The Rise and Crisis of the Dagalo Proto-Dynastic Project Hemedti, the RSF, Economic Power and the S

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The Rise and Crisis of the Dagalo Proto-Dynastic Project
Hemedti, the RSF, Economic Power and the Struggle for the Sudanese State
Dr El-Tahir El-Faki
Abstract
The rise of Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, widely known as Hemedti, represents
one of the most consequential transformations in Sudanese politics since independence.
Emerging from the armed conflicts of Darfur, Hemedti developed from a militia commander into
the leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), deputy chairman of Sudan’s Transitional
Sovereignty Council and one of the country’s most powerful military, political and economic
actors.
This paper argues that the political structure associated with Hemedti developed important proto-
dynastic characteristics. Military authority became increasingly concentrated within Hemedti’s
family and personal network; economic resources, particularly gold and associated commercial
enterprises, provided an increasingly autonomous financial base; and political alliances were
constructed largely around personal power, patronage and strategic calculation rather than a
coherent ideological programme. Yet the project never became a conventional dynasty. It lacked
institutionalised succession, broad national legitimacy and uncontested sovereignty.
The war that began in April 2023 fundamentally altered the character of the project. What had
initially appeared to be an attempt to convert military and economic power into influence within
the Sudanese state became a struggle for control of the state itself. The subsequent development
of RSF-controlled territories, parallel political institutions and alternative financial and
administrative mechanisms indicates a further transformation: from a personalist attempt to
capture state power to an increasingly territorialised political-military order.
This transformation demonstrates both the resilience and the limitations of the Dagalo model. The
RSF has demonstrated an ability to survive battlefield setbacks, maintain territorial influence and
reproduce financial and administrative networks. Yet it has failed to convert coercive power into
uncontested national legitimacy. Instead, its expansion has contributed to the fragmentation of
Sudan.
The paper concludes that the fundamental weakness of the Dagalo project lies in the same
feature that originally made it powerful: the concentration of military, economic and political
authority around a narrow personal and familial network. Such a structure can produce
exceptional cohesion under a dominant leader but remains vulnerable to succession crises,
factional competition, legitimacy deficits and external pressure. The future of the RSF therefore
depends not simply on Hemedti’s survival, but on whether the networks constructed around him
can evolve into institutions capable of reproducing authority beyond personalised command.
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1. Introduction
The emergence of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, or Hemedti, from the armed conflicts of Darfur to
the highest levels of Sudanese political power is one of the clearest manifestations of the
transformation of the Sudanese state from a centralised authoritarian order into a fragmented
political and security system.
Hemedti’s trajectory cannot be understood simply as the rise of another Sudanese military officer.
His power was constructed from the combination of several distinct assets: an autonomous
armed organisation, personal and familial networks, access to commercial resources, political
patronage and relationships with domestic and foreign actors.
The resulting configuration was unusual.
Hemedti was neither simply a state official nor merely the commander of an armed militia. He
occupied an intermediate position in which state authority, private economic interests and
coercive capacity became increasingly intertwined.
The RSF itself emerged within a political environment that had already blurred the boundary
between state and irregular armed forces. The regime of Omar al-Bashir relied extensively on
paramilitary formations during the Darfur conflict and subsequently institutionalised the RSF in
2013. The organisation was therefore not an external force that suddenly penetrated the
Sudanese state. It was, in important respects, a product of the state’s own strategy of delegated
coercion.
The fall of Bashir in April 2019 created a new political opening. Instead of disappearing with the
regime that had sponsored it, the RSF became one of the principal institutions competing to
shape the post-Bashir order. Hemedti became deputy chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty
Council, placing him formally within the highest political structure of the transitional state.
The central argument of this paper is that the Dagalo project acquired proto-dynastic
characteristics during this period.
The term requires careful definition.
“Proto-dynastic” does not mean that Hemedti established a hereditary monarchy, nor does it
imply that succession from Hemedti to another member of the Dagalo family became
constitutionally or institutionally established. Rather, it describes a political structure in which
military command, economic resources and political authority became increasingly concentrated
around a dominant individual, his family and a closely associated patronage network.
The concept therefore sits between several established categories: personalist rule, military
entrepreneurship, militia politics and family-based political power.
A conventional political party can survive the removal of its leader because its institutions
reproduce political authority. A professional national army can replace its commander without
necessarily destroying the organisation. A dynasty becomes durable when succession itself
becomes institutionalised.
The Dagalo project occupied an uncertain space between these models.
It possessed substantial organisational capacity but remained heavily dependent on personal
authority. It possessed considerable economic resources but operated within a wider and
contested commercial system. It possessed political influence but lacked broad-based national
legitimacy.
The war that began in April 2023 exposed these contradictions.
The central question is therefore not simply how Hemedti rose to power, but what kind of political
order his rise represented—and whether such an order could survive beyond the individual who
created it.
It is whether Sudan can construct a state strong enough that no individual commander, family
network or armed organisation can again become sufficiently powerful to negotiate with the state
as though it were itself a state.
2. From Darfur to National Power
Hemedti’s rise was inseparable from the militarisation of Darfur and the fragmentation of
Sudanese political authority.
The RSF emerged from earlier paramilitary structures associated with the Darfur conflict and was
formally established in 2013. Its emergence demonstrated an important feature of the Bashir
system: the state increasingly relied upon armed actors whose institutional position was neither
fully civilian nor conventionally military.
This history is essential to understanding the Dagalo project.
Hemedti did not construct his power in an institutional vacuum. He inherited and expanded a
political model in which armed organisations could perform state functions while simultaneously
acquiring independent interests.
His personal background was also significant. Unlike much of Sudan’s traditional military and
political elite, Hemedti emerged from a peripheral environment with limited formal education and a
background associated with camel trading before his involvement in armed politics.
His rise illustrated the consequences of the erosion of Sudan’s traditional political hierarchy.
The collapse of central authority created opportunities for individuals whose principal assets were
not educational credentials, bureaucratic positions or established political parties, but armed
followers, local networks and the capacity to mobilise resources.
The RSF’s recruitment and cohesion should nevertheless not be explained solely through ethnicity
or tribal identity.
Kinship and regional relationships were important, particularly in Darfur, but recruitment also
reflected remuneration, patronage, military opportunity, coercion and local security calculations.
The RSF’s growth therefore represented a combination of personal loyalty, economic incentive,
social networks and coercive organisation.
This combination became increasingly important as the RSF expanded beyond Darfur.
By the final years of the Bashir regime, the organisation had evolved into a substantial military
force capable of operating throughout Sudan. Its growing autonomy gave Hemedti a bargaining
position that distinguished him from conventional military officers.
The more the RSF could recruit, equip and deploy independently of the Sudanese Armed Forces
(SAF), the less dependent Hemedti became upon the conventional military hierarchy.
This autonomy would eventually become the foundation of the confrontation with Abdel Fattah al-
Burhan.
3. The Post-Bashir Opening
Bashir’s overthrow in April 2019 produced a profound struggle over the architecture of the post-
authoritarian state.
Hemedti initially participated in the military leadership that followed Bashir’s removal and
subsequently became deputy chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council, with General
Abdel Fattah al-Burhan as chairman.
The relationship between Burhan and Hemedti was therefore simultaneously cooperative and
competitive.
Both benefited from the continuing political influence of the military, but they controlled different
institutions and possessed different sources of power.
Burhan’s authority rested primarily on the SAF and its historical position within the Sudanese
state. Hemedti’s rested on the RSF, personal networks and an increasingly autonomous economic
base.
This distinction mattered enormously.
The two men could cooperate when their interests coincided, but cooperation did not eliminate
the underlying institutional contradiction: Sudan had two major armed organisations with separate
command structures and increasingly divergent economic and political interests.
The October 2021 coup demonstrated the continued unwillingness of the military establishment
to surrender political authority rapidly to civilian actors.
Hemedti and Burhan were both part of the post-coup order, but their strategic interests were
never identical.
The subsequent dispute over the transition therefore cannot be reduced to personal rivalry.
At its core was a structural question:
Could Sudan become a civilian state while two powerful armed institutions retained
independent political and economic power؟
The proposed integration of the RSF into a unified national military brought this contradiction to
the surface.
For the SAF, the existence of a large parallel military institution represented a fundamental
challenge to national military hierarchy.
For Hemedti, integration threatened the independent coercive capacity that had made his political
influence possible.
Consequently, the dispute over integration was never merely a technical disagreement about
military organisation.
It was a struggle over the future distribution of power within the Sudanese state.
4. The Proto-Dynastic Structure
The Dagalo project acquired its proto-dynastic characteristics principally through the
concentration of military and economic authority within a narrow family network.
Hemedti’s brother, Abdul Rahim Hamdan Dagalo, became deputy commander of the RSF and one
of its most important figures. Another brother, Algoney Hamdan Daglo, became involved in
procurement and commercial activity associated with the organisation.
The significance of this structure has been reinforced by international sanctions.
In September 2023, the United States sanctioned Abdul Rahim Dagalo over his leadership role in
the RSF. In October 2024, the US Treasury sanctioned Algoney Hamdan Daglo, identifying him as
the RSF’s procurement director and describing him as one of Hemedti’s younger brothers.
Treasury explicitly stated that Hemedti had a preference for placing family members in key
organisational positions.
These facts provide unusually strong evidence for the family-centred character of the
organisation.
A family-centred command structure offers clear advantages.
It can increase trust among senior commanders, reduce the danger of internal coups, facilitate the
management of sensitive information and allow military and commercial operations to be
coordinated through personal relationships.
In a highly unstable political environment, kinship can function as an organisational technology.
But the same arrangement generates serious vulnerabilities.
When command is concentrated within a family, the institutional identity of the organisation can
become inseparable from the survival of that family.
This is why the concept of proto-dynastic power is useful.
The Dagalo structure was not a dynasty in the conventional sense because succession was never
formally institutionalised. There was no constitutional principle by which authority would
automatically pass from Hemedti to a designated family successor.
But the concentration of command, wealth and political authority around the Dagalo family
created the social and organisational conditions from which dynastic succession could
potentially have emerged.
The project was therefore dynastic in tendency rather than dynastic in completed form.
That distinction is analytically important.
Calling it simply a “dynasty” would exaggerate the degree of institutionalisation. Calling it merely a
“militia” would underestimate the extent to which family, military and commercial authority had
become intertwined.
“Proto-dynastic” captures the intermediate character of the project.
5. The Economic Foundation of Power
Military power alone could not have sustained Hemedti’s rise.
The economic dimension is therefore central to understanding the Dagalo project.
The most important resource was gold.
The US Treasury identified Al-Junaid Multi Activities Co. Ltd. as a Sudanese holding company
controlled by Hemedti and Abdul Rahim Dagalo. Treasury stated that Al-Junaid operated across
multiple economic sectors, including gold mining, and that following the RSF’s seizure of Jebel
Amer in 2017, gold mining and exports became an important source of revenue for the Dagalo
family and the RSF.
Gold mattered for reasons extending far beyond the value of individual mines.
A military organisation dependent entirely upon state salaries, state procurement and
government-controlled resources remains vulnerable to political pressure from the central
government.
A military organisation possessing an independent revenue stream can recruit, reward and equip
personnel without relying entirely upon the state.
This fundamentally changes the balance between a commander and the government he formally
serves.
The economic autonomy of the RSF therefore strengthened Hemedti’s political bargaining power.
Sudan’s gold economy also became increasingly securitised during the Bashir period. Armed
actors competed for mines, transport routes, trading networks and access to export markets.
Research by Chatham House has described gold as a central element of Sudan’s conflict
economy and emphasised the connection between gold production, armed groups and regional
commercial networks.
Jebel Amer was particularly important.
The area became one of the major centres of Sudan’s gold economy, and control over it was
closely connected to the evolution of RSF power. The commercial significance of the area was
therefore also political: control of a resource-generating territory enabled the accumulation of an
independent financial base.
The resulting model can be understood as a military-commercial complex.
Coercive power protected economic networks.
Economic resources financed coercive power.
Political authority protected both.
The relationship was mutually reinforcing.
This was one of the most important foundations of Hemedti’s rise.
6. Gold, Dubai and the Regional Conflict Economy
The economic structure of the Dagalo project cannot be understood solely within Sudan.
Gold connected the RSF to regional financial and commercial networks, particularly those centred
in the United Arab Emirates.
The United States has identified a number of UAE-based companies and individuals in connection
with RSF financing and procurement. In January 2025, Treasury sanctioned Hemedti and several
associated entities. Among the designated networks was Capital Tap Holding, a UAE-based
company that Treasury said had provided the RSF with money and military equipment. Treasury
also identified UAE-based gold-related companies and financial networks associated with RSF
procurement.
The UK has similarly targeted economic networks associated with the RSF.
In April 2024, the British government sanctioned Alkhaleej Bank and Al-Fakher Advanced Works,
describing Alkhaleej as important to RSF financing and Al-Fakher as a company used to export
gold whose proceeds were used to purchase weapons.
The UK went further in July 2026, sanctioning eleven individuals and entities connected to gold,
procurement and financial networks associated with both sides of the conflict. The government
described illicit gold exports as a major component of Sudan’s war economy and identified Dubai
as an important destination and financial gateway.
These developments demonstrate the transnational character of the Dagalo economic system.
Nevertheless, the evidence should not be reduced to the assertion that “the UAE controls the
RSF.”
The UAE has repeatedly denied providing military support to the RSF. At the same time, US, UK
and UN investigations have identified extensive commercial and logistical networks involving
UAE-based companies and individuals.
The analytically defensible conclusion is therefore more precise:
RSF-linked economic networks became deeply embedded in a transnational commercial
system in which UAE-based companies, gold markets, financial intermediaries and
procurement networks played an important role.
The wider conflict economy is not reducible to one foreign state.
The latest UN investigation has identified transnational networks involving the UAE, Chad, Libya
and Somalia in connection with support to the RSF, while also identifying foreign assistance to the
SAF.
The result is a form of transnationalised political power.
The Dagalo project became increasingly connected to networks of gold, finance, logistics,
weapons and political influence extending well beyond Sudan’s borders.
7. Ethnicity, Tribe and the Limits of the “Arab Project” Explanation
The ethnic dimension of the RSF is both important and easily misunderstood.
The organisation emerged from Darfurian armed formations and recruited heavily among Arab
communities. It consequently developed strong relationships with particular tribal and regional
networks.
Yet reducing the Dagalo project to an “Arab tribal project” is analytically inadequate.
Sudanese Arab identity is politically heterogeneous. Tribal loyalties are neither fixed nor uniform,
and local alliances are often influenced by security, economic incentives and political calculations.
The RSF has also recruited individuals outside the immediate networks from which it originally
emerged.
A more useful analytical framework is to understand RSF cohesion through several overlapping
layers:
1. personal loyalty to Hemedti;
2. family and kinship;
3. tribal and regional networks;
4. economic patronage;
5. military remuneration;
6. political interests;
7. local security calculations.
Ethnicity can reinforce some of these relationships, but it does not replace them.
This distinction is particularly important because the war has acquired increasingly severe ethnic
dimensions in Darfur.
The RSF and allied forces have been accused of ethnically targeted killings, mass displacement
and other grave abuses. International investigations have documented atrocities in Darfur,
including during the fall of El Fasher in 2025.
The appropriate analytical response is not to deny the ethnic dimension, but to distinguish
between ethnic mobilisation by an armed organisation and collective responsibility of an
entire ethnic community.
The latter is both empirically unjustified and politically dangerous.
The war has repeatedly demonstrated that ethnic polarisation can become self-reinforcing: armed
mobilisation produces fear; fear produces communal alignment; communal alignment expands
recruitment; and expanded recruitment deepens the perception of an ethnic conflict.
Understanding this mechanism is essential to any attempt to reconstruct Sudan after the war.
8. The War of the Two Generals
The war that began on 15 April 2023 was the culmination of a prolonged deterioration between
the SAF and the RSF.
The phrase “war of the two generals” captures an important personal dimension, but it is
insufficient as a complete explanation.
The conflict involved at least four interconnected questions:
• Who would control the Sudanese state؟
• What would happen to the RSF؟
• How would Sudan’s military institutions be reorganised؟
• Could the country return to civilian political rule؟
The immediate crisis concerned the proposed integration of the RSF into the regular armed
forces.
For Hemedti, integration threatened the independent military institution upon which his political
position depended.
For Burhan and the SAF, continued RSF autonomy represented a direct challenge to the military
hierarchy of the state.
The confrontation therefore reflected a structural contradiction that had emerged after Bashir’s
fall.
Sudan had failed to establish a legitimate civilian authority capable of subordinating competing
armed centres of power.
Once fighting began, however, the conflict rapidly exceeded its original institutional dispute.
Armed movements, tribal organisations, local communities and external actors became involved.
The war became simultaneously:
• a national struggle for political authority;
• a contest over territory;
• a struggle over economic resources;
• a regional conflict;
• and a humanitarian catastrophe.
This transformation fundamentally altered the Dagalo project.
Before April 2023, Hemedti could plausibly seek to become one of the dominant actors within the
Sudanese state.
After April 2023, the survival of his political project increasingly required control over territory and
the construction of alternative institutions.
9. Military Power and the Limits of Conventional Superiority
The SAF entered the war with major conventional advantages: airpower, artillery, armour, military
infrastructure and access to many formal state institutions.
The RSF possessed different strengths: mobility, dispersed forces, extensive local networks,
experience in irregular warfare and substantial familiarity with urban combat.
Neither side’s advantages guaranteed victory.
The RSF demonstrated that a heavily armed paramilitary force with substantial financial resources
could challenge a national army for control of major urban areas.
The SAF, however, retained the conventional military advantages necessary to recover substantial
territory, including Khartoum.
The result has been a geographically differentiated conflict rather than a straightforward hierarchy
of military superiority.
By 2026, the SAF had consolidated significant areas in eastern and northern Sudan and regained
Khartoum, while the RSF maintained extensive territorial influence in Darfur and continued to
contest areas of Kordofan. The continuing fighting around El Obeid illustrates the importance of
Kordofan as a strategic corridor between the western and central parts of Sudan.
The strategic failure of the RSF should therefore not be defined as military collapse.
Its more important failure was political.
The apparent logic of the pre-war Dagalo project was to transform military strength into national
political dominance.
The war instead produced territorial fragmentation.
The RSF acquired substantial territorial power without obtaining uncontested national authority.
That distinction lies at the centre of the project’s crisis.
10. From National Political Project to Parallel State
One of the clearest signs of the transformation of the Dagalo project has been the development of
parallel political institutions.
In February 2025, the RSF and allied political and armed groups signed a charter proposing an
alternative governing structure. In July 2025, the coalition announced a parallel government, with
Hemedti designated head of the presidential council.
This represented a major evolution.
Before the war, Hemedti’s strategy could be interpreted as an attempt to become a powerful
participant within the Sudanese state.
After the war, the project increasingly became an attempt to construct an alternative political order
in territories controlled by the RSF.
The development of parallel financial institutions reinforces this transformation.
In 2026, Reuters reported that newly printed Sudanese banknotes had begun circulating in RSF-
controlled areas and that the RSF-aligned authorities had developed alternative financial
mechanisms, including digital banking arrangements.
Such developments demonstrate organisational capacity.
But organisational capacity should not automatically be confused with successful state-building.
A state requires more than territory, armed force and administrative mechanisms. It also requires
legitimacy, fiscal capacity, institutional continuity and some degree of national or international
recognition.
The parallel structures therefore embody a fundamental paradox.
They demonstrate that the RSF can reproduce governance functions outside the formal state.
At the same time, their existence demonstrates the failure to capture the Sudanese state as a
whole.
The project has consequently shifted from state capture toward competitive state formation.
That is a far more difficult political enterprise.
11. The Succession Problem
The deepest structural weakness of the Dagalo project remains succession.
Hemedti’s personal authority has been central to the cohesion of the RSF.
His brother Abdul Rahim has occupied a senior command position, while other family members
have been involved in procurement and commercial networks.
This creates two broad possibilities.
First: family continuity
If Hemedti were removed from political and military leadership, members of the Dagalo family
could attempt to preserve the organisation through Abdul Rahim or another senior figure.
The family-centred structure would provide a ready-made mechanism for continuity.
But this would depend upon whether senior commanders accepted the successor’s authority.
Second: organisational fragmentation
Commanders who have accumulated independent territorial, military and economic resources
may increasingly perceive themselves as autonomous political actors.
The longer the war continues, the greater the possibility that commanders develop constituencies
that are only partially dependent upon the central leadership.
This could create a centrifugal dynamic.
The organisation might survive Hemedti but cease to remain a coherent Dagalo-controlled project.
This distinction is crucial.
The proposition should not be:
Hemedti disappears, therefore the RSF disappears.
Rather:
The removal or political neutralisation of Hemedti would increase the probability of
renegotiation, fragmentation and redistribution of authority within the RSF.
A family-centred military organisation can survive its founder.
But survival requires institutions capable of reproducing authority.
This is precisely what the Dagalo project has not yet demonstrated conclusively.
12. The Problem of Political Conversion
The greatest strategic challenge facing Hemedti was never simply military victory.
It was the conversion of military power into political legitimacy.
During the transitional period, Hemedti attempted to position himself as a political actor capable
of communicating with civilian forces and presenting himself, at various moments, as an
opponent of elements of the Bashir order.
He also publicly supported aspects of civilian transition and the principle of a unified national
army.
The analytical question is not whether every such statement was sincere.
Political actors frequently combine genuine preferences with strategic calculations.
The more important question is whether Hemedti could transform coercive power into legitimacy
extending beyond the networks upon which his authority had originally been constructed.
The evidence suggests that this conversion remained incomplete.
Military power generated bargaining strength but also fear.
Economic autonomy created resources but also allegations of illicit enrichment and conflict
financing.
Family-centred command generated loyalty but reinforced perceptions of personalised rule.
The outbreak of war magnified the legitimacy problem.
International sanctions increasingly targeted Hemedti, his family, procurement officials and
economic networks. In January 2025, the US Treasury sanctioned Hemedti, while subsequent
measures targeted associated commercial and procurement structures.
The result was a widening gap between power and legitimacy.
Hemedti could exercise substantial coercive power without acquiring the national political
legitimacy necessary to transform that power into uncontested state authority.
This gap is central to understanding the crisis of the Dagalo project.
13. External Powers and the Regionalisation of the Project
The Dagalo project cannot be separated from Sudan’s regional environment.
Sudan sits at the intersection of the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, North Africa and the Red Sea. Its
borders connect it to Chad, Libya, Egypt, South Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea, while its Red Sea
coastline provides access to the wider Gulf and Indian Ocean systems.
The war has consequently become deeply internationalised.
Different external actors have developed relationships with different Sudanese institutions and
armed groups.
The RSF has been associated with networks extending through the UAE, Chad, Libya and other
regional states, while Egypt has maintained close strategic relations with the SAF. Other regional
and international actors have also pursued their own interests.
The latest UN fact-finding investigation provides further evidence of this internationalisation. Its
September 2026 findings describe external support networks involving individuals and entities in
several countries and report evidence of weapons, military equipment, logistical support, training
and foreign personnel reaching the RSF. The investigation also found evidence of foreign support
affecting the SAF, underscoring that externalisation is not exclusively an RSF phenomenon.
This produces two contradictory effects.
External support can enable an armed organisation to survive battlefield setbacks.
But dependence upon external networks can also make political compromise more difficult
because external actors possess interests that do not necessarily correspond with Sudanese
national interests.
The Dagalo project therefore became increasingly embedded in a regional conflict ecosystem.
Its future cannot be analysed solely through the relationship between Hemedti and Burhan.
14. The Humanitarian and Strategic Cost
The political and military analysis cannot be separated from the humanitarian consequences of
the war.
Sudan has experienced mass displacement, famine, destruction of health infrastructure, attacks
on civilians and widespread allegations of war crimes.
The scale of displacement has reached catastrophic proportions.
The September 2026 UN investigation reported that more than 14 million people had been
displaced by the conflict, while more than 1,000 people were reportedly killed in drone attacks
during the first five months of 2026. Investigators warned that attacks by both sides had caused
serious civilian harm and that some incidents could constitute war crimes.
The increasing use of drones is strategically significant.
Technological advances have reduced the protective value of geographical distance and
increased the destructive capacity of both conventional and irregular forces.
This has altered the nature of Sudan’s war. The conflict is simultaneously becoming more
technologically sophisticated and more destructive to civilian society.
The resulting war economy creates another paradox.
Military organisations have developed mechanisms capable of sustaining prolonged warfare while
simultaneously destroying the economic infrastructure necessary for post-war recovery.
The longer this continues, the greater the danger that Sudan’s economic destruction becomes
self-reinforcing.
15. Is the Dagalo Project Collapsing؟
The answer depends on what is meant by “collapse.”
If collapse means the disappearance of the RSF, the evidence does not support such a
conclusion.
The RSF remains a major armed organisation with significant territorial influence, especially in
Darfur, and continues to operate militarily in other parts of Sudan.
If, however, collapse means the failure of the project’s original political strategy, the argument
becomes considerably stronger.
The apparent strategic ambition before the war was to transform Hemedti from commander of a
powerful paramilitary organisation into a nationally consequential political leader capable of
exercising decisive influence over Sudan’s political future.
That objective has not been realised.
Instead, the project has produced:
• prolonged national war;
• severe international sanctions;
• territorial fragmentation;
• immense humanitarian destruction;
• international allegations of grave violations;
• dependence on transnational economic networks;
• and a political order increasingly divided between competing centres of authority.
The central paradox is therefore this:
The Dagalo project has become more organisationally resilient while becoming less
successful as a national political project.
This distinction is perhaps the most important conclusion of the paper.
Hemedti’s ability to maintain military power should not be mistaken for the achievement of his
original political objective.
16. Three Possible Futures
Three broad scenarios can be identified.
Scenario One: Fragmentation
A decisive weakening or removal of Hemedti could cause the RSF to fragment.
Regional commanders might retain their own territories, economic assets and military forces.
Some could negotiate separately with the SAF; others could form new armed movements or
regional political structures.
Such an outcome would represent the failure of the Dagalo family to convert personal authority
into durable institutional authority.
Fragmentation, however, would not necessarily mean peace.
A fragmented RSF could produce multiple armed actors and make Sudan’s political landscape
even more difficult to govern.
Scenario Two: Political-Military Transformation
The RSF could survive as a political-military organisation and attempt to transform its territorial
control into a negotiated political constituency.
Its parallel administrative structures could become bargaining instruments in negotiations over a
decentralised or federal Sudan.
Such a transformation would require profound changes.
The RSF would need greater civilian participation, reduced family concentration, credible
accountability mechanisms and acceptance of a national political settlement.
Given the scale of atrocities and distrust, this would be extraordinarily difficult.
But organisational transformation remains theoretically possible.
Scenario Three: Negotiated National Settlement
The third possibility is a comprehensive settlement involving a ceasefire, territorial arrangements,
security-sector reform and a renewed civilian transition.
Such a settlement would have to address the fundamental structural problem that produced the
war: the existence of competing armed centres of power.
A sustainable settlement cannot simply reproduce the pre-war system in which military
organisations retain autonomous political and economic authority.
The central challenge is therefore not simply deciding which military actor wins.
It is constructing a state in which no military leader can again acquire sufficient independent
coercive and financial capacity to negotiate with the state as though he were himself a state.
17. Policy Implications
Several policy conclusions follow.
First, military victory is not sufficient.
Even if one side achieves military dominance, Sudan’s structural crisis will remain unless armed
organisations are subordinated to legitimate civilian authority.
A military victory without institutional reform would risk reproducing the conditions that created
the conflict.
Second, conflict finance must be addressed.
Gold remains central to Sudan’s war economy.
Sanctioning individual commanders is useful, but insufficient if commercial and financial networks
continue to facilitate conflict-related transactions.
International efforts should focus on beneficial ownership, gold supply chains, financial
intermediaries, procurement networks and companies operating across jurisdictions.
The UK’s 2026 sanctions demonstrate increasing international attention to this issue.
Third, external military support must be reduced.
The September 2026 UN findings demonstrate that Sudan’s war cannot be understood purely as
an internal conflict.
Foreign weapons, personnel, finance and logistical networks have become part of the war’s
infrastructure.
Reducing external support is therefore an essential component of any serious peace strategy.
Fourth, civilian politics must be reconstructed.
The weakness and fragmentation of Sudanese civilian political forces have repeatedly allowed
military actors to dominate political transitions.
A sustainable settlement therefore cannot simply be an agreement between Burhan and Hemedti,
or their respective successors.
It requires rebuilding credible civilian institutions capable of exercising authority over the security
sector.
Fifth, Sudan’s territorial integrity must be protected.
Parallel administrations may provide temporary governance in territories outside central control.
But their institutionalisation risks transforming wartime territorial divisions into permanent political
separation.
The formation of an RSF-aligned parallel government in 2025 was therefore not merely an
administrative development; it represented a significant escalation in the institutional
fragmentation of Sudan.
Sixth, accountability cannot be indefinitely postponed.
A settlement that completely ignores atrocities risks reproducing the conditions that generated the
war.
At the same time, accountability mechanisms must be designed carefully enough to preserve
political space for negotiation.
The challenge is to distinguish legitimate political compromise from impunity for serious
international crimes.
Seventh, post-war economic reconstruction must address the political economy of armed
power.
Reconstruction cannot simply restore infrastructure while leaving the economic structures that
financed armed organisations intact.
The relationship between gold, commercial enterprises, banking institutions, procurement
networks and armed groups must form part of any long-term reform agenda.
Otherwise, the economic foundations of future conflict will remain in place.
18. Conclusion
The rise of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo was made possible by the prolonged weakness of the
Sudanese state, the militarisation of Darfur, the fragmentation of Sudan’s security sector and the
inability of civilian political forces to establish durable institutions.
Hemedti’s extraordinary rise resulted from the combination of military force, personal networks,
family authority, economic resources and political flexibility.
The resulting Dagalo project developed significant proto-dynastic characteristics.
Military command became closely associated with the Dagalo family. Economic power developed
through gold, commercial enterprises and associated financial networks. Political influence rested
heavily upon personal relationships, patronage and strategic calculation.
Yet the project never became a fully institutionalised dynasty.
Its central weakness was precisely the source of its strength: personalisation.
Personalisation allowed Hemedti to construct a cohesive military and political network in a highly
fragmented environment. It also made that network dependent upon a narrow leadership circle
and created a fundamental succession problem.
The war beginning in April 2023 transformed the project.
What had initially appeared to be an attempt to become a dominant participant within the
Sudanese state became a struggle over whether the RSF could construct an alternative political
order.
The establishment of parallel political, administrative and financial structures demonstrates the
adaptability of the project.
But adaptability should not be confused with political success.
The RSF has acquired territory without achieving uncontested sovereignty; administrative
capacity without national legitimacy; financial autonomy without secure institutional recognition;
and military resilience without a settled mechanism of succession.
The Dagalo project therefore faces a fundamental paradox:
It has succeeded in creating power without creating legitimacy; institutions without national
institutions; territory without uncontested sovereignty; and military strength without an
institutionalised succession mechanism.
This is the central crisis of the project.
Its future cannot therefore be determined solely by the survival or removal of Hemedti.
If Hemedti remains in command, the project may continue as a powerful regionalised military-
political system.
If he is removed, the RSF may fragment, transform itself politically or become incorporated into a
negotiated national settlement.
The decisive question is whether the networks built around Hemedti can become institutions
capable of surviving him.
That question remains unresolved.
More importantly, however, Sudan’s future cannot depend upon either the survival or destruction
of one man’s political project.
The underlying problem is structural.
Sudan cannot achieve lasting stability while armed organisations possess independent coercive
capacity; while military leaders exercise political authority outside accountable civilian institutions;
while conflict-linked economic networks finance armed power; and while foreign actors are able
to sustain competing centres of military influence.
The ultimate failure of the Dagalo project would therefore not simply be the defeat of Hemedti.
It would be the transformation of the political conditions that made a Hemedti possible.
The enduring lesson of Sudan’s crisis is that personalised armed power flourishes where
institutions are weak. It accumulates wealth where economic governance is fragmented. It
acquires political influence where civilian forces are divided. And it can survive for years when
regional actors find it strategically useful.
But coercive power is not the same as legitimate state authority.
The long-term future of Sudan depends upon replacing the politics of armed patronage with a
political order in which the military is subordinate to civilian authority, economic resources are
subject to public accountability, and political legitimacy derives from Sudanese citizens rather
than from weapons, family networks or foreign patrons.
The question, ultimately, is therefore larger than Hemedti.
It is whether Sudan can construct a state strong enough that no individual commander, family
network or armed organisation can again become sufficiently powerful to negotiate with the state
as though it were itself a state.
Only then can the cycle that produced the Dagalo project—and the wider crisis of the Sudanese
state—begin to end.
Notes and Selected Sources
1. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, “Treasury Sanctions
Military-Affiliated Companies Fueling Both Sides of the Conflict in Sudan.” Treasury identified
Al-Junaid Multi Activities Co. Ltd. as controlled by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo and Abdul
Rahim Dagalo and described its role in the gold sector.
2. U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Sudanese Paramilitary Leader,
Weapons Supplier, and Related Companies,” 7 January 2025. Treasury sanctioned Hemedti
and identified UAE-based financial, commercial and procurement networks associated with
the RSF.
3. U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Sudanese Rapid Support Forces
Procurement Director,” 8 October 2024. Treasury identified Algoney Hamdan Daglo Musa as
RSF procurement director and Hemedti’s brother and described the role of family members in
senior organisational positions.
4. UN Security Council, “Abdul Rahim Hamdan Dagalo,” narrative summary, 24 February 2026.
The listing identifies Abdul Rahim as RSF deputy commander and Hemedti’s brother and
documents allegations concerning his role in the conflict.
5. Chatham House, Gold and the War in Sudan, March 2025. The research analyses the
relationship between Sudan’s gold economy, armed actors and the regional conflict economy.
6. UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, “UK sanctions businesses funding
Sudan war,” 15 April 2024. The UK sanctioned Alkhaleej Bank and Al-Fakher Advanced Works
among other entities associated with financing the war.
7. UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, “UK sanctions illicit gold networks
fuelling Sudan’s war amid crisis around El Obeid,” 16 July 2026. The UK described illicit gold,
procurement and financial networks as important components of Sudan’s war economy.
8. Reuters, “Sudan’s RSF, allies sign charter to form parallel government,” 22 February 2025.
The report documents the RSF’s agreement with allied political and armed groups to establish
an alternative governing structure.
9. Reuters, “Sudanese coalition led by paramilitary RSF announces parallel government,” 26
July 2025. The report describes Hemedti’s appointment as head of the parallel presidential
council.
10. Reuters, “The two rival governments that could split Sudan,” 31 July 2025. The report
examines the emergence of competing governing structures and the risk of de facto partition.
11. Reuters, “New Sudanese notes circulate in RSF areas, deepening de facto split,” 25 June
2026. The report documents the circulation of newly printed currency and the development of
alternative financial mechanisms in RSF-controlled territory.
12. United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Sudan: External
support networks are fuelling conflict and civilian harm,” September 2026. The UN
investigation documents foreign support networks, military assistance and civilian harm
associated with the conflict.
13. Reuters, “Foreign support, drones fuel Sudan war and possible war crimes, UN probe says,”
3 September 2026. The report summarises the UN findings concerning external support,
drone warfare, civilian casualties and displacement.
14. Chatham House, “The flow of arms and money feeding the war in Sudan can be cut: what’s
missing will,” May 2026. The analysis examines gold, financial networks and regional logistics
sustaining the conflict.
15. U.S. Department of the Treasury, sanctions relating to RSF procurement and financing,
2023–2025. These measures provide primary-source evidence concerning the links between
RSF leadership, family members, gold, procurement and UAE-based commercial networks.

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