Ahmed Haroun’s Interview: Can Sudan Achieve Peace Without Confronting Its Political Past؟

06:29 PM November, 11 2026

Sudanese Online
Dr.El-Tahir El-Faki-UK
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By Dr El-Tahir El-Faki

Sudan’s war is increasingly becoming a contest not only over territory and military supremacy, but also over the political future of the country. The recent interview with Ahmed Haroun, the former governor of South Kordofan and a prominent figure in the former Islamist government, provides an opportunity to examine the competing narratives surrounding the war, the prospects for peace and the possible return of the former ruling establishment to political life.

The significance of the interview extends beyond Haroun’s personal political views. It raises fundamental questions about the relationship between the military establishment and the former ruling movement, the legitimacy of political actors seeking a role in post-war Sudan, and whether the country can achieve sustainable peace without confronting the political structures that contributed to its prolonged instability.

The politics of separating the party from the army

One of the most interesting aspects of Haroun’s interview is his attempt to distinguish the National Congress Party (NCP) from the military leadership while acknowledging their shared position in the ongoing war against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

He rejects the existence of an organisational relationship or political alliance with General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, describing their relationship instead as one of common interests on the battlefield.

This distinction deserves closer examination.

Political cooperation during wartime cannot necessarily be separated from the political consequences of military victory. When a political movement mobilises its supporters, resources and networks in support of one side in a national conflict, it inevitably acquires an interest in the political settlement that follows.

The question, therefore, is not simply whether the NCP and the army have a formal organisational relationship. It is whether their wartime partnership is creating the foundations for a renewed political alliance after the fighting ends.

Military victory versus negotiated peace

Haroun makes an important observation: wars do not end through military operations alone; ultimately, they require negotiations. However, he also suggests that battlefield developments determine the negotiating strength of the parties.

This position reflects a familiar dilemma in conflict resolution. Military actors often believe that improving their battlefield position will produce better negotiating outcomes. Yet this strategy can become self-defeating when each side interprets negotiations as a temporary interruption rather than a genuine commitment to ending the conflict.

There is an important distinction between negotiating to end a war and negotiating to consolidate military gains.

If negotiations are conditional upon the complete defeat and surrender of the opposing force, the possibility of a political settlement becomes increasingly remote. Conversely, negotiations without addressing the security structures responsible for violence may simply create the conditions for another conflict.

Sudan needs a peace process that addresses both realities: the imperative of ending the violence and the necessity of establishing a credible security and political framework.

Peace cannot mean rewarding military aggression, but neither can it depend indefinitely on the expectation that one side will achieve total victory.

The RSF question and the failure of Sudan’s security architecture

Haroun’s rejection of coexistence with the RSF raises a broader question about the future of armed institutions in Sudan.

The RSF did not emerge in a political vacuum. Its institutional development was closely connected to the policies of the former regime, which relied on paramilitary structures to pursue security and political objectives.

This history makes it difficult to discuss the dissolution or integration of the RSF without examining the political decisions that enabled its emergence and expansion.

The problem is therefore larger than the future of one armed organisation.

Sudan requires a comprehensive security-sector reform programme addressing the fragmentation of military authority, competing chains of command, political interference in the armed forces and the proliferation of armed groups.

The objective must be a unified, professional and nationally accountable security system under constitutional civilian authority.

Simply defeating one armed organisation while preserving the political conditions that produced competing military centres of power would leave the fundamental problem unresolved.

The proposed hybrid state: A solution or a continuation of the problemØŸ

Another important dimension of Haroun’s political thinking is his earlier advocacy of a political arrangement combining civilian and military participation in government.

The idea of a hybrid system is not inherently impossible. Countries emerging from conflict have sometimes adopted transitional power-sharing arrangements involving civilian and military representatives.

However, the critical issue is the distribution of authority.

Who controls national security policyØŸ Who determines military appointmentsØŸ Who controls economic resourcesØŸ Who exercises oversight over the security servicesØŸ And, most importantly, who has the final constitutional authorityØŸ

Without clear answers, a hybrid arrangement could institutionalise military influence rather than facilitate a transition towards democratic government.

Sudan’s experience since independence demonstrates the difficulties of establishing a stable relationship between civilian political institutions and military power.

The lesson should not be that civilians and military institutions cannot work together. Rather, their relationship must be governed by constitutional rules, democratic accountability and a clear separation between political leadership and military command.

The former ruling movement and the question of political legitimacy

Perhaps the most politically consequential aspect of Haroun’s appearance is the question of whether the former ruling establishment intends to re-enter Sudan’s political arena.

There is a legitimate distinction between allowing individuals to participate in political life and permitting an entire former ruling structure to regain influence without addressing its historical record.

Political participation should not be determined solely by ideological identity or association with a particular political movement. Equally, political legitimacy cannot be established simply by declaring an intention to participate in future elections.

It requires accountability, institutional transparency and public confidence.

The former regime governed Sudan for approximately three decades. Its record, including the wars in Darfur and other regions, the concentration of political and economic power, and the weakening of independent institutions, must form part of any serious national historical assessment.

Haroun himself is wanted by the International Criminal Court over alleged crimes in Darfur. These allegations require judicial determination, not political assumption. Nevertheless, the outstanding ICC proceedings raise an unavoidable question about accountability in any future political settlement.

National reconciliation cannot be synonymous with immunity from justice.

Nor should justice be used as an instrument of political exclusion. A credible process must distinguish individual criminal responsibility from collective political rights.

The missing element: The Sudanese people

One of the greatest weaknesses in Sudan’s political discourse is the tendency to discuss the country’s future primarily through the calculations of armed forces and established political organisations.

Yet the principal victims of the war are ordinary Sudanese citizens: displaced families, women subjected to violence, children deprived of education, workers who have lost their livelihoods and communities whose social and economic foundations have been destroyed.

Their interests cannot be represented adequately through military victory or elite political negotiations alone.

A sustainable peace process must give meaningful representation to civilian political forces, professional associations, resistance committees, women’s organisations, youth movements, displaced communities and the wider population.

The question should not simply be who governs Sudan after the war, but how Sudanese citizens can recover ownership of their state.

Conclusion: Peace requires more than a new political bargain

Ahmed Haroun’s interview deserves attention because it exposes several unresolved questions about Sudan’s political future. It highlights the relationship between the former ruling movement and the military establishment, the tension between military victory and negotiated peace, and the possibility of restoring former political actors to national prominence.

However, the interview also illustrates a fundamental problem in Sudanese politics: the tendency to approach peace through the calculations of political elites and military institutions rather than through a comprehensive reconsideration of the state itself.

Sudan does not simply need an agreement between competing armed forces or a political bargain between established parties. It needs a new constitutional settlement that addresses the relationship between military and civilian authorities, the organisation of the security sector, the distribution of political and economic power, transitional justice and the right of citizens to choose their government.

The former ruling movement has the right to articulate its political position, just as other Sudanese political forces have the right to challenge it. But no political organisation should be allowed to convert its contribution to a military campaign into an automatic entitlement to govern.

Equally, military victory cannot substitute for political legitimacy.

The central challenge facing Sudan is not merely how to end the present war, but how to prevent the next one.

That requires a peace process capable of confronting the past, reforming the institutions of the present and establishing a political order in which neither the army nor any political movement can claim ownership of the Sudanese state.