Could Hemedti Follow the Somaliland Path؟ From Sudanese War Leader to De Facto Ruler of a Separate

10:06 PM November, 05 2026

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Could Hemedti Follow the Somaliland Path؟

From Sudanese War Leader to De Facto Ruler of a Separate Territory

By Dr El-Tahir El-Faki

Could Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, transform his military control of western Sudan into a permanent political entity؟ The possibility deserves serious consideration. Yet while Somaliland offers a useful historical comparison, eastern Libya may provide a more realistic picture of what could emerge: a rival administration sustained by armed power and external relationships, but without broad international recognition or an agreed constitutional status.

Three outcomes must be distinguished: Hemedti’s personal survival, the survival of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and the emergence of a legitimate state in Darfur. They are not interchangeable, and none guarantees the others.

Somaliland: A Model with Limits

Somaliland demonstrates that a political authority can maintain separate governance for decades without widespread international recognition. Following the collapse of Somalia’s central government, Somaliland declared independence in 1991, developed its own institutions and sustained a distinct political administration.

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland in December 2025 marked a significant diplomatic development, but it did not secure general international acceptance. The African Union continues to defend Somalia’s territorial integrity.

The lesson for Hemedti is that recognition need not precede effective self-government. Territorial control, functioning institutions and sustained external relationships can establish a durable political reality.

However, the historical foundations differ fundamentally. Somaliland’s claim rests on its former colonial boundaries, its brief independence in 1960 and its subsequent union with Somalia. Darfur has no directly equivalent history. RSF military control cannot, by itself, establish a collective mandate for independence or demonstrate that Darfur’s diverse communities support Hemedti’s political project.

Eastern Libya: The More Immediate Analogy

Eastern Libya offers a closer comparison with the likely trajectory of Hemedti’s project. There, rival political and military authorities have maintained competing centres of power, supported by armed alliances and external relationships, without resolving the country’s national political division.

A similar arrangement could emerge in Sudan. An RSF-led administration based in Nyala might consolidate territorial control, organise security structures, collect revenue and develop civilian-facing institutions. Cross-border commerce and relationships with regional actors could help sustain it.

Such an administration might survive for years without becoming an internationally recognised state. Sudan could remain legally united while functioning increasingly as a country divided between competing political and military orders.

This is the central distinction: Somaliland represents a long-term pursuit of separate statehood through sustained self-government; eastern Libya illustrates how territorial fragmentation can become entrenched without producing an agreed sovereign settlement.

For Hemedti, the second outcome appears more plausible in the near term.

Three Possible Futures

The first possibility is a Somaliland-like trajectory. Hemedti’s administration could gradually develop functioning institutions, secure broader civilian participation and establish durable external relationships. But this would require a transformation from military rule into accountable governance, alongside a credible political and legal basis for its claims.

The second is an eastern Libya-style arrangement: a rival administration that survives through territorial control, armed alliances and selective external engagement, while remaining internationally contested. This could institutionalise Sudan’s fragmentation without delivering recognised independence.

The third is military contraction. If the RSF loses strategic territory, experiences internal defections or loses external support, Hemedti could face exile, a reduced insurgency or negotiations from a position of weakness. His personal survival would not necessarily preserve the political project he leads.

These are scenarios, not predictions. Their outcomes will depend on military developments, coalition cohesion, regional calculations and the administration’s ability to secure public acceptance.

Conclusion: A State Within a State؟

The greatest danger is not necessarily a formal declaration of independence. It is the gradual normalisation of separate institutions, competing chains of command and divided economic systems until temporary wartime arrangements become permanent political realities.

Darfur, however, is not the possession of any armed organisation. Its communities have different interests, political affiliations and historical grievances. An administration that concentrates power in one leader, one military structure and a narrow circle of allies risks reproducing the exclusion it claims to challenge. Allegations of atrocities and demands for accountability would further complicate any effort to establish legitimacy.

There is also a fundamental question of succession. If the project depends overwhelmingly on Hemedti’s personal command, his removal, exile or loss of authority could expose its institutional fragility. A durable state must be able to survive its founder.

The decisive question is not whether Hemedti can hold territory, but whether he can build a political order that commands public legitimacy, functions without permanent war and survives beyond his personal leadership.

Until then, eastern Libya is the more revealing warning than Somaliland: Sudan risks becoming a country in which rival armed authorities turn military front lines into lasting political boundaries.

Preventing that outcome requires more than defending Sudan’s territorial integrity on paper. It demands an inclusive political settlement, civilian government, accountability, security-sector reform and a serious response to the historical exclusion that has repeatedly fuelled conflict.

The ultimate test will be whether Sudan can overcome the conditions that make fragmentation attractive—not whether another armed leader can establish a state within the state.

Arabic Forum