Fram Karbala To Hemedti The Likely Fate of Hemedti: Six Scenarios and the Future of Sudan Part Two

00:03 AM October, 29 2026

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Fram Karbala To Hemedti
The Likely Fate of Hemedti: Six Scenarios and the Future of Sudan

Part Two

By Dr El-Tahir El-Faki

The historical record offers no single answer to the question of what will happen to Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, leader of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

As Part One demonstrated, rebel leaders have died in battle, been executed after capture, escaped into exile, negotiated political settlements or survived defeat to rebuild their movements. Their outcomes have depended on more than battlefield success. Alliances, organisational cohesion, political legitimacy and the calculations of former supporters have also played decisive roles.

Hemedti’s future must therefore be considered in two separate but connected dimensions: his personal fate and the future of the RSF.

The organisation could fragment even if its leader survives. Conversely, the removal of Hemedti would not necessarily end the conflict if other commanders retained the capacity and motivation to continue fighting.

Six scenarios illustrate the range of possible outcomes. They are analytical possibilities, not predictions or assigned probabilities.

I. Six Possible Scenarios for Hemedti

1. Death During Continued Fighting

One possible outcome is that Hemedti is killed if the conflict continues and his military position deteriorates.

The fate of Velupillai Prabhakaran, leader of the Tamil Tigers, provides a modern example of a rebel leader dying during the final military defeat of his organisation.

However, the circumstances of the LTTE’s defeat cannot be transferred directly to Sudan. The RSF’s organisational structure, relationships, territorial presence and conflict environment differ substantially.

The broader lesson is that the survival of a rebel leader becomes inseparable from the military and political circumstances surrounding his organisation. Nevertheless, battlefield defeat does not automatically mean that a leader will be killed.

2. Capture and Judicial Accountability

A second possibility is capture, followed by legal proceedings if sufficient grounds and evidence exist under the applicable law.

This outcome would raise questions about the authority responsible for detention, the jurisdiction of the relevant court, the protection of evidence and witnesses, and the rights of the accused.

The historical record contains numerous examples of defeated rebel leaders being executed. But historical precedent should not be confused with an appropriate modern legal outcome.

Any credible process must distinguish allegations from proven offences and establish individual responsibility through lawful procedures. A political or military defeat cannot substitute for a fair trial.

The challenge for Sudan would be to pursue accountability while preventing reprisals, protecting civilians and avoiding the selective application of justice.

3. A Negotiated Settlement

A third possibility is that a political settlement ends or substantially reduces the conflict.

Such an agreement could address a ceasefire, the future of RSF combatants, the status of commanders, disarmament, security-sector reform and the restoration of civilian political authority.

The FARC experience in Colombia demonstrates that an armed organisation can negotiate an exit from conflict and transition towards civilian political participation. It also shows that implementation can remain difficult long after an agreement has been signed.

For Hemedti personally, a negotiated arrangement could involve withdrawal from military command or departure from political life. But any such outcome would depend on the negotiating parties, the terms of the agreement, domestic legitimacy and applicable legal obligations.

A settlement should not be equated with automatic immunity from prosecution. Nor should it be assumed that an agreement can be sustained without credible guarantees and effective implementation.

The central question is whether an arrangement could end the war without sacrificing accountability or granting an armed organisation a permanent veto over Sudan’s political future.

4. Exile and External Refuge

A fourth possibility is that Hemedti leaves Sudan if his position becomes untenable.

The historical experience of Abd al-Rahman I illustrates how escape can preserve a political leader’s life and create an opportunity for future renewal. Yet his eventual success in al-Andalus depended on unusual circumstances and the formation of a new political coalition.

For a contemporary Sudanese leader, exile would offer no guarantee of renewed power. His future would depend on the policies of host governments, the cohesion of his remaining supporters, access to resources and any applicable legal restrictions.

Exile could reduce his direct involvement in the conflict, but it might also create a struggle over succession within the RSF.

The fate of the organisation would consequently depend on whether its commanders accepted a new leadership arrangement, pursued their own interests or continued fighting independently.

5. Survival Through a New Political Arrangement

A fifth possibility is that Hemedti survives the conflict and attempts to retain some political influence through a negotiated transition.

The historical experience of Abd al-Rahman I demonstrates that political survival can sometimes produce a new order. The Taliban’s return to power, meanwhile, shows that an organisation can regain control after losing it.

Neither example establishes that Hemedti will follow a comparable path. The relevant circumstances in Sudan are different, and any political future would depend on the outcome of the conflict and the legitimacy of the resulting arrangement.

A distinction must also be made between personal political survival and the preservation of an independent armed force.

The participation of former combatants in civilian life or lawful politics is not the same as granting their former commanders continued military autonomy. A durable settlement would require a credible framework for unified security institutions and accountable civilian government.

6. The Fragmentation of the RSF

The sixth scenario concerns the organisation rather than Hemedti personally.

If the RSF loses cohesion, its commanders and units could respond in different ways. Some might continue fighting, others might seek local arrangements, and still others might pursue negotiations or reintegration.

The removal of a central leader does not automatically dissolve the networks, financial interests, local alliances or grievances that sustain an armed organisation.

Conversely, the survival of a leader does not guarantee that the organisation will remain united.

For Sudan, fragmentation could create new security challenges if armed groups operate independently or compete for territory and resources. It could also create openings for negotiations, although these would be difficult to manage if no authority could credibly bind all factions.

Any post-war strategy must therefore consider the organisation’s wider structure rather than focus exclusively on Hemedti’s personal fate.

II. The Factors That Could Shape the Outcome

Six interconnected factors will influence which trajectory emerges.

Military balance. The ability of either side to sustain operations and control territory will affect the incentives for continued fighting or negotiation. Battlefield developments alone, however, cannot establish a political settlement’s durability.

Organisational cohesion. The degree to which commanders and fighters remain committed to a common leadership will shape the RSF’s capacity to continue as a unified organisation.

External relationships. Political, financial and military support from outside Sudan can affect the conflict’s duration and the parties’ negotiating positions. Such relationships may also change as regional interests evolve.

Political legitimacy. A settlement’s durability will depend partly on whether Sudanese civilians and political constituencies regard the resulting arrangements as credible and representative.

Accountability and security guarantees. Negotiations must address the protection of civilians, the treatment of former combatants and the investigation of alleged crimes. The challenge is to reduce violence without abandoning lawful accountability.

The country’s social and economic recovery. Displacement, damaged infrastructure, disrupted livelihoods and competition over resources can undermine a settlement if they remain unaddressed.

No single factor determines the outcome. Their interaction will shape both Hemedti’s personal circumstances and the future of the RSF.

III. The Central Distinction: Hemedti and the RSF Are Not the Same Question

The historical comparisons suggest that the fate of a rebel leader and the fate of his movement must be assessed separately.

Husayn ibn Ali died, but his memory endured. Abu Muslim was killed by the political order he had helped establish. Abd al-Rahman I escaped defeat and founded a new centre of power. The Tamil Tigers lost their leader and their territorial military organisation, while the Taliban survived defeat and eventually returned to government.

These different experiences demonstrate that there is no automatic relationship between a leader’s survival and the long-term outcome of his movement.

In Sudan, the RSF could be defeated without every network associated with it disappearing. It could also fragment even if Hemedti remained alive. Alternatively, a political agreement could create a pathway for some combatants to return to civilian life without preserving the RSF as an independent military force.

The practical challenge is to prevent the end of one phase of conflict from becoming the beginning of another.

IV. What Should Matter Most for Sudan؟

The question of Hemedti’s fate is important, but it should not overshadow the interests of the Sudanese population.

The overriding priorities should be:

• Ending the war and protecting civilians.
• Facilitating humanitarian access and the safe return of displaced people.
• Establishing accountable civilian government.
• Creating a credible process for security-sector reform and the integration or demobilisation of eligible former combatants.
• Investigating alleged crimes through lawful and impartial procedures.
• Supporting reconciliation and addressing the political and economic grievances that have contributed to instability.

These objectives may require difficult negotiations. They also require clear distinctions between ending hostilities, achieving political reconciliation and determining individual legal responsibility.

A ceasefire may stop immediate fighting without resolving the causes of conflict. A political agreement may redistribute power without establishing accountability. Military victory may remove an adversary without creating the institutions needed for lasting peace.

A sustainable outcome must address all three dimensions: security, political legitimacy and justice.

Conclusion: Beyond the Fate of One Man

The history of rebellion offers several possible scenarios for Hemedti: death during continued fighting, capture and prosecution, negotiated withdrawal, exile, political survival or the fragmentation of the RSF.

No historical analogy can determine which outcome will occur. The experiences of earlier rebel leaders and modern armed movements clarify the range of possibilities, but Sudan’s circumstances will ultimately shape the result.

The more consequential question is what follows Hemedti.

Will the conflict end in a way that allows Sudan to rebuild its institutions, protect its population and establish accountable civilian government؟ Or will the removal or survival of one leader leave the structures of armed competition largely intact؟

The answer will depend not only on the choices of Hemedti and his adversaries, but also on the willingness of Sudanese political actors and external stakeholders to support a credible settlement.

The ultimate measure of success should not be the personal fate of a single commander. It should be whether Sudan can end the war, protect its people, secure justice and establish a political order in which armed organisations no longer determine the country’s future.

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