a need for more, effective and meaningful pressures on the NCP to implement CPA.
(b) Political Transformation: Need to identify and support strategic democratic partners in the Sudan to champion the democratic transformation in the Sudan. In particular the agenda of the SPLM of the New Sudan is appealing to all Sudanese, particularly among rural population and modern democratic forces in Northern Sudan. Providing substantial assistance to the SPLM as political party will not only enhance democratic transformation but will provide a political platform for rural Sudan to bring effective political change and make unity of Sudan a possible outcome. Efforts must be made to ensure that general elections are held on time as agreed upon in the CPA and in transparent and accountable manner. We are aware that the anti-CPA members of NCP are not only slowing the implementation of the CPA but they are equally working hard to distort the necessary legislations and to manipulate the results of such elections if they are to be held. NCP must be made to commit itself to the coming general elections.
(c) Security Transformation: The deteriorating security situation in Southern Sudan caused by militias supported by the anti-CPA members of the NCP makes it essentially critical to support SPLA within security sector transformation and counter-terrorism agenda and to become regular conventional army equipped with necessary skills, facilities and equipment as deterrent forces for any violations of the CPA and terrorist activities in Sudan. It is critical that strategic regional countries are to be mobilized as well so as to be on alert to ensure full implementation of the CPA and regional stability and peace.
(d) GoSS as Strategic Change Agent in Sudan: The Government of Southern Sudan is a key strategic springboard to bringing political change and peace dividends in Sudan around the values of democracy, good governance, secularism, non-discrimination, freedom and fair competition as enshrined in its interim constitution. These are the very values for which the people of US have fought and upon which they based their systems of governance. GoSS provides basis for realizing the vision of New Sudan and makes it a strategic alley to USG in the promotion of democracy and freedom in Sudan and the region. As anti-CPA members of NCP are keen to incapacitate GoSS so as not to deliver and make people of Southern Sudan dissatisfied with its performance, more tailored assistance in areas of development assistance, infrastructure development, agriculture and natural resources management, access to soft loans, governance, and rule of law, technical assistance and capacity building, transparency and accountability, petroleum sector, private sector development and US foreign direct investment, return of Diaspora and financial and procurement system will be urgently needed. USAID programmes and development assistance need to be scaled up and strengthened.
(e) Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile: As the people of Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile are becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the implementation of the CPA and coupled with drifting away of the focus of the international community away from their cause, more assistance to their governments or through NGOs and UN agencies will be extremely important. The recent Focus Group Discussion Report prepared by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) on the Three Areas depicted a rather pessimistic picture of dismay and disappointment of the people of these areas as they are gradually losing faith in CPA and with strong feeling of being abandoned and forgotten. These areas are strategic for the future of the Sudan in cementing relations between North and South, particularly if South opts to succeed.
(f) Abyei Protocol: The US Government, as part of its current pressure on the NCP, to make NCP accept the outcome of the Abyei Boundaries Commission report as final and binding as per CPA and to effect the special administrative status of Abyei area with Chief Administrator and Deputy Chief Administrator to be appointed by the President with consent of the First Vice President immediately from among and in consultation with the citizens of Abyei area. Based on the recent report prepared by NDI on the three areas and my recent visits to Abyei area, people of Abyei area are becoming increasingly impatient and have initiated their own administration to look after their affairs with assistance from UN agencies and NGOs operational in the area. Given the huge return of IDPs back to their home areas in Abyei area, more humanitarian and development assistance is urgently needed to assist in resettlement programmes initiated by local communities and supported by UN agencies and NGOs.
(g) Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC): With slow implementation of the CPA, lack of punitive measures and actions to address and contain the bottlenecks and flashpoints in the implementation of the CPA, there is a compelling reason to strengthen the monitoring mechanisms provided in the CPA such as Assessment and Evaluation Commission and Ceasefire Political Commission. As we are now approaching the mid-term review of the implementation of the CPA, it becomes necessary to have a full time membership on the AEC, particularly from individuals who participated in the peace talks and with adequate knowledge of the Sudan context. In particular the USG full representation on the AEC will exceptionally be critical during the mid-term period of the CPA.
(h) Darfur Conflict: As conflict in Darfur is having a profound and far reaching impact on the implementation of the CPA, there is urgent need for the US Government to harmonize its approach to Darfur conflict, CPA implementation and counter-terrorism into one holistic strategy. As SPLM is more appealing and credible to all Darfurians movement, more efforts are needed to support the SPLM role in bringing on board all non-signatories to DPA. Given the credibility crisis experienced by SAF in the eyes of people of Darfur and as CPA recognizes Joint/Integrated Units (SPLA and SAF) as symbol of national unity and sovereignty during Interim Period, the US Government may need to push for the deployment of JIUs in Darfur as part of UN Peace Forces so as to gain confidence and trust among people of Darfur.
References:
Ahmed, A., 1988, ‘Why the Violence?’ in War Wounds: Sudanese People Report on their War, London: The Panos Institute.
Ali, A.A.G. and I. Elbadawi, 2002, ‘Prospects for Sustainable Peace and Post-Conflict Economic Growth in the Sudan’ Washington: World Bank.
Alier, A., 1990, Southern Sudan, ‘Too Many Agreements Dishonoured’, London.
Churchill, W., 1940, ‘The River War: An Account of the Conquest of the Sudan’, London: Eyre and Spottiswoode.
Cook, T. and Deng, L., 2005, ‘A Foundation for Peace: Citizen Thoughts on Southern Sudan Constitution’, Rumbek: NDI and NSCSE.
Cook, T. and Deng, L., 2004, ‘On the Threshold of Peace: Perspectives From the People of New Sudan’, Rumbek: NDI and NSCSE.
Deng, F., 1995, ‘War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan’, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
Deng, L., 2003a, “Confronting Civil: A Comparative Study of Household Livelihood Strategies in Southern Sudan during 1990s”, PhD Thesis, Brighton: University of Sussex, Institute of Development Studies (IDS).
Deng, L., 2003b, ‘Education in Southern Sudan: War, Status and Challenges of Education for All Goals’, Paper Prepared for EFA Monitoring Report, Paris: UNESCO.
Douglas, J., 2003, ‘The Root Causes of Civil War in the Sudan’, Oxford: James Currey.
Garang, J., 1987, ‘John Garang Speaks’, London: Kegan Paul International.
Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, 2005, ‘The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan people’s Liberation Army’, Nairobi: IGAD
Lesch, A., 1998, ‘Sudan Contested National Identities’, Oxford: James Currey.
Sudan Ministry of Justice, 2005, ‘Interim National Constitution of the Republic of Sudan, 2005’, Khartoum: Ministry of Justice.
World Bank and UNDP, 2005, “Framework for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty Eradication’, Nairobi and Khartoum: Sudan Joint Assessment Mission.
Yongo-Bure, B., 1993, ‘The underdevelopment of the Southern Sudan since independence’ in Daly, M. and A. Sikainga, ‘Civil War in the Sudan’, London: British Academic Press.
[1] It is an opinion research as one method among many to give voice of citizens who may not otherwise be present in the deliberations of decision-makers, who in turn are able to test their decisions. The focus group discussions were stratified according to gender, age, ethnicity, religion, educational attainment and economic status.
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| العنوان |
الكاتب |
Date |
| إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Biraima M Adam | 07-29-07, 08:33 PM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | تبارك شيخ الدين جبريل | 07-29-07, 08:40 PM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Biraima M Adam | 07-30-07, 01:11 AM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Biraima M Adam | 07-30-07, 01:15 AM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Deng | 07-30-07, 00:10 AM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Deng | 07-30-07, 00:15 AM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Deng | 07-30-07, 00:17 AM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Deng | 07-30-07, 00:21 AM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Deng | 07-30-07, 00:34 AM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Deng | 07-30-07, 00:39 AM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Deng | 07-30-07, 00:42 AM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | هاشم نوريت | 07-30-07, 00:46 AM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | حيدر حسن ميرغني | 07-30-07, 01:25 AM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Biraima M Adam | 07-30-07, 05:39 PM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Biraima M Adam | 07-30-07, 01:40 AM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Biraima M Adam | 07-30-07, 01:52 AM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Deng | 07-30-07, 01:45 AM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Biraima M Adam | 07-30-07, 02:03 AM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Biraima M Adam | 07-30-07, 02:59 AM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | هاشم نوريت | 07-30-07, 03:11 AM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | هاشم نوريت | 07-30-07, 03:12 AM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Biraima M Adam | 07-30-07, 03:15 AM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | صلاح شعيب | 07-30-07, 03:13 AM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Biraima M Adam | 07-30-07, 03:39 AM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | حيدر حسن ميرغني | 07-30-07, 03:43 AM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Deng | 07-30-07, 03:56 AM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Biraima M Adam | 07-30-07, 04:14 AM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Biraima M Adam | 07-30-07, 04:22 AM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Biraima M Adam | 07-30-07, 04:34 AM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | malamih | 07-30-07, 04:50 AM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Najlaa El Mahi | 07-30-07, 06:07 AM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | mutwakil toum | 07-30-07, 07:26 AM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | malamih | 07-30-07, 07:35 AM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Biraima M Adam | 07-30-07, 12:26 PM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Biraima M Adam | 07-30-07, 12:22 PM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Abdel Aati | 07-30-07, 11:33 AM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Biraima M Adam | 07-30-07, 12:32 PM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Biraima M Adam | 07-30-07, 12:12 PM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Adil Osman | 07-30-07, 10:50 AM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Biraima M Adam | 07-30-07, 12:46 PM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Biraima M Adam | 07-30-07, 06:21 PM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | عبدالغني بريش فيوف | 07-30-07, 06:57 PM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Biraima M Adam | 07-30-07, 07:02 PM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Khalid S Yosif | 07-30-07, 08:56 PM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Adil Osman | 07-30-07, 10:23 PM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Biraima M Adam | 07-31-07, 00:38 AM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Deng | 07-31-07, 01:30 AM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Biraima M Adam | 07-31-07, 02:22 AM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Biraima M Adam | 07-31-07, 02:32 AM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Adil Osman | 07-31-07, 10:47 AM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Adil Osman | 07-31-07, 10:55 AM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Deng | 07-31-07, 11:02 AM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Adil Osman | 07-31-07, 11:12 AM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Biraima M Adam | 07-31-07, 12:35 PM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Biraima M Adam | 07-31-07, 12:39 PM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Biraima M Adam | 07-31-07, 04:29 PM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Biraima M Adam | 07-31-07, 10:27 PM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Kostawi | 08-01-07, 00:14 AM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Biraima M Adam | 08-01-07, 01:35 AM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Deng | 08-01-07, 01:45 AM |
| Such men they do not need Islam to be recognized..Islam needs such living testimony | Mutwakil Mustafa | 08-01-07, 02:43 AM |
| Prof. Francais Deng | Mutwakil Mustafa | 08-01-07, 06:42 AM |
| Re: Prof. Francais Deng | Biraima M Adam | 08-01-07, 12:07 PM |
| Re: Prof. Francais Deng | Biraima M Adam | 08-01-07, 12:28 PM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Biraima M Adam | 08-01-07, 12:34 PM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Biraima M Adam | 08-01-07, 12:38 PM |
| Re: إلى الجالية فى واشنطن: لماذا تخصيص تكريم الدكتور فرانسيس دينق دون غيره؟ | Biraima M Adam | 08-02-07, 11:25 AM |
| Prof. Deng | Mutwakil Mustafa | 08-02-07, 01:46 PM |
| Re: Prof. Deng | Biraima M Adam | 08-04-07, 04:21 AM |
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