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 Re: توثيق: كل ما كتب ونشر بالمنبر عن الأوضاع في دارفور (Re: Ishraga Mustafa)
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الاخت / اشراقة
شكرا علي هذه الفكرة ..
لاستسهال البحث ووحدة الموضوع ..
اليك بعض من ما ورد في تقارير ..
هيومن رايت ووتش ... hrw ...
SUMMARY
The government of Sudan is responsible for “ethnic cleansing” and crimes against humanity in Darfur, one of the world’s poorest and most inaccessible regions, on Sudan’s western border with Chad. The Sudanese government and the Arab “Janjaweed” militias it arms and supports have committed numerous attacks on the civilian populations of the African Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa ethnic groups. Government forces oversaw and directly participated in massacres, summary executions of civilians-including women and children—burnings of towns and villages, and the forcible depopulation of wide swathes of land long inhabited by the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa. The Janjaweed militias, Muslim like the African groups they attack, have destroyed mosques, killed Muslim religious leaders, and desecrated Qorans belonging to their enemies.
The government and its Janjaweed allies have killed thousands of Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa-- often in cold blood, raped women, and destroyed villages, food stocks and other supplies essential to the civilian population. They have driven more than one million civilians, mostly farmers, into camps and settlements in Darfur where they live on the very edge of survival, hostage to Janjaweed abuses. More than 110,000 others have fled to neighbouring Chad but the vast majority of war victims remain trapped in Darfur.
This conflict has historical roots but escalated in February 2003, when two rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) drawn from members of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa ethnic groups, demanded an end to chronic economic marginalization and sought power-sharing within the Arab-ruled Sudanese state. They also sought government action to end the abuses of their rivals, Arab pastoralists who were driven onto African farmlands by drought and desertification—and who had a nomadic tradition of armed militias.
The government has responded to this armed and political threat by targeting the civilian populations from which the rebels were drawn. It brazenly engaged in ethnic manipulation by organizing a military and political partnership with some Arab nomads comprising the Janjaweed; armed, trained, and organized them; and provided effective impunity for all crimes committed.
The government-Janjaweed partnership is characterized by joint attacks on civilians rather than on the rebel forces. These attacks are carried out by members of the Sudanese military and by Janjaweed wearing uniforms that are virtually indistinguishable from those of the army.
Although Janjaweed always outnumber regular soldiers, during attacks the government forces usually arrive first and leave last. In the words of one displaced villager, “They [the soldiers] see everything” that the Janjaweed are doing. “They come with them, they fight with them and they leave with them.”
The government-Janjaweed attacks are frequently supported by the Sudanese air force. Many assaults have decimated small farming communities, with death tolls sometimes approaching one hundred people. Most are unrecorded.
Human Rights Watch spent twenty-five days in and on the edges of West Darfur, documenting abuses in rural areas that were previously well-populated with Masalit and Fur farmers. Since August 2003, wide swathes of their homelands, among the most fertile in the region, have been burned and depopulated. With rare exceptions, the countryside is now emptied of its original Masalit and Fur inhabitants. Everything that can sustain and succour life – livestock, food stores, wells and pumps, blankets and clothing – has been looted or destroyed. Villages have been torched not randomly, but systematically – often not once, but twice.
The uncontrolled presence of Janjaweed in the burned countryside, and in burned and abandoned villages, has driven civilians into camps and settlements outside the larger towns, where the Janjaweed kill, rape, and pillage—even stealing emergency relief items--with impunity.
Despite international calls for investigations into allegations of gross human rights abuses, the government has responded by denying any abuses while attempting to manipulate and stem information leaks. It has limited reports from Darfur in the national press, restricted international media access, and has tried to obstruct the flow of refugees into Chad. Only after significant delays and international pressure, were two high-level UN assessment teams permitted to enter Darfur. The government has promised unhindered humanitarian access, but has failed to deliver. Instead, recent reports of government tampering with mass graves and other evidence suggest the government is fully aware of the immensity of its crimes and is now attempting to cover up any record.
With the rainy season starting in late May and the ensuing logistical difficulties exacerbated by Darfur’s poor roads and infrastructure, any international monitoring of the shaky April ceasefire and continuing human rights abuses, as well as access to humanitarian assistance, will become more difficult. The United States Agency for International Development has warned that unless the Sudanese government breaks with past practice and grants full and immediate humanitarian access, at least 100,000 war-affected civilians could die in Darfur from lack of food and from disease within the next twelve months.
The international community, which so far has been slow to exert all possible pressure on the Sudanese government to reverse the ethnic cleansing and end the associated crimes against humanity it has carried out, must act now. The UN Security Council, in particular, should take urgent measures to ensure the protection of civilians, provide for the unrestricted delivery of humanitarian assistance and reverse ethnic cleansing in Darfur. It will soon be too late.
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SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS
To the Government of Sudan
Government forces and government-supported Janjaweed militias must immediately cease their campaign of ethnic cleansing and attacks on civilians and civilian property in Darfur.
Immediately disarm and disband the Janjaweed militias in Darfur and withdraw them from those parts of Darfur they have occupied from 2003 to the present.
Conduct prompt, impartial and independent investigations of abuses by the Janjaweed militia forces and the Sudanese armed forces in Darfur, prosecute alleged perpetrators in accordance with international fair trial standards, and provide reparations for the victims of such abuses, including by recovering and returning all looted property.
To the Government of Sudan and the opposition Sudanese Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)
Facilitate the full, safe and unimpeded access of humanitarian personnel and the urgent delivery of humanitarian assistance to all populations in need in Darfur.
Take immediate and effective measures to enable the voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes in safety and dignity.
Facilitate the establishment of, and cooperate with, a U.N. human rights monitoring mission, and an international Commission of Experts to investigate and reach conclusions on the evidence concerning crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other violations of international humanitarian law committed by all parties in Darfur in 2003-2004.
To the members of the U. N. Security Council
Take measures, including through the adoption of a resolution, that seek to end and reverse “ethnic cleansing” in Darfur, ensure the protection of civilians at risk, create an environment conducive to the voluntary return in safety and dignity of all refugees and displaced persons, and provide for the effective and unrestricted delivery of humanitarian assistance.
Establish an impartial Commission of Experts to investigate and reach conclusions on the evidence concerning crimes against humanity, war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law committed by all parties in Darfur in 2003-2004.
Establish an international human rights monitoring mission with field offices in Darfur and Khartoum mandated to periodically publicly report on human rights and humanitarian law violations.
To the African Union
Rapidly deploy the Ceasefire Commission and ceasefire observers to Darfur and ensure that adequate numbers of observers are deployed before the start of the rainy season.
Ensure that ceasefire observers periodically publicly report on all violations of the ceasefire agreement including the parties’ compliance with international humanitarian law.
Monitor access to, and the provision of, humanitarian assistance to war-affected civilians.
To U.N. member states
Contribute personnel, equipment, other resources and funding to the African Union ceasefire monitoring mission.
Contribute to the economic and social reconstruction of Darfur and support international humanitarian assistance and human rights monitoring and investigations in Darfur.
To U.N. humanitarian agencies and humanitarian nongovernmental organizations
Promote the protection of civilians simultaneous with the distribution of humanitarian assistance; decentralize aid distribution rather than concentrate it in displaced camps and settlements, to the greatest extent possible within security limits.
Make efforts to prevent the creation of permanent displaced persons camps that reinforce the ethnic cleansing and forced displacement that has occurred.
Complete recommendations appear near the end of the report.
BACKGROUND
Darfur is Sudan’s largest region, on its western border with Libya, Chad, and the Central African Republic. Darfur has been divided into South, West, and North since 1994. The predominant ethnic groups of West Darfur are the Masalit and Fur, who have often united in marriage with Arabs and other Africans.1
West Darfur, with a population of more than 1.7 million,2 is ethnically mixed although African groups predominate: in Geneina and Habila provinces the Masalit are the majority (60 percent), followed by the Arabs and other Africans, namely, Zaghawa, Erenga, Gimr, Dajo, Borgo and Fur. In Zalingei, Jebel Marra, and Wadi Salih provinces the Fur predominate. In Kulbus province approximately 50 percent is Gimr, 30 percent Erenga, 15 percent Zaghawa, and 5 percent Arab. Together the Fur and the Masalit comprise the majority of the population of West Darfur. Dar Masalit, or homeland of the Masalit,3 is located around Geneina—the state capital—and north and south along the border.
The Masalit, Fur, and other sedentary African farmers in Darfur have a history of clashes over land with pastoralists from Arab tribes, primarily the camel- and cattle-herding Beni Hussein from the Kabkabiya area of North Darfur and the Beni Halba of South Darfur. Until the 1970s, these tensions were kept under control by traditional conflict resolution mechanisms underpinned by laws inherited from the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (1898-1956). While clashes over resources took place, they were usually resolved through negotiations between community leaders.4 It is not the case, as the Sudanese government maintains, that the current violence is merely a prolongation of the predominantly economic tribal conflicts that have always existed in the region.
In recent decades, a combination of extended periods of drought; competition for dwindling resources; the lack of good governance and democracy; and easy availability of guns have made local clashes increasingly bloody and politicized. 5 A wide-reaching 1994 administrative reorganization by the government of President Omar El Bashir in Darfur gave members of Arab ethnic groups new positions of power, which the Masalit, like their Fur and Zaghawa neighbors, saw as an attempt to undermine their traditional leadership role and the power of their communities in their homeland.6
Communal hostilities broke out in West Darfur among other places in 1998 and 1999 when Arab nomads began moving south with their flocks earlier than usual.7 During the 1998 clashes, more than sixty Masalit villages were burned, one Arab village was burned, approximately sixty-nine Masalit and eleven Arabs were killed, and more than 5,000 Masalit were displaced, most fleeing either into Geneina town or to Chad. Despite an agreement for compensation for both sides negotiated by local tribal leaders,8 clashes resumed in 1999 when nomadic herdsmen again moved south earlier than usual.
These 1999 clashes were even bloodier, with more than 125 Masalit villages partially or totally burned or evacuated and many hundred people killed, including a number of Arab tribal chiefs. The government brought in military forces in an attempt to quell the violence and appointed a military man responsible for security overall, with the power to overrule even the West Darfur state governor. A reconciliation conference held in 1999 agreed on compensation for Masalit and Arab losses.9 Many Masalit intellectuals and notables were arrested, imprisoned, and tortured in the towns as government-supported Arab militias began to attack Masalit villages; a number of Arab chiefs and civilians were also killed in these clashes. The barometer of violence crept steadily upward.
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[1] The terms “African” and “Arab” have been used to describe the conflict in Darfur yet fail to capture the ethnically diverse society of Darfur and the nuanced relationships among ethnic groups. Especially since the beginning of the conflict in 2003, members of the Zaghawa, Fur, and Masalit communities have used these terms to describe the growing racial and ethnic polarization in Darfur, perceived to result from discrimination and bias emanating from the central government.
In this report, Human Rights Watch uses the term “African” mainly to describe the Zaghawa, Fur, and Masalit, the principal victims of the government’s military campaign against the rebel insurgency in Darfur in 2003-2004. The term “Arab” is used to describe the Arabized, Arabic-speaking groups of nomadic and semi-nomadic people who have been recruited and deployed as Janjaweed militia. The use of these terms is not intended to gloss over the complexity of the ethnic picture in Darfur. Many of the smaller African and Arab ethnic groups are not direct participants in the conflict. See Appendix A for a summary of the only ethnic census in Sudan, taken in 1956.
[2] See Appendix B for a geographical breakdown of the population of West Darfur in 1999.
[3] Dar roughly corresponds to homeland or home territory.
[4] This report focuses on the recent conflict and abuses in the Masalit area of West Darfur. For further background on the conflict in the Darfur region, including North and South Darfur, see Human Rights Watch, Darfur in Flames: Atrocities in Western Sudan, Vol. 16, No.5 (A), April 2004.
[5] The largest African ethnic group in Darfur is the Fur, while the Masalit and Zaghawa are among the largest.
[6] See Dawud Ibrahim Salih, Muhammad Adam Yahya, Abdul Hafiz Omar Sharief and Osman Abbakorah, Representatives of The Massaleit Community in Exile, “The Hidden Slaughter and Ethnic Cleansing in Western Sudan.” Cairo, Egypt, April 8, 1999, http://www.massaleit.info/reports/internationalcommunity.htm (accessed April 29, 2004).
[7] In January 1999, during a confrontation over animals trampling crops, angry Masalit farmers shot at Masalit and Arab tribal ######### who came to restore calm, killing an Arab chief. The Sudanese government claimed that the Masalit were a fifth column of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA, southern-based African rebels), and sealed off Dar Masalit. Reportedly the Arab militias then killed more than 1,000 Masalit. The government set up special courts to try leaders of the clashes, sentencing fourteen people to death, and sponsored a tribal reconciliation conference. It concluded that 292 Masalit and seven Arabs were dead; 2,673 houses burned down; and large numbers of livestock looted, with the Masalit suffering most. The Arab tribes refused to pay compensation. About 29,500 fearful Masalit refugees remained in Chad, where the Arab militias reportedly came to kill eighty Masalit refugees in mid-1999. See Human Rights Watch, “Sudan,” Chapter from World Report 2000 (Events of 1999) (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2000).
[8] The 1998 agreement included blood payments of 70 million Sudanese pounds and 9 million Sudanese pounds from the respective Arab and Masalit communities. Unpublished report on file with Human Rights Watch.
[9] This agreement provided that nomadic tribes would not commence movement southward until February 28 of each year, that everyone would be allowed access to water sources, and that state authorities would provide security and obtain resources for longer term development of water projects. Ibid.
<> May 2004
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إيمان أحمد
HOPEFUL
kamalabas
الجندرية
nada ali
الطيب بشير
Kostawi
Raja
Ishraga Mustafa
hamid hajer
alfatih
بلدى يا حبوب
فيس بوك
تويتر
انستقرام
يوتيوب
بنتيريست