Explanatory note about the precentage of the power-sharing in South Sudan

Explanatory Note

For the last few days, the issue of power sharing quotas carried by Sudan tribune report has occupied a lot of space in our discussions. Some have even gone to make a "Back-of-Envelop Calculation" that 40 Ministerial Posts (*) 25% equal to 10 - the exact number of the SPLM Leaders (Former Detainees. Whilst 25% asa "Divisor" is true, 40 as "Dividend" has not arisen anywhere in the proposals. It goes without saying that we have a sizeable constituency in the country and the fact that only 10 of us were incarcerated, does not necessarily mean that we are stagnant and are not growing at any rate.

But, by all acount, this debate is healthy because that is how democracy
should work in our country. I am happy that our resolve to share information with our people, is generating this thoroughgoing debate and scrutiny of us by the public. This alone is an achievement for democracy because we have nothing to hide and are keen on receiving criticism or even cynicism from our people, however sharp their responses might be; or regardless of stinging effects that these might caused. Observing the way Juba is curtailing freedoms, muzzling and gagging the media and press, and misinforming the public on the IGAD badly baked Protocol, our open interaction holds a promise to freedom of expression and assembly and the supremacy of the rule of law in ourcountry.

That said, however, I would like to provide the context for 25 percent proposal that you have debated exhautively in the past week. Well, it first appeared when we posted the document to a number of South Sudanese discussion fora last week. This was a response to IGAD Single Negotiating Text in which they asked the parties to respond to specific questions on the template (a kind of examination script, if I may say). As a matter of fact, all the stakeholders except the Fiath-based Group gave their responses in writing to IGAD. In this rejoinder, I will restrict my explanation to the power sharing proposals of the parties. In the interest of brevity, proposals pertaining to economy and security arrangements as well as other aspects of governance, will not be tackled here. I would summarize below the power sharing arithematic proposed by the parties and you have the liberty to cross-examine from other sources and make a fair judgment:

A) GRSS (a.k.a SPLM IG):

• Proposing the maintenance of the status quo with President Salva as Head of State and Government; VP Wani as the First Vice President and an accommodation of the SPLM-IO in the position of the Second Vice President - who could be Riek Machar or his nominee.

• Proposing the Allocation of 80% of power to themselves and leaving the rest of the 20% of power to be shared by the SPLM-IO, SPLM-FPD, Political Parties, etc.

• Cabinet size: 31 Ministers

B) SPLM-IO

• Proposing the President and one VP to lead the transition and that the President must come from the SPLM-IO which according to them is the "Aggrieved Party".

• Allocating of 70% of power to themselves leaving the rest to share 30% of power among themselves (that is, GRSS/SPLM-IG, SPLM-FPD, Political Parties, etc.).

• Cabinet size: 22 Ministers

• Note: As can be easily discerned, (a) and (b) are inversion of the other.

C) Political Parties

• Proposing the President to be the incumbent; VP to the Political Parties; Prime Minister to SPLM-IO.

• Proposing the allocation of 60% of power to all SPLM factions (SPLM-IG, SPLM-IO, SPLM-FPD; and probably SPLM-DC (?)) and 40% for the Political Parties - probably including the SPLM-DC.

• Cabinet size; 24 Minister.

D) SPLM-FPD

• Proposing that the President be the Head of State and Prime Minister be the Head of Government. These to be shared between the SPLM-IG and SPLM-IO depending on how they agree to share these positions.
• The position of VP to go to the Political Parties. Given the enormity of transitional tasks, the PM to be assited by two deputies.
• The leadership of the Transitional Government (President, PM, VP) should not take part in the immediate general elections after the transition.

• Accepting the SPLM-IG position on allocation of 80% of power to the SPLM but to be shared among the SPLM factions as follows:
• SPLM-IG: 28%; SPLM IO: 27%; and SPLM FPD 25%. The remaining 20% of power goes to the Political Parties including the SPLM-DC.

• Cabinet size: 35 Ministers. (The rationale is that virtually all post conflict experiences tend to prefer a Big Tent Approach and then tapers as elections determines the winning party. For example, Kenya started with a bloated executive following Kibaki-Raila election crisis in 2007; and then reduced to only 18 secretaries following the last election in 2013).


In the broader scheme of things, these are negotiating positions subject to invasive forces of bargaining and the give and take logic. Making a negotiating position only signals the intention to make a deal but is is not a final deal itself. However, parties are steeped in their positions at this stage, it should not be misconstrued as the way of inhibiting the progress.
Everything is up for discssion and even the context-specific matters of governance, constitution, economy, security, reconciliation and healing, transitional justice; are receiving elaborate attention from the delegates.

Furthermore, our call for reforms is not in any way dampened by making proposals on the running of the country during the transitional period. Rather, our limited presence in that Administration is simply meant to help in the implementation of those programmes as advocay alone does not necessarily lead to the realisation of political objectives.


Sept 1st – 2014
Nairobi, Kenya

Arabic Forum