We never forget those who died in Mostapha Mahmoud

Egyptian officials, including the director of security for the Giza
district of Cairo, meet with protest representatives.
· The authorities tell protesters that they will be taken under police guard to “camps” with
“humane conditions,” and that they would be provided with food, water, and shelter. The
demonstrators are told that if they refuse to go voluntarily, they will be removed by force.
· The protest representatives ask for guarantees that the camps really exist and are safe.
They suggest that either a delegation of protesters be sent ahead to view the camps in
advance or that UNHCR officials provide guarantees regarding the safety of the camps.
The authorities tell them neither is possible.
70 FMRS interview, 4 January 2006.
71 El Nadim Center for the Management and Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence, “Testimony: What happened
in Mustafa Mahmud?”, 4 January 2006, on file with FMRS.
32
The protesters refused to leave peacefully for several reasons. One was their fear of
mistreatment in police custody, which is well founded. According to a 2003 report on
detention conditions for asylum seekers and refugees, 79 percent of respondents said that they
were subjected to “violence, harassment, and abuse” while detained. 72 Another reason was
the fear that the buses would take the demonstrators to the airport to be deported. Some
protesters were concerned about losing the sense of solidarity and strength achieved during
the sitin.
The protesters’ response was to ask for guarantees about the location and conditions of the
“camps,” which the authorities refused to give. As became evident later on, the socalled
camps were not facilities where refugees and asylum seekers could be permanently housed,
but police training camps that had been turned into temporary detention facilities. In the end,
the authorities did not address the protesters’ fears and made no concessions.
2:40–5:00 a.m.
· On three or four occasions, water canons surrounding the park are fired at protesters, each
time for 10 to 15 minutes.
· In between the water canons, there are several rounds of talks. The authorities’ initial
demands are repeated but no concessions are made by either side.
· Sudanese embassy and Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) representatives
meet and negotiate with protest leaders, but they fail to convince them to heed demands
made by police and to leave the park peacefully.
· Riot police begin “warming up” by chanting nationalist slogans, running in place, and
jumping up and down.
5:00–5:30 a.m.
· Final negotiations with SPLM officials end and water canons are turned on for the last
time.
· Riot police move into the camp to begin removing people by force. They press inward
from all sides, leaving no exits for protesters who may want to disperse at this point. The
only option is to board the buses.
· In some parts of the park, protesters resist being removed and police aggressively beat
them with batons and sticks.
· Some protesters are crushed underfoot as a result of people being forced inward into the
park center.
· Some children who were covered by blankets and plastic sheeting to protect them from
water are stepped on and may have been crushed or suffocated in the mayhem.
· Individual protesters are restrained by two or three policemen each and loaded on buses.
· The buses move out to different locations in and around Cairo.
72 Human Rights Center for the Assistance of Prisoners, “A Study of Refugees’ Experience of Detention in
Egypt,” 2003, p. 80.
33
Egyptian government officials claimed that no violence was used to remove protesters.
Soon after the eviction, Mr. Mofid Shehab, Minister of State for the Shura Council, told
the People’s Assembly that it was “decided to evacuate them without using any
weapons.” He also stated, “At 4:45 a.m., some of the protesters, some of them drunk,
started to throw equipment they had collected at the police.” 73 This was also reported in
the daily press. Eyewitnesses strongly contradict this account, however, and many say
that nothing was thrown at the police before they entered the park. Once the raid began,
however, protesters in some parts of the camp reportedly threw kitchen utensils, plastic
bottles, and even fuul (beans), and some tried to fight back with sticks. This resistance
was quickly overcome.
I was not aware of anything until they were hitting me. I think there were five policemen for
every refugee. When we started to defend ourselves, there were many more coming. They
came and attacked. I saw one person I knew. They were beating him and when he fell down,
they broke his neck. One of the police broke his neck with his baton. One pregnant woman
also died in the same place.
FMRS interview with demonstrator, 13 January 2006
Security forces moved into the park from all sides, blocking possible escape routes. The
area was already overcrowded and those on the edges were forced inward. Eyewitness
reports indicate that police used disproportionate and indiscriminate violence, causing
injuries and death. In the mayhem, both adults and children were trampled by police
and possibly by protesters themselves.
Security forces aggressively beat protesters, even those who offered no resistance, including
children and some adults who were apparently already unconscious. One journalist who
witnessed the removal said, “I saw women and children sitting down being beaten by
police—very enthusiastically, too. I saw two guys being beaten while unconscious, totally
inert. In 20 years of reporting, I never saw anything like this: people being beaten with such
hate and ferocity, like animals. It reminded me of documentaries showing baby seals being
beaten.” 74
Police continued to be kick or beat protesters with batons even after they had been restrained
and removed from the park, and while they were on the buses. There are some indications
that the level of violence was unplanned, or at least that not all security officers were
enthusiastic participants in the mayhem. Two bystanders reported plainclothes officers
shouting at lowranking
police to stop the beating but being ignored.
73 Transcript of the People’s Assembly debate on the evacuation of Sudanese protesters, 2 January 2006.
74 FMRS interview, date unavailable.
34
Some of the police said, “We are forced, we don’t want to do that, but we have orders.” I
thought that Abdulrahman was going to die because he was beaten and I did not know where
Abeer was. I saw people…an eighteenmonthold
baby died in Abdulrahman's hands in the
stampede. People were running over him and his sister was crying and could not find her
parents. I think it took 1 hour and 50 min until they brought us to the buses.
FMRS interview with demonstrator, 8 January 2006
Several protesters said that after entering the park, some police used handheld
canisters of
gas, which may have been CS gas (tear gas, which has a distinctive peppery smell), pepper
spray, or another chemical. Demonstrators said it made their eyes burn and one protester
described the canisters as having pink and red writing. This description matches photographs
of tear gas canisters used by Egyptian police on demonstrators during 2005’s parliamentary
elections. Two days later, a bystander returned to the remains of the camp and found police
looking for lost canisters of what they referred to as pepper spray.
Before the attack, water canons were aimed over the ######### of or directly at protesters.
Some protesters suggest that there was a chemical in the last spray of water, but this
was not consistently reported. A minority of demonstrators interviewed also reported a
number of other weapons, including “electric sticks” (electric cattle prods) and knives
or sticks with knives attached, 75 and one person said that police had shot protesters with
“silent guns.” None of these reports were confirmed, however.
The authorities deny that any weapons or excessive violence were used, and clearly did
not consider wooden batons and tear gas as weapons despite the damage they inflict as
a result of misuse. Regarding the causes of deaths, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
official told FMRS: “The police did not use any kind of weapons; the deaths were
caused by suffocation, and nobody was beaten.” 76 Minister of State Shehab said,
“Regarding the injured, they were 73 Sudanese and they were hospitalized in the
instant.” 77
But eyewitnesses reported that there was no sign of immediate medical attention for
protesters. Injured and even apparently unconscious Sudanese were put straight onto buses to
be taken to the detention camps. One demonstrator reported, “They beat us with sticks and
shoved us into the buses. We were even beaten in the buses.” 78 A protester and a bystander
said that a threeyearold
boy, who had been hit on the neck by a police baton, was taken to
Torah detention center, where he died a few hours later. Reports suggest that the only
Sudanese who were put into ambulances were those who were already dead. There are reports
of between two and 10 bodies seen lying on the street.
75 A doctor who treated demonstrators’ wounds at Sakakini Church on January 3, 2006, noted lacerations that
required stitches, but said that these are consistent with both sharp and blunt objects (see next section).
76 See Hamzawy, op. cit.
77 See People’s Assembly, op. cit.
78 FMRS interview, 12 January 2006.
35
5:30 a.m.
· The park has been cleared.
The scene is one of stunned silence and desolation. Hundreds of blankets and suitcases are
strewn all over the park. Other private belongings, such as notebooks, family pictures,
children’s toys, and blue and yellow refugee identity cards, are scattered on the ground.
We hope the international community to take us to any place except here and Sudan. I feel
afraid, I don’t feel safe. I left my home where there was a lot of killing and there was no
safety. Now there is no safety for me here.
FMRS interview with demonstrator, 14 January 2006
36
THE AFTERMATH
Confusion and anxiety characterized the weeks following the breakup
of the sitin.
It proved
difficult to find reliable statistics covering the number of dead, hospitalized, and detained,
and even more difficult for individuals to locate their family members and friends. Families
were often forced to rely on informal channels, such as word of mouth from church members
and detainees who had been released, to discover the whereabouts of loved ones.
Despite this, the Sacred Heart Church (Sakakini) in Abasseya moved quickly to gather a list
of missing individuals; it had an incomplete list of 120 by January 1, 2006. Rumors mixed
with official reports from the Egyptian government regarding how many were killed. Initial
eyewitness reports of bodies seen in the morgue ranged as high as 265. 79 Security officials
put the number at 25, while the Interior Ministry claimed only 12 had died in the incident. 80
There was also confusion over whether those Sudanese who had been detained would be
deported. While the government issued a statement on January 3 that the then 654 Sudanese
in detention would be deported, 81 other sources indicated that no deportation would occur.
Medical Treatment
Hundreds of demonstrators were severely beaten by riot police and suffered such injuries as
concussions, broken bones, bruises, and lacerations. Some reported having been exposed to
unknown chemicals and suffering respiratory problems, while others were trampled or
smothered under plastic tarps.
While official referrals to hospitals totaled fewer then 150 persons, AMERA estimated that
hundreds more sustained injuries. In addition, AMERA estimated that at least 200 people in
the three primary detention centers had significant medical concerns. 82 When UNHCR staff
gained access to the detention facilities almost a week after the forced removal, most of the
detainees had only received first aid.
Approximately 600 injured or sick Sudanese were triaged at a makeshift clinic in Sakakini
Church during the five days following the incident. CARITAS, which is the primary provider
of health services to refugees in Cairo, was closed on December 30 and in the days
immediately following the forced removal. The severely injured were seen within the first
day or two and transferred to the Italian Hospital in Abasseya. The injured were also
transferred to El Sanabel Hospital and El Agouza Hospital. Injuries included severe head
injuries, lacerations, and fractures. Following an attempt by demonstrators to organize a
79 See Eric Reeves, “Egypt Celebrates Fifty Years of Independence for Sudan,” 3 January 2006, available at <
http://www.sudanreeves.org/index.php?name=News&file=article&sid=83>.
80 See Hossam Bahgat, “UN Says Egypt Has Given Another Week to Sudanese Refugees,” Sudanese Tribune,
9 January 2006.
81 Ibid.
82 Personal correspondence, 26 January 2006.
37
second protest within the church premises, 83 the makeshift clinic at Sakakini was closed and
the injured were redirected to facilities at Arba waNuss
and CARITAS.
UNHCR called a humanitarian coordination meeting on January 9, 2006, at its offices. The
Medical Focal Point stated that approximately 700 persons were treated, most with cuts,
bruises, and broken bones, of whom 40 persons were sent to the Italian Hospital. There were
at least four traumatized children who were nonfunctional
(i.e., not speaking or eating) but
who were “starting to come around now.” 84
Most of those who had been in detention received only basic first aid, some apparently from
soldiers and others possibly from doctors. Of the medical cases that were seen at the three
detention centers, none was considered life threatening. Most had cuts, bruises, and/or broken
bones and associated pains. Four older women were reported to be in a bad state, one with a
heart condition and one with a large gash on her leg that could have become serious.
Authorities at the detention centers were told to keep on eye on these persons, though they
would not allow them to be released immediately for medical treatment.
In the detention center there were many people in a very bad condition. Although there were
people trained in first aid at the detention center, they deliberately did not offer to treat
anybody.
FMRS interview with demonstrator, 3 January 2006
Deaths
It is believed that all the bodies of those killed were sent to Zenhom Morgue. According to a
survey conducted by AMERA on January 2, “Unconfirmed sources indicate that bodies were
also being kept elsewhere, at hospital morgues, although Zenhom Morgue…did not have any
information on additional incoming bodies.” 85 AMERA collected these unconfirmed reports
from four different hospitals—Oum ElMesreen,
Manishiet Bakri, Kasr AlAini,
and
Imbaba—with the total being more than 250 deaths. Investigations by Dr. Ashraf Azer and
others from UNHCR, as well as AMERA legal advisors, revealed this number to be
exaggerated. Up to 35 had been reported dead at Manishiet Bakri, though this number was
never confirmed. The body count from the Kasr AlAini
Hospital varied from 23 to 27,
though UNHCR found only one dead body that was subsequently transferred to the Zenhom
Morgue. The Imbaba Hospital reported three dead, all of whom were also transferred to
Zenhom. The Oum elMesreen
Hospital reported nine dead, all of whom were transferred to
Zenhom.
Zenhom Morgue’s final count was 28, of whom 11 were children under the age of 12. 86 This
included one man who committed suicide while in detention. 87 In a letter dated January 30,
83 It is unclear what group or person was responsible for the attempt at organizing this second protest. Some
have attributed responsibility to Kifaya, an Egyptian political opposition group. Others have suggested the
Muslim Brotherhood may have been involved. There are no confirmed reports.
84 It is unknown which components of this brief are in reference to those in and those out of detention.
85 “List of Bodies at Zenholm [sic] Morgue as 2.01.06,” document on file with AMERA.
86 See “List of Bodies at Zenholm [sic] Morgue as of 18.01.06,” document on file with AMERA.
38
2006, the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs put the number of dead at 27. 88 On February
2, another boy died after more than a month in a coma resulting from severe beating suffered
during the forced removal. This brought the confirmed number of dead at the morgue to 29.
One of the leaders of the demonstration has suggested that as many as 53 died as a result of
the forced removal, but this number has not yet been verified. Testimonies of many Sudanese
indicate that there may have been more deaths in the days following the breakup
of the
demonstration. 89 The Egyptian government has not released any autopsy reports or
information regarding the causes of death.
Permission to view the bodies was only given to immediate family members. AMERA
reported that bodies were kept in “makeshift
coffins/boxes” and that initial information
provided by officials at Zenhom about the identification of bodies and the number of children
killed was contradictory and confusing. 90 Some relatives expressed concern that organs had
been removed at the hospitals or in the morgue, though the assistant to the lead doctor at
Zenhom and Dr. Azer from UNHCR reported that, given the time that passed between death
in the hospitals and final transfer to Zenhom, the cellular death of the organs would have
rendered them inoperative. Relatives and family members were not allowed to photograph the
bodies.
Initial family concerns included delayed access to the bodies of their loved ones. In addition,
family members were upset by the performance of autopsies and the sacrilege of delayed
burial. In late February, bereaved families were seeking closure on the matter, as the
government of Egypt had not yet released the bodies of their loved ones. This was a source of
considerable emotional stress.
On February 3, one individual, after having secured permission from the relevant Egyptian
authorities, traveled with the body of his maternal uncle’s wife to the Cairo International
Airport in preparation for a transfer to Sudan. Although he possessed what appeared to be the
appropriate paperwork, 91 he was told at the airport that he had to return the body to the
morgue. 92
87 See “Detentions” section below.
88 See “Letter of Egyptian Embassy in London to the Parliamentary Group Concerning the Sudanese
Refugees,” 30 January 2006, available at MFA_News/Statements/Letter+of+Egyptian+Embassy+in+London+to+the+Parliamentary+Group+concer
ning+the+Sudanese+Refugees.htm>.
89 See “List of Bodies at Zenholm [sic] Morgue as of 18.01.06,” op. cit.
90 “Note for the Record, 1.01.06,” document on file with AMERA.
91 This paperwork included: 1) a death certificate (with no cause of death listed); 2) a letter of permission from
the Ministry of Health to transport the body to Sudan, confirming his authorization as the closest living
relative in Cairo to receive the body; 3) a letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent from Khartoum via
the Sudanese embassy in Cairo that providing permission for the deceased’s body to enter Sudan; and 4) a
document from the Ministry of Justice to confirm again that the holder is the legal guardian of the deceased’s
body and that he officially took possession of the body on 3 February 2006.
92 See “Case Details for Family Member Prevented from Transporting Body of Deceased (Victim of
Mohandeseen Park Eviction) Back to Sudan, 10 February 2003,” document on file with AMERA.
39
Two pieces of information have subsequently come to light that explain the delays and
problems regarding the transfer of bodies from the morgue to families and, eventually, to
Sudan. First, UNHCR noted that it took a considerable amount of time to verify the identity
of those who had been killed and then to find relevant family members. Second, a joint
investigative team—consisting of officials from the Sudanese Ministries of Foreign Affairs,
the Interior, and Justice in partnership with a forensic doctor from the Egyptian Ministry of
Justice—was formed to look into the widely circulated rumors of organ theft. According to a
UNHCR email, it was the Sudanese authorities in Egypt that requested that no bodies be
allowed to leave the country until the investigation was completed. 93 The team completed its
work on February 15 and made its findings known to the relevant authorities; the findings
have not been made public.
The same email also suggested that as of February 19, relatives would finally be able to take
the bodies of their loved ones from the morgue for burial, whether in Sudan or in Egypt. This
did not happen. After weeks of confusion, bureaucratic hurdles, and ongoing political
infighting, a number of bodies were released from the morgue on March 8, but only for burial
in Cairo. By March 21, after almost three months of obstructed efforts by relatives and
advocates to transport the deceased to Sudan, all remaining victims were buried in Cairo.
Detentions
An eyewitness notes that six white public transportation buses transported the demonstrators
to the Dahshur Military Camp some 40 kilometers outside of Cairo on the Al Fayoum desert
road. 94 Other Sudanese were reportedly taken to the Torah police camp, the Alexandria
Desert Road Police Camp, the Manshiet Nasr detention facility, and a detention center in
Dokki. According to Mofid Shehab, Sudanese were taken to four detention sites, though he
did not specify which four. 95
Those without any identification were sent to three different prisons: all women and children
were sent to Kanater Prison, while men were sent to Shebeen Alkoum Prison (some 65
kilometers outside of Cairo) and Abu Zaabal Prison (approximately 40 kilometers outside of
Cairo). According to the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “those who have been vacated
were safely driven to empty housing units in a suburb of Cairo under the custody of the
judicial authority.” 96
The police divided the demonstrators in detention into three groups: blue cardholders,
yellow
cardholders,
and those without documents, including individuals with closed files and who
were newly arrived and not registered with UNHCR. It appears that those who held blue and
yellow cards were later grouped together and put back onto buses. They were then released in
various areas in small groups (1012
people) throughout Cairo in the days and nights
following the forced removal.
93 A copy of the email, sent on 18 February 2006, is on file with the author.
94 See Nora Younis, “Disgraced to be Egyptian: A Testimony,” available at <
http://www.norayounis.com/2005/12/30/74>. Last accessed 30 January 2006.
95 See People’s Assembly, op. cit.
96 See “Letter of Egyptian Embassy,” op. cit.
40
Mofid Shehab reported on January 2 that 2,174 Sudanese had been removed from the park
and 1,444 had been released shortly thereafter. 97 The Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
stated on January 18 that after “resolving the protest,” 1,550 people had been released. 98
According to UNHCR, 627 Sudanese remained in detention on January 5, when it requested a
month from the Egyptian government to do “proper legal assessments” to determine whether
the detainees met the refugee definition. 99 The Egyptian government allowed UNHCR three
days, which was later extended to January 26. UNHCR conducted the legal assessments with
the Sudanese in detention. The government did not grant access to lawyers or NGOs.
A January 13 UNHCR press briefing announced that on January 11, “164 Sudanese asylum
seekers and refugees, including 41 women and 31 children, and holders of UNHCR
registration cards as asylum seekers or refugees, were released by the Egyptian authorities
upon UNHCR’s recommendation and following photo identity verification.” 100 UNHCR also
noted that it had received “no guarantees” that the 463 demonstrators still in detention would
not be deported, though it advised the Egyptian government against “forcible return.”
UNHCR reported that 183 detainees remained in custody by January 19. Radhouane Nouicer,
UNHCR’s Genevabased
deputy director for the region, who was then on mission in Cairo,
reiterated that UNHCR would conduct a “proper, indepth
legal assessment to ensure whether
these people are of concern to UNHCR.” 101
Employing 25 interviewers, UNHCR representatives met with the 183 detainees for an
average of three hours each over a weeklong period and met the January 26 deadline. On
January 27, UNHCR announced that 14 of the remaining detainees were found to be “persons
of concern who should be released immediately.” The organization also recommended to the
Egyptian government that 34 of the recently arrived detainees be allowed to appeal
UNHCR’s decision. While under normal circumstances an asylum seeker rejected at first
instance has 30 days to express her intention to appeal and a year to formulate a legal
argument, UNHCR asked the government that the detainees be given five days to appeal.
According to a January 30 letter written by the Egyptian embassy in London, “All those who
proved to be refugees, asylum seekers, or have a valid legal permit or entrance visa were
released.” 102
Conditions in Detention
Not much official information on the conditions in detention is available. UNHCR provided
clothing, shoes, and personal hygiene items, but also noted that “morale is very low, as a
97 See People’s Assembly, op. cit.
98 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Statement on the Sudanese Refugee Crisis, 18 January 2006, available at <
http://www.mfa.gov.eg/MFA_Portal/enGB/
MFA_News/Statements/sud.htm>.
99 UNHCR briefing, 27 January 2006.
100 UNHCR briefing, 13 January 2006.
101 UNHCR briefing, 19 January 2006.
102 See “Letter of Egyptian Embassy,” op. cit.
41
number of people are showing signs of trauma because of the events and many have been
separated from their families.” 103
In the hall where we stayed [in Kanater Prison] there were beds but not enough for everyone.
Each of the 17 beds was shared by two women. About 30 more women had to sleep on the
ground, which was very cold and wet, due to the toilets inside the hall. Among us, there were
about 15 children. There were three children without their parents in the hall; their ages were
approximately one, five, and 11 years old.
FMRS interview with demonstrator, 8 January 2006
One demonstrator noted that those injured were only given rags to clean their wounds and no
other treatment. Two protesters who were taken to Mounira Hospital noted that the doctor
used the same needles to stitch up all of the injured Sudanese without disinfecting them.
Describing treatment in the detention centers, one demonstrator said, “When somebody tried
to move a bit because of the pain or the coldness/dampness of the floor, he was beaten with
sticks or slapped.” 104 Another noted, “In the camp, the officials were writing down names.
They were very bad to us. One officer started to abuse people. He was hitting the women,”
calling them “whores” and other expletives. 105
Family members were separated. One man recounted: “On Saturday night, my wife and I
were put on two separate buses, one for women and one for men. When we refused to get
separated, we were told that both buses would arrive at the same camp. This was not true. My
wife was brought to Kanater and I was brought to Shebeen Alkoum.” 106 He described his
experience at the prison:
We were 25 people in our cell. The size of the cell was about 4x3 meters.
There were no beds. We received blankets. It was very cold. The floor was
cement and was very damp.
Inside the cell was a toilet separated by a wall. We were told to drink from
it.
In the middle of the night, one of the men inside the cell went into the
toilet. When he did not come out for a long time and did not answer our
calls, we banged against our cell door to get the attention of the police
who were on the floor under us.
It took about one hour before the police opened the door. When they
opened the toilet door they discovered that the man had hung himself. I
took a picture on my mobile phone showing him hanging.
103 UNHCR briefing, 13 January 2006.
104 FMRS interview, 4 January 2006.
105 FMRS interview, 13 January 2006.
106 FMRS interview, 8 January 2006.
42
During the investigation we were taken to another room and then returned.
When we returned to the room we refused to carry on drinking from the
WC because of the dead body. We were told to drink further from the WC
and we did. 107
Many demonstrators said that their belongings, especially money, were confiscated by the
Egyptian authorities, although this was not always the case. One man recalled: “One officer
offered to keep our money safe until we would leave prison. He held his promise.” Another
woman was surprised by the good treatment: “It was very hard to believe that these people
were Egyptians because they were treating us very well. They gave us juice and biscuits, and
milk, pajamas, slippers, and blankets. The treatment was very good. It was hard to believe
that they were from the same nationality like the police who was hitting us.” 108
Those who had been detained were often released in abandoned areas. One refugee recounted
his release from the Torah police camp: “At 2 a.m. on the following night, the weakest were
selected. We were promised to be taken to a place where we could get medical treatment,
beds, and blankets. In fact, we were asked to leave the bus in small groups of three to four
people in the middle of nowhere without shoes or money.” Another described a similar
experience: “On Saturday night, the Egyptians brought the bags from the park. But they did
not give us sufficient time to look for our belongings. They put a group of 20 people into a
bus and dropped us somewhere. I was unable to walk and I did not have shoes on.” 109 One
demonstrator recalled, “I was released on Friday 6 p.m. We were insulted by the police. They
took us on a bus before we were released and then they would stop every now and then and
let us out of the bus after insulting us. They left me out with other refugees in a place that I
didn’t know.” 110
Threatened Deportations
Shortly after the breakup
of the protest, the Egyptian Foreign Affairs Ministry indicated that
it would deport the Sudanese who remained in detention. AlAhram
Weekly reported that the
“Egyptian Foreign Ministry announced that it was deporting 645 Sudanese it classified as
‘illegal immigrants.’” 111 On January 4, the Egyptian daily AlAhram
noted that 650 Sudanese
detainees were to be deported to Sudan.
On January 5, however, the Egyptian government announced it would delay the deportations.
Astrid van Genderen Stort, a UNHCR spokesperson, said that the government had agreed to
move the deportations back three days. 112 It was at this point that UNHCR first had access to
the detainees and began to determine which individuals were already registered with
UNHCR.
107 Ibid. See also the AMERA document, “List of Bodies at Zenholm [sic] Morgue as of 18.01.06.” It appears
the body of the man who died in detention was transferred to Zenhom Morgue.
108 FMRS interviews, 8 January 2006
109 FMRS interviews, 4 January 2006.
110 FMRS interview, 14 January 2006.
111 Gamal Nkrumah, “The Noose Tightens,” AlAhram
Weekly, 511
January 2006.
112 “Egypt to Delay Sudanese Deportations,” Agence France Presse, 5 January 2006.
43
From January 7 through 20, the Egyptian government allowed UNHCR to carry out its legal
assessment of the Sudanese detainees and no deportations occurred. On January 18, an article
from the New York Times confirmed that no deportations would take place. According to
Nasser Hamzawy from the African Affairs department of the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, “After the UNHCR and the authorities look into their individual files and determine
their status, they will be released.” 113
Nonetheless, there was again concern that detainees would be made to return to Sudan after
UNHCR finished its assessment on January 26, at which point 183 Sudanese remained in
custody. As discussed above, UNHCR recommended that 14 of the 183 be released and that
another 34 be given a chance to appeal. Those remaining were determined “not to be eligible
for international refugee protection under UNHCR’s mandate.” 114 The Egyptian government
appears to have put those fears to rest when, on January 30, Nasser Hamzawy indicated that
none of those remaining in custody would be deported. “Now that the UNHCR has completed
its assessment interviews, it’s been decided that none of the remaining detainees will be
deported back to Sudan.” 115
On February 11, all Sudanese remaining in detention were released from prison. It appears
that the passport of each had been extended and given a sixmonth
residency stamp—an
operation carried out by the Egyptian Ministry of the Interior in cooperation with the
Sudanese embassy in Cairo.
Involvement of the Sudanese Embassy in Cairo
One issue that remained unclear during the weeks following the breakup
of the
demonstration was the role of the Sudanese embassy. AMERA has a list of names, given to
the organization by a client, that was apparently collected by the embassy in preparation for
deportation. Some of the testimonies also indicate that the embassy was interested in having
the Sudanese detainees return. One demonstrator said, “On Wednesday, we were told to go
downstairs in groups of 10 people. At the front gate, there were six officials from the
Sudanese embassy who wanted to take information from us.” He added, “One official from
the Sudanese embassy approached me and said to the policeman that he wanted to take me
with him.” 116
Many of those in prison described how they were told they would be deported. One example
came from a woman who was sent to Kanater: “Since we were without documents, the prison
management said that we would be sent to the Kanater Prison, and then we would be
deported.” 117
113 Michael Slackman, “Egypt Says It Won’t Deport Any of the Jailed Sudanese,” New York Times, 18 January
2006, Section A; Column 1; Foreign Desk; p. 3.
114 UNHCR briefing, 27 January 2006.
115 “Egypt: No Deportation for Sudanese Detainees, Says Government,” IRIN, 30 January 2006, available at <
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=51415&SelectRegion=Middle_East&SelectCountry=EGYPT>.
116 FMRS interview, 8 January 2006.
117 FMRS interview, 28 January 2006.
44
The “attention” and involvement of the Sudanese embassy gave rise to the possibility that
those in detention should be considered to be sur place refugees, which are individuals who
become refugees by virtue of activities since leaving their country of origin. 118 On January 8,
AMERA forwarded a legal argument to UNHCR Cairo and Geneva arguing that those in
detention should be considered “of concern” to UNHCR on this basis. It was argued that the
involvement of the Sudanese embassy, particularly the preparation of travel documents, the
highly politicized nature of the demonstration, and the indication that the demonstration was
undermining the bilateral relationship between Sudan and Egypt amounted to a reasonable
likelihood of persecution upon return to Sudan.
In an email dated January 13, UNHCR acknowledged that it was clearly aware of the
involvement of the Sudanese embassy. The email referred to the “uncertainty surrounding the
ramifications for the safety of the persons concerned due to their involvement with the
demonstration and the role subsequently played by the Sudanese officials.” 119
Emergency Assistance
Many of the Sudanese who had moved to Mustafa Mahmoud Park were evicted from their
homes. After the demonstration was broken up, many demonstrators had no housing.
Compounding this problem was the number of Sudanese who suffered injuries during the
violent removal. It proved difficult for humanitarian organizations to coordinate and respond
to the great need for assistance in the days and weeks following the removal.
Two staff members from AMERA worked on December 31 to transfer critically injured
Sudanese to hospitals in Cairo. Following the advice of the lead doctor from CARITAS, the
two began to transport Sudanese to Sanabel Hospital. Starting from 10 a.m., the two worked
throughout the day and late into the night taking patients to the hospital. The next day, they
transported patients to Oum El Nour Hospital. The two AMERA employees concluded their
account of the two days following the breakup
of the demonstration on an ambivalent note:
It was observed that the need for medical attention among the survivors
was great. Without guidance and assistance many would have suffered
through pains, bruises, and broken bones without being able to care [sic] at
a hospital. One can only wonder how many more who we do not know
about are still in need of medical attention and still either unconvinced to
go to the hospital or not yet linked with assistance in getting to a medical
facility. Of course, those still in detention likely had serious injuries, and
as no outsider had access initially to the prisons and detention facilities in
the early days, these injuries went untreated. 120
118 The UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status indicates that the key
assessment is “whether such actions may have come to the notice of authorities of the person’s country of
origin and how they are likely to be viewed by those authorities.” See par. 96 of the Handbook, 1979.
119 Email from Hamdi Bukhari, UNHCR Geneva, to Tarek Badawy, AMERA, 13 January 2006.
120 George Milad and Mohamed el Messiry, “Sudanese Eviction Aftermath,” document on file with AMERA.
45
Staff from UNHCR, CARITAS, and AMERA canvassed various hospitals in Cairo in search
of injured Sudanese. As noted above, convincing those who had been wounded, often
severely, to go to a hospital posed yet another challenge, as many Sudanese were wary of
Egyptian assistance. By January 6, 10 different facilities had seen patients, with over 190
having been treated at the Italian Hospital at Sakakini Church. 121
AMERA staff coordinated with the church in compiling lists of those missing, as well as lists
of Sudanese detained at the various facilities. UNHCR also requested lists, as reliable
information on the whereabouts of friends and family members was difficult to access.
UNHCR only provided information to the International Committee of the Red Crescent/Cross
(ICRC) for security and confidentiality reasons. 122 At January 5, Sakakini’s list of missing
stood at 120 (and was acknowledged to be incomplete). At January 15, AMERA had a list of
21 clients whose whereabouts were unknown or unconfirmed.
On March 14, UNHCR issued a twopage
statement entitled “Missing Persons Following the
Events of 29 December 2005.” 123 The document describes how communitybased
associations, churches, and NGOs forwarded lists of missing persons to UNHCR, and how
UNHCR collaborated with ICRC to “connect missing family members and answer queries
about family members who may be in prison.” 124 The number of those missing as a result of
the forced removal remains unknown. Although the UNHCR document says that “some
organizations have sent follow up inquiries of persons still missing over the last fortnight, and
this number remains at less than five persons still missing,” 125 another list given to FMRS
includes more than 23 names. 126
UNHCR established an emergency housing and assistance fund at the Bank of Alexandria
that was handled by CARITAS. Assistance was limited to Sudanese who had been at the
demonstration from September 29 through December 29, and “whose names appeared on the
list submitted to UNHCR by the leaders of the demonstration on 19 December 2005.” 127
Sudanese were directed to different branches in Cairo depending on the first letter of their
name. By January 18, the housing fund was exhausted. UNHCR claimed that 1,500 people
had benefited from the assistance. There were also reports, however, that the bank had told
individuals to come back after two weeks, which caused considerable frustration. Some
reports indicated that more than 500 people claiming to have been at the protest came to the
bank, but their names were not on the list submitted to UNHCR. 128
121 See “Update 6.01.06: AMERA Coordination of Medical Assistances and Related Updates,” document on
file with AMERA.
122 See “Report on the UNHCR Meeting on Separated Children and Missing People,” 17 January 2006,
document on file with AMERA.
123 UNHCR, “Missing Persons Following the Events of 29 December 2005,” 14 March 2006, document on file
with AMERA and FMRS.
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
126 Document on file with FMRS.
127 See UNHCR, “Announcement,” 3 January 2006 (English and Arabic), facsimile on file with AMERA.
128 See “UNHCR Meeting on Separated Children and Missing People,” op. cit.
46
UNHCR directed those still in need of assistance to CARITAS or directly to the UNHCR
Administration Office. 129 A UNHCR representative also stated that those released from
detention would be assisted. 130 The agency said it would give blue and yellow cardholders
released from detention LE300 to find housing. 131 Americans Aiding Refugees (AAR), a
private charity, established the Sudanese Survivors of December 30 th Fund, separate from UN
resources. This charity directed donations toward medical attention, shelter, and other basic
needs.
UNHCR and a Sudanese NGO, SUDIA, coordinated to address the issue of unaccompanied
minors. UNHCR stated it would provide for foster care of children who had been orphaned as
a result of the removal. It intends to channel funds allocated for an HIV prevention program
to foster families in the Sudanese community who would take responsibility for 24
unaccompanied minors. 132
UNHCR, AMERA, and the El Nadim Center for the Management and Rehabilitation of
Victims of Torture collaborated in an effort to meet the mental health needs of those
traumatized by the violence and suffering during and after the breakup
of the demonstration.
These groups coordinated with other service providers in Cairo. AMERA offered counseling
to family members of the deceased, and it organized a meeting with UNHCR on January 15
to determine what would be done with the dead. After some negotiation, UNHCR agreed to
pay US$1,000 (through CARITAS) to each family and to facilitate the transfer of the bodies
from the morgue to each of the families. 133 In March, more than two months after the forced
removal, the money was disbursed. Families were also supposed to be able to decide whether
to have the body transferred to Sudan or to have it buried in Egypt. However, as noted above,
all of the bodies were buried in Cairo.
AMERA continues to provide crisis counseling for the immediate family members of the
deceased and has received referrals for counseling for children traumatized by the violence.
In addition, AMERA advocated successfully for assistance to orphans. Four were
subsequently reunited with their grandparents in Sudan. Longterm
mental health support for
immediate family members is still needed. UNHCR and ICRC also need assistance in
information dissemination regarding the deceased and missing so that families can be
reunited.
Another concern centers on the belongings lost during the breakup
of the demonstration.
Allegedly, the Egyptian government is holding three truckloads of items in a warehouse in
the Dahshur police camp but will not take responsibility for distributing them, claiming this is
UNHCR’s task. 134
129 Ibid.
130 See “Briefing at UNHCR on 18 January 2006,” document on file with AMERA.
131 See “UNHCR Meeting on Separated Children and Missing People,” op. cit.
132 Ibid.
133 See “Meeting at AMERAEgypt,
15 January 2006,” document on file with AMERA.
134 See “Briefing at UNHCR on 18 January 2006,” document on file with AMERA.
47
Local and International Reactions
UNHCR
UNHCR’s reactions to the eviction of the protest varied. The BBC quoted High
Commissioner Antonio Guterres stating on December 30 that he was “deeply shocked at the
deaths.” 135 In a written statement, he declared that “although we still do not have all the
details or a clear picture of what transpired…there is no justification for such violence and
loss of lives.” 136 Similarly, CNN stated on December 30 that Kofi Annan, SecretaryGeneral
of the United Nations, condemned the unjustified violence of the Egyptian security and
regretted that the situation was not handled peacefully through dialogue according to
UNHCR’s demands. 137
In contrast, Astrid Stort, the spokeswoman for UNHCR Cairo, declared that the Egyptian
government had been patiently handling the situation of Sudanese refugees in cooperation
with UNHCR. In a press conference attended by Goodwill Ambassador Adel Imam, she
announced that several hours had been spent on negotiations with protestors from the
beginning of the protest until the December 17 agreement. She added that UNHCR had asked
the Egyptian government to end the protest peacefully and had not expected the high rates of
injuries and death. She said that UNHCR understood the problems refugees face and that
UNHCR tries to assist them to its fullest capacity. 138 Yet she also stressed that UNHCR
needed to prioritize its assistance to refugees, alleging that many of the protestors were not
refugees but economic migrants. Stort noted that UNHCR could not help prevent
discrimination in Egypt, where unemployment is high. 139
UNHCR noted that the Egyptian government reserved the privilege of ending the protest for
the sake of Egyptian society. According to Stort, the Egyptian government had not been
reluctant to handle the situation peacefully, especially given its special relationship with
Sudan. She said that UNHCR was in full cooperation with the Egyptian government in
conducting interviews with demonstrators in detention centers. 140
The deputy representative of UNHCR Cairo, Dessalegne Damtew, meanwhile, denied that
UNHCR had asked the government to end the protest: “Who are we to tell a sovereign
government what to do? We have been giving the government updates and we reported the
deteriorating health conditions at the park. We never requested the forced removal of the
asylumseekers.”
141
135 “Twenty Sudanese Die in Cairo Raid,” BBC, 30 December 2005, available at <
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4568340.stm>.
136 “Annan Slams Cairo Protest Deaths,” CNN, 30 December 2005, available at
.
137 Ibid.
138 Fawzi Mekhemer, “UNHCR’s Spokeswoman: Protest Eviction Took Place Based on an Agreement by the
Egyptian Government,” AlAkhbar,
4 January 2006.
139 “Twenty Sudanese Die in Cairo Raid,” op. cit.
140 Fawzi Mekhemer, “UNHCR’s Spokeswoman,” op. cit.
141 Gamal Nkrumah, “The Noose Tightens,” op. cit.
48
The UNHCR is based on three foundations: providing human rights, protection and
development….I have been in Egypt for four years and as a refugee I never had any of the
these three basic rights. That is why I call upon the international community to interfere and
address the problems of the Sudanese refugees here, so that the catastrophe which happened
here will not reoccur.”
FMRS interview with demonstrator, 14 January 2006
Egyptian Government
Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed AbouEl
Geit stressed that throughout the three months of
the protest, Egypt’s role as a host country was to mediate between UNHCR and the protestors
and to aid the beleaguered residents of the area. According to AbouEl
Geit, Egypt played a
leading a role in providing security to UNHCR, coordinating several negotiations, protecting
refugees in Egypt, contacting Sudanese officials who promised refugees a secured voluntary
return, and forming a committee that consisted of concerned Egyptian ministries to discuss
strategies for ending the protest peacefully.
On December 22, 2005, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs received a letter from UNHCR
stating that the situation had become critical in the park, that it was attracting media attention,
and thus that it was affecting the image of the Egyptian government and UNHCR
internationally. The letter requested that the Egyptian government end the protest.
AbouEl
Geit stressed that ending the protest was not done on the government’s initiative and
called attention to the fact that it had provided security for the sitin
for three months,
allowing a protest in one of its squares. He also noted that the demonstrators had violated
Egyptian law, as well as the refugee convention by breaking domestic law. He added that no
other country in the world would allow refugees to protest in one of its most prominent
squares for three months. He expressed his sadness at the deaths that resulted from the
eviction; however, he stressed the distinction between the decision to end the protest and the
events that followed. 142
I did not imagine people were going to be killed….People say water canons were behind the
deaths. It is not true—the water was aimed over their #########. Look at the documentaries to see
this was a false claim.
Minister of the Interior Habib ElAdly,
Hadith AlMedina
TV program, January 27
At a People’s Assembly soon after the removal, opposition groups and parties criticized the
violence Egyptian security forces used. However, members of the National Democratic Party,
who constitute the majority, as well as Mofid Shehab, noted the strong bonds between Egypt
and Sudan. According to the majority of MPs, the Egyptian government violated neither
international law nor the Geneva Convention. Like AbouEl
Geit, Shehab stressed that the
government has a responsibility to its citizens who were negatively affected by the protest.
142 Ahmed Abu El Geit, “Egypt’s Calls to Explain the Facts Behind the Eviction of the Sudanese Protest,
UNHCR Did Not Direct Any Blame to Egypt,” AlAhram,
3 January 2006.
49
He ended his statement by saying that no other country would have allowed such a protest to
occur on its territory. 143
In the months following the sitin,
several demonstrators complained that they were being
harassed and threatened by Egyptian police and security forces, who they said were using
many of the same arguments put forward by the government officials above. The members of
Refugee Voices, the group that first organized the protest, said that they were being
interrogated, detained, and threatened with being spied on by the government and “friends of
the security.” Several members said that security forces threatened to frame them for crimes
such as drugdealing
and currency trading. They appealed for international protection from
these humiliating and frightening tactics. 144
Egyptian Media
Adel Imam held the protestors responsible for the deaths and injuries that followed the
eviction. He argued that the Egyptian government tried to its full capacity to solve the
situation through negotiations and to end the protest peacefully, but that protestors never
wanted to reach an agreement with the other parties. “As a goodwill ambassador for refugee
affairs, I have tried to mediate between UNHCR in Cairo and the refugees, but we never
understood what they wanted—finally we realized that they wanted to be resettled. However
this is not a simple matter because it has to do with international agreements and depends on
acceptance by resettlement countries.” 145 He added that even after the protest ended, a
number of refugees who were released threatened the staff at UNHCR and CARITAS, which
in turn stopped providing support to the refugees. 146
On January 1, AlAhram
reported that 36 humanitarian organizations had declared that the
Egyptian government had not violated international human rights law, specifically the 1966
Convention on Civil and Political Rights and Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights. It was also reported that the government had requested an intervention from the
National Council for Human Rights. 147
In an AlAhram
article, Ambassador Masum Marzuk, director of the Sudan department in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, attempted to clarify Egypt’s position regarding the eviction of
the protesters. He said that the eviction was a response to the continuing calls by UNHCR to
the Egyptian government to handle the situation and to the complaints of nearby residents,
but that the government would have preferred to handle the situation peacefully through
negotiations that the ambassador attended personally. He noted having witnessed the
stubbornness of the protestors and their refusal of the Four Freedoms Agreement, which he
143 Refaat Rashad, Osama Saeed, and Mohamed El Fiqi, “People’s Assembly Discusses the Eviction of
Refugee Protestors,” AlAkhbar,
3 January 2006.
144 Refugees Voice in Egypt, “Appeal for Group Protection and Humanitarian Assistance,” 23 February 2006,
on file with FMRS.
145 “UNHCR Did Not Ask for Investigations for the Eviction and Is Not Blaming Anyone,” AlAhram,
4
January 2006.
146 Ibid.
147 Emad Hegab, “According to 36 Humanitarian Organizations: Egypt Did Not Violate International Human
Rights Law,” AlAhram,
1 January 2006.
50
claimed benefited the refugees specifically. According to Marzuk, refugees considered the
park under the jurisdiction of UNHCR and not of the Egyptian government.
The ambassador said that the leaders of the protest were responsible for spreading misleading
information to keep the protest going, including rumors that protestors who stayed in the park
would receive aid or be resettled. He said that prior to the eviction, protestors had been
warned yet had responded to these warnings with violence toward the security forces. Marzuk
reminded people who had condemned the action taken by the Egyptian government that the
government was previously blamed for not taking action. He praised the patience of the
government in dealing with the stubborn protestors, who had refused all previous support. 148
The main concern of many writers at AlAhram
was to reiterate the positive relations between
Egypt and Sudan, as well as to point out the negative impact refugees have on the economy
of Egypt. Local newspapers often interpreted blame of the Egyptian government as a
conspiracy against the relationship between Egypt and Sudan and argued that the incident
should not become a wedge between the two countries. 149
On January 5, 2006, AlAhram
published a number of articles on Sudanese labor in Egypt.
One article, an interview with the Minister of Labor, stressed that the ministry is only
concerned with Sudanese laborers who are legally employed. Sudanese who entered the
country illegally and who work in the informal sector do not fall under the ministry’s
mandate. 150 In Sabah AlKheir,
an Egyptian magazine, an article entitled “Sudanese Brothers
Refused All the Possible Solutions” blamed the protesters for the situation. It claimed that the
spread of AIDS and other epidemic diseases was the main reason behind the eviction. 151
International Media and International Civil Society
The New York Times reported that the Egyptian government had not only blamed the
Sudanese and UNHCR for the eviction but that it had also threatened to deport more than 600
refugees who had no legal documents. It also stated that the way the government handled the
situation has not been publicly questioned. 152
Deirdre Clancy, director of the International Refugee Rights Initiative (IRRI), commented
that the eviction appeared to be a “premeditated violent attack by state forces on a group of
refugees and asylum seekers carried out with utter disregard for human life.” 153 IRRI
148 Masum Marzuk, “Truths and Frauds Concerning the Issue of Protest Eviction,” AlAhram,
15 January
2006.
149 See Nadia Mansur, “Hababakum Ashara: The Slogan of Sudanese Communities” and “The Sudanese in
Egypt Who Has an Important Value,” Wagih AlSaqar,
“Refugees Dream of the Yellow Card,” Nermine Qotb,
“A Survey of What Has Happened: Citizens Criticize What Happened in Mohandeseen,” AlAhram,
4 January
2006.
150 Abd Al Azeem AlBasel,
“The First Conversation with the New Minister of Labor with AlAhram
Newspaper: I am not responsible for the smuggled informal labor in Egypt,” AlAhram,
5 January 2006.
151 “Sudanese Brothers Refused All Possible Solutions,” Sabah AlKheir
Magazine, Issue 2609, 2 January
2006, pp. 1011.
152 See New York Times, 18 January 2006, op. cit.
153 IRRI, “IRRI Condemns Horrific Attack on Refugee Demonstrators in Cairo,” Press Release, New York and
Kampala, 2 January 2006, available at org/Newsletters/NorthAfrica/PR010206.
htm>.
51
criticized the fact that only UNHCR had access to the detainees. Moreover, it claimed that
local hospitals had been uncooperative in providing information about the number of injured
and the number of dead in their morgues. 154
The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and the Egyptian Organization for
Human Rights (EPHR) issued a condemnation of the violent action of Egyptian security
forces and described the attack as a violation of multiple international standards that bind
Egypt. FIDH called for an investigation into the eviction. It also called upon the Egyptian
government to adopt a new law to guarantee the protection of refugees and asylum seekers. 155
Egyptian Civil Society and Opposition Parties
On December 30, 2005, a number of Egyptian human rights NGOs issued a joint statement
on the removal. They described the Egyptian Ministry of Interior as the real criminal, who
knows no other way of dealing with opposition except through violence. They condemned the
local media and newspapers for misleading the public by failing to convey the reality of the
situation for refugees, who lived for three months in humiliation and hunger. 156 The NGOs
called for a few concessions from UNHCR and the Egyptian government, including the
release of detainees, the resignation of Minister of the Interior Habib ElAdly,
a transparent
investigation of the removal, publication of the names of the dead, and civil society access to
detained refugees. They also encouraged condemnation by civil society of UNHCR and of
the Egyptian government’s treatment of refugees.
On January 9, 12 Egyptian NGOs, many but not all of the same ones that authored the
December 30 statement, sent a letter to Louise Arbour, UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights. The letter lamented the failure of UNHCHR to make any public statement regarding
“the excessive use of force by Egyptian security forces.” 157 The groups called for an
investigation into what happened, including an examination of UNHCR’s conduct. The letter
concluded:
At a minimum, we request that you publicly condemn the killing of
dozens of Sudanese protestors, and take steps to ensure that the Egyptian
government fulfills its obligations under international human rights law to
investigate these serious human rights violations, bring their perpetrators
to justice, compensate the victims, and halt any deportation without due
process of law of any of the protestors back to Sudan.
154 Ibid.
155 The statement can be found at .
156 A statement by 12 NGOs in Cairo, 30 December 2005, document on file with FMRS.
157 The letter can be found at .
52
COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FMRS put this report together in order to clarify what happened on that fateful morning and
why, as well as to consider what can be done to ensure that it does not happen again. It is in
this spirit that the following comments and analysis are offered.
A series of failures on the part of the Egyptian government and UNHCR, combined with
unrealistic expectations and grave miscalculations on the part of the demonstrators and their
leaders, resulted in the tragedies of the forced eviction. This is a complicated story with many
actors, each of whom bears some level of responsibility for the unnecessary deaths of so
many people, including 12 children, and the physical injuries and psychological damage to
hundreds more. The incident further damaged already strained relations between UNHCR
and refugees and between UNHCR and the government, as well as to the government of
Egypt and its reputation as a host country. It will take a long time to repair this damage.
Egyptian Government
The government showed remarkable restraint over the three months of the sitin,
but came
under increasing pressure from UNHCR, the local media, and residents to remove the
protesters. Under the Egyptian Emergency Law, the gathering was manifestly illegal, and it is
to the government’s credit that such a long period of time was given for the peaceful
resolution of the issues between the demonstrators and UNHCR. Given the failure of
negotiations, however, it was inevitable that the Egyptian authorities eventually intervene.
During the removal, Egyptian security forces did not offer protesters the choice to disperse
peacefully, which might have averted the violence that occurred. Instead, a decision was
apparently made at the highest levels to remove the demonstrators to unidentified detention
centers. The authorities gave no clear or consistent information to protesters about the
“camps” they were being transported to and refused to grant any requests for guarantees. In
fact, misinformation about where the demonstrators would be moved meant that negotiations
were compromised from the start: no guarantees concerning the “camps” could be offered
because they were actually detention centers. This was very difficult for the protesters to
accept, and consequently, neither they nor security officials had an avenue by which to avoid
the confrontation.
Egyptian security used excessive and disproportionate force in removing the protesters,
leaving no alternatives or avenues for escape. No allowances were made for the safety of the
park’s occupants, especially vulnerable groups such as children, the elderly, and the sick.
Security forces entered the park from all directions at once, leaving nowhere for people to
flee. They used indiscriminate violence, and there was no immediate medical attention
available to injured protesters. Inadequate training in crowd control methods does not
adequately explain the high number of casualties and injuries that resulted. This is clearly a
matter for Egyptian and international human rights organizations to pursue.
In statements and in interviews with FMRS, government officials have chosen to deny that
there was any police violence. Some claim that any violence was only in response to the
53
protesters’ aggression. Most eyewitnesses dispute these assertions. Given the substantial
international media coverage, this denial seems shortsighted. It has also reduced the
possibility of a dialogue about the lessons to be learned from the tragedy and what measures
could prevent further incidents of the kind.
With attention focused on asylum seekers and refugees, and the issue discussed openly in the
People’s Assembly, this may be an opportune time for the government to seriously consider
the passage of domestic legislation to detail and systematize Egypt’s obligations under the
1951 and OAU refugee conventions, as well as to make its policies and procedures clear.
Without transparency and clarity, asylum seekers and refugees cannot access services, and
this translates into frustration that could lead to a repeat of the protest strategy. UNHCR has
been encouraging the government of Egypt to articulate such laws, putting the legal
responsibility for refugees back where it belongs, on the state party to the refugee
conventions.
UNHCR
UNHCR’s mandate is the protection of refugees and asylum seekers. From the beginning of
the sitin,
however, the agency adopted a hostile and confrontational attitude toward the
protesting asylum seekers, refugees, and closed files. It issued statements that accused the
protesters of everything from rumormongering
to outright deception. It suggested that the
demonstrators were not of concern to UNHCR, given that they included closed files and
persons the agency claimed were economic migrants. UNHCR also implied that the protesters
were responsible for keeping other, nonSudanese
asylum seekers away from its offices
although the decision to “close” the office was made by UNHCR itself. The agency’s claims
drove a wedge between the various communities of concern and exacerbated the lack of
communication between UNHCR and asylum seekers and refugees. Its attitude served to
confirm the protesters’ grievances and frustrations.
Throughout the sitin,
UNHCR exercised tight control over its public posture visàvis
the
protest. It refused to allow its staff to go the Moustafa Mahmoud Park and interact with the
refugees directly until December 17. The agency leadership insisted on meeting and
negotiating only with the leaders of the demonstration, even as it was denouncing them as
“selfappointed”
and accusing them of creating false expectations to lure people to the
park. 158
In early statements, UNHCR placed itself squarely on the side of the government of Egypt,
citing mutual concerns and interests. It repeatedly asked authorities to remove the protesters,
albeit “peacefully,” without demanding any substantive assurances that the intervention
would indeed be peaceful. UNHCR staff members were present as bystanders during the
evening of December 29, but no one from the agency was officially sent to intervene, despite
requests by protesters and increasing evidence over many hours that the protest could end
violently. It is unclear what UNHCR could have done at that late stage. The die was cast, and
all the agency could do was watch.
158 See, for example, UNHCR’s statement, “Rumours, Myths and Speculations Behind the Sudanese
Demonstrations,” op. cit.
54
UNHCR took a number of grave risks concerning the safety of the population in the park. It
must accept accountability for a number of failures and miscalculations that, at least
indirectly, led to the tragic results.
The Protesters
Leaders of the protest and the protesters generally must also bear some of the responsibility
for the incident. The protesters remained adamant about their demands throughout the three
months and refused to accept any compromise that may have ended the protest, such as that
offered by UNHCR in the failed December 17 agreement. While the protest leaders did
accept and sign the agreement with UNHCR, dissenting voices within the park succeeded in
overturning the decision, despite warnings from supporters and friends, and convinced others
to continue the protest.
It is understandable that the level of frustration that led to the protest in the first place and the
sense of unity and solidarity achieved during the three months militated against a
compromise. Nevertheless, the protesters should have been aware of the low likelihood that
the authorities would allow the sitin
to continue indefinitely or that it would end peacefully.
This was not the first time that authorities reacted violently to demonstrations in Egypt. Many
refugees in Cairo have firsthand experience of police brutality, and the refugee demonstration
in August 2004 was broken up violently.
Questions remain about whether everyone in the park made an informed decision to be at the
sitin,
and whether the leadership actively sought to create and sustain unrealistic
expectations. Also relevant are complaints about excessive control by the protest’s security
and organizing committees, particularly related to the public message and to punishment.
The protesters do not seem to have considered or planned for a possible intervention by the
authorities. Some demonstrators thought they were under UNHCR rather than Egyptian
government jurisdiction, and thus felt protected from the state’s intervention. Given the
number of vulnerable people in the park, especially children, the lack of planning by protest
organizers was a tragic oversight.
The accountability of victims of violence is a complex and sensitive matter that is impossible
to address here. It may be enough to say that the protest leaders had a responsibility to those
who elected and followed them, and a particular responsibility to protect children and
particularly vulnerable adults.
Longterm
Thematic Issues
A number of issues arise that require serious consideration by all parties if such a tragedy is
to be averted in the future. They are the same problems and issues that led to the protest, and
longterm
solutions and programs are required to resolve or at least to ameliorate the
frustration and hopelessness that asylum seekers and refugees in Egypt feel. These issues
55
include problems of communication and trust, the provision of adequate services that make
life livable even in limbo, and a redefinition of responsibilities and roles.
Information
Topping the list is the need for adequate, thorough, and helpful information for asylum
seekers and refugees in Egypt. The rumor mill that often plagues newcomers and longterm
residents in Cairo and creates false and unrealistic expectations has to be dealt with in an
active and comprehensive manner, involving everyone concerned. While the need for good
and effective information sharing among all parties concerned has been evident for a long
time, it was dramatically highlighted in the aftermath of the forced removal. Throughout
January and much of February, most parties did not know where detainees were located, who
died or was injured, and what emergency aid was available and where.
UNHCR, the Egyptian government, and organizations that serve refugee communities need to
improve access to authoritative, useful information for asylum seekers, refugees, and closed
files, as well as for Egyptian society and Sudanese community members. The information
must include where to access services, as well as trustworthy details on resettlement
prospects and the implications of various authorities’ decisions. Refugees must know the
policies of resettlement countries, the political dynamics developing between Egypt and
Sudan as well as Egypt and UNCHR, and developments in relations between UNHCR and
the population of concern. This is a challenging prospect, given the size of the refugee
population widely dispersed in Cairo’s urban setting.
Centralizing this information through the Web would be one helpful avenue. While many
asylum seekers and refugees may not have access to computers or the Internet, some do, and
they have a responsibility to share information with their compatriots. Service providers can
also rely on such a service to accurately inform their clientele on a regular basis. 159 A recent
effort by FMRS students, members of Student Action for Refugees, may be an auspicious
beginning for such an effort. 160
This recommendation applies not only to the need for accurate and helpful information, but
also to a reconsideration of its purposes. Beyond simply informing refugees about a particular
fact or service, the parties involved must clarify why such a fact or service needs to be known
and how to make use of it. For example, UNHCR issued a onepage
brochure about its
blanket decision to suspend RSD interviews for Sudanese asylum seekers, which may not
have been enough. UNHCR might have also organized community meetings to announce the
decision and offered more thorough explanations of the reasons for the decision.
159 See “Services for Refugees” on the FMRS Web site for an annotated list of organizations that provide
services for refugees. This list provides only basic information and needs constant and regular updating, which
FMRS sometimes fails to do.
160 “Refugee Online: The Use of the Internet as a Source of Information and Communitybuilding
in Cairo,”
proposal presented at the FMRS Wednesday Seminar, 17 May 2006. For more information, email
[email protected].
56
UNHCR has a particular responsibility to coordinate efforts in this regard. 161 There has been
a longstanding
problem of communication between refugees and UNHCR, and the agency
needs to reexamine
the “fortress mentality” it periodically exhibits. UNHCR must assess
how to rebuild trust, communication, and relationships with the Sudanese asylum seeker and
refugee community. A communications strategy may include regular community visits to
evaluate needs and share information, the publication of frequently asked questions in
accessible and straightforward language, and taking account of the different languages
spoken by the various refugee communities. Regular examination and evaluation of how
information is publicized and distributed needs to take place, and this can happen in
cooperation with partner agencies and service providers. This, of course, requires additional
resources from Geneva, which may be difficult to come by, but it is necessary if similar crises
are to be avoided. The key is open and transparent communication with the communities
concerned. UNHCR needs to rebuild faith in its role as an agency that serves people in need
and not only the governments that provide funds.
The government of Egypt also has significant responsibilities in making known to the refugee
community what services it is prepared to provide. In particular, the government must work
to improve the flow of information from the policyformation
level to implementing bodies,
including schools and healthcare providers, and to cut back bureaucratic and feebased
hurdles that hinder access to these bodies.
Racism
Part of each party’s effort to disseminate accurate information should be to overcoming the
reasons people sometimes stay away from, for example, certain service centers for reasons of
assumed racism or selectivity. In this regard, Cairo’s Sudanese community has a significant
responsibility to ensure that accurate information is available to refugees, to dispel damaging
rumors and unrealistic expectations, and to attempt to break down selfmarginalizing
attitudes
and behaviors.
This, however, needs to be complemented by serious educational efforts aimed at Egyptian
society generally, to confront the racist attitudes demonstrated by sectors of the general
public and by Egyptian media, security forces, and police. Educational programs in schools
as well as public workshops and other educational efforts should aim at relaying information
on why asylum seekers seek protection in Egypt, the living conditions and hardships faced by
them in Cairo, and the historic relations between Sudan and Egypt.
It is particularly incumbent upon the Egyptian government to include refugee matters,
including refugee law, in its training of police and security forces. Educational institutions
such as the American University in Cairo can provide these services, as well as special
programs to educate the media and civil society. All need to work together to dispel racism
and resentment, in part through education about the struggles and rights of refugees and
asylum seekers. All need to work to create programs on international refugee law and on
international responsibility toward individuals who have lost the protection of their countries
161 UNHCR hosts a bimonthly
InterAgency
Meeting, where information is shared amongst serviceproviders
and partner NGOs. However, this meeting is by invitation only and does not include refugees. It is designed
for the service providers themselves only.
57
of origin.
The charge of racism has often been levied at the private security personnel employed by
UNHCR itself. It is incumbent upon UNHCR to ensure adequate training for its personnel,
even if they are formally employed by a private security firm. In the final analysis, UNHCR
is responsible for the treatment of its clients from the moment they first approach its offices.
Living Conditions
Both the government of Egypt and Sudanese asylum seekers see Egypt as a transit country for
refugees. They share a preference for rejecting longerterm
programs that may ameliorate
difficult living conditions with the expectation that, soon enough, refugees will be resettled to
another country. Experience has shown that relatively few are resettled and that the majority
has to resign itself to many years of life in limbo. Yet life goes on and families need adequate
shelter and food and children need schooling. They need a life as normal as possible even if
the legal situation is temporary and the future has yet to be resolved. This is the purpose of
the rights granted to asylum seekers and refugees by virtue of the 1951 Convention.
The daily difficulties faced by asylum seekers, recognized refugees, and closed files create a
situation that is untenable if it lasts for years. The government of Egypt needs to recognize
that refugees are a special population with special needs. The 1951 Convention and its
regional version, the 1969 OAU Convention, provide for a set of rights and privileges that
people must enjoy even as they wait to be repatriated or resettled. Different degrees and
levels of rights are provided for by the conventions, 162 and meeting those needs should be a
priority for the government of Egypt and for UNHCR.
In particular, the government of Egypt must facilitate the acquisition of work permits by
asylum seekers and refugees. It is not enough to say that refugees have a right to work, and
then to deny them permits. The ability to work legally would go a long way toward helping
this group be selfsustaining
and less reliant on the minimal aid provided by UNHCR and its
partner agencies. It would enable families to pay school fees for children and to effectively
provide for other needs. Legal work would also minimize the exploitation faced by many, as
they work “under the table” or in a shadow economy without any protection or recourse.
Most of all, the ability to work would make possible a life of selfreliant
dignity for asylum
seekers and refugees. Lastly, it is important to note that workingage
refugees number in the
thousands and would not significantly affect the government’s efforts to ensure employment
for its own citizens. For example, there should be no reason to deny a work permit for those
refugees who can selfemploy.
In Closing
Six months after the violent breakup
of the demonstration, the situation for refugees is as
difficult as it has ever been, and in some cases even worse. Many employers have dismissed
Sudanese refugees and asylum seekers out of a generalized fear of “trouble,” and youth
162 Some rights under the convention should be equal to those exercised by nationals of the host state, such as
elementary education, while others are to be enjoyed at a level at least equal to aliens in the same
circumstances.
58
violence in the community is escalating to dangerous levels. Other than shedding light on the
difficult situation that asylum seekers and refugees face in Egypt and highlighting the
importance of paying attention to this situation, the tragedy has changed very little on the
ground. The government of Egypt has not done enough to meet its legal obligations toward
asylum seekers and continues to relegate all matters related to refugees to UNHCR. UNHCR,
in turn, continues to implement its mandate in the same fashion, with few significant changes,
under the same financial and human resource constraints as before. The population of
refugees in Egypt continues to fend for itself, for the most part, dealing with the same
constraints, hostilities, and difficulties it has always dealt with in the effort to survive and find
some avenue for hope.
59
APPENDIX A
List of Protester Demands with Commentary
1. We, the Sudanese refugees in Cairo, fear that UNHCR or the Egyptian government will
impose compulsory involuntary repatriation to the South because we read in UNHCR’s
newsletters about repatriation how things have improved there. We have contrary
information and are afraid to return.
This point relates to potential repatriation to Sudan as a result of the January 9, 2005,
Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the government of Sudan and the Sudanese
People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), which formally ended the country’s longstanding
civil war. As a result of formalized peace, it is likely that formal refugee status will be harder
to access for southern Sudanese. Repatriation has become a favored solution for UNHCR;
indeed, UNHCR has asserted that it is now safe for many refugees and asylum seekers to
return to Sudan. This controversial repatriation program provides UNHCR aid to Sudanese
who voluntarily return to Sudan. Many southern Sudanese in Egypt do not, however, believe
that it is safe to return and fear being forced to do so, either directly through policy or
indirectly through lack of alternatives and unlivable conditions in Egypt.
In its earliest version, this option read, “The Sudanese refugees object to the UNHCR
program of compulsory voluntary repatrtriation [sic].” The version of the list released by
UNHCR states, simply, “Sudanese refugees reject any notion of voluntary repatriation.”
2. Because of racial discrimination and no protection from it, and lack of the right to work,
health, and education, we can see no possibilities of our integrating into Egyptian society,
even temporarily.
Local integration is the reality faced by the great majority of Sudanese refugees and asylum
seekers in Egypt. Many feel that this option is impossible because of the high levels of
discrimination and racism in Egypt, as well as extreme difficulties in finding employment and
education. There is also widespread distrust of the Egyptian medical establishment, with
accusations of black market organ dealing and malpractice circulating widely.
While Egypt was a drafting member of the 1951 Convention and, in 1954, the first Arab
country to welcome a UNHCR office, its signing of the document itself was contingent on
five specific reservations to the Convention itself: “article 12(1) (personal status); article 20
(rationing); article 22(1) (access to primary education); article 23 (public relief and
assistance); and article 24 (labour legislation and social security).” 163 As a result of these
reservations, Egypt has maintained the right to deny refugees employment, education, and
legal status. These measures have considerably challenged refugees’ ability to integrate into
Egyptian society. Egypt, while maintaining a large number of refugees within its borders,
163 Sherifa Shafie, “FMO Research Guide: Egypt—Needs and Responses: Policies Towards Refugees,”
Forced Migration Online, June 2005, available at .
60
“officially…does not support the policy of local integration as one of the durable solutions to
the refugee problem.” 164
3. We believe that UNHCR is making unfair distinctions between Sudanese refugees
according to their ethnic/geographical origins in Sudan.
Demonstrators maintained throughout the protest that there is a distinction between being
considered refugees (what they considered a unifying quality) and being considered tribes or
of different geographical origins (potentially divisive). While vehement about national
solidarity and “unity in the park,” it is quite possible that alternative motivations include
worries about a blanket policy for all Sudanese. While UNHCR distinguishes the South as
safe for return, it does not look at the Darfur region so optimistically.
4. We ask UNHCR to intervene on behalf of those refugees who have been arbitrarily
detained by police and seek their release immediately.
Egypt’s prison population quite possibly includes refugees, but information regarding who
and how many is difficult to acquire and access to this population is limited. UNHCR has
successfully intervened in a number of cases to have recognized refugees released, notably
following a January 2003 police operation dubbed Operation Track Down Blacks, during
which many Sudanese were arbitrarily detained. Stories of arbitrary arrest and detention by
Egyptian authorities are ubiquitous in the Sudanese refugee community.
5. We believe that UNHCR is obliged to consider each refugee’s prospects for the future on
an individual basis.
This point alludes to the fear that all cases from South Sudan will be rejected, rather than
considered individually.
6. We fear the application of the Four Freedoms Act, signed between the Sudanese and
Egyptian governments, because we do not know how it will affect the refugees who do not
have passports but hold refugee status IDs. There is no guarantee that it will provide us
access to work and education and may put us out of reach of UNHCR protection.
The reciprocal Four Freedoms Agreement, signed by the governments of Sudan and Egypt
before the suspension of UNHCR RSD interviews in 2004, creates allowances for freedom of
movement, residence, employment, and property ownership between Sudanese and Egyptian
citizens. The demonstrators were unsure of the effects of this agreement on their status or
potential future status. Many saw the act as jeopardizing their refugee status and opportunities
for resettlement. UNHCR has maintained that its function in Egypt will remain “as necessary
and required.” 165
164 Grabska, op. cit., p.74.
165 UNHCR, “Rumours,” op. cit.
61
7. We fear the presence of Sudanese National Conference personnel in Egypt and ask
UNHCR to ensure our protection from them.
In an October 30 response to the demonstrators’ requests, UNHCR Cairo suggested, “the
claim that Sudanese security agents frequently abduct and torture refugees in Egypt is more
selfserving
than anything else. Why would the Sudanese Government be interested in
southern Sudanese in Egypt who are only the victims of the 21 years civil war, which in any
event has now come to an end?” 166 There is evidence, however, of harassment of refugees by
Sudanese officials, including an incident at the demonstration itself. Protesters reported that
Sudanese embassy vehicles would regularly circle the sitin
and that representatives from the
Sudanese government entered the prisons where former demonstrators were held.
8. We request UNHCR register Sudanese asylum seekers immediately on arrival because
delays threaten their protection.
While unregistered in Egypt, Sudanese in flight are in danger of being forced to return to
Sudan without the benefit of recognition of their official presence in Egypt and the temporary
protection offered by a yellow card. UNHCR maintains that it is a matter of policy to register
asylum seekers as quickly as possible. During the three months of the protest, the UNHCR
office became more inaccessible. Many Sudanese report being turned away from making
inquiries of any kind at the UNHCR offices, before the sitin
and after repeated visits.
9. We call upon UNHCR to help us locate the missing. Sudanese refugees that we have
identified.
UNHCR is aware of some number of Sudanese who have left Egypt for such places as Libya
and Israel “in an irregular manner,” and strongly suggests that this is due to the “spouse
abandonment [which] is quite widespread within the Sudanese community in Egypt” and the
“lure of resettlement.” 167 However, it is widely suspected within the Sudanese community
that many of their kin have been victims of foul play, prolonged detention, human trafficking,
and other fates while in Egypt.
10. We implore UNHCR to reconsider their criteria for assisting vulnerable refugees, in
particular elders, unaccompanied minors, and women who are currently being denied
financial support.
In its response to this request, UNHCR said that it already prioritizes care for the most
vulnerable. Funding is limited, however.
11. Because most files that are now closed were closed when procedures for RSD at UNHCR
were faulty, in the interests of fairness, we request UNHCR to reconsider the files of those
Sudanese refugees which have been closed.
166 Ibid.
167 Ibid.
62
It is thought that RSD procedures were faulty because asylum seekers were not being
considered under OAU guidelines, which would give all Sudanese asylum seekers prima
facie recognition as a result of the situation in their country. The UNHCR deputy regional
representative stated that the agency only uses its own statutes, including the “extended
definition,” which mirrors the OAU guidelines. 168
12. Realizing that Sudanese refugees are faced daily with discrimination and violence and a
denial of their human rights, we urge UNHCR to pursue resettlement for as many of the most
vulnerable cases as possible.
Only a portion of refugees are accepted for resettlement. Refugees view this as the most
favorable option because local integration is fraught with difficulty and repatriation is viewed
by most as dangerous. Both UNHCR and media coverage tended to focus almost entirely on
this last point—the desire for resettlement—which undermined some of the legitimate
complaints put forward by the protesters.
168 Dessalegne, op. cit.
63
APPENDIX B
The December 17 Agreement
Cairo, 17 December 2005
UNHCR, considering the best interests of an estimated 20002500
Sudanese demonstrators in
Mostapha Mahmoud park, mindful of the hardship that the current demonstration is causing
to many persons, especially to women and children, and desirous of finding a satisfactory
resolution to the demonstration within the requirements of the law of the host country and the
abilities of UNHCR, makes the following offer to those persons taking part in the
demonstration as a means of resolving the issue:
1. Persons demonstrating in the park and named on a definitive list provided to
UNHCR by the leaders of the demonstration:
1.1. This offer shall apply to all Sudanese nationals present in Mostapha Mahmoud park
who are named on a definitive list drawn up by the leaders of the demonstrators under
the supervision of the UNHCR.
1.2. All individuals named on the list will be processed as follows:
1.2.1 All blue card holders will have their durable solutions reviewed according to
standard UNHCR criteria relating to durable solutions.
1.2.2 All yellow card holders (including those newly registered) will have their files
reviewed for any valid claims that qualify their case for refugee status
determination and will be appropriately counseled. If any yellow card holder
demands that refugee status determination (RSD) should be conducted in their
case, the individual will be provided with an appointment for refugee status
determination to be conducted. However, if such persons are refused status as
a result of the refugee status procedures, that individual will no longer be of
concern to UNHCR and will no longer be eligible for ongoing assistance from
the UNHCR.
1.2.3 All persons not registered with UNHCR will be immediately registered as
asylum seekers and issued yellow cards.
1.2.4 All persons with closed files will have their case reconsidered for refugee
status determination (RSD) in light of new circumstances in Sudan.
1.3. All recognized refugees and asylum seekers registered with UNHCR and holding
valid yellow cards issued since 1 June 2004 and who are named on the list will be
64
assessed according to standard UNHCR criteria for ongoing assistance (financial,
medical and education).
1.4. All persons named on the list will be brought as of 18 December 2005 to UNHCR in
groups of 20 persons to be scheduled for processing of their case. Priority for
processing will be given to those individuals who fall within UNHCR assistance
needs criteria (aged and infirmed, sick or disabled, single women, single parents,
unaccompanied children). Included in this criterion will be those persons who have
come directly to Egypt from Darfur.
1.5. All cases named on the list will be eligible for a “one off” financial assistance for
housing. This shall apply to any case whether they are a registered asylum seeker,
recognized refugee, closed file or have not registered with UNHCR.
1.6. Once the individuals’ needs are addressed as above, those who are able to make their
own way to their homes will then be able to leave the office. Those persons who are
not able to make their own way to their homes will have appropriate arrangements
made by UNHCR.
2. Voluntary Repatriation:
2.1. Sudanese refugees and asylum seekers who wish to repatriate can approach UNHCR for
voluntary repatriation registration, either during the processing for assistance or at any time
thereafter. Those registered with UNHCR for voluntary repatriation may be assisted to go by
plane directly to Juba, with charter flights organized by UNHCR once a minimum number of
people have registered. Small repatriation grants are also available. On arrival in Juba,
returnees are given food and other essential items.
3. Those persons not present in the park and not named on the list
3.1. UNHCR procedures allow any person whose refugee status application has been refused
and whose file has been closed to request the reopening of her/his file on a case by case basis.
All reopening requests must be in writing to UNHCR. Reopening requests are considered
where new elements justifying reconsideration of the case are submitted in the request.
3.2. Any person from Darfur previously registered with UNHCR whose file was closed may
approach the UNHCR office and obtain a Yellow Card.
3.3. Any asylum seeker issued a yellow card since 1 June 2004 may benefit from UNHCR
assistance so long as they meet the established UNHCR assistance criteria.
4. New Comers:
4.1. UNCHR will continue, as in the past, to register all newcomers
from Sudan and issue
them a Yellow Card with which they can obtain a renewable six month residence permit.
Registration will be based on a thorough interview which will help UNHCR to identify any
individuals with particular vulnerabilities which may require special assistance and/or
protection.
65
5. Consultations with UNHCR
5.1. For follow up to the problems presented by the Sudanese demonstrators in the park and
any other needs that may arise in the future, UNHCR Cairo agrees to hold monthly meetings
between its senior management and the demonstration leaders.
________________________
With the acceptance of this offer, the sit in will come to an end. The persons named on the list
mentioned above will be processed in the manner set out in this offer and vacate the park as
soon as the initial processing is completed and is in any event before 22 December 2005.
Signed by five leaders of the demonstration

Arabic Forum